The Criticality of Time in Combat

The French t heologian Louis Bour-dalone said, "There is nothing more precious than time, lor it is tlie price of eternity." It is curious that so few thoughts or philosophical writings are devoted to tlie advantages that a step ahead in time gives to the attacker in modern ground warfare. Examples abound, and Ilicre are a number of very successful generals in modcrn history who instinctively unclcrstood this valuc of time, i.e., whcn your antagonist is reacting to your moves rather than you to his, when you dictate maneuvers in time and tempo and he attempts to counter them too late and to no avail, whcn you get this advantage then you have him by the throat. The advantages of time and space accrue in geometric rather than arithmetic proportion, so that twice ahead in time is about four times ahead as a force multiplier. Raw numbers of units or firepower aggregates don't count, while time and space advantages - your tempo and not his - dominate and dictate. A look into recent history shows that Napoleon understood time and accompanying space or miiiiciiver to an extraordinary degree and at a very early age. I n liis classic It, 'I 1' iaii Campaign o f 1706-97, his first major command at age 27, he fought three major battles in ten clays and won them all, totally defeating three diffcrent Austrian columns while lieavi-ly outnumbered but, importaiitly, never at the point of attack. While lie repeated his favorite tactic over and over again in the ensuing years, by dividing or, more often, separating and conquering while outnumbered or, as Nathan Bedlord Forrest said, "Get there fustcst with the niostest," he never could fully explain his tactical genius. Napoleon's so-called "maxims" are olten irrelevant, or at Icast not persuasive, in attempting to discover the secret of his iiiilitary 'I... Rommel had the power to create surprise, to produce the unexpected move, reinforced by an acute time-sense and by the capacity to develop the highest possible degree of mobility.... I' successcs. His well-known prin-ciplcs of tlic direcfive, offertsiw, sirizpliciy, corzvol, etc., are so generalized as to be almost meaningless. Perhaps the closest they come to his tactical methods is in surprise, which he believes is important for the commander or a force that does not have combat superiority. This is achieved by speed, secrecy, dcceptiort and moving through seemingly impossible tcrrain. What he really said is that one must seek an advantage of time and position over superior forces if one is to prevail. Other generals understood these methods of time and tempo of tlie all-out assault against superior but uncoordinated forces, and the American classic is, of course, Jackson's Valley Campaign of 1862. Thcre, he Jcfcated three diffcrciit Union forccs in about ten days and moved over to the Battle of Second Bull Run wlicre his flanking attack turned tlie tide. As far as known, General Jackson Icft no serious military writings on his successes. It is unfortunate that lie was killed, because he was a professor of hoth history and mathenintics at the Virginia Military Institute and could have left a marvelous heritage of military thought. WWI produced no great commanders worthy of special note, while in WWII, Roninicl and Patton inimediatcly come to mind. Montgomery doesn't qualify because he relied on B careful build up, a cautious attack with considerable superiority of numhcrs. And with all of that, he was beaten twice, at Caen and at Arnhem. Eiscnhowcr did not exercise gcncral-ship but, rather, was the coordinator and dispenser of resources and was best at resolving disagreements among the Allies. Liddcl Hart says in his introduction to Tlte Ro111iid Papers that Rommcl had the power to create surprise, to produce the uncxpccted move, reinforced by an itcute time-sense and by the capacity to develop the highest possible degree of mobility. Probably the grcatcst modcrn insight of the value of a timc aclvantage can be dcrivecl from Rommel's account o f liis attack. breakthrough, and exploitation from thc Ardciines to the sea in mid-May o f 1040, as described in the first two chapters of 77ze Rorltntcl Pupcrs. 10 ARMOR - I

Here one sees the ultimate in audacious attack, in which Gudcrian's armored corps, most aggressively handlcd, ovcrpowcrcd and totally disorganized a much superior enemy force, even without total surprise. As its leading element, Rommel moved with such speed and daring that he surprised French units not once but often. primarily because he arrived ahead of time. He set the tempo of attack and hit before the time the French expected him. Unquestionably, Patton, Rommel, Gudcrian, and von Manstein undcr-stood the values accruing from advantages in time and space, but none really explained it adequately, and all seem to have becn guided more by instinct than hy a carefully reasoned process. Patton on many occasions drove his command to exhaustion when he sensed a time advantage and never permilled his enemy to have the hours or days lo mount a coordinated counterattack or prepare a solid dcfensive position. His most graphic expression of his philosophy was "hold him by his nose and kick him in the butt," but he also said that an ounce of sweat was worth a gallon of blood, meaning "drive your comlut units hard when you sense an advantage and save casualties." But lo return to Guderian. Rommel, and Liddcl Hart, Hart had this to say about time and tempo in the German 194) drive to the Channcl in S/rategr "The issue turned on the time-factor at stage after stage. French counter-movements were repeatedly thrown out of gear because their timing was too slow to ciltch up with the changing situa-lions, and that was due to the fact that the German van kept on moving faster than thc French (or for that matter, the Gcrman higher command) had contemplated. The "... To be specific, FM 100-5 does not tell the commander how to recognize situations where speed and boldness really pay off. In effect, what are your advantages when you begin to get ahead of the enemy in time and tempo, what are the signs and what do they tell you, and how should you, as the commander, react to them?..." French, trained in the slow-motion mcthods of WWI, were mentally un-fitted to cope with the new tempo and it caused a spreading paralysis among them. The vital weakness of the French lay, not in quantity or quality of equipment, but in their theory." Hart also had this to say in speaking of the ratio of troops to space: "The offense potentially carries one unique advantage, that if the attack is made unexpectedly and with sustained speed of follow-through, it may split a slow-responding defense so deeply and disintegratingly as to paralyze resistance, annulling the comparative balance of numcrical strength. The basic advantage of defense can only be ensured if it has adequate flexibility and mobility, the primary condition bcing that the defender has a clear understanding of the attacker's technique and tempo. The time factor is of crucial importance in rclation to the ratio of force-to-space." The U. S. Army Field Manual 100- S, Operations, modestly says of itself, "The fundamcnral mission of the Army is to deter war.'' Should conflict occur, FM 1W-5 is the Army's keystone "How to Fight" manual. It explains how thc Army must conduct campaigns and battles in order to win. It describcs U. S. Army operational doctrine involving maneuver, firepower and movement, etc. All other licld manuals stem from this key one, down to the ultimate FM 7-8, 77zc Zifaiztry Platoon, for guidance and doctrine. FM 100-5 uses such phrases as "Move fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly;" "Carry the battle deep in the enemy's rear;" "Speed is absolutely essential for success;" "A hold exploitation should always follow a successful attack;" "Move aggressively and boldly." All these con-ccpts are good when applied to appropriate situations, hut they are more in the form of exhortations or admonitions than theory or policy. To be specific, FM 100-5 does not tell the commander how to recognize situations where speed and boldness really pay off. In effect, what are your advantages whcn you begin to get ahead of the enemy in time and tempo, what are the signs and what do they tell you, and how should you, as the commander, react to them? A battalion or brigade CO must be well forward and should have taught his subordinates what to search for, what signs to look for, how to instinctively smell the beginnings of disorganization or panic in the enemy ranks. Some battle leaders have an eye for this, as noted earlicr, and some must be taught, but there is often positive evidence if one knows what to look for. More often than not, the first evidence of had morale on thc other side is thc dcfcction of lower-ranking soldcrs, or an evident desire to surrender after an almost token ARMOR - 11 resistance to modest combat pressure. The list of evidence is long; aban-duned equipment, gaps in minefields not fused and armed, road barriers not in place, campfires still burning, rations still being cooked, vehicles or couriers blundering into your lines, abandoned wounded or operational aid stations left behind, stacks ol ammunition or other stores, excess artillery ammunition remaining at empty gun positions, and more. One of the earliest indications that you are getting ahead of your enemy is the shelling of your last position after you have left it and are attacking your next objective. When the Enemy Disintegration: Some Indicators 0 Surrender after token resis-:ance 0 Abandoned equipment 0 Gaps in minefields not 'used and armed 0 Road barriers not in place 0 Campfires still burning 0 Rations still being cooked 0 Vehicles or couriers blundering into your lines 0 Abandoned wounded or operational aid stations left behind 0 Stacks of ammunition or other stores 0 Excess artillery ammunition at empty gun positions 0 Shelling of your last position after you have left it 12 enemy is dropping his shells behind you, it is a sure sign that his coordination is breaking down and that he doesn't quite know where you are. These signs, if recognized, let you, the commander, know that your opponent is not reacting to your currcnt moves but, rather, to your last moves and that you have a distinct time advantage over him. The importance o l advantage in the tempo of the attack is that the harder you press him, the greater becomes your advantage and, as noted earlier, it increases in geometric proportions rather than arithmetic. Numbers and firepower don't count. A tank company behind your enemy's brigade is equal to a battalion on his flank or two brigades attacking frontally. No modern army is trained to handle a relatively small but effective force in and among its rear area support, communication, and supply echelon. Nor are these logistic troops capable of any decent resistance. Quite the opposite, they most certainly will be thrown into a complete panic and either surrendcr or flee. "Devil take the hindmost" is generally the watchword of these troops when thrust suddenly into a confrontation with aggressive and unexpected combat formations. In reviewing FM 100-5 Operations, one can find almost no mention of the importance of time, except in the discussion of surprise (page 96). "To reap the benefits of surprise, therefore, the attackins commander must exploit its initial shock ruthlessly, allowing the enemy no TIME to regain his equilibrium." It continues: "...even when achieved, it rarely lasts," which is dead wrong and shows a serious lack of understanding. Surprise, when achieved, should be built on, and the cumulative effect of a time advantage increases as the tcmpo acce1cr;ites. lnterest-ingly enough, there is no mention of time in the very comprehensive index to the field manual. Again, in discussing surprise as a principle of war, FM IlW-5 states, (page 177), "It is not essential that the enemy be taken unaware, hut only that hc become aware too late to react eflectively." In other words, the attacker has an advantage in time, that time is working for him. There is a rather good discussion (page 121) titled "Time Available," which quotes Clausewitz and Patton on the importance of time in the attack and concludes with the statement, "Time is, therefore, vital to the attacker; he must prolong the enemy's surprise, confusion and disorganization for as long as possible." Unfortunately, this section is all too brief and is buried under some twelve pages devoted to The Tactical Offense, much of which is obvious and trite. We have been led astray by computerized war games and map exercises because the primary dctcr-minant of victory in these exercises is a preponderance of firepower with slight input on maneuver and on terrain and weather as it relates to firepower. It is almost impossihle to determine the values of artillery fires or close air support and totally hopeless to gauge the intangibles such as generalship, training, fatigue and the like. Some very sophisticated games attempt to feed in some of the above, but this is of very questionable value. The value of a time advantage, to my knowledge at least, is not attempted or even understood. The net result is that the side with the most firepower wins by attrition and this in turn relates directly to numbers. The media gives much prominence to the numbers game. And so does ARMOR - I our civilian and military hierarchy. As an example, a recent issue of Nclivsweek displayed a table of com-pariltivc numbers of tanks, artillery, fighter aircraft, and others, which showed that the Warsaw Pact outnumbered NATO by a factor of about 2-to-1, and the gloomy conclusion was, by implication at least, that NATO will be quickly defeated in a conventional war. niis is piwe IlOIISeItSe. In fact, an attack by the Warsaw Pact is very scenario-dependcnt. If the Pact was able to mount a full-scale attack on a Sunday morning without prior detection, NATO would have a dreadful time with or without atomic weapons. But such an attack represents a dreadful risk by the Soviet leadership because of the chance of detection and of the battle becoming a one-on-one attack. On the other hand, if we had five days warning and mobilized so that NATO divisions were in position and ready, we wcld surely achieve a standoff or stalemate and possibly a victory. Again, time is not critical; it is priceless. Furthermore, with a time advantage, numbers don't count. It is the mosl exciting, exhilarating experience a soldier may en,joy. It begets boldness and daring i d, as stated earlier, increases the relative superiority as the events accelerate and only ends when support is outdistanced. My own 3rd Armored Cavalry reached the Moselle River with one troop out ahead and actually captured intact the bridge at Thionville. The troop had to he recalled as no reinforccnients could join it, and the 7th Armorcd Division was running out ol' gas, tank by ti& bchind us. And significantly enough, the planning for I!.. a recent issue of Newsweek displayed a table of comparative numbers of tanks, artillery, fighter aircraft, and others, which showed that the Warsaw Pact outnumbered NATO by a factor of about 2-to-1, and the gloomy conclusion was, by implication at least, that NATO will be quickly defeated in a conventional war. This is pure nonsense." Overlord and beyond envisioned a progressive widening of the Normandy bridgehead in successive "all-hold-hands" advances. Unfortunately, the planners did not foresee the painfully slow progress in the hedgerows. But worse than that, they had no concept of the wild breakouts and confusion that followed. Third Army advances depended almost totally on availability of gasoline, whereas the German Army could do almost nothing to delay our speed of advance. Had we had the gasoline, Third Army could have breached the Seigfried Line easily, because it was almost unmanned. We had the time advantage, but lost it because we had outrun our support. In a war of maneuver, fuel is critical, while in a battle ol' attrition, ammunition is the decisive Factor. We had the firepower but lacked the POLand thereby lost our "time" advantage. It certainly cost the Allies six months of active warfare and un-conscionable casualties. We fell into a war of attrition in Octobcr of 1944 and never achieved any rcal success until the breakout in the spring of 1045, when we once again got moving and had "time" on our side. We must avoid battles of attrition - Caen, Anzio, Tet, Porkchop Hill, Verdun, Passchcndaele - the names are endless, and the results are meaningless and horrendous. We must seek the war of maneuver, we must break through, seek the priceless time advantage so that we are ahead of our adversary, he is reacting to our last move, our time advantage overcomes his numbers, we get one step ahcad, then two stcps ahead, then we have him by the throat, when boldness counts, and numbers don't mattcr, and we know and he knows that it is almosl over. We the Icaders, once this precious time advantage is gained, must drive our attacking units to the limit of endurance and beyond, because our adversaries are not only exhausted, but badly frightened and they are ours to harvest. The American soldier is not stupid, and when he collectively smells victory, he is incredibly brave and ruthless, and numbers don't count. lltis is victory! General James H. Polk was born In 1911 In the Philippines, where his father was an Army officer. He was commissioned in cavalry from West Point in

1933. During WWII, he commanded Third Army cavalry units and was decorated three times for gallantry. From 1955 to 1957 he was chief of staff, then assistant commander, of the 3rd Armored Division and served two years with NATO's land forces in Central Europe. He was commander-in- chief USAREUR and Seventh Army when he retired in 1971. I ARMOR - 13