The Division Commander's Eyes and Ears

The Division Considerable concern has been generated in the armor community by the Division 86 cavalry squadron operational organizational (O&O) concept which was approved by the Army Chief of Staff in August 1980. This O&O concept deletes the missions of guard and cover from the repertoire of the Division 86 cavalry squadron and includes the following: Detailed ground/air reconnaissance within, and to the front, flanks, and rear of the division. 0 Command and control liaison. Line of communication surveil-Screening. Internal surveillance to facilitate rear area protection (RAP) operations (rear area combat operations (RACO) and area damage control (ADC)). 0 Emplacement and monitoring of remote sensors. NBC rec0nnaissance.l Of all missions and tasks, its primary function is detailed ground and air reconnaissance within and to the front, flanks, and rear of the division. lance (assist troop movement). Commander‘s Eyes and Ears by Major Robert P. Bush This was the primary reason the chief of staff approved removal of tanks from the squadron’stable of organization and equipment cro&E). Another factor influencing the chief of staffs decision was the limited number of tanks and personnel available to equip the required Division 86 force structure. Given the absence of tanks in the Division 86 cavalry squadron, the purpose of this article is not to argue the pro’sand con’s of tanks in that organization, although there is actually sufficient historical precedent to present good arguments for either position. Rather, my purpose is to explain to field commanders of all ranks how the Division 86 cavalry squadron may be used to its best advantage. The Division 86 cavalry squadron remains a very flexible, highly mobile, and durable asset that possesses a significant amount of fire power. This asset, properly used, greatly increases the chance for sue cess on the battlefield of the late 80’sand 90’s. It’s organization was speclfically designed to be effective on Day 6 or 7 of the next war, as well as Day 1 or 2. The Division 86 cavalry squadron is shown in figure 1. In order to accurately discuss the Division 86 cavalry squadron, a short discussion of the Corps 86 armored cavalry regiment (ACR) is necessary. Just as the principal mission of the divisional cavalry squadron is reconnaissance, the principal mission of the armored cavalry regiment is to provide the corps commander a self-contained economy-of-force unit for covering force missions,’ which will attack, defend, or delay to provide battlefield reconnaissance and part of a security “umbrella” under which the corps commander may thrust and parry as he moves divisions in order to clearly establish superior combat power against the enemy’s first- and second-echelon divisions. The corps security “umbrella” will also include intelligence information from eche lons above corps and national assets. Additionally, the ACR may be used as a self-contained force to strike 13 deeply into the enemy’s rear areas. The ACR is not able to provide the corps constant 360” combat security. This limitation and the corps commander’s need to be able to quickly mass and disperse divisions clearly establishes two essential requirements. First, the corps commander must seize the initiative early by taking calculated risks and making justifiable tradeoffs resulting from expe rienced, astute risk analysis as he literally and intuitively “sees” the battlefield. Second, divisions (as a whole entity) must be able to move rapidly as well as quickly mass and disperse their brigades and battalions laterally, forward, and rearward. These are not new requirements, but within the context of the modern, lethal, and highly-mobile battlefield, their relative value and significance is greatly increased. The current operational and organizational concepts of cavalry resulted largely from these premises. Historical Background The division restructuring study (DRS) of 1976 was the h t step of the force modernization effort that resulted in the design of a force capable of success on the battlefield for the last 10-15 years of the 20th century. Structuring for the conflict in Viet-qpn caused the army to miss a modernization cycle. The most recent army reorganization had been in the mid-1960’s as a result of the reorganization objective army division (ROAD) study. The Division 86 project was initiated in September 1978 by General Donn A. Starry, then Commander of US. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Division 86 was not only intended to define and develop a remodeled mounted division, but to institutionalize a process to conduct periodic force reviews and design the needed changes of major division components. This process is a continuing function of TRADOC schools today, and just as the DRS of 1976, its purpose is to determine the best use of new weapons to fulfill the tactical goals of achieving maximum fire power at the critical place and time on the battlefield.2 The current O&O concept for the Division 86 cavalry squadron evolved as a result of the years of study described above. Combat organizations and tactics are basically functions of evolving technology and the enemy’s organizations, tactics, and evolving technology. B. H. Liddell Hart was years ahead of his time in 1928 when he wrote: -

CFV’r 1UH bined arms formations. These were usually called cavalry regiments, groups, divisions, or corps. Our Division 86 cavalry squadron enables the division commander to maneuver his heavy cavalry i.e. his armored brigades, rapidly and accurately, to the decisive point on the battlefield - the enemy’s flanks and rear. FM 100-5, Operations, June 1944, direded that all operations should be designed to destroy the enemy through aggressive, offensive action by rapid, deep, and violent attacks into the enemy’s flanks and rear.5 Our current FM 100-5, Operations expresses exactly the same philosophy as the field manuals of WW II.6 At that time mechanized cavalry was primarily a reconnaissance unit. “Mechanized cavalry units are organized, equipped, and trained to perform reconnaissance missions employing infiltration tactics, fire, and maneuver. They engage in combat only to the extent necessary to accomplish the assigned mission. “Reconnaissance units on reconnaissance missions contribute to the security of the main force by reporting the locations of enemy forces and by giving timely warning of ground and air attacks. Information and warnings are transmitted directly to units whose security is threatened and to higher headquarters. When opposing main forces close, mechanized cavalry may be employed on reconnaissance missions toward an exposed flank, used to maintain liaison with adjacent units, or placed in reserve.”’ The Battlefield The technologically sophisticated, highly mobile weapon systems that are being fielded will drastically change the conduct of future warfare, much like that which occurred when armies of the past abandoned their horses for mechanization. The impact of these systems cannot be taken lightly; the capability to move rapidly across terrain at high speed while simultaneously acquiring and accurately engaging targets places greater demands on the skill of maneuver commanders. Military operations, which previously occurred over days, weeks, or months, will now be completed with decisive results within a matter of minutes, hours, or days8 We must be prepared to fight battles of considerable movement, with violent and intense volumes of fire, which are increasingly accurate, sophisticated, and lethal. Opposing forces will rarely fight along orderly distinct lines. Rapid movement to concentrate and disperse will be the key to achieving superior mass at the decisive point on the battlefield. Distinctions between rear and forward areas will be rare. Air and ground maneuver forces; conventional, nuclear, and chemical fires; unconventional warfare; active reconnaissance, surveillance, and target-acquisition efforts, and electronic warfare will be directed against the forward and rear areas of all ornbatants. In order to win on the modem battlefield, division commanders’ decisions must be quick, correct, and rapidly disseminated. The reconnaissance and surveillance systems of modem cavalry must be capable‘of collecting and reporting critical information faster and more accurately than ever before. Battlefield reconnaissance cannot be sacrificed for the unwise or improperly-timed decisive engagement of the division cavalry. The modem division commander must possess the mental clarity to use his cavalry appropriately to help him see and control the battle’s ebb and flow. He must then rapidly deploy his forces accordingly. A significant battlefield decision that is withheld for a few hours may cause disastrous results when a force is opposed by an enemy commander who possesses the ability to quickly assess the battlefield and rapidly employ the mobility and firepower of his force. The problem of command and control on the modern battlefield is greatly exacerbated by what is currently labeled “battlefield clutter.” As can be clearly seen by views of the same brigade defensive area shown in figures 2 and 3, rapid movement of even a company-sized unit forward, laterally, or rearward through this brigade area would be difficult at best. Movement priority on routes and at checkpoints must be enforced, accurate navigation must be insured, and obstacles and fire plans must be mor-dinated. One possible solution to movement control problems for the division commander is using his cavalry squadron as guides, traffic control parties, liaison, and to reconnoiter and monitor routes within the division area. Employment The (O&O) concept for the Division 86 cavalry squadron is a very appropriate and precise explanation of how the division commander should employ his cavalry squadron. However, some of the concern voiced in the field regarding its use may be the result of incorrect extrapolation of peacetime training experiences to war. One significant example is the REFORGER exercise. It is a fact that peacetime constraints of money, september-October 1983 15 training areas, control, civilian population and traffic, maneuver damage, and time force the battlefield to be relatively linear and within strict lateral boundaries. The exercise is extremely valuable in many respects, but to a certain degree, battle outcome is the result of the skillfully applied art of gaming, whereby units are funneled into an artificially defined and controlled area to ensure that local fi-iendly combat power surpasses the enemy’s. The problem here is not really to find the enemy, nor to outmaneuver him, but within a division sector or zone, to defeat him in spottily isolated platoon, company, or battalion engagements by carefully using the rules of the game. The REFORGER scenario has not yet been redesigned to provide for utilization of a Division 86 cavalry squadron on a dynamic, wide, deep, and extremely violent battlefield. Division commanders really haven’t needed its reconnaissance or command and control liaison capability, particularly, after several days or weeks of heavy fighting. As a result, squadrons have, in recent history, been primarily used a? division minicovering forces, and to add significant localized combat power once a major decisive battle is joined. In some cases, the divisional cavalry squadron is apparently direded to engage in decisive combat because it seems to be considered a prefabricated combined arms battalion or task force. On the “nonlinear” battlefield, division commanders will use their cavalry squadron to find enemy flanks and rear support areas. While this is not anew mission, within the context of Division 86 it has very high priority. The squadron air scouts will help locate gaps, or seams, between enemy first echelon divisions laterally, and between first and second echelon regiments in depth. The air scouts will be able to identify locations of specific elements such as battalion or regiment centers of mass, command support elements, service support units, etc. The air scouts and ground scouts working together will reconnoiter the width, traffkability, and utility of a seam between enemy units, and very precisely guide maneuver battaliondbrigades to the enemy’s flanks and rear. This capability requires light, mobile, recon-naissanceoriented forces that will make every effort to avoid decisive engagement. However, they must be able to kill tanks in self defense and provide rapid fire suppression for security purposes. The M3 cavalry fighting vehicle (CFV) with its TOW and 25mm automatic cannon fulfills these requirements. Reconnaissance requires both air and ground scouts as there is a complimentary relationship between these two types of scouts. In those areas where one is restricted, the other is less susceptible to the given restrictive condition. Essentially the strengths of the two systems are the air scout’s ability to maximize speed and distance, and the ground scout’s ability to provide maximum and continuous surveillance for prolonged periods of time. Each system’s strength is its employment at varying distances from the main body. The air scout operates at extended distances and provides early warning, particularly during those periods when a vague enemy situation exists. Further, the air scout is able to find those areas which contain light or no enemy activity at a very low force-commitment cost. This results in a greater number of forces available to the commander for deployment against the critical areas in which the enemy main force is located. As the enemy situation stabilizes, or becomes more defined, the ground scouts work closer to the friendly main body to develop the situation in greater detail. The Division 86 cavalry squadron readily assimilates combat electronic warfare and intelligence (CEWI) and target acquisition battalion assets to provide accurate, timely, and relevant information to the division commander. Cavalry can therefore be cued by sensors, focusing its attention on specific points to confirm or refute the sensor’s information and develop it in more detail. Cavalry can cover areas where there are no sensors; or it can be sent, with or without sensors, to particularly critical areas of interest. The motorcycle platoon complements air and ground troops 16 by operating in isolated areas or restrictive terrain where enemy contact is not likely. The NBC platoon reconnoiters to locate, mark, and report areas of NBC contamination. The division can use this information to plan tactical maneuver, decontamination operations, and service s u p port operations more effectively. Aggressive reconnaissance efforts by properly-trained cavalry fulfills the commander’s need to “see the entire battlefield.” A current issue that will almost always start a serious discussion is the removal of tanks from the divisional cavalry squadron. This decision was intended to accomplish the following: To produce the most efficient combat power from tanks on the battlefield. 0 To remove the temptation at all levels of command to readily allow part or all the divisional cavalry to become decisively engaged. To help in solving the problem of a shortage of main battle tanks. Historical studies, studies of recent Middle East experiences, and the Mission Area Analysis (Close Combat, Heavy) all add significant credibility to the first two propositions. The third is intended to insure that available tanks are tactically deployed on the battlefield for immediate application of combat power, not diluted to division flank or rear security (screen or guard) missions. It has been found that tanks in a divisional cavalry squadron are employed in a nonfiring overwatch role most of the time. With the capabilities of the M3 CFV, the requirements within a division for tanks to overwatch scouts during a reconnaissance or screen mission,is greatly reduced. In these roles, contact will usually be with enemy reconnaissance elements, and, there fore, rapid fire suppression and the ability to kill a tank, should one appear, is required. A cavalry squadron can be reinforced with tanks (attached to or under operational control) if the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and resources available, and time (METT-T) die tate. Air cavalry and attack helicopter units also provide tank-killing and suppressive fires. Within a division, tanks are more efficiently used as offensive, attack systems rather than for overwatch. An additional factor involved in the tank decision is the intelligence pre vided by echelons above corps and various national assets. Divisions no longer need layered security forces on the ground in the form of a corps covering force and a division guard force. Large enemy forces can be located and tracked by electronic instruments and this data will be provided to corps and divisions. As described above, much of the security for divisions on the modem battlefield will be provided by dispersion, mobility, and timely intelligence, as well as a finely-tuned command and control system that provides the capability for a faster, more accurate decision cycle. It cannot be said that divisions will no longer need to employ an economy-of-force element. Since an economy-of-force mission is usually to attack, defend, or delay, it may be that a unit other than the cavalry squadron, such as a battalion task force, will be more appropriate for a specisc mission of this type. By definition, an economy-of-force element is “...the minimum force necessary to accomp lish a mission. Forces are normally economized to permit concentration of forces elsewhere.” If the cavalry squadron needs tanks to perform this or any mission, as dictated by the factors of METT-T, the division commander must task organize for that purpose, and tradeoff assets as he sees fit. Units should establish a habitual training relationship for this contingency whenever possible. Another role of the Division 86 cavalry squadron is for command and control liaison and surveillance or control of lines of communication. The environment envisioned for the (division) battle will strain command and control at all echelons to an unprecedented degree. To counter this stress, the Division 86 cavalry concept provides a command and control system that is: Personal. Responsive. Durable. Redundant to the inherent division system. Capable of continuous operations over extended distances and frontages. Very flexible. When the division commander is unsure of the location or situation of a major subordinate unit (for example, a brigade) the ground or air cavalry troops or the motorcycle platoon can be used to carry the division commander’s request for information or instructions to the subordinate unit. On a confused, “nonlinear” battle field, the cavalry squadron may be the only unit capable of getting a message through, or determining the situation by bypassing pockets of enemy resistance or friendly battlefield clutter. The use of cavalry for this role will be particularly important when the enemy jams command nets or uses chemical or nuclear weapons. Cavalry can provide more than crib ical command liaison and messenger service. It can: Physically guide maneuver units as they close with the enemy. 0 Assist in massing and dispersing maneuver units rapidly. Control routes and choke points to insure that navigation is accurate and priorities are properly observed. Help control the “battlefield clutter” problem by monitoring (and controlling) the movement of combat support and combat service support elements. In this regard, Division 86 cavalry is also specially suited for RACO and ADC missions. Summary As new systems on the battlefield become more deadly and mobile, the commander who first and best inte grates these capabilities can expect significant tactical advantage. The cavalry squadron is equipped and organized to aid the division commander in capitalizing on the effect of mobility on the future battlefield. U. S. Army reconnaissance doctrine is based on the requirement of the commander to constantly “see” the entire battle area. The armored cavalry regiment (ACR) is organized to permit the corps commander the means to observe and rapidly influence the corps battle area. The division cavalry orients within the division sector whereas the ACR is more heavily equipped to fight decisive battles in the corps area of operations. In closing, the Division 86 cavalry squadron is specifically designed and equipped and specially trained to conduct reconnaissance, command and control, and limited security func tions within, and to the front, flanks, and rear of the division area of operations. Its design is oriented for use on the “nonlinear,” cluttered, dynamic, and violent battlefield of the eighties and nineties. It performs its missions very efficiently and without siphon-ing off division combat power (tanks) that can be better used in the decisive battle. There is no other uniqs) specifically designed for the cavalry squadron’s roles; nor is there another unit in the division that can perform these roles with any degree of efficiency without detracting from its primary purpose. Footnotes 1 Operational and Organizational Concept, Division and Corps 86 Cavalry, pp. 31, U. S. Department of the Army, Fort Knox, 1980. * Division 86 Final Report, pp. 1-1 throbgh 1 3 U. S. Department of the Army, USCACDA, Fori leavenworth, 1981. The Remaking of Modern Annies, pp. 46 and 57, B. H. Liddell Hart, Little, Brown, and Company, San Rafael and London, 1928. 4 Ibrd. pp. 38 through 60. FM 1005, Operations. US. Department of the Army, Washington, 1944. FM 1005, Operations. US. Department of the Army, Washington, 1982. FM 1005, Operations, pp. 8 and 9. U. S. Department of the Army, Washington, 1944. Draft Operation and Organizational Plnn for the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnarssance System, para 3-2a. CPT(P) Novak. DCD. Fort Knox 1983. 8 Ibid., para 32b. lo FM 101-51, Operational Tmms and Graphics, pp. 1-43. l1 Patton’s Principles, pp. 92. Porter B. Williamson, Management and System Consultants, Inc, Tucson, 1979. l2 Ibid.

was graduated from USMA in 1972 and the Command and General Staff College in

1982. He served as a cavalry platoon leader, a cavalry troop XO and commander and was commander of HHC, 1st Bn, (RGR) 75th Infantry. He has served in regimental and division units in USAREUR and CONUS and is currently assigned to ‘the Doctrine Division, Command, Staff and Doctrine Department, USAARMS, Fort Knox, KY. september-October 1983 17