Fighting to the Heart

The setting is the National Training Center. To the east of the battle position, a seemingly endless stream of Soviet tanks pours into the Valley of Death. As the US. forces engage with deadly accuracy, they are awed by the enemy’s total disregard of danger and destruction. It seems that for every enemy “kill” light that goes on, two more tanks appear and continue the drive towards the objective. Although this is a frequent Ft. Irwin scene, is this what we can expect from future, real-life enemies? Unlike the pieces moved around a wargame board, the forces in real battle are controlled by human beings. It is not the rifle that kills; it is the soldier pulling the trigger and the leader directing the fire. Therefore, it is the moral, rather than the physical, influence that is dominant in warfare. What exactly is meant by the phrase “moral influence in war”? In this context, the phrase does not mean the social mores of a society, but the moral forces that act on the will of the soldier and the effectiveness of the organization. Fear and chaos are certainly negative moral forces, while discipline and calm are positive forces. Fear erodes the soldier’s will and discipline serves to bolster it. Chaos and calm act similarly upon the control of the organization. Thus, moralinfluences are the forces that make effective action possible. In Men Against Fire, a study of the human element in battle, Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall states that, according to his battlefield research, less than one quarter of the infantrymen involved actively engage the enemy. This figure comes from WWII interviews with American infantrymen fresh from battle and may seem unbelievable when first read. To the mind accustomed to the rifle range and the rigors of peacetime maneuvers, this seems apathetic indicator of the willpower of our predecessors. If 25 percent were fighting, then 75 percent were more or less cowering. General Marshall, however, saw this as a normal reaction of human nature given the situation.’ According to General Marshall, fear and confusion freeze the actions of the individual soldier. It is the physical proximity of companions - and simply seeing that others are doing “something” - that makes effective action h a p pen. But the circumstances of the battlefield act to increase fear and confusion by isolating soldiers. For example, simple tactics tell us that when under fire, we disperse and seek cover. The immediate benefit of this is to limit the destructiveness of enemy fire. But an additional result is to create a feeling of isolation within the average soldier. He is suddenly unable to feel the security of human companionship. The fight is reduced to the perspective of his own life weighed against the enemy bullets. By acting logically to physically disperse, we diminish the moral strength of the unit. We also see this effect in the movement techniques of armored formations. As the expectation of enemy contact becomes greater, we disperse. The crew of an armored vehicle shares human companionship, and tank crews are thus more likely to fight than alone infantryman hiding behind a tree; however, the commander of a seemingly isolated tank must alone issue the order to “move out” in the face of a deadly enemy.2 This is not to say that dispersal under fire is the wrong solution. But it is useful to understand its moral impact. If it is true that confusion detracts from the activity of the soldier and seeing others taking action enhances it, then the leader becomes a vital element. In this context, the leader’s rank or position has little to do with it. The leader can be anyone who -through verbal command or personal intervention - spurs others to action. The probable outcome of an engagement may well hinge on the extent to which he is capable of accomplishing this.3 At the next higher level in the organization, we see that small unit leaders must also have direction from their chain of command to act in concert and towards the appropriate objective. Information flow becomes a key element in doing this. For higher commanders to “see the battlefield,” and for frontline leaders to act together for a common goal, they must be able to communicate. On a battlefield where there are heavy casualties among leaders and the situation is changing often, the information link is very fragile. Because of this, preparations for an upcoming fight are made as thoroughly as possible. Prior to an operation, commanders are briefed on the expected situation, the objective, and the means of attaining it. The leader ensures that all soldiers understand these points to offset the effects caused if he becomes a casualty. Once in battle, if the enemy force is encountered in the manner expected, the leader can be fairly sure what courses of action to take. Even if the designated leaders are killed and outside communications are lost, whoever assumes command should be able to deduce the proper action to pursue. But when the situation does not develop as expected and the enemy is met in a location or in a manner not anticipated, effective action becomes much more difficult. The leader is likely to find his unit in a vulnerable position, with the enemy’s disposition unclear and himself unsure about what to do. Add to this the loss of communications, or the loss of the leader, and the unit is not very likely to act effectively. Through the use of surprise, the enemy is able to disrupt the vital link between the leader and the unit. Once that is done, the individual soldiers are not likely to act effectively, if at all. If the disruption is sufficient to bring chaos to the organization, the unit will break up and no longer be of consequence. The heightened dispersion brought about by the increased lethality of weapons brings to light a principle that has always been true, but has been often overlooked. Battles are not won by killing, but by breaking the moral fiber of the enemy organization. Killing is simply a means of achieving the end. For Hannibal to break the Roman legions, he had to kill a great number of legionnaires. This is because the compactness of ancient formations produced a very strong moral force within a unit. Consequently, great- 46 ARMOR. The Magazine of Mobile Warfare er attention was paid to the act of violence than to the effect it created. As the lethality of weapons has grown, the ratio of captured to dead soldiers has increased dramatically. The increased dispersion within units has weakened the moral bond: while Hannibal killed many times more enemy that he captured, the WWII experience was the opposite. This phenomenon highlights the point that an army’s ability to resist depends upon the cohesion of its units.4 There is a limit to what we can do to counter the negative moral effects that we will find on future battlefields. Fear will bite into our will, and we do need to disperse when under fire. We will not always be able to anticipate the enemy. We can, however, use the understanding of the moral forces on combat organizations to our benefit. Future enemies may well exhibit the kind of audacity we’ve seen in Ft. Irwin OPFOR tank commanders. If a unit can remain cohesive under a hail of bullets, a forceful leader may well induce his soldiers to face any danger. But we can break down the link between the leader and the led and create emptiness out of strength by taking actions aimed directly at the moral fiber of the enemy organization. All too often, the planning of military operations concentrates on the geometric and materiel-related factors of battle, but ignores the moral forces. If we kill a thousand of the enemy, but his unit remains effective, we will have no victory. But if we kill ten, and break his unit’s ability to act effectively, we have conquered him. Bringing death alone upon the enemy will never defeat him. But breaking his ability to function as a unit will allow US to crush him. Certainly, violence and death are crucial in achieving this kind of dissolution, but by applying them in such away as to bring maximum chaos, we can make these methods of destruction all the more potent. To do this, we must plan to confuse the enemy with the unexpected and take advantage of situations which make him particularly vulnerable. By using reverse-slope defenses, small units can ambush and decimate considerably larger forces. The history of the Arab-Israeli wars contains many examples of armored units being destroyed by much smaller forces in this way, before the direction of fire could even be determined. Well-timed and well-placed counterattacks against advancing formations sow confusion and chaos and break down the enemy’s coordination. No unit is more poorly prepared to defend than one that is attacking. Striking an enemy force that has just assaulted an objective allows us to face a unit that already has its organization disrupted. The recent loss of leaders, the expenditure of ammunition, and the general confusion brought on in the assault makes it ripe for attack. Deception, though a seldom-stressed idea, can often provide the edge that wastes enemy strength and brings victory. There are numerous ways the enemy’s moral structure can be attacked, but the key is change. By changing the situation from what is expected, we force the enemy to change the actions he planned and prepared. His present courses of action become invalid, and he is forced to find anew, proper course amidst the fog of battle. The appearance of aggressors from unexpected directions and at unexpected times strains the already fragile line that separates a fighting force from an impotent, lifeless body. The demands of modern war pose a greater threat to our combat units’ moral fiber, but also provide new opportunities for attacking that of the enemy. The mobility of recent combat vehicles far outstrips the opponent’s ability to command, control, and communicate as he reacts. Therefore, the side which can use this mobility to create and take advantage of opportunities to disrupt the other’s control over his own forces will be able to steal the initiative. By destroying the vital link between the leader and the led, we render concerted enemy action impossible and with it, his resistance. Footnotes ’Marahall, S. L. A., Men Against Fire, The Infantry Journal, Washington and William Morrow and Company, New York, 1947, pp. 50-68. zZbid, pp. 42-43. 31bid, pp. 60-68. ‘Dupuy, Trevor Nevitt, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare, Bobbs-Memll and Co., Inc., New York, 1980.

Captain, Armor Fort Knox, KY.