COBRA: The Normandy Breakout

by Captain Stephen D. Borows One month after D-Day, Allied planners had envisaged controlling the whole of Normandy, including the major town of Caen. But by July, a million Allied troops were still bottled up in a beachhead only 3% miles deep that could be pushed back into the sea by the opposing 650,000 Germans. Only 17 Allied airfields were in operation in the beachhead area with just thirty-one fighter squadrons. And the airfields were subject to periodic shelling. General Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Forces in Europe, wrote to the Army’s Chief of Staff, General George Marshall, of his difficulties in achieving a breakout. He attributed his lack of success to three factors: One, the superior fighting qualities of the SS and parachute troops of the German Seventh Army; two, the Normandy countryside that was ideal for defense and precluded the massive use of armor and, three, the terrible weather in the English Channel which had inflicted horrendous damage on Allied equipment, had broken up the artificial harbors at the beaches and, in general, inflicted five times the damage to Allied equipment than the enemy had done on D-Day. Among other negative results of the weather, the Allied ammunition supply had been reduced by one-third. The Normandy countryside was an extensive patchwork of tangled shrubs and trees up to fifteen feet in height and three to four feet thick. These hedgerows, called bocuge. had been set by French farmers generations before to mark the boundaries of their fields and to protect their crops from the sea winds. The bocuge severely restricted mobility and visibility and, combined with the fact that few good roads existed in the area, gave the enemy great advantages in his defense. It seems that the D-Day planners had paid less attention to the Normandy bocuge than they had to the beaches. It would fall to American ingenuity and technical know-how to solve the problem of cutting through t h e hedgerows that imposed a style of war that the Americans were unsuited for, both by temperment and training. This was to be a war that demanded combined arms operations, something the American Army had not practised to Hit by an 88-mm antitank gun as it approached Avranches, an M4A3 of the U. S. 4th Armored Division burns in afield. any great degree prior to the invasion. A solution to the bocuge problem came from Sergeant Curtis Culin of the 2d Armored Division’s 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron. Sergeant Two Panther tanks of the Panzer Lehr Division knocked out in early July, 1944, when they attempted to counterattack. 24

Shaded area on map of France pinpoints tiny beachhead held by the Allies prior to Operation COBRA breakout. Several earlier attempts made little headway. Culin welded steel prongs to the front of Allied tanks, which allowed the tanks to dig in and uproot a portion of the hedges. The prongs were hastily welded up from steel girders that had been part of the German beach defenses. General Omar Bradley, 1st U. S. Army Commander, saw the Culin device on July 14 and ordered it mass-produced. During the breakout operations, three out of five U. S. tanks were equipped with the “rhinoceros hedge-cutter” which proved to work, providing much better mobility for the armor. Other improvisations, like external telephones on the rear decks of the tanks and infantry-frequency radios inside the tanks, increased the Americans ability to tight as tank-infantry teams. The leading tanks in the offensive were equipped with VHF aircraft-frequency radios, and every armored column had an on-station patrol of 3 to 4 P-47 fighter-bombers orbiting overhead on half-hour shifts, ready for immediate air strikes. Very rarely would the Luftwaffeever contest Allied air superiority over Normandy. This advantage would have a dramatic, though not decisive, effect in the breakout. The Germans, despite the need for forces to contain the Soviet armies in the East and to block Allied advances in Italy, had amassed 20 divisions to oppose the 34 Allied divisions in Normandy. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, Commander of Army Group B, would very effectively check t h e Allied advance and would prevent them from quickly breaking out onto the open plains where they could employ their armored superiority to advantage. On 28 June, the Germans divided their forces into two groups to accomodate their newly-arriving reinforcements and to meet the likely Allied breakthrough attempts. The logical place for a breakout was in the east, in the British Second Army sector around Caen. The ground there was flatter and more open, and a breakout there would threaten the communications of all the German forces in Normandy. Therefore, Rommel placed four corps under control of Panzer Group Westin the Caen sector. British intelligence, however, underestimated the depth of the Ger- - - oPariS 5

France I f” The Allied Beachhead July, 1944 1 w Spain - Scale,01 man front as well as the number of reserves the Germans would be able to commit to their area. Of the 13 divisions of Panzer Group West, 10 were concentrated on the 35-mile Caen front. Among these were five SS Panzer Divisions, including 250 medium Panther and 150 heavy Tiger tanks. Allied tanks were hopelessly outclassed by the Tigers. On 18 July the British opened Operation Goodwoodwith three armored divisions commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Richard O’Connor. The attack, made east of Caen, followed a massive, 2,100 plane air strike. The German defenses in the Caen area were organized in depth, with infantry forward and the panzers back, east of Caen. At a crucial moment of the attack, a Panther battalion of the 1st SS Panzer Division came up on the disengaged side of an armored brigade of the British 11 th Armored Division and occupied critical high ground. When the British brigade topped the open rise east of Caen, near Cagny, it came under murderous antitank and tank gun fire. The British pushed forward long after they had lost their initial momentum, and the 11th Armored lost 126 tanks in the first day. They lost a further 200 tanks before repulsing a counterattack that ended Goodwood on 21 July. Operation Goodwood was regarded as a failure by General Eisenhower because it failed to break out and to reach its tactical objectives. Goodwood did clean out the area east of Caen but at a cost of 500 tanks. To the British Second Army paradoxically, the bloody British repulse made the eventual American breakout possible by confirming the German hunch that Caen was the crucial area. This contributed to the weakness of the German front in the U. S. First Army sector where the Germans had placed only two corps. General Bradley was already planning his version of a breakout to be made on 8 July. He planned an attack on a limited front close to the western end of the beachhead area. It was to cut off the German troops and pin them against the coast of the Cherbourg peninsula. The plan was finalized on 13 July and Operation Cobra was to begin on 18 July. The area chosen for this attack was on Major General Lawton Collins’ VI1 U. S. Corps front of about 4.5 miles. General Bradley concentrated three infantry divisions (9th, 4th and 30th) 25 for the assault with the 1st Infantry and 2d and 3d Armored Divisions poised for exploitation and pursuit. Available artillery tubes amounted to 83 for each 1.6 miles of front. However, the key to Cobra was a massive aerial bombardment to saturate a zone of 7,000 yards by 2,500 yards. This area was to be pounded for three hours by more than 1,500 B-17 and B-24 heavy bombers dropping 3,300 tons of HE; more than 380 medium bombers dropping fragmentation bombs, and more than 550 fighter-bombers dropping 200 tons of HE and napalm. The purpose of this air strike was to severely disrupt, if not destroy, communications and create havoc in the German lines. Once the initial rupture had been made, the U. S. VI11 and XIX Corps would launch limited attacks to tie down the surviving Germans and prevent their redeployment to seal off the gap. The 9th and 30th Infantry Divisions and part of the 4th Infantry Division of VI1 Corps were to make the initial penetrations and secure the flanks of the breach, creating a “defended corridor.” The tanks would be sent in through this corridor. The motorized 1st Infantry Division, with part of 3d Armored Division, was to bolt through the hole and attack toward Coutances, while the remainder of 3d Armored Division was to make a wide end sweep toward that town and 2d Armored Division would sweep even wider to the southeast. The Germans were already in a much weakened state. In the fierce fighting since the invasion, Punzer Group West and Seventh Army had suffered nearly 117,000 casualties, but had received less than 12,000 replacements. Similarly, of the total 250 tanks lost during this period, only 17 replacements had arrived at the front. Allied air strikes had destroyed most if not all of the German reinforcements on their way to the front. Counting upon this sheer numerical advantage in troops and equipment, the Allies set the target date for the attack as 20 July, a two-day postponement from the original date. A further postponement until 1300 hours, 24 July, was caused by bad weather. That morning, however, Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, commander of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, decided that the weather was too overcast and unsuitable and cancelled the air strike. Unfortunately, the order did not reach all the air units and more than 300 bombers went ahead with the mission. The results were tragic. The bombers were given a clearly-defined coordination Doint. the road from St. Lo to Periers, but were allowed to bomb only on a north-south line, rather than parallel to the front which was roughly east-west. General Bradley had withdrawn his troops 800 yards from the marker road, but some bombs were released short of the aiming point and 25 Americans were killed and 131 wounded. The infantry divisions launched probing attacks after this abortive bombing, but achieved no significant results. Afresh start was ordered for 1100 the next day. Paradoxically, this miscarriage of the Cobra plan made the Germans overconfident; they believed they had thwarted a major attack, and subsequently relaxed their vigil. When the full air bombardment began 22 hours later, the Germans were doubly surprised. More than 4,150 tons of bombs were dropped and Punzer Lehr Division, which took the brunt of the air assault, ceased to function as an effective force. Lieutenant General Fritz J I * n h *. ) above, and at left and right, U. S 9 units surge into Coutances, ar 4 early oDjective of the COBRA breakout The- tank above is a howitzer-armec Sherman, favored for its 105-mm firepower and heavier armor. Light tanks like the M5A1 and Shermans with the more common 75-mm gun often facec murderous antitank fire from heaviei German guns in well-concealed defen. sive positions. 26

P \ t '

Bayerlin, Panzer LehrS commander, later said: "... By noon nothing was visible but dust and smoke. My front lines looked like the face of the moon and at least seventy percent of my troops were out of action - d e a d, w o u n d e d, crazed, or numbed. All my forward tanks were knocked out, and the roads were practically impassable." Once again, however, some bombs fell short, this time killing 11 1 American soldiers, including the commander of U. S. Army Ground Forces, General Lesley J. McNair, and wounding 490 troops. Although the bombings had disrupted a number of American assault formations, the attack went in on time. Remnants of the German units put up a stubborn resistance and the Americans found that their hoped-for "walkover" instead turned out to be a hard fieht.

tion Cobra Breakout f oA"ranches Scale of Miles

An American 57-mm antitank gun crew, mounted in a halftrack, rolls past the shell-pocked village church at Villeidieu les-Poeles. General Collins nevertheless decided to commit his armor and the tanks went in soon after daybreak on 26 July. Major General Edward H. Brookes, commanding 2d Armored Division on the left flank, took St. Gilles by the afternoon. They made good progress and, in fact, achieved the greatest penetration on VI1 Corps front. At the same time, the 1st Infantry Division, with Combat C o m m a n d B of 3d Armored Division under Major General Clarence A. Huebner, attacked toward Marigny, aiming to capture that town quickly and push on toward Coutances. The main attack was held up by stubborn resistance, and was finally blocked when the commander of the German 84 Corps, Lieutenant General von Choltitz, rapidly switched elements of 17 Panzer Division south to block the roads to Coutances. On 27 July, the rest of 3d Armored Divison was committed, but inadequate and bomb-cratered roads did not permit effective deployment. The initial Cobra forces of VI1 Corps had achieved only a disappointing and partial success. What they had done, however, was to attract the slim German reserves to their area from the British area. Thus, when VI11 Corps under Major General Troy Middleton began its holding attack on the morning of 26 July, it found little German opposition. By the 27th, the enemy had disengaged from the VI1 Corps front. Despite suspicion about a possible German withdrawal, the Americans were too cautious (after the hedgerow fighting) to prevent it. On 28 July, Brigadier General Isaac

D. White’s CCB, 2d Armored Division, was dispatched southeast to cut off the German retreat. The 82d Reconnaissance Battalion of White’s CCB pushed through the defenses before the Germans were aware of what was going on and seized blocking positions south of Coutances. Any opposition was eliminated by the combined arms team perfected in the hedgerow fighting -infantry-armor-artillery supported by fighter-bombers. By 28 July, General Bradley sensed that the door had been kicked open, and ordered General George S. Patton, whose Third Army was scheduled to become operational at 1200 hours, 1 August, to “supervise” the advance of Middleton’s VI11 Corps on the coastal flank. This command arrangement would establish a useful continuity between the exploitation of the Cobra breakout and future operations in Brittany. General Patton immediately took over. Even in his limited supervising role, he began to embellish the attack plan with his own brand of audacity. He withdrew his infantry spearheads and replaced them with two armored divisions, the 4th, commanded by Major General John S. Wood, and the 6th, commanded by Major General Robert

W. Grow. Grow’s force, attacking south along the coast, was to exert the main effort. M i d d l e t o n ’ s a r m o r e d division advanced more than eight miles a day against weak opposition. The main effort had now shifted from VI1 Corps to VI11 Corps as the flow of the battle overtook the attack plans. By the evening of 28 July, the German 84th Corps had lost effective control of its units. Most of the survivors were trying to escape and evade to the southeast. On the 29th, American fighter-bombers pounced on a traffic jam and destroyed more than 500 German vehicles. In the original plan, Coutances had been the pinnacle, but the situation had changed drastically. With the entire German Seventh Army on the run, and Coutances already taken by Colonel Bruce C. Clarke’s CCA, 4th Armored, on the 28th, Avranches had 28

These cavalry troopers attached to the 4th Armored Division get a welcome and a cool bottle of Normandy cider as they pass through Le Repas on the push toward Avranches. At left is an Ope1 Blitz truck registered to a German SS division. The cavalrymen are in M - 8 armored cars, mounting 37-mm guns. become the primary objective - it was the gateway to Brittany, and, in view of the resistance being encountered now in all other sectors, it was probably the only way out of Normandy for the Germans. On 29 July, with their sights set firmly on Avranches, 6th and 4th Armored Divisions again moved south, with the more experienced 4th assigned the task of taking Avranches itself and securing bridge crossings over the Selume River to the east. CC B of the 4th Armored advanced 18 miles on 30 July to capture Avranches, the vital point in the area for both attack and defense. It contained the only road south within ten miles of the coast; it was bordered on three sides by water; and it stood on a height of 200 feet that gave artillery commanding fields of fire overlooking the bridges over the Selume at Pontau-bault. This allowed General Patton, with his newly-activated Third Army, to push seven divisions over that bridge within the next three days and get behind the German front. The Cobra breakout was complete. First and Third Armies of General Bradley's newly-designated 12th Army Group could now pour through the gap and begin to end the war in western Europe. Overall, German losses in the Normandy campaign were 2 10,000 prisoners and 230,000 other casualties. However, neither the aerial bombardment nor the unplanned advance of VI11 Corps had succeeded in destroying the Germans in western Normandy. The success of Operation Cobra resulted from the Allied preponderance of force rather than a novel application of strategic airpower. It is interesting to note that the U. S. Army in Europe avoided the use of carpet bombing in its operational planning throughout the rest of WW 11. Strategically, however, Cobra broke the Normandy stalemate and prepared the way for the rapid liberation of Paris on 25 August. Just as at Sedan in 1940, when France succumbed to the radical German blitzkrieg tactics, it would be the speed of an armored advance and adept use of combined arms that would disorganize and confuse an enemy who was too large to destroy with ahead-on frontal assault.

ROWS is a 1976 graduate of Virginia Military Institute and was a candidate for a masters degree at the University of Louisville in 1983. He was an instructor and military historian at Command, Staff and Doctrine Department, USAARMS, Fort Knox from 1980, to

1981. He is a graduate of the airborne and ranger schools and the French Command School No. 4. He served as a tank and cavalry platoon leader, a brigade headquarters company XO, an armor battalion assistant S1 and assistant 54, and an AIT company commander at Fort Knox in 1982 and 1983.