The New Night Fighter

The New N by Major Jam ally, the solution to this problem is improved self-confidence. To achieve this we must first indoctrinate our soldiers. Secondly, we must condition them and, finally, we must refine their fighting skills through realistic training. Indoctrination. We must instill in each American soldier the belief that he is an unbeatable opponent at night. Basic to this psychology is the contention that in night combat, the soldier will naturally assume one of two character roles. He will see himself as either the hunter or hunted. The purpose of our instruction should be to imbue his character with the qualities of the hunter. If we are successful, the soldier will imitate, in movement and thought, the aggressive animal that stalks its prey at night.

Conditioning. War is a 24-hour-a-day reality. Normally, half of that period occurs during darkness, and darkness is normally associated with sleep. Leaders, therefore, must be prepared to deal with problems relating to acute loss of sleep. Unfortunately, too many leaders dismiss the cumulative effect of sleep loss. They realize too late that without adequate rest, the body and mind lack an essential ingredient that supports rational judgment, endurance, and courageous performance in combat. One solution to this problem is to ght Fighter!s Henderson change the soldier’s sleeping habits. In some practical way, the individual should be conditioned to sleep shorter periods. In doing so, however, he must be allowed more than one sleep period in a 24-hour day. For example, an 8-hour on and 4-hour off workhest cycle over a 12-hour period will afford adequate rest. By following such a schedule, the unit will be able to operate continuously for several weeks. Other work/ rest schedules are also acceptable, depending on the type of tasks being performed.

The entire unit cannot sleep at the same time. Work and rest must be arranged so that at least two, and preferably three, crewmen of a tank are awake and working at all times. Because of the necessity to complete the rotation during a 12-hour period, there will be times when one member of the crew will be resting with three working. At other times, there will be two’ resting and two working. The key is that the same individual should be scheduled to sleep at the same time during every 12-hour period. And, barring combat, the individual should be required to sleep during his time off. This will be a difficult challenge for frontline leaders. Sleep periods will be missed. Sleep periods will be interchanged among crewmen, or dismissed with m h o apathy. If these violations persist, the end result will be fatigued troops, reduced performance, low morale, and incidents of hallucina-tion caused by acute sleep loss. (See “Continuous Operations,” ARMOR, January-February 1982; and “Sleep Loss-A Debt That Must Be Paid, ARMOR,” January-February 1979. Ed.)

Training. The last measure intended to enhance the soldier’s effectiveness in night combat is training; specifically physical training and job training.

Leaders must not forget the need for physical strength in soldiers who will fight at night. Their strength is needed not only to perform normal combat tasks, which may include hand-to-hand fighting, but also to offset the tenseness and uneasiness that all soldiers experience at night. This is due to the undeniable fact that operating in darkness is a stress-producing activity. Senses are on edge. Muscles are alert for the unexpected. ORen these expectations are realized when a vehicle inadvertently falls into a depression, or a soldier steps over the edge of a ravine. In both cases, the body receives an unexpected jolt. The vital difference is that a soldier in good physical condition will have a better chance of surviving than a soldier in poor condition. In addition to physical strain, the soldier must contend with mental tension. While searching for signs of enemy activity, the eyes and ears strain to see and hear everything. Often, that which can be seen is drastically distorted. For example, a shrub may look like an enemy soldier, or vice versa. Aline of telephone poles may appear to be aline of advancing troops. A small village may look like a forest. Until he learns to discriminate between sights and sounds that are important and those that are routine, the soldier’s good physical condition will act to offset mental fatigue. Regarding job training, there are many who will testlfy that weapons often must be loaded and even repaired in total darkness. Expertise with the “tools of the trade” is a must. Soldiers must also be trained to respect and understand the phenomenon of light and sound transmission at night. For instance, alighted cigarette can be seen as far as 800 meters. In an area of reduced background noise, the sound of shovels and pickaxes in use may be heard up to 1,000 meters. Other examples of light and sound peculiarities at night are shown in tables 1 and 2. In addition, all must be versed on the “how-to-do-it” techniques written in our tactical standard operating procedures (SOP). Since night operating techniques differ from the day, there should be a special section of the SOP dedicated to the night attack, the night defense, and the night road march. By training to the standard of the tactical SOP, recurring night operations will be accomplished with a minimum of verbal instructions. Night Vision Equipment Thermal Systems. Of all the new night vision devices, the thermal sight seems to be the most significant. While of differing designs, the thermal systems found on the M60A3 and M1 Abrams tanks, the M2 and M3 Bradley fighting vehicles, and the improved TOW vehicle generally produce the same result-a video image based on temperature variances of the objects being observed. Crewmen, and especially gunners on the new combat vehicles, think that the thermal sights are the greatest innovation since the introduction of video games.

The primary advantage of this new tool is that it sees the heat produced by objects, rather than the objects themselves. Table 1. Distances at which various light sources can be observed at night with the naked eye Source Distance km Headlights of motor vehicles and tanks 4 -8 4 -5 Muzzle flashes from small arms 1.5 -2 Bonfire 6 -8 Flashlight Up to 1.5-2 Lighted cigarette.5 -.8 Muzzle flashes from single cannons Light match up to 1.5 Air observation doublesltriples these distances Table 2. Distance at which sounds are perceptible by man at night in open areas Sound Distance Cannon shot up to 15 km Single shot from a rifle 2-3 km Automatic weapons fire 3-4 km Tank movement

- O n a dirt road up to 1.2 km

- O n a highway 3-4 km Motor vehicle movement

- O n a dirt road up to 500 m

- O n a highway upto 1 km Movement of troops on foot

- O n a dirt road up to 300 m

- O n a highway up to 600 m Small arms loading up to 500 m Metal on metal up to 300 m Conversation of a few men up to 300 m Steps of a single man up to 40 m Axe blow, sound of a saw up to 500 m Blows of shovels and pickaxes up to 1,000 m Screams up to 1,500 m Oars on water up to 2,000 m On the battlefield, objects that are intent on doing us harm usually produce more heat than do rocks, trees, and man-made structures around them. For this reason, the glow of a warm-bodied Soviet soldier and his hot BMP will stand out in our thermal sight in contrast to their colder surroundings. Whereas past night vision devices were defeated by smoke, dust, and rain, the new thermals continue to see the battlefield through the obscurations. The tradeoff is that, as ranges are extended, the ability to achieve a defined image is reduced. To offset this disadvantage, gunners must over-train, to some degree, on the techniques of identification peculiar to thermal systems.

One technique of identification that seems to work well has been built into the system. It is the ability to switch image polarity. When polarity is reversed, the target’s outline and hot spots are enhanced.

Well-trained gunners know that a T-62 tank, when seen through thermal sights, will display a definite glow or hot spot over areas corresponding to the vehicle’s heat-producing components such as the engine and final drives (figure 1).

Zmge intensifirs. Other night vision devices that turn night into day include image intensifiers and active infrared (IR) devices. Image intensifiers have been around for several years. First-generation devices were called “Starlight Scopes.” They are passive in that they do not project detectable energy. Instead, they amplify the ambient light that exists in the night to project an image inside the scope. These devices intensify moonglow, starshine, and even faint sky-glow, up to 40,000 times.

The other category of night vision equipment is active IR. Active IR devices were around in WW 11, and are still used on some armored vehicles today; however, their usefulness is limited. The active light source, which is an integral part of the system, is easily detected by other night vision viewers on the battlefield.

Night Fighting Techinques Most tacticians will agree that at night we still do the same things we did before night vision aids were invented. We still attack, defend, and move from point to point on the battlefield. It’s just that today we are able to do these things with more contidence and at somewhat greater speed. Of course, there are others who feel that the new devices are the solution to all our problems. In the final analysis, however, the balanced opinion seems to be that the new night vision aids are a giant step forward, but do not guarantee success. There are no short cuts to the detailed planning and training process that is a prerequisite to successful night operations by large, mobile forces. d To illustrate the veracity of that statement and the applicability of other major discussion points in this article, consider the stories of two American combat units. The first illustration is based on fact. The other is enhanced conjecture. Both involve American combat troops who are about to experience the turbulence of night combat. 19 July 1950. Taejon had been ominously quiet that evening. Occasional showers settled the stifling dust raised by traffic in the city. As the night wore on, the quiet gave way to noises that signalled the movement of a large armored unit.

At his command post, Lieutenant Colonel Harold B. Ayres, commander, 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, heard the movement of tanks on his right. He strained his eyes to see through the darkness but without moonlight his effort was useless. The radio was silent, yet he knew that something was going on. Why were there no reports? At 2200 hours he sent a patrol from headquarters company to investigate. They never reported back. At 0300 hours, another patrol drove cautiously down the same road to reconnoiter the situation. Enemy fire stopped them at a roadblock. The patrol members reported seeing bodies of several men of the earlier patrol and their destroyed jeeps. It was clear from these incidents that enemy units were moving around the battalion’s positions under cover of darkness to the rear of Taejon.

Shortly thereafter, the enemy attacked in strength. Infantry and armor came down both sides of the highway that biseded the 1st Battalion’s position. Other enemy infantry attacked the north flank. Confusion and panic was rampant as smoke and dust filled the darkness. The North Koreans penetrated to the mortar positions behind the rifle companies and then struck headquarters company. At about 0400 hours, small arms fire hit the Korean house in which the 1st battalion command post was located and riflemen from overrun positions began streaming into the headquarters company area. Lieutenant Colonel Apes tried, but failed, to communicate with his front line companies. He sent a messenger to the regimental headquarters with word that tanks had penetrated his position and were headed toward the city. In the rapidly-spreading confusion, Ayres decided to evacuate the command post. Major Leland R. Dunham, the battalion executive officer, led about 200 men from the heavy mortar company, the heavyweaponscompany, and the battalion headquarters southward from the Yudung valley and away from the sound of enemy fire. Lieutenant Colonel Ayres and his S3, followed. The rifle companies, for the most part, had already scattered into the mountains. The time was 0520 hours. Day was dawning.

So what does this story teach us? Was the military philosopher correct when he stated that our best tactics and plans are abandoned when the first shot is fired? I think not. A better assessment would be that when the first shot is fired in darkness, tactics and night control measures are severely tested. Actions are automatic and are based on training. Command and control is only as good as the detailed instructions issued prior to engagement. Consider the next example: 19 January 1988. The position chosen by the team commander was slightly higher and approximately 2,000 meters southeast of his team’s objective. From his vantage point he could see evidence of the enemy’s presence on a series of camel hump hills that were dotted with vegetation. As he observed the area, the commander’s chief concern was the probable location of enemy ATGMs. He also searched for areas where enemy pre-planned fires and obstacles would likely be located. Based on intelligence estimates, the enemy force was a mixture of armor and infantry elements, prepared to defend the key terrain on which they were located. Meanwhile, back in the assembly area, crews were going through precombat preparation. The platoon sergeants were in charge and they knew exactly what to do. Tanks and carriers were being topped off with fuel and ammunition. Night vision sights were mounted, tested, and boresighted. Extra batteries for the night vision devices were distributed along with pyrotechnic ammunition. With equal energy, the tank commanders and squad leaders secured the thermal reduction camouflage screens that disguised the visual outline of their vehicles. Mud was used to cover shiny surfaces. External lights were disconnected as were all but the most essential internal lights. Required instrument lights were dimmed because of the dangerous amount of light they emit through periscopes and vision blocks. Personal camouflage also received much attention due to the dangerous thermal signature produced by exposed skin.

After the team operation order had been given and reconnaissance by all leaders and scouts had been completed, the team waited for darkness. Sleeping schedules were enforced; however, no one slept soundly. At dusk, and again after sundown, the platoon sergeants, selected tank commanders, and squad leaders moved forward to look at the objective and its surrounding terrain by moonlight.

They were looking for the control points on the ground that would be used to control the night attack. Once they were satisfied, the group started on the return trip, all the while moving with stealth and caution, trying to remain concealed from the enemy’s thermal viewers. Following the commander’s timetable of actions, the team went on full alert at 0200 hours. Since midnight, supporting mortars from the battalion mortar platoon had deliberately fired beyond the objective to give the appearance of a reconnaissance-by-fire mission. In reality, the sound of mortar explosions would cover the track and engine noise of the team as it moved toward the objective. The first element crossed the line of departure at 0230 hours.

Across the front of the division main attack, other teams were performing identical missions. The question was, who would be detected first, and thus alert the enemy that he was being attacked in a concentrated area? The time was 0250, and alight drizzle began. Earlier, dismounted scouts from the battalion had gone forward to locate weaknesses in the enemy obstacle system. With grappling hooks and ropes they had already removed some of the barbed wire to form passage lanes. To everyone’s surprise, the wire had not been backed by booby trap mines or flares that would have alerted the enemy to the tampering. An enemy observer, however, must have heard the sound of movement because, within minutes, the sky filled with flares and a searchlight from a flank position illuminated the obstacle line.

Not wanting to reveal their location, the breaching force for the team held their fire. They were still in a covered position 600 meters short of the objective. Rear elements of the breaching force continued to place chemical light sticks along the direction of attack to serve as directional guides for the remainder of the team. The sticks were placed in cutaway cans that directed the greenish light toward friendly forces and away from the enemy.

Back on the objective, the scouts called for smoke on the far side of the obstacle. Simultaneously, the team commander called for indirect fire on the objective. Viewing through his thermal range finder, the FIST responded and adjusted fire accordingly. Within seconds, the enemy also called for artillery fire on preplanned targets in front ofhis obstacle line. The scouts threw their last hooks and ropes across the wire and tied the ends to a Bradley fighting vehicle that had moved forward to retrieve them. When the Bradley took off, dirt, wire and small bushes followed, causing random explosions within the obstacle system. However, before reaching a covered position, theBradley was flipped and demolished by incoming artillery. Since no other targets were presented on the field, the enemy’s direct fire weapons remained silent, another unlucky break for the attacker.

Feeling that he still had some element of surprise, the commander signaled the support force to begin direct fire suppression of suspected enemy firing positions. In accordance with the event-oriented operation order, this signaled the breaching force to commence their assault breach.

With two mine-breaching line charges in tow, and mine rollers mounted on the front of two MI tanks, the breaching force moved forward. Once in place, and detonated, the line charges widened the lane previously cleared of wire by the battalion scouts. The mine rollers immediately moved through the system, followed by the two remaining tanks, that continued to fire on the move on suspected positions on the objective. Once through the minefield, the tanks deployed to the best of their ability; however, the platoon leader and his wingman were simultaneously hit by direct fire. Immediately behind the breaching force came the assault force, which consisted of a mechanized infantry platoon in M2 fighting vehicles. They passed through the cleared lanes, following the line of chemical light sticks, and began a final, mounted assault. By this time, the enemy had exposed most of his positions and his strength. The support force overwatching the attack, had obligingly eliminated two ATGMs and two tanks by firing at the source of their tracers. Now it was time for the assault force to clean up.

As friendly direct and indirect fire was shifted, the mechanized infantry moved up and into the objective, their firing ports spewing white and red tracers forward and to the flanks. Their aim was not deliberate, but their effect was unquestionably hair-raising. Through 16 ARMOR thermal sights, the crews of the Bradleys saw scores of infantry and at least two tanks preparing to withdraw. The same sight was seen by the tank crews of the breaching force. Both enemy tanks were engaged with deadly accuracy and destroyed. Some of the enemy infantry were successfully evacuated by their carriers located in reserve positions.

By the commander’s estimate, the team had successfully attacked a platoon-size defensive position, killing approximately 23 enemy soldiers and destroying 4 combat vehicles. The remainder of the enemy force scattered into the mountains. The time was 0520 hours. Day was dawning.

As the examples illustrate, night combat is as confusing as it is stimulating. Combat events are unpredictable, yet they must be met by our best estimates and matched by simple control measures. Also, we must not rely too heavily on our new night vision devices.

Night Logistics Up to this point, we have concerned ourselves with the night fighter. Equal attention must be given to the night logistician. He is just as critical to the unit’s success, and he faces equal difficulties as he moves about the battlefield in darkness while providing the necessary combat service sup port. The CSS functions most affected by darkness are maintenance and supply.

Maintenance. Basic to the maintenance support plan should be the premise that the night’s routine work activity will be anticipated and assigned to mechanics at least 3 hours before sundown; a difficult but not impossible challenge for the experienced motor officer. The handling and issue of bulky repair parts should also be completed before dark. Once these prerequisites have been met, the maintenance manager should position vehicles and equipment to be repaired in light-proof or lightr suppressing shelters. Permanent structures such as gym-nasiums, meeting halls, or civilian garages, if available, are recommended. If such structures are not available, mechanics can repair small components, on or offthe vehicle, under a lean-to or some other make-shift shelter constructed of tarpaulins or ponchos. The chemical light stick provides adequate light for most detailed repairs under these conditions.

To prevent congestion and confusion, a staging area must be designated for vehicles awaiting repairs. When possible, tow cables or tow bars remain attached to vehicles that cannot move under their own power. If not needed elsewhere, a prime mover such as a personnel carrier, or recovery vehicle, remains attached to the deadlined vehicle to facilitate movement into the maintenance shelter or for emergency evacuation. The latter contingency is especially critical, given the likelihood of a night evacuation of the trains or unserviceable equipment rally point (UERP) activity. Forward of the battalion field trains, repairmen are equipped with the ANIPVS-5 night vision goggles, which add an additional 2 pounds of weight on the head, but permit free hand movement. Using the attached IR light source, repairmen can read necessary technical manuals and accomplish most repairs requiring detailed viewing. Also, to ease their work during darkness, mechanics are night trained for specific items of equipment and then routinely assigned to those pieces of equipment during darkness. To avoid the inevitable fumbling for lost wrenches, mechanics mark their tools with luminous tape. Supply. While all classes of supply are affected by night combat, Classes III and V present the most significant problems.

ClassIII-Petroleum, oils, lubricants (POL). Consumption of POL increases during sustained night operations. Generators operating continuously require more fuel and oil, as do idling vehicle engines. Vehicles operate in lower gear ratios, which increases POL consumption. Spillage is usually greater because of reduced visibility. Consequently, the night logistician plans for this increased consumption, and does whatever is necessary to make the fuel handler’s job easier. For example, distribution of bulk fuel involves the operating of dispensing equipment; therefore, control valves and containers are identified according to their respective products; i.e., gasoline, diesel, grease, or engine oil. Forward area fuel handlers are equipped with night vision goggles to reduce spillage and as an aid in cross-country navigation. Class Vdmmunition. Improved night vision devices have done much to equalize day and night capabilities of weapons and related ammunition consumption rates. Because of this, ammunition-required supply rates may be greater than forecasts based on previous night statistics. Night operations may also result in increased requirements for barrier munitions such as mines, pyrotechnics, or countermine line charges. Sometimes it is advisable to pre-stock limited amounts of ammunition, especially in the defense. At night, these stocks are more vulnerable to infl-trators and must be guarded by infantry with night vision goggles and sights. These devices are also helpful to crewmen and ammunition handlers who must transfer bulky ammunition from trucks to tanks.

Miscellaneous. Other items of supply vary in demand depending upon weather, terrain, and the type of operation under consideration. However, for most tactical operations at night, the logistician must forecast the increased demand for: Engineer tape and stakes Tarpaulin shelters Night vision device batteries Night vision device float supply Flashlights, lenses, bulbs and batteries Luminous tape and paint Chemical light sticks Red lensed goggles Pure tracer subcaliber ammunition belts Logistic packages (LOGPAC). One of the most innovative resupply techniques to be implemented in recent years is the LOGPAC. The survivability of the LOGPAC is increased many times over when the convoy moves at night. The idea behind the LOGPAC is a simple one. Instead of moving ammunition trucks, POL trucks, and other supply vehicles forward on an individual basis, the services are combined into a single package, the LOGPAC. This convoy of supply vehicles is led by a vehicle with night vision capability to a battalion logistic release point. At that point, the company first sergeant meets his resupply package then guides them to the company’s forward positions to conduct resupply. At night, the first sergeant may want to reduce the movement of his combat vehicles by guiding the ammunition and fuel truc!cs directly to each fighting vehicle’s position. This technique is good, but has some drawbacks such as the unacceptable noise generated by many of our fuel-dispensing units, or the noise of ammunition being transferred from trucks to tanks. An alternative method is to have the combat vehicles return, one or two at a time, to a service station operation 100-200 meters behind the fighting positions. If the service station can be located in a depression or behind an embankment, the noises created by the operation will be partially deflected. After completing the resupply, the unit first sergeant returns the CSS vehicles to the release point, where the battalion support platoon assumes responsibility for their return to the battalion trains. The following evening, the same process is repeated.

Over the years, as forces became larger and more mobile, the difficulties inherent in night operations have multiplied. Perhaps that is the reason why the Army tended away from night operations on a large scale in the years following WW

I. Unfortunately, the most significant casualty of that trend was the spirit and skill of the American night fighter. In recent years our attitude toward night operations has changed. Now, night combat is viewed as a tactical necessity. To meet this challenge, we must begin relearning those skills that make units successful at night so that when the sun goes down on future battlefields, fear of the American night fighter will once again consume the hearts of the enemy.

MAJOR JAMES HENDERSON was commissioned in armor from Texas Technological Unirsrsity, Lubbock, Texas in 1969. He has served as mortar platoon commander, tank company CO, tank gunnery assistance team OIC, Battalion S1, S4, HHC Commander, Bn XO and is currently assigned to the Command Staff and Doctrine Department, USAARMS, Fort Knox, Kentucky.