Interoperability in NATO

Interoperability amongst land forces in NATO suffers from a lack of communications and equipment standardization. Complete standardization may be beyond the realm of reality. Hc-zpver, NATO land force commanders must resolve to seek their own mutually agreed upon operative solutions to interoperability needs. The U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Liaison Oflice in Cologne, Germany, publishes information dealing with U. S. and German Army interoperability.1 To satisfy a need for definition, the Department of Defense Steering Group on Rationalization/Standardizationz 3 within NATO agreed that the following definition for interoperability will apply: “The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.”4 It follows, having read the detinitions of rationalization, standardization, and interoperability, that interoperability comprises those actions needed to produce effective joint operations. AUSA News recently noted, “The need today for interoperability in NATO is obvious - 16 nations, 15 with military forces, pledged to the proposition that an attack on one is an attack on all, must believe that their forces can operate collectively, effectively. They must believe that their military leaders have developed the policies, engaged in the training, and accomplished the preparations essential to assure such a capability.”s Unfortunately, the 16 nations cannot be assured that such a belief is welLfounded.”6 Why? There are many stumbling blocks to effective interoperability amongst 16 nations who are also pursuing their own national interests while professing to be part of a defensive alliance. Major obstacles are equipment standardization and communications. “No nation has an adequate organization to coordinate the activities of its forces with those of its allied neighbors. No nation has designed its communications equipment to net with that of its allies.”7 Without equipment standardization, joint logistical resupply efforts would be minimal. As a result of lack of standardization of weapon systems and support systems, only 15-20°/o of associated supplies used by both (U. S. and German) armies are similar wherein some mutual support would seem possible when needed.* Certainly standardization of weapon systems and support systems are complicated by national economic interests and lack of a proven method to “do it together” in a cooperative defense-industrial effort. Until such efforts succeed to promote joint-cooperative results, the ability to net communications equipment amongst the NATO allies, the ability to provide a common logistical support base for common major weapon systems, the capability to effectively interoperate remains within avoid. Sixteen nations dedicated to a defensive alliance can only hope to achieve their common goal as a deterrent force if they are able to “interoperate” together. The present most effective means of coordinating US/GE command and control communications is thru a liaison team. The field solution has been for units to exchange liaison teams, utilizing their own national radios, national fre- 18

“... The LNO must be able to wear two hats in order to be effective. He cannot only represent the interests of his own force...” quencies and CEO1 equivalents. While this duplication of‘ effort may be a workable solution in some cases, it quickly becomes wasteful of personnel, equipment and available frequencies. Also, by utilizing a liaison team to coordinate command and control, we are adding another human link to the critical chain of communications between commanders. While adding a human link to the chain may be a disadvantage, the advantage is the capability to cover the gap of current communication difficulties through human understanding. Leaders of liaison teams need not only to have an adequate linguistic ability, but also be well versed in the tactics, normal operational techniques, and the commanders’ priorities in order to fully understand both units whose operations he is attempting to coordinate. This is complicated in that there is currently no methodical or progressive training program for liaison teams. In order to develop any degree of proficiency, liaison teams must be assigned in peacetime to live and work, for the majority of their time, with their host unit. When it comes to coordinating actual tactical operations, both US and GE forces proceed from different tactical concepts. While tactics will not be developed in detail in this article, commanders and G3s/S3s should be aware that differences do exist, and know how to approach these differences before conducting any joint ventures. It must be remembered that both US and GE forces in the defense have the same objective of destroying the enemy’s offensive capabilities, however different priorities develop different methods. Tactical doctrine is a living, breathing entity as new weapons, equipment, research, and changing considerations urge new emphasis and continuous development. GE defensive tactical doctrine, as is NATO’s, is based on forward defense. GE defensive doctrine calls for a delay followed by a defense on the FEBA and includes counterattacks when the probability of success is high. The main emphasis is to defeat the enemy far forward when possible, and, to be able to defend as close to the FEBA as possible. Our “new” U. S. Army FM 100-5, Operations, leads us away from the active dynamic defense to the AirLand Battle in conjunction with Division 86 transition. Such phrases as “interdiction targeting as part of an integrated effort to create time and space gaps,”9 “attacking deep is essential to winning; attacking deep and the close-in fight are inseparable,... and, extending the battlefield.”lO have become new guidelines for American operations officers. The whole purpose of coordinating tactical operations is to allow for mutual consultation and transfer of vital information. NATO cannot afford to have unit commanders fighting their own individual battles in their assigned sectors without regard for a combined effort. Through a total effort we have the option of creating a synergistic effect which will overwhelm the enemy. “We are taught that flank security, especially in the defense, means immediate contact with the units on our left and right... In the event of an initial enemy breakthrough anywhere along an extended front line, this sort of thinking has historically led to overreaction, often a panic to scurry back to anew defensive line and attempt to reestablish an unbroken front.”ll Through effective coordination and exchange of vital information, our flanks would be the strongest points on the battlefield. The ability of 16 nations to have plans that call for a mutual shoulder-to-shoulder defense is undoubtedly the major indicator of resolve within the NATO alliance. At the same time, it demands interoperability and prior coordination at the flanks where the two shoulders meet. Within their own boundaries, different national forces can utilize their own SOPS; however, at the international flanks we must resolve to coordinate our intentions with our neighbor. When we know beforehand what the other guy is planning for on his side of the fence we can best prepare our own plans. These plans should coincide in a synergistic effect as a combat multiplier to destroy the enemy. Flanks are made identifiable by boundaries and coordination/contact points. Boundaries, if properly selected, are on terrain which does not favor any major mounted approach and can be easily defended by friendly forces. Boundaries can be screened or overwatched without actual positioning of forces. At points where physical coordination is established, a checklist in the appropriate languages is needed to enhance understanding, to ensure that all mutual coordination is accomplished. In case of a threat from the enemy in the vicinity of the coordination/contact point, the senior NATO soldier present, regardless of nationality, should be in command. Boundaries at coordination/contact points need not turn into strong points. It is precisely at the flanks where, when needed and if available, we can direct the combat power of not one national force, but two! All available combat support (attack helicopter, close air support, artillery, air defense and engineers) and reserve combat maneuver elements of both forces can quickly converge, preferably under a unified command, to destroy the enemy. The boundary is a responsibility of both commanders who share it, and depending on the terrain and their assigned missions, they will jointly determine how best to handle it. The boundary may be screened at some locations, established by coordination/contact points at others, and in some instances may require the joint occupation of battle positions. Units should have knowledge of each other’s intentions, and be aware of the current situation on the “other side.” When a threat along the flanks is foreseen, commanders should have plans prepared and be ready to react if such a reaction is possible. If a flank is broken, the first reaction should not be to back up and reestablish the flank, but to destroy the enemy’s capability to carry on his intrusion any further. Any combat force operating on or crossing an international boundary should come under a unified command. Procedures for conducting such operations will have been developed in a combined Field Standard Operating Procedures (FSOP) document, which is coordinated during peacetime. Although different national forces may have diverse guidelines and principles for their individual employment, it is the responsibility of liaison officers (LNOs) in place during peacetime, to coordinate the procedures and incorporate them into the combined FSOP for use in war. The LNO must be able to wear two hats in order to be effective. He cannot only represent the interests of his own force, but must able to adequately portray the intentions and interests of the neighboring force to which he has been attached. A consistent and truthful information exchange is necessary. A combined FSOP that is exercised and revised as

.. We must have, within NATO, a renewed concerted effort to resolve to make interoperability a reality...” necessary, coupled with mutual trust for one another achieved through personal contact, is vital. Boundaries, while in effect delineating the command responsibility, have historically been a leadership problem. Hauptmann (Captain) i. G. (General Stam R. Ostermeyer, while attending the German Bundeswehr General Staff School in Hamburg and thru his studies, has been able to determine that - up to the battalion level - those leaders who have traditionally led from the front have been the most effective at avoiding danger on boundaries. It is at brigade level and higher, where leaders are positioned more to the rear, that danger presented itself most often.12 Ostermeyer offers these points as possible solutions to maintaining a secure boundary: 0 Move the boundary to other points when threatened to provide for a unity of command over the threatened area. 0 Put units sharing a boundary under a unified command. 0 Have quick reacting reserves available and positioned behind main forces along the boundary. Place counterattacking forces under a unified command.13 Moving the boundary may solve the problem of unified command. One questions, however, the practicality and the ability of commanders to move boundaries whenever they are threatened; not to mention that, by moving the boundary, we still have not removed the threat! The availability of quick reacting reserves emplaced along the boundary is a waste of forces that may be better employed elsewhere. Emplacing units which share a boundary and unifying the command of counterattacking forces who ’ must cross the boundary are certainly possible and even likely. The key, again, is prior coordination incorporated into a combined FSOP, and interoperability. SPRINGEX is an annual interoperability exercise conducted between elements of the 4th (GE) PunzepGrenadier Division (Mechanized Infantry), and the 1st (US) Armored Division. The first SPRINGEX was conducted in 1984 under a U. S.-developed plan. Subsequently, exercises have been held each year, alternating responsibility for planning between participating US and GE units. A major byproduct of the exercise is a “Combined FSOP”. SPRINGEX is normally conducted in the Spring at the Hohenfels Maneuver Training Area. The exercise has traditionally involved joint training from individual soldier to brigade unit level, and culminates with a joint field training exercise. This past year’s exercise, SPRINGEX 83, involved participating units from the 2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, and the 12th Punzer (Tank) Brigade, of the 4th (GE) Punzer Grenadier Division. The planning responsibility for the exercise rested with the 12th Punzer Brigade. Traditionally, the exercise was designed to devote four days to interoperability training and three days for a joint FTX. This year’s FTX was designed to explore methods of conducting joint defensive operations. There are many impediments within NATO to achieving interoperability. However, we cannot let these blind us from those actions that commanders can take to achieve the interoperability that they need. We are not living under the same conditions as existed as when the United Nations reacted to the North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK) on 25 June 1950, where, “it may be stated fairly, however, that some rationalization, standardization and interoperability had occurred through integration of US doctrine, equipment, armament and training.”l4 US doctrine, equip- 20 ment, armament and training is not, cannot, be the guidance for other NATO countries to follow. The ROK/US Combined Forces Command no longer has the U. S.-controlled rationalization, standardization and interoperability that was once possible. These three areas are now a national coordinated responsibility. We must have, within NATO, a renewed concerted effort to resolve to make interoperability a reality. To be successful, it will take a major effort, not only by the military leadership, but by civilians as well. Interoperability would not always mean utilization of the same systems, but that at least the major systems would be compatible as much as possible. Until the time comes when interoperability actually becomes a real capability within NATO, military commanders must resolve to seek their own operative solutions to interoperability within the needs that their subordinate commanders may jointly require with their partners. Commanders can achieve the coordination they need with their allies through dedication and by understanding the importance of interoperability. Footnotes 1For information write TRADOC Liaison Office, ATTN: ATFE-LO-GA, Box 1 15, APO New York 09080 and ask for a copy of Periodic Index Number 13. 2JCS Pub 1, DOD Dictionary of Mi/itury und Associuted Terms. Rationalization; Any action that increases the effectiveness of Allied forces through more efficient or effective use of defense resources committed to the Alliance. 3lbid. Standardization: The process by which member nations achieve the closest practicable cooperation among forces. 41bid. 5Defense Report, “Interoperability - The Glue of Coalition Warfare,” 61bid. ’]bid. *lst (US) Armd Div, 4th (GE) PzGren Div. “G-4 Work Group” study 9TRADOC PAMPHLET 525-5, U. S. Army Operational Concepts, “The IOIbid, pp. 23-24. “Peters, Ralph H. Jr.. 1st Lt., “Battlefield Initiative and the Small Unit,” I2MS., “Grenzen als Fuhrungsproblem” (Boundaries as a Leadership Prob- I3Ibid, p. 5. 14Cooling, 9. Franklin, “Allied Interoperability in the Korean War,” Milirory AUSA News, August 1983, p. 7. results based upon GE review of U. S. supply catalogs. AirLand Battle and Corps 86,” 25 March 1981, p. 20 (7). Army, December 1983. p. 50. lem). Maj. I. G. W. Korte (FRG), Amberg, FRG, 27 December 1983, p. 4. Review. June 1983, p. 27.

CAPTAIN RONALD M.

SCHROCK, JR. was commissioned into armor a s a distinguished military graduate from Northeast Missouri State University. H e is a graduate of the AOAC and has served in a TRADOC BCT battalion, a FORSCOM armor battalion and in t h e 1st Armored Division, USAREUR. H e is currently one of two liaison officers from the 1st Armored Division to the Bundeswehr’s 4 t h Panzer Grenadier Division. ‘L