Soviet Heavy Tanks

tank.

(T-85 is the authors’ hypothetical T-series designator based upon Soviet design-program history, and is not to be considered the valid designator for any actual future Soviet tank, nor is it to be considered an official or unofficial U.S. Army designator.)

The Western Threat to Soviet Armor During the late 1950’s and early 1960’s the major arms producing countries were all engaged in designing new main battle tanks2 A number of heavy tanks were produced in the Conqueror and M-103 designs. Though they were unsuccessful, due to the size and weight required to meet then minimum standards in western armies, theConqueror did cause the Soviets to recognize the distinct possibility that they might again face a “heavy” tank in a future war. This was borne out by the Soviets’ retention of the T-1OM long after the western heavies had exited the field.2 During the later WW I1 years and continuing to the present, both Soviet and western tank development programs have been seesaw affairs with first one side, then the other, fielding a technically-superior product. It would seem, however, that the western nations were faced with more severe funding problems than were the Soviets. It is a fact that a number of western tank development programs have been forced into oblivion because of funding restrictions.

Outcome of Western 1960’s Design Programs The American/West German development program fell on hard times in the face of Congressional budget cuts and a certain lack of cooperation between the two nations. As for the French AMX-30 program and West German Leopard Z, we would expect the Soviet tank authorities to have said that they could be adequately countered by the continued development of the T-34 series. Therefore, we would also assume that the Soviets believed that if the T-55 was slightly redesigned and armed with a hypervelocity smooth-bore cannon, the result would be an acceptable design that would meet the Soviet tactical doctrine of a “close-and-deliver” medium tank armed for high-intensity, close-quarter (1,000 meters on the average) combat. Given this philosophy, there remained only one concern, the BritishChieftain. The Chieftain’s Threat Though small in numbers fielded, the design concepts of the Chieftain that embodied heavy, well-sloped armor, and a big gun at the expense of mobility, certainly had to strike close to the heart of theZS-ZZ and T-10 designs. Of even more importance would be the British plans for obtaining a kill-to-loss ratio of 4:l with their Chieftain’s superbly-refined rifled cannon and battlesight system.^ Faced with a need to overcome growing numbers of stockpiled antitank missiles, a considerably greater battlefront density of enemy tanks compared to the war years, and now a tank specifically designed to deny them the advantage of their tank numbers and their powerful, though short-ranged cannons, the threat of the Chieftain must have been viewed as a very unpleasant fact by the Soviet tank designers.

The Soviet Requirement Faced with the prospect of going to war again with a very proficient medium tank design, whose tactical features, however, were threatened by the West’s development of consistently heavier and harder-hitting tanks, it seems reasonable that the Soviet designers had to look at producing a coun-terweapon. And, given the long-term developments in the west that were now producing the MI Abrams, AMX-32, Leopard ZZ and the Chieftain’s successor, Challenger,4.5 the threat became crystal clear: once again a Soviet heavy tank must be developed for the breakthrough role, if for no other purpose than to hunt down and shoot it out on a one-for-one basis with the western main battle tanks (MBT). For example, the West German Leopard ZZ, alone, points out the Soviets’ need for a new long-range, heavily-armored “animal hunter.”

Justification for Design-Why the T-64 As we noted in our previous article,’ we do not believe the design of the T-64 was a mistake. Many attributes of the T-64 fit the solution to the problems under discussion and deserve consideration.

The Chieftain was the single heavy tank project to go into full production in the mid-1960’s. By Soviet standards, it was a logical, simple design placing emphasis on the gun first and armor second, exactly as the Soviets would T-64 Figure 1. General Design Similarities of the T-64 and Chieftain (to scale) have done. Also, while simple by comparison with American and West German concepts, all of its features (with the exception of the cannon rifling) are now being adopted in other western armies, while high-technology proposals of the USlGerman MBT-70 have generally fallen by the wayside. Therefore, given the Soviets’ limited ability to produce high-technology, electronic-intensive weapons, and with a historic pattern of borrowing heavily from western design development, the importance of the Chieftain grows abundantly clear.

There are many similarities between the 1960’s Chieftain and the 1970’s T-64. They both mount large guns (with the Soviets maintaining the characteristic several-calibers lead), both use a track running on smaller than Christie-style road wheels with return rollers, and both are driven by a flat, opposed-piston diesel engine.5 Perhaps even more amazing is the remarkable similarity between the vehicles where hull configuration is concerned (figure 2). Both use a reclin-ing seat for the driver, allowing a severely sloped glacis for excellent ballistic protection.3. 6 The turrets, both semispherical to the midpoint (gun in battery) are virtually devoid of mantlets. The British completed the turret in a square pattern with internal stowage, compared to the round turret of the T-64 with external fittings.3.6 The panniers of both are also wedge-shaped, fitted with tool boxes or fuel cells. However, more impressive than any other example of parallel develop ment is the general size and shape of the vehicles. If the skirts over the suspension of the Chieftain are removed and both turrets traversed so the gun is trained over the sponson to face the viewer, the two vehicles are close enough in external appearance to be readily accepted as coming from the same family (figure 1). So remarkable is the general similarity that one is immediately led to ask if, as in the case of Chobham armor, the plans to the entire Chieftain tank were smuggled off at some point in the distant past, to be developed in the Soviet pattern shop as the T-64 at 90 percent scale to more snugly fit their smaller tank crewmen. It appears that at least some good amount of Soviet attention is paid to the British tank designers. So we must consider one more British design concept.

The Valiant Concept One important design consideration, which should not go unstressed, is the continuing developments by Vickers in Britain of combat vehicle standardization. The Vickers’ efforts to produce a standard tank chassis, which permits the application of various levels and types of armor protection and a choice of different caliber cannons, is simple in concept and apparently effective in practice. While we consider the design features of the forthcoming Soviet tanks and the possible transfer of concepts from the 1960’s British tank to the 1980’s Soviet vehicle, we might also consider the Soviet development of a 22 ARMOR march-april 1983 standard vehicle chassis onto which various armaments might also be fixed. Design Features for the T-85 Heavy Tank Though there are many rumors about Soviet tank design features some make sense, given past developments. We will endeavor to work through as many as possible while emphasizing the most direct possibilities in order to present a picture of the most probable vehicle (figure 2).

Longer hull-Very brief reports have been released suggesting that the hull of a Soviet tank now being tested is somewhat longer than the present T-64 and T-727.8 with greater spacing between road wheels. Although there is a possibility that this is an optical illusion, rumors of the armor, engine, and turret differences lead us to accept the lengthened hull as fact.

Armor-As we have seen in the November-December 1981 issue of ARMOR Magazine3 in the reprint of a Znamenosets article on the T-72, the current Soviet tank production models seem to be sporting some form of laminated armor on the glacis. This armor was rated against common steel armor and the British-developed Chobham armor, earning a “2” if steel armor was rated “1” and Chobham rated “3”.1° However, rumors from Germany still abound about a Soviet development of special, perhaps Chobham-style armor--” a development undoubtedly assisted by the Chobham sample smuggled to the Soviet Union.’* We are skeptical about an envelope of this armor on a future Soviet tank in the pattern of western armor because it stands to reason that a Soviet armor laminate on the severely reclined glacis would very likely give as much protection as Chobham. Thus, the heavy and bulky Chobham-style armor could be reserved for the turret face afid sides alone. Not only would this reduce the cost per vehicle, but it would also support the current discussion of Soviet tanks having been seen sporting a square, i.e., Chobham-style, welded turret on a n otherwise standard T-series production chassis,’3.14 which might weigh up to 45.8 tons.7.8, 13 If true, this would be a very cost-effective answer to the Chobham envelope armor problem.

Suspension-Rumors also abound about a new Soviet vehicle that is soon to be fielded with a hydropneumatic, variable-geometry suspension.15 Though such a development is possible, it seems unlikely that such would be the case.

Since the T34, Soviet tank hulls have been reduced in height to provide a lower overall silhouette. Therefore, we wonder if mor , passage of time, and component changes, such as the 14 shock absorbers on the T-64 have led some to believe that it was equipped with a hydropneumatic suspension. The high number of shock absorbers is best explained as being a requirement for a high-speed chassis, protecting torsion bars from heavy strain in high-speed, cross-country maneuvers under the assumed heavier weight of 48.5 tons.

Another suspension question concerns the wheels. Are the road wheels for the T-64 family rubber-tired, or steel-sheathed, as in the original Soviet KV series and the later WW 11 German Tiger IZ heavy tanks?, 16 If the latter, then we may see again that the T-64 may be a progenitor of a heavy tank. This assumption is supported by the fact that rubber tire failures on the road wheels of heavy tanks have been a persistent problem, apparently best solved in Soviet circles by encasing the rubber as an internal shock absorber in the wheel, even at the cost of reduced track life.17 The live track of the T-64, a recent addition to the Soviet tank family, seems to run on a standard Vickers-type suspension, with return rollers, that reduces the tendency for the track to be thrown at high speeds, or in sharp turning maneuvers. Another interesting question to consider is whether the new Soviet tank at its heavier weight will appear with the characteristic seven road wheels per side as was the case of the Soviet T-10 heavy tank of 50 tons2 Though only the T-10 had seven wheels (the rest of the KV family had six), given the rise in weight from the 38 tons of the T-64 to the projected 48.5 tons, we could readily understand the addition of an extra pair of road wheels to support the added weight. Studies of the seven-road wheel configuration or of the considerably lighter West German Leopard Z demonstrated that the additional pair of wheels reduced wear on the torsion bars and bearings, while extending the life of the suspension.’* This, in turn, might partially explain the lengthened hull.

Finally, we might consider the probability that, as in the BMP, the driver will steer the vehicle by means of pneumatically-assisted controls. Driver fatigue should be reduced, and considerably better vehicle control at high speeds and more nimble response in maneuvers should promote a higher level of mobility to the T-64 family. Engine-The most recent western publications list the T-64 as equipped with an 700-750-hp engine.l9 It is reported to be a 5-cylinder engine with opposed pistons,l3 which we suspect leads to a total of 10 pistons. Again, rumors suggest that a more powerful engine is in development. Speculations are that a turbine engine, recently observed tested in a wheeled vehicle,” T-85, Cast Turret (T-64 Derivative) T-85, Welded Turret (T-64 Derivative) may be the new 1,000-hp powerplant for the next generation of Soviet tankszo We are hesitant to agree. For example, we might consider the development of the Daimler-Benz MTU MB837, 630-hp, V8 installed in the Swiss Pz61, which saw service as the MTU MB838 in a 10-cylinder, 830-hp, 90”-V engine installed in the Leopard Z.4 By using the same power increase ratio, we could then see a 12-cylinder piston engine, otherwise basically unmodified, producing 1,080-hp. Or, applied to the current 10-piston 750-hp engine of the T-64, a jump to 983-hp with the addition of another cylinder and two pistons. We also wonder if, like the L60 engine in the Chieftain, the T-64 family’s engine is a development of the Junkers Jumo aircraft engine? In as much as the aluminum block engine of the T34 was a diesel aircraft engine,21 paid for the Soviet Air Force and adopted by the Red Army under what might be considered a “take the best available” argument, the possibility of another aircraft engine being added to the tank forces is logical. Though they may be suffering teething troubles similar to the 16 years of difficulties with the Chieftain’s L60 en-the Soviets have had a long time to get to know the engine. It also makes sense that a 1,000-hp engine would be more than sufficient to move a 48.5 ton tank at the same relative speed as the 1,500-hp turbine used to move an M1 Figure 2. The Hypothetical T-85 (less skirts) Abrams’ 62 tons.

Transmission-One of the major stumbling blocks to Soviet tank development has been the transmission. This problem has now probably been handily solved by the importing of five Lion (Italian-constructed Leopard Z) main battle tanks from Libya.149zi 24 “And i t holds the promise o f a suitably-sized caliber for future development of the aluminum-based HEAT round, where overkill is . . . an important factor in armor penetration.”

Skirts-Observations of Soviet field tests have apparently resulted in reports that forthcoming tanks will carry lightweight skirts13 such as those observed during the testing of an early T-64 hull carrying a T-62 turret.25.26 GunCince we have followed the possible wide-ranging influence that the superb physical characteristics of the Chieftain may have had on the Soviet design team, we should also consider the impact of the 120-mm LllA2 rifled cannon. Recent rumors about upcoming Soviet tanks (T-80 and follow-on) have stressed that the gun appears similar to the 125-mm cannon now mounted on the T-64 and T-72.” Though it is very probable that the smoothbore cannon will once again be employed for its high velocity, flat trajectory profile that provides excellent grazing fire (battlesight) capabilities, we must consider the possibility that the Soviets will again attempt to mount a version of their superlative 130-mm rifled cannon. And given the previous identification problems of specifying the T-64’s 125-mm cannon as a 122-mm cannon, it may just be that a new and larger gun is being fitted in succeeding vehicles. Since the mid-war years, the Soviets have either prototyped or fielded a 130-mm rifled cannon on four distinct chassis; the ZSU-130 assault gun, the SU-130 on the T-54 chassis, the T-141130 on T-10 chassis and the latest, the SU-130 on the T-62 chassis.3.27 Though each has apparently now been withdrawn from service, it is significant that cannons mounted as assault guns, like the T-62-basedSU-130, have routinely appeared a short time later in a turreted tank form. Thus, it is interesting to again see a corps gun (artillery regiment of an army)s. 28 mounted on a self-propelled assault gun chassis just as the 122-mm gun was mounted on the ISU chassis prior to fielding in the IS-ZZ heavy tank. Thus, all Soviet gun designs have slowly been creeping up in caliber to the present 1201125mm. But there are two schools of thought; the aforementioned high velocity, flat trajectory profile currently in vogue with American, Soviet, West German, and French designers, and the British concept of using a large high explosive squash head (HESH) round to batter the enemy tank to pieces. The former is undoubtedly well into its own where the Soviets are concerned about easy targeting and good penetrating power from close range on their great numbers of medium tanks.

As with its WW I1 predecessors, a new Soviet heavy tank would be faced with dozens of medium and heavy crew-served antitank missile launchers which would require a very effective HE round. Yet, at the same time, a replacement for the high-explosive antitank (HEAT)-armed BRDM missile carriers, which stand to be rendered ineffective as overwatch vehicles by the western use of Chobham armor, sees the necessity of a 3,000-meter (+) long-range, gun-armed tank with the high accuracy and hard punch to supplement the scores of medium, smoothbore-armed tanks firing at close range on the move.

“Finally, we might consider that unlike the gun-loading difficulties encountered in the T-10 heavy tanks the new Soviet auto-loading systems are already in service and certainly capable of handling the 130-mm round and propellant charge.” ~ Astute readers are going to object that mounting a 130-mm rifled cannon on a T-64 chassis at only 38 tons is too much to ask of such a vehicle, since jump dispersion would be enhanced to the detriment of fire accuracy. To this charge we bow. But, as we have noted, the weight of the upcoming series of tanks is soon to become 48 tons. Thus the weight factor seems to be adequately accounted for, just as it was in the entire ZSIT-10 family of heavy, rifled-gun tanks at 45-50 tons. What would seem to be a greater problem would be the larger turretand turret race-to accommodate the enlarged breech and recoil assembly. Again, we must remember that vehicles have been observed not only with a longer hull, but with an altogether different, box-shaped turret,l3.14 which we suspect might be longer than the current semispherical turret, at which point the characteristic Soviet turret panniers would be expected to be enlarged to accommodate a larger turret race. Finally, we might consider that unlike the gun-loading difficulties encountered in the T-10 heavy tanks the new Soviet auto-loading systems are already in service and certainly capable of handling the 130-mm round and propellant charge. The 130-mm is well tested and well received by those fortunate to have it. The PLO has testified to its worthz9 and even the Israelis have been rumored to have considered it for the principal weapon in their new Merkava MBT.4 As a weapon greater in caliber than the largest in-service western cannon, the 130mm could be readily adopted. And it holds the promise of a suitably-sized caliber for future development of the aluminum-based HEAT round, where overkill is such an important fador in armor penetration. Last, but not least, British contentions that a rifled cannon may prove to be cheaper in service compared to smoothbore cannons must be a contributing factol3O in the Soviet choice of a rifled cannon.

Sights-The continued Soviet developments in the laser optics field for their tank sights3 promises to deliver a Soviet tank equipped with analog computers: that can trade round-for-round with western tanks on acceptable terms, and provide long-range stand-off fire against hard-to-spot, crew-served antitank guided missiles (ATGM) positions.

Mobility-As we have noted, the engine and suspension seem to present growing evidence of Soviet intentions to field a vehicle with mobility characteristics similar to their triumphant T-34. If they are successful, the need for the SU chassis, as a base on which to mount a large antiarmor weapon on a platform possessing similar mobility to the current medium weight tanks, will have diminished. “ . . . the Soviet armament deuelop-ment teams deliver new equipment in far shorter research and development cycles than . . . the American experience.”

Where to look for the T-85 As we are well aware, the Soviet armament development teams deliver new equipment in far shorter research and development cycles than the average of up to 20 years common to American experience.’. 31 If the T-64 was strictly a new medium weight tank, we would expect it to be deployed strictly on a replacement basis for older equip ment. But since the T-72 w m s to meet the criteria for that role, being deployed in medium armor regiments of 95 tanks, we have to determine where and how a T-64 would fit in as a progenitor to a heavy tank.

Looking again at WW 11 history, we find that by 1943 the Soviets had developed specific heavy tank regiments having around 21 at a time when a medium tank brigade (3 regiments) had 6333 tanks. After the war, the size of Soviet tank units was standardized and the number of tanks per unit gradually increased to where a Soviet battalion having 3 1 to 40 tanks compares favorably with western units of the same size.8 This is about twice the number of vehicles in the Soviet WW I1 units. To apply this ratio to the heavy regiment, we would again reach a number of approximately 42 vehicles. Yet, if we suggest that a heavy tank formation is to be included again in the Soviet mobile division, we would face the problem of explaining the sudden appearance of the mysterious battalion-sized formations of 51 tanks that were assigned to Soviet motor rifle divisions around 1976.= Hand-in-hand with this development it was reported that high-priority units in the Group Soviet Forces Germany (GSFGI4 were being reequipped with a vehicle whose purpose was explained as a participant in a runoff for a successor medium tank. We wonder again.

Is it not possible that the T-64 was fielded, as was the T44, to allow the user units to become acquainted with the vehicle family they were soon to use? Is it not possible that the units receiving the new T-64 tanks were indeed specially selected units to be trained and equipped, not for the role of tank replacement battalion or artillery overrun battalion,= but as a new heavy tank battalion to overwatch the motor rifle division and assist it in achieving the breakthrough into which highly mobile tank divisions would cascade into the rear of the Allied lines? If this is true, then we have reason for a “failure” like the T-64 to be placed with Soviet units in Germany, while never being seen overseas. We believe that just as our forces are working up with the initial production M1 Abrams in West Germany in 1982, the Soviets are working up with the initial models of their soon-to-arrive heavy tanks, the T-64185. The only difference is, they have been training since 1976. The authors wish to atend a special note of thanks to authors Steve Zaloga, James Grandsen, James Steuard and their associates. Their meticulous research and detailed reporting of armor from WW ZZ to the present, have more than once set us thinking along a new direction. Though we assume fill re-References lBurniece, J. R. and Hoven, P. A.; “Soviet Armor-Past and Present,” ARMOR, July-August 1981, Volume XC, No. 4. FOSS,

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34“Soviets Add New Battalion,” Strategy and Tactics Magazine, No. 65, November-December 1977. spom assun to ack could velopc PAUL A. HOVEN served as a combat assault helicopter pilot and flight commander in Cambodia and Vietnam with the 9th Infantry Division, achieving the rank of chief warrant officer. Upon return, he completed his studies at the University of Minnesota and Mankato St at e University , graduating with a B.S. in Political Science and Education in 1973. Mr. Hoven is currently a weapons analyst and reasearcher with Summit Simulations, Inc., where he is involved in the design of tactical trainina systems.