Cavalry Action in Central America

Honduran cavalry defending the Amatillo Bridge used Israeli RBY armored vehicles and armed quarter-ton jeeps. Cavalry Action in Central America by Lieutenant Colonel Sewell Menzel and Colonel William Said On Friday, 29 April 1983, at 0200 hours, Farabundo Marti guerrilla forces numbering approximately several hundred men conducted a surprise night attack on the Salvadoran end of the Amatillo International Bridge separating Honduras from El Salvador (Map 1). This critical bridge carries much of El Salvador’s trade with Panama, Costa Rica, and Honduras, and was thus a prime target for the communist guerrillas fighting to bring down the government of El Salvador. The first volleys of rifle and machinegun fire cut down the sentinels guarding the bridge, decimated the Salvadoran customs officials, and wiped out the dozen-man security police detachment sleeping in their wooden billets. The commander of the police detachment was captured, tortured, and shot. While this was taking place, other guerrillas looted and burned the nine cars and commercial trucks waiting to be processed through customs that next morning. The occupants, caught by surprise and unable to fight back, died in their cabs and seats. The remainder of the local population, keeping low and under cover from the streams of bullets spattering about the bridge and customs houses, clustered in their adobe huts trying to avoid antagonizing the guerrillas. Some were not fortunate enough: eight houses were grenaded and burned out with Molotov cocktails. A few terrified people made their way down the embankments of the Goascoran River and crossed the semi-dry stream bed to safety on the Honduran side of the bridge. The screams of women and children were distinctly audible to the Honduran customs personnel who attempted to observe the obvious carnage taking place in the dim moonlight some 400 meters away. The Hondurans reported the events taking place on the other side of the river to their military district commander some 48 kilometers east, in the vicinity of San Lorenzo. He ordered the men manning the border post to occupy observation posts and previously prepared security positions to detect any intruders who might attempt to cross the bridge. Some three hours later, at about 0500, this small defense force came under intense rifle and machinegun fire as two squad-sized guerrilla units began working their way along each side of the bridge toward them. A third group was detected as it began to set demolition charges along the underpinnings of the bridge. The Hondurans returned the fire with rifles and pistols, killing two guerrilla sappers. The guerrillas on the bridge withdrew. At 0600 hours a demolition charge was fired and a six-meter span of the bridge fell into the river bed. The guerrillas again opened intensive fire and began to mass for a charge across the river bed with the objective of capturing the entire bridge. The fire was returned at every chance as the attack preparations built UP. Honduran Reaction The Honduran military district commander at San Lorenzo was kept 10 abreast of the situation and at 0620 ordered two platoons of light infantry from Co A, 11th Infantry Battalion, and two platoons of the 2d Squadron, 1st Armored Cavalry Regiment, to reinforce the beleaguered forces at the bridge. (A squadron in the Honduran Army is equal to a troop in the U.S. Army.) When the 2d Squadron, located some 81 kilometers from Amatillo, received the alert, the troopers were already at their morning formation and in less than five minutes, the two platoons, with full combat loads, were on their way. This force, basically organized for reconnaissance and screening operations, consisted of two Israeli-made RBYs, wheeled, armored reconnaissance vehicles, each armed with a 106-mm recoilless rifle; three additional Israeli RBYs scout vehicles armed with 7.62- mm machinguns, and three %ton jeep vehicles armed with M2 SO-caliber machineguns; a total of eight well-armed and highly mobile fighting vehicles - ideally suited for the action at hand. Traveling at a high speed by road, the Honduran cavalry force reached the Amatillo bridge in less than an hour. Upon arrival, the two platoons went into covered and concealed positions about 1 kilometer east of the bridge and south of Nancito Hill (Map Locator map, above, pinpuinis I V U I I l V ~ VI IW porder checkpoint attacked by guerrillas in the action described. Map 2 shows how Honduran cavalry and infantry deployed to pin guerrillas down, preventing them from crossing the river and destroying the bridge, a crucial link in the Pan American Highway. I 1 o O o ~ e = M M U R ' September-October 1984 1 1

2). Captain Carlos Andino - a 1981 graduate of the AOAC at Fort Knox, Ky., - made a quick reconnaissance to establish contact with the local forces and the two platoons of infantry from Co. A that had arrived a few minutes earlier from their base a short distance from the bridge. Both infantry platoons were under heavy machinegun fire and were unable to relieve the besieged bridge defenders. The guerrillas had now formed a 100-man force with the objective of storming the river bed to attack the Honduran defender's right flank (Map 2). Captain Andino, who had stationed himself with one of his motorized platoons, ordered mechanized units into the attack to relieve the infantry. Using the highway as a guide, the 1st platoon took the right (north) zone and the 2d platoon the left (south) zone. All vehicles opened fire simultaneously and the vehicles proceeded by bounds toward the river, closing the distance to the enemy. Automatic weapons fire was directed first at guerrilla machinegun nests, then against antitank weapon sites, and finally at groups of infantry. As the 106-mm recoilless rifles and SO-caliber machineguns opened fire, the scout vehicles moved to the flanks of the moving force to screen and provide early warning of any enemy movements (Map 2). A guerrilla machinegun nest in the former Salvadoran customs building was destroyed by a direct hit from a 106-mm shell at 800 meters. The fire from the recoilless rifles and the heavy machineguns was an unexpected shock to the guerrillas and they ceased fire as the Honduran cavalrymen concentrated on the machinegun nests. The force that had massed to storm the river, had sensed the slackening of their supporting fires, panicked, and began to run away up and over the barren, grass-covered hills. They were driven by Honduran machinegun fire back into the Salvadoran houses. By 1030, the Honduran infantry had worked its way forward and completed the relief of the customs and militia personnel who were almost out of ammunition. The Honduran military district commander had by now arrived and ordered that the bridge be defended at all costs to prevent further structural damage. A second order preserved Salvadoran sovereignty by directing that Honduran soldiers remain on their own side of the river. The Honduran commander believed that Salvadoran forces would soon arrrive to attack the guerrillas on their side of the river. He was wrong. The action had been so intense and prolonged that strict ammunition conservation was now ordered for the Honduran forces. Fire superiority had been gained over the guerrillas and their return fire was, at best, sporadic. Guerrilla sharpshooters and grenadiers using U.S. 40-mm grenade launchers tried to reverse the fire situation and killed a civilian and wounded three Honduran infantrymen. These were the only Honduran military casualties of the action. Honduran 81-mm mortars fired suppression missions throughout the afternoon and, early that evening, were reinforced by a three-piece 160-mm mortar battery that pounded the guerrillas into the night. Action Terminated The battle died during the night as the guerrillas began to withdraw through the hills to the northwest. The Hondurans were now able to take stock of the situation. In addition to the burned-out trucks, cars, and buildings, with the bodies of the slain civilians still in them, a dozen customs and police security officials had been killed and the bridge had been damaged. The bodies of 60 guerrillas were found in a draw where they had been partially consumed by gasoline fires. Honduran estimates of guerrilla casualties ran to some 96 killed with scores of wounded. The hard-hitting cavalry had saved the day. Some Observations The cavalry commander used the factors of mission, enemy, terrain, time and space to quickly size-up the enemy and then he took the initiative. 0 In encounter-type engagements, the action usually goes to the side that plasters its opponent with fire. In this case, the cavalry opened fire with all its weapons simultaneously and quickly gained fire superiority. 0 The Hondurans kept the structural base of the bridge (lower abutments and pilings) under continuous rifle fire and significantly reduced the threat of further demolition. The enemy snipers could have been better suppressed had the Honduran machineguns saturated their treetop hiding places. It was noted that the 40-mm grenade launcher gave off a distinctive pop when fired giving an alert soldier a second or two to seek cover. This time-lag was especially true at ranges of more than 200 meters. 0 Combat operations in Central America are no different than those in other parts of the world and they demonstrate that, in counter-guerrilla actions, cavalry forces employed in accordance with their capabilities, and resolutely commanded, can often defeat enemy forces many times their size.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL

SEWALL MENZEL was commissioned in artillery from the Citadel in 1964 when he received his bachelor degree in history. Two years later he transferred to armor and later commanded armored cavalry units in Vietnam. More recently, h e served for 2 years as Chief, Army Section, for t h e U.S. Military Group in Honduras. He is fluent in Spanish and conversive in Portugese.. Currently, he is assigned to' the DAMO-SSA, DCS-OPS, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

COLONEL WILLIAM SAID,

a cavalry officer in t h e Honduran Army, is a 1977 graduate of the Command and General Staff College, US. Army School of the Americas, in Panama. H e has been associated with the Honduran armored force since its formation in 1977 and currently commands the 1 st Honduran Armored Regiment. 12