The Two-Man Tank — Its Fightability and Endurance

The Two-Man Tank -I Its Fightability and Endurance I by Robln Fletcher I from one to the other almost instrmta-neously. In practice, it will be difficult Captain Mike Newell, in his article in the March-April 1992 issue of ARMOR, sets out to demonstrate “the advantages and the feasibility of a future MBT concept with a two-man crew.” He considers that “any future MBT design is likely to place a reduced crew in the tank hull, mount an external gun, have an automatic loader and, because of the prolifem-tion of blinding battlefield lasers, depend on indirect optics for viewing... This is basic FMBT design used throughout [his] discussion.” He says that “a two-man tank is potentially more survivable than a three-man tank. Survivability is the critical issue... But] can two men effectively fight the tank in sustained combat operations?”

Captain Newell’s contention that survivability will be increased simply by reducing the number of crewmen and so reducing the vehicle’s armored volume should surely be accompanied by an acknowledgement that increased survivability will, in fact, be attributable as much to the adoption of the new turretless configuration as to straightforward volume reduction. The proposed turretless configuration will give a significant reduction in the MBT’s frontal area, which will then be able to be more heavily armored, with the vehicle’s components, such as crew stations, ammunition stowage and power plant, mnged in series behind it. If a front-engined hull layout is preferred, as it almost certainly will be, these components will be arranged in a different order, with the ammunition magazine at the rear of the hull for crew safety and easy re-plenishmen t.

There are other factors which will affect survivability, apart from configuration and volume, and these will be addressed later, but for the moment, let us address the key question: “Can a two-man tank crew maneuver the tank, acquire and engage targets, and exercise command and control of the tank (and tank unit for leaders)? And can a two-man tank crew remain combat effective during sustained combat operations?”

Maneuvering and Fighting the Tank In the case of a three-man, automati-mlly-loaded, turreted tank (e.g. Russian T-72), two men can handle the vehicle when it is road marching and maneuvering out of contact with the enemy, with one man driving from his position in the front of the hull and the other exercising all-around observation from the top of the turret. It will be even easier to march and maneuver a tank specifically designed for two-man operation with both men seated together in the hull and having “360-degree vision as well as duplicate driving, viewing, and weapon controls,” as was found necessary in the German VT 2x2 trials quoted by Captain Newell. For instance, the crewman driving a two-man tank will be able to reverse without having to be supervised by the other crewman, which is not the case at present in a turreted tank where the turret blocks rearward vision.

But things will become more complicated when the two-man tank enters combat and the three sepmte crew tasks of all-around observation, target engagement, and driving have to be handled by only two crewmen. These three tasks can be shared between them in three different mnge-ments and, due to the duplication of I their crew stations, can be exchanged for one m w to combine driving with all-around observation and command of the vehicle, and it is doubtful if the other crewman can be allowed to remain unoccupied until he undertakes target engagement. Therefore, the vehicle commander might make himself responsible for all-around observation in the normal manner and then go on to engage targets himself while his junior crewman would look after the driving and only assume responsibility for all-around watch while his commander was actually firing. Or the commander might confine himself to all-around observation and the command of his vehicle and hand off acquired targets to his driver who would have the assistance of an automatic target tracking and engagement system. An advantage of the latter arrangement would be that with both driving and gunnery being handled by the same crewman. he would be able to maneuver the tank rapidly when engaging from behind a crestline and reposition it immediately if an obstruction were to block his view of the target.

There are, however, a number of problems that should be acknowledged, of which the first is that the tank commander*s all-around obsem-tion will have to continue to be exercised from the highest point of the vehicle. If this is not done, the enemy may spot the external gun on its raised mounting as the tank moves cross-country before our crewmen are in a position to see the enemy. The enemy will then simply wait and open fue when ready and probably destroy our vehicle. No doubt, Captain Newell has appreciated this potential hm-ard and has avoided it by specifying that the all-around observation sensors ARMOR - are to be located on top of the external gun mounting.

A second problem will be that, although it will be easy to display both driving and sighting vision on flat screens in front of each crewman, it will be far more difficult to make all-around remote vision available to the crewman commanding the vehicle who will need to be given the widest possible field of view to observe the battlefield. Indeed, as already mentioned, the VT 2x2 tests found that “360-degree [remote] vision [was] required [not only for one but] for both crewmen.”

The commander of a present day conventional tank will fight “head out,” if that is at all possible, in order to continue to use his natural 150-degree wide angle vision. The all-around vision cupola, with its array of vision blocks or episcopes, gives him more or less the same ability while also giving him protection. If the introduction of battlefield lasers makes the use of indirect vision from remote sensors essential, he will only be able to watch part of the battlefield on a flat screen at any one time, and enemy movement and gun flash in other sectors will be likely to go unnoticed. No doubt, an automatic detection system would be able to draw his attention to enemy vehicles appearing outside his observed sector -and even identify them for him and then go on to track them - but how will he become aware of enemy bunkers and infanhy tank hunters outside his restricted field of vision?

Will this result in crewmen having to be surrounded by an array of screens giving full 360-degree coverage (as is believed to be the case, initially at least, in the German VT 2x2 trials vehicle), as in that case the volume occupied by their crew stations is likely to become excessive. Might crewmen not have to be given Helmet Mounted Display (HMD) and helmet position-sensing systems so that they can quickly and naturally turn their restricted fields of view to observe in any direction? -,,ay of TV screens needed for 360-degree viewing in German VT 2x2 test vehicle. A third problem will be that of the gun itself. Its raised external gun mounting will make it very prominent and is bound to attract enemy attention. No doubt, it will be able to be camouflaged, screened against thermal emission, and covered with radar absorbent materials, but an external gun mounting is not the most suitable configuration with which to start before applying low observable technology (see ARMOR, March-April 1992, p. 7).

A fourth problem will be that of protecting an external gun raised permanently above the hull of the vehicle. Although the barrel itself may be able to accept a great deal of punishment, protection will be needed for the breech and for the recoil system. Also, reloading a gun in such a position will not be easy, although the probable adoption of a front-engined hull layout with a sealed and vented ammunition magazine at the rear of the vehicle will certainly make it easier.

Continuous Combat For an Extended Period If the above-mentioned series of problems are acknowledged and can then be overcome, our two-man tank can certainly be fought for 24 hours continuously given night vision devices which are now available or which are in development. But can the two crewmen carry on beyond that period when they will become exhausted, or will they have to be removed from the vehicle and two fresh crewmen substituted?

Captain Newel1 sets out to support his two crewmen with all manner of new technology.and states that “with basic near-term technology improvement, we [can] give the crewmen of a two-man tank over eight hours of free time a day.” Frankly, I don’t believe it, This might be so in some outmoded 24-hour combat cycle in which tanks are expected to maneuver and fight by day and to use the night for rest and replenishment. But this will certainly not be the case in the immediate future, when full sets of night vision devices are made available and tanks afe able to maneuver and fight almost as well by night as they can in daylight. In this new environment, maneuver and combat will be almost continuous, apart from pauses of minimum length for maintenance and replenishment so that crewmen will be on duty constantly and get no rest to speak of. Should the tanks of a formation be held in reserve, and be dispersed and stationary, the most that can be hoped for will be that a proportion of the formation -perhaps every other vehicle -will be allowed to switch off and for crewmen to sleep in their crew stations. An infallible alerting ARMOR - November-December 7992 system will then have to be provided so that resting tanks can be contacted and again become available. operating under this pressure, a two-man crew will last for 24 hours -or 48 hours at the utmost

- before fresh crewmen will have to be introduced into the tank to keep it operational. If two two-man crews are available to man each two-man tank alter- “1 nately, the offduty crew will have to be carried in some form of light armored vehicle which will then have to meet up with the tank for a crew change to be effected. An advantage will be that all four crewmen will then be available to work on their vehicle together, doing maintenance or replenishment, but will the socalled “fresh” crewmen have been adequately rested and will they be able to reach the designated rendezvous? Captain Newell says that “extra crews and maintenance crew chiefs may not be necessary” but it is difficult to see how they will not be needed given the availability of night vision devices and the increased tempo of maneuver demanded by AirLand Operations. However, an alternative system of crewing might see a third crewman canied within the vehicle, not to take part in its operation but to change places with the other two crewmen when they become exhausted. If all three crewmen are similarly trained in the operation of their vehicle; they can change places every four, six, or eight horn according to a fixed schedule of rotation and each man will then have the “eight hours of free time a day” for resting and sleeping mentioned by Captain Newell.

Such an alternative crewing system can, of course, be rejected out of hmd on the grounds of reduced survivability. The tank would have to be enlarged to accommodate the resting crewman and would be bound to present a larger target, and three men would be put at risk in a larger crew compartment. But the inclusion of a third man would not be so contentious Although Sweden’s ‘S-Tank‘ is designed to operate with only two crewmembers. a third travels at the rear of the hull compartment to provide added endurance. if he were able to occupy space within the vehicle which had been provided for another purpose. For instance, if he were able to rest and sleep in a passageway running between the fighting compartment of a front-engined tank and an entrance in the rear of the vehicle, he would only be making full use of armored volume which was already available.

It is of interest to note that in the case of the Swedish “S” tank, which is the only tank in service currently operated by only two crewmen, a third crewman is, in fact, accommodated in the rn of the hull to extend the vehicle’s endurance.

Surely, the increase in survivability sought by Captain Newell has been achieved as much by the adoption of the proposed turretless crew-in-hull configuration as by a reduction in the number of crewmen, leading to a reduction in the vehicle’s volume? It is doubtful whether the term “external gun” should be taken to mean only one that is permanently raised above the hull of the vehicle because, in that case, it will be prominent and vulnerable and reloading will be difficult. Several other external gun mounting systems are now the subject of proposals, and these should be examined and considered as possible id-ternat ives.

Can only two crewmen fight such a vehicle? Yes, certainly that will be possible, particularly if they are seated in duplicate, fixed hull crew stations with “360-degree vision and duplicate driving, viewing, and weapon controls” and are given the assistance of “an automated acquisition and engagement system.“ With only two crewmen handling the three crew tasks of all-around observation, target engagement and driving between them, it is possible that the reactions of a two-man tank will be more rapid than those of a vehicle which needs a team of three to operate it. However, while there will be little difficulty in presenting driving and target engagement images on fixed screens in front of each crewman, giving them wide-angle 360-degree vision from raised remote sensors will remain a problem.

Can only two crewmen “remain combat effective during sustained combat operations?” No, that will not be possible because night vision devices will make 24-hour operation entirely feasible and AirLand Opemtions will demand a continuous war of maneuver. Either afresh two-man crew must replace exhausted crewmen or a third man must be carried within the vehicle to join in a crew rotation system, which will make two crewmen available to operate the vehicle 24 hours a day for long mtinuous periods. Robin Fletcher was commissioned in the Westminster Dragoons in 1941 and later served in the Special Operations Executive and 2d Special Air Service Regiment. After the war, he attended the technical staff officer‘s course at Shrivenham, spent two years on tank design at Chobham, and returned to Shrivenham to lecture on tank armament. After leaving the service, he raised crops in Kenya and cattle in Ireland. His articles on armor have been published in International Defense Review, Soldat und Technik, Military Technology, and other journals. ARMOR -