The Challenges of Change and Continuity

Today America’s Armored Forces - along with the rest of the Army - stand triumphant. The shattered remains of Iraqi tank divisions sent a clear message to both our friends and our foes - our systems work, they survive, and they are lethal. We demonstrated to a watching world what we have known for along time - our soldiers and equipment are the best in the world - our Army is trained and ready, and America’s armor stands at the cutting edge of our nation’s defenses. -.& As we celebrate this great success, let us not forget that every soldier, every civilian, and every family shares in DESERT STORM. This was a Total Army victory - Active, Reserve, and National Guard. DESERT STORM could only have been fought and won by an Army that is trained and ready to respond anywhere in the world. Remember also that this same Army has triumphed in three wars in the past 18 months alone - the Cold War, which we won without firing a shot, Operation JUST CAUSE, and now,

DESERT STORM.

But even in the midst of this unprecedented victory, we must now turn again to the task of shaping the Army for the future. Therefore, I want to spend a few minutes discussing the challenges the Army and our Armor Force will face in shaping the Army for the future. I want to stress the parallel themes of change and continuity - change in the environment, in our strategy, and in our forces, but continuity of purpose, responsibility, and capability as we move forward in a quest for anew world order. I want to begin by looking at DESERT STORM in the context of our changing national military strategy - a change that will significantly affect how we must shape the Army for the challenges of tomorrow. Changes The strategy has its roots in three fundamental factors. The fvst of these - and the most important - is the unambiguous success of our strategy of containment and the collapse of the Soviet empire. The second is the challenge of a world in a state of revolutionary change - a world alive with unprecedented opportunities but also rife with instability and violence fueled by the accelerating spread of sophisticated weapons. The final factor is, of course, the precipitous decline in resources our nation is willing to devote to national defense. Together, these factors define the evolving nature of the international system in the post-Cold War era. August 2, 1990, was a pivotal moment in our history, defining the end of one era and the dawn of another. It was on that day that the legions of Saddam Hussein launched their brutal aggression against Kuwait, threatening the very fabric of the international system. It was also on that same day, on the other side of the world, that President Bush announced anew nation-deterrence and colle&ve -security At the same time, in recognition o the changing environment, tht -.--.-- -1 _-_- ---- ---l---:- -- The new military strategy rests on the time-honored principles of f siraegy piaceb ncw c;rnpnasis on three additional concepts - each of which is of central importance to the armor community and must be understood by all Army leaders if we are to maintain a trained and 28 ARMOR - MayJune 1991

I ready Army in a time of great global uncertainty. First, as an element of our nation’s forward presence, the Army will maintain powerful forces - including armored divisions - stationed in Europe and the Pacific to anchor stability and to provide a credible capability to influence events in those critical regions. Commensurate with the declining Soviet threat, however, we can and will reduce our forces in Europe to a level appropriate to the challenges we confront. The heart of our new military strategy lies in the second element - the projection of power - swiftly and massively - to trouble spots around the world. To meet this power projection requirement, we must have a force of five fully-structured active divisions - including armor, mechanized infantry, light, airborne, air assault, and special operations units - that are coiled in readiness to deploy immediately and to fight and win. From this powerful grouping, we will tailor the package that is appropriate to the threat that we confront. Powerful projection also requires that the Army have the capacity to reinforce our committed forces. A critical element of this capability will be our Active Component divisions rounded-out by maneuver brigades from the National Guard. For more protracted or larger-scale conflicts in Europe or elsewhere, the Army will rely on its remaining reinforcement units - our National Guard combat divisions. The final aspect of the strategy is the requirement to reconstitute the force. Reconstitution - put simply - means the generation of additional forces from units that are either not fully manned or must be mobilized from scratch as we did during World War 11. In this regard, we are examining the concept of cadre divisions as one means of quickly fielding more forces. That is the essence of our new strategy - a strategy in which the United States Army and its Armor Forces will be at the very center. It is a strategy that recognizes that most potential adversaries have invested their resources primarily in their land forces - forces that alone can seize or defend territory. Only powerful land forces - including modernized, trained and ready Armored Forces - can deter, dissuade or defeat these enemy armies should the need arise. Desert Storm Seldom has a national strategy been more quickly tested by fire. For, even as the President was announcing the strategy, the Iraqi Army stood victorious in Kuwait and was poised like a dagger at the throat of the entire world. With virtually no American forces forward deployed in the region, the United States faced the monumental challenge of projecting credible, capable combat power from the United States and Europe. Beginning with the arrival of the first Abrams tanks in those early, uncertain days of the crisis, the United States and our coalition partners methodically built a mighty force that could withstand the power of the Iraqi Army. This same force - which included over 60 percent of our armor battalions and cavalry squadrons - would ultimately drive Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. Those who would contemplate challenging the United States would do well to remember the images of the fourth largest tank army in the world crushed and burning in the wake of the most overwhelming onslaught of military power in the history of our nation. The 100 hours of the ground offensive clearly demonstrated what power projections is all about. DESERT STORM was a triumph for our strategy and for the Total Army - a winning team of Active, Reserve, and National Guard. It was a victory for the American soldier - men and women who are courageous in war, compassionate in peace, and committed to the defense of our nation. It was a victory for the armor leaders - from the platoon leader to the corps level - who honed their units into the polished, razor-sharp formations that slashed through the vaunted Iraqi Army. Finally, it was a triumph for the Army throughout the world - soldiers, units, and leaders manning the ramparts of freedom from the DMZ in Korea to the Panama Canal to the North German Plain. Every soldier, every civilian, and every family of America’s Army share in this vlc-tory. Challenges We cannot afford to rest on our laurels, however, as we look ahead to a future we can only dimly see. We face many challenges that we must attack with the same resolution we displayed during DESERT STORM. The Army must continue our disciplined evolution into the force the nation will need to fulfill ARMOR - May-June 7997 29 our strategy in the 1990s and beyond. In the years ahead, we will shape an Army of 20 divisions - Active and Reserve - that will be the smallest since the eve of World War 11. However, this is the force that we must shape to preserve training, readiness, and, above all, quality - the essence of the force that fought and won in DESERT STORM. By the mid-l990s, we will have a force that is perilously small for a nation with the global interests of the United States - a force that is at an irreducible minimum. Yet, I believe that if we are imaginative, determined, and responsible, the result will be an Army that has the characteristics necessary to fulfill our strategic responsibilities. It will be an Army that is versatile in its ability to satisfy the wide range of requirements in multiple theaters with force packages a p propriate to the threats our nation will face. For the Armor Force, this means that your weapons and doctrine and your thinking must be applicable to diverse environments and threats, and you must be able to fight in a variety of force packages. Versatility also means that you must retain the ability displayed during DESERT STORM that caused an Iraqi general to label American soldiers as heroes - the ability to shift from being destroyers to being deliverers when called upon to render humanitarian relief. It will be an Army that is deployable in its ability to project power rapidly and massively throughout the world. This presents a particular challenge to the Armor Force. You must find ways to improve your ability to deploy rapidly. More sealift and airlift and prepositioning are only partial answers. We need to design our weapons so they are more easily deployed, and we must train for deployment. We cannot be content with rotations to the combat training centers or an occasional "Reforger"-type exercise. Deployability must become a mindset in the entire force. It will be an Army that is expansible - able to grow rapidly to meet a resurgence of Soviet adventurism or the rise of violence wherever it threatens our interests around the globe. This requirement means that you must ensure that the Active and Reserve forces are trained to common standards so that integration during mobilization can be effected quickly. The Reserve components have been essential to our readiness in the past and will continue to be a key element in the future. Finally, it will be an Army that is lethal and can fight and win on any battlefield at any time. The violence unleashed during

STORM only foreshadows our future capabilities. But you must recognize that lethality is not simply bigger, faster, or more modem weapons. Lethality also comes from the ability to generate combat power - the combination of leadership, protection, maneuver, and fvepower - in synchronization, so that the effect is devastating. Versatile, deployable, expansible, and lethal - that is the Army the nation needs and the Army that we must build. Your challenge is to forge the armored component of such an Army - an Army trained and ready to meet the military strategy of our nation. Continuity In the midst of these massive changes in the environment, in our strategy, and in our forces, we must retain steel threads of continuity - continuity of purpose, continuity of commitment, and continuity of capability that will preserve the fundamentals of the force as we move into a future we can only dimly see. These vital threads of continuity have their clearest expression in the vision of the Army of the future - a vision that each of us as leaders must share. It is a vision of a trained and ready Army, today and tomorrow, that can fulfill its strategic mandate anytime, anywhere. We can achieve such a force, and we will undergird continuity, if we are unyielding in our adherence to the Army's six fundamental imperatives - principles that are now f d y embedded in the Army at all levels. They are of singular importance to the Army and to our soldiers. As I discuss each of them, I ask that you consider the impact of these imperatives on your units and how you can implement them as the foundation of the Armor Force we will need in the future. The first imperative - fvst listed and fvst in importance - reminds us that we must maintain the quality of the force throughout the total Army. We have achieved levels of quality unprecedented in our nation's history. The soldiers, sergeants, and officers are the best America has to offer. The quality of the Armor Force had benefitted from the matchup of these quality personnel with quality equipment and doctrine. This must remain the standard for the future. Your challenge is to ensure that our soldiers continue to have a training environment that is unsurpassed in its ability to teach and motivate. You are key to bringing out the quality inherent in our young soldiers. We also must recognize that the entire quality of life is important to the readiness of the force. We 30 ARMOR - cannot forget that the family is part of that environment. We are a married Army today - far different from the Army I entered as a lieutenant over 30 years ago. Perhaps at no time in our recent past has the role of the family been more important to the Army's success - whether it be in routine garrison activities, rotations to the combat training centers, or mobilization for war. Our goal must be to provide our soldiers, civilians, and family members with a quality of life equal to that of the citizens they defend. Second, we must maintain an effective warfighting doctrine. At no time in our history has doctrine demonstrated its importance so decisively. AirLand Battle is now part of the lore of America. It was manifest in the images of armored cavalrymen spearheading the assault deep into Iraq; of tens of thousands of Iraqi prisoners plodding south past the burned-out remnants of a once-proud army; and of Abrams tanks and Bradleys racing north to seal the fate of the Iraqi Army. We must now ensure that our doctrine continues to evolve so that AirLand Battle-Future will be as effective on the battlefields of tomorrow as AirLand Battle was today. We must look to the special demands that our new strategy places on the capability of our forces. Our doctrine must now include not only the classical principles for combat, but also encompass the entire range of military operations from peacetime engagement to major war. While you can take pride in Operation

STORM, your challenge for the future is to develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures that will bring AirLand Battle-Future to life for soldiers in the Armored Force. Third, we must maintain the right mix of forces - armored, mechanized, light, and special operations - within our active and reserve components - that provide us the necessary versatility in implementing our national strategy. Our experience in the last 18 months vividly demonstrates the vital importance of combined arms. I liken this imperative to a kit bag from which we can draw out the right forces we need for the job - whether it is a minor regional contingency such as JUST CAUSE, which was predominantly light forces support by elements of Mech and Armor, or major regional contingency such as DESERT STORM that required the largest commitment of U. S. Armored Forces since World War 11. We must have forces whose capabilities range across the entire spectrum of conflict while we retain also the ability to tailor forces that can operate competently in joint and combined operations. Fourth, we must continue to train to tough, realistic standards - standards that are uncompromising in application and uniform across the entire force. The payoff for our investment in training was manifest in the destruction of a powerful army and in the low casualties our forces suffered. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the fate of the Iraqi Army was decided years ago in our combat training centers. One young armor captain underscored the value of such training when he stated emphatically that, "It was hard sometimes to remember we were really at war, because the drills and maneuvers were exactly the same as we had used at the NTC." We cannot afford to abandon this key to the confidence and success of America's soldiers. You must concentrate on the fundamental skills - such as gunnery, maintenance, and individual proficiency. We must continue to train soldiers, units, and leaders - this is the highest priority of the army in the field. Fifth, we must continue to modernize both our Active and Reserve component forces. In the sands of the Arabian Desert, we vividly witnessed the life and death difference that modernization makes. Thanks to American industry, new equipment was fielded rapidly, and older equipment modified quickly and expertly. And it did wonders for the confidence of our soldiers. During Christmas, I visited with a unit of the 1st Cavalry Division that had been upgraded with the MlA1. The soldiers could not say enough about how much better it was than the older version - whether it be firepower, accuracy, or chemical protection. As dramatic as the performance of the Abrams was, however, we cannot afford to become complacent. We must ensure that we stay on the cutting edge of technology. We must maintain the same battlefield advantage into the next century that let our tanks see and kill targets at over 3OOO meters; the edge that put sabot rounds through the defensive berm, through the front glacis, and through the engine block of a T72 before exiting the rear of the tank. The experience of one Iraqi tank battalion commander summed up the importance of technology when he described the impact such an advantage has on morale. He said that his first knowledge that the Americans were nearby came when the turret blew off the tank next to his - in a sandstorm with only 150 meters of visibility. By the time a ARMOR - 31 second tank beside him blew up, he decided it was time for his battalion to abandon its tanks and surrender. So he gathered his men together, raised a white flag, and waited. Today, the Armored Systems Modernization Program is key to developing the Armored Force for the Army of the 21st century that is second to none on the battlefield. It is vital to our future capabilities. This program symbolized the forward-looking approach that takes the changing environment into account. A common platform for our armored vehicles will enhance our effectiveness in every area, from maintenance to maneuver. We must aggressively explore new technologies in the areas of composite and other types of armor, countermeasures, and firepower. Additionally, we must continue to pursue the Armored Gun System in the near term, so that we can provide our contingency forces with air-droppable armored firepower. We must never be guilty of sending our quality soldiers - entrusted to us by the American people - into battle with outdated and overmatched technology. We should never have to say that a single life was lost because our soldiers were ill-trained or ill-equipped - either now or in the future. Finally, we must continue to develop leaders - officers and sergeants - who are competent in the art of war, responsible for their soldiers, and committed to the defense of the nation. Our leader development program must continue to meet the demands of our new strategy, and we must remember that the leaders we develop today will be our most enduring legacy to future generations of Americans - especially to those who will serve the nation in our ranks. I want to stress that our experience in the Gulf underscores the importance of sending our leaders to school. Combat experience should reinforce - not replace - leader education. These are the imperatives. For the Armor community, these imperatives must be far more than catchy phrases pasted on a bulletin board. They are the essence of your professional purpose. Your challenge now is to apply these imperatives without compromise and without equivocation. For they are the road map for shaping the Army that the nation will require in the tumultuous times ahead. It falls to you to ensure that the Armored Force remains at the peak of readiness during the critical years as the Army becomes smaller. We cannot assume that we will accomplish the reshaping of the Army quietly, without crises that will demand the use of force in some manner. Nor can we assume that threats will come with any warning. Conclusion There is a story that illustrates the importance of the imperatives and goes to the heart of the meaning of "Trained and Ready." Chapter one begins in June, 1950, with elements of the U. S. Army serving on occupation duty in Japan. Nobody expected a war - and nobody wanted one. Nonetheless, on 25 June, the armies of Kim I1 Sung invaded South Korea. As the spearhead of the United Nations' response to North Korea's naked act of aggression, Task Force Smith was scraped together from our occupation forces and dispatched to stem the onslaught. The task force had courageous men, but it was ill-prepared, udermanned, and ill-equipped - abandoned by a nation that had lost its vision of a trained and ready Army. As a result, thousands of Americans died, and our forces were nearly defeated by the Army of a backward and impoverished nation. In chapter two, our story now leaps ahead more than 40 years and half a world away. The soldiers of America's Army were again walking point in an international coalition. This time, they were trained to a razor's edge, led by sergeants and officers of unparalleled ability, and equipped with the finest weapons our nation could produce. Eight American Army divisions - spearheaded by cavalry and armor units - slashed deep into enemy ttr-ritory, and waded into the heart of the Republican Guards. They destroyed division after enemy division and thousands of Iraqi tanks, until no organized resistance was left. All of this was accomplished at the cost of fewer than 100 soldiers. Chapter three remains to be written, and you are the authors. You will determine what the Army of the future and the Armor Force will be like. You have a sacred obligation to the nation and the soldiers of the past - to all the Task Force Smiths that have gone before, and to all the soldiers who have laid down their lives. You bear the heritage of the cavalrymen who guarded the western frontier and the tankers who were the hope of the Western Front. Your lineage is steeped in battles from Normandy Beachhead to the Bdlge; from Korea to Vietnam. You must never permit our Army and its Armored Forces to be anything but trained and ready, or our soldiers to be lead by anyone but dedicated professionals who are competent, responsible, and committed. It is a task which you cannot and will not fail. 32 ARMOR -