The 26th Cavalry in the Philippines

The history of American horse cavalry did not end with the Indian Wars, nor with WW I. In 1941, while the world watched in apprehension as massive armored formations wrestled for control of North Africa, a determined band of horsemen trained and waited for war with Japan. They were the 26th Cavalry Regiment (Philippine Scouts), and they were the last of the type of men who rode with General “Light Horse Harry” Lee in the Revolution. The 26th Cavalry’s story has never been properly told. As today’s cavalry is training to fight a war outnumbered and undermanned, their story, and lessons learned, should be focused on and analyzed.

In 1920, the American Expeditionary Force Cavalry Board recommended that since “the mounted combat of large bodies of cavalry is probably a thing of the past, cavalry units should be stricken from the Infantry Division, and the number of total (cavalry) units cut.” The reorganization went into effect in 1921, and effectively cut the mounted force to less than half its former strength. Between 1922-1932 reorganization resulted in more cuts in units and personnel. The only bright spot for horse cavalry came in 1922 when the 26th Cavalry was organized in the Philippine Islands. This unit with two squadrons, each with two cavalry troops, one light machinegun troop, and a headquarters troop, was unique, as it was manned by Filipinos and officered by Americans.

However, the demise of the horse soldier accelerated in 1931 when Chief of Staff, General Douglas MacArthur, directed the Army to adopt mechanization and modernization *‘as far as is practicable and desirable.” This type of pressure led to the establishment of a cadre for a mechanized cavalry regiment at Camp Knox in late 1931 and the mechanization of the 1st Cavalry Regiment at that post in 1933. In 1938 the War Department directed the mechanization of all remaining cavalry units. The era of the horse soldier was thought to be over, except for the 26th Cavalry-for they had been forgotten. In early 1941, the 26th was beefed up, from 575 to 789 men, and one additional troop was added to each squadron. However, the regiment was still smaller than other cavalry regiments. About this time, a scout car platoon was assigned to the regimental headquarters and headquarters troop. The 26th had no artillery, but a considerable number of trucks were added. The regiment lacked antitank guns and mortars. In fact, there was no modern equipment or weapons in the entire regiment. Most equipment was WW I issue or older-some dating to the Philippine Insurrection. The 26th Cavalry might have been short in men and modem weapons, but they were definitely stout in heart. The regiment was known as the best trained Regular unit in the Philippine Islands, if not the whole U. S. Army. The reasons for the high state of training were many, foremost being that the regiment was a Regular U. S. Army unit with all the tradition and esprit de corps which that implies. Second, many of the Filipino career noncommissioned officers (NCO) had over 30 years service, and even though the regiment was fairly new, most of the NCOs had come from the old, island Cavalry Guard units. Third, even the lowest private in the Scouts held a very enviable position in Philippine society. Their service was fairly prosperous in a very structured prewar caste system where money and birthright dictated social status. Due to the benefits accorded them, the scouts were proud of their units and intensely loyal to their officers. The sauts actually considered themselves more American than Filipinos. This was not generally true of conscripted Philippine Army units. Finally, the 26th Cavalry‘s officers were the best. Some, like General Jonathan M. Wainwright, Philippine Division Commander and Colonel Clinton A. Pierce, Commander, 26th Cavalry, were old-style cavalrymen who never quite got over the days when cavalry meant horses, not smelly, noisy tanks. Others like Captain T. J. H. Trapnell would prove themselves again and again during the coming days.

The Islands were a lush paradise, and life was good in 1940. But it suddenly ended in the spring of 1941. The threat of war with Japan was imminent, and all dependents were ordered home to the US.

General Wainwright knew that the old War Plan Orange (WP0-3), which he had helped draft in 1922 for the defense of the islands, had been dropped and the strategic plan was now to defeat Germany before Japan. WPO-3’s main point had been that, in the event of invasion, the troops would immediately withdraw onto Bataan and hold there for up to 6 months and await reinforcements. But Army and Navy planners knew that even with the Pacific Fleet intact, due to the war in Europe, it would be at least 2 years before sufficient troops and equipment could reach the islands’ garrison. So, almost a year before the islands fell, they had been effectively written off-the troops arbitrarily doomed.

To counter the shfi away from WPO-3, General MacArthur was transferred from the Philippine to the American Army and placed in overall command on the islands. He instructed his commanders to plan to fight and defeat the enemy on the beaches. No withdrawal onto Bataan was planned. MacArthur believed the firepower of the Navy would be available to aid his beach defense and that the Army Air Corps would “add the decisive blow to any invading enemy.” It is ironic that the massive modem technology MacArthur was planning to use against the Japanese would in reality devolve to a band of brave horsemen whom he had tried to do away with. They would give him his most impressive victories in the islands.

MacArthur created the Northern Luzon Force, commanded by Major General Wainwright, and the Southern Luzon Force, commanded by Brigadier General George M. Parker, Jr. The major units in the northern force were three infantry divisions and the 26th Cavalry. The southern force consisted of two infantry divisions. All of the Filipino-manned divisions were supported by artillery, but no tank units were stationed in the islands. General MacArthur requested that some be sent immediately, but only two federalized National Guard tank battalions, the 192d and 194th ccmprising a Provisional Tank Brigade arrived in the late fall of 1941. They were equipped with the new M3 Stuart tanks armed with one 37-mm gun and two, 30 caliber machineguns. However, the crews were untrained. General MacArthur firmly believed that the war with Japan would not start until April or May 1942 and was very optimistic about the readiness of his troops. What General Wainwright found instead were units unprepared except for the 26th Cavalry. He made rough plans to do the impossibledefend 600 miles of open beach with untrained troops and understrength units. The one bright spot was the 26th Cavalry that had been training as though they were already at war. They never moved without full packs and wartime ammunition loads. Since the invasion was expected to come after dark, the 26th’ night problems were stiff and exacting. Training was first perfected in the classroom and then moved to the field with platoons and troops competing. Each session was followed by blistering critiques that spared no one, including the regimental commander. Exercises were repeated to correct weaknesses. Blank ammunition of all calibers helped accustom both men and horses to gunfire. Special attention was paid to conditioning horses and pack mules. Horses were repeatedly loaded on and off trucks to accustom them to this mode of travel.

On the night of the 7 December (6 December in Hawaii), General Wainwright had dinner with Colonel Pierce. They talked of the old cavalry days and joked about the movie review of the week in the lad paper; anew Errol Flynn film, entitled Custer’s Last Stand. They hoped that history wouldn’t repeat itself. Then he and Colonel Pierce rode their horses over to inspect elements of the 26th Cavalry and its pack train. After leaving Colonel Pierce, General Wainwright returned to his quarters and turned in at 2300. The next day the waiting was over.

When war exploded over the American fleet on the morning of 7 December, the 26th Cavalry was deployed as follows: Troop F was at Nichols Field (an Army Air Corps base); Troop A was practicing tactics in the field small detach-meqts of Troop B were on outpost duty at Baler and Dingalan Bays on the east coast of Luzon and the remainder of the regiment was at Fort Stotsenburg, Pampanga, about 60 miles north of Manila. When word of the Pearl Harbor attack came, General Wainwright ordered Colonel Pierce to place the regiment on full alert and they worked out details for dispersing the regiment to make it safe from air attacks. The “The first day of war was one of muss confusion supplemented with impotent rage when Clark Field, the major Army Air Corps base, was bombed and the bulk of the Army Air Corps in the Philippines was destroyed on the ground.” bulk of the regiment was to be moved into a concealed bivouac about 3 kilometers north of Fort Stotsenburg. Troop F would rejoin the regiment by forced march as soon as possible. In less than 3 hours, the regiment was moving with all equipment and ammunition-the 26th Cavalry was going to The first day of war was one of mass confusion supplemented with impotent rage when Clark Field, the major Army Air Corps base, was bombed and the bulk of the Army Air Corps in the Philippines was destroyed on the ground. Fort Stotsenburg was attacked at the same time, but with little effect. Troop F rejoined the regiment on 10 December, and recently promoted Major Trapnell learned from the Regimental S3, Lieutenant Colonel William E. Chandler, that General Wainwright had ordered the 26th Cavalry to act as a mobile reserve for the Northern Force and to remain where they were until further notice. The regiment bivouacked in the Bamban River valley. On the afternoon of the loth, General Wainwright ordered Colonel Pierce to move the regiment to a position in the hills northeast of Clark Field to cover potential drop zones to preclude an expected enemy paratroop drop to seize the airfield. Prior to the moveout, an urgent message was received that enemy paratroops were landing in the vicinity of Cabiao, about 50 kilometers west of the regiment. Colonel Pierce asked for a platoon of tanks from the provisional tank brigade and a platoon of self-propelled 75-mm guns from the artillery. He dispatached the 2d Squadron under their new commander, Major Trapnell, to destroy the enemy paratroops. The remainder of the regiment, less Troop G which was dispatched to relieve the elements at the Baler and Dingalan Bay area, was to screen northeast of Clark Field from Mabalacat to Wardville. Early the next morning, the 2d Squadron reported that no enemy paratroops were found and that the parachutists had been US. pilots shot down by Japanese pilots. The screen also had not tumed up anythmg and the regiment was ordered to return to anew bivouac in a woodline along Taconda Hill, 3 kilometers south of Fort Stotsenburg. Although not as War. safe as the first bivouac site, being smaller and more open, the regiment would be clocer to likely enemy drop zones. Dpring air attacks approximately 40 horses and 20 troopers were wounded and 2 soldiers were killed. After the bombing, one section of the regimental scout car platoon, was dispatched to the infantry forces at Tuguegerao, to enhance communications in the Cagayan Valley. As a result of constant air attacks, Colonel pierce ordered officers’ calls and meetings to be held at the regimental headquarters building at Fort Stotsenburg, believing that the air attacks there had ceased. This worked well until, Major Ketchum, Commander of the 1st Squadron, and his officers had to abandon the headquarters through windows and doors when the building was bombed and strafed. No one was hit, but Colonel Pierce had had enough and received permission from General Wainwright to move the regiment to a more concealed assembly area, south of Clark Field. Early on 13 December, the regiment began to move and completed it without any losses, due to wide dispersion and the regiment’s excellent march discipline. However, at the time, the Japanese Air Force was elsewhere supporting the first, yet undiscovered, landing of troops at Aparri, on the northern tip of Luzon. When discovered, these landings were believed to consist of only two reinforced infantry companies. General Wainwright believed that the main landings would come in the Lingayen Gulf area and the Aparri landings were “nothing more than a decoy.” As a result, he did not oppose them.

Late in the afternoon of 13 December, General Wain-Japanese slipped across a mountain range that was thought impassable, and struck the Filipino force that had been containing them on the right flank. The Filipinos broke, allowing the Japanese to flood into the coastal valley along Lingayen Gulf and to capture the town of San Fernando, in La Union province on the gulf. General Wainwright, disturbed that his line could be broken so easily, ordered Colonel Pierce to counterattack north immediately since the regiment was only about a 2-hour march south of the enemy lines. The 26th Cavalry, while underway and under air attacks, received further orders attaching it to the 11th Infantry Division, Philippine Army (PA), and calling for it to halt at Poz-zorubio and await further orders. The 26th Cavalry waited on the orders all through the night of 21 December. Only the animals were fed and watered that night. Troopers later reported that that night’s lonely vigil was the longest they could remember. At 0300 hours the order was given to move “with all possible speed” to Rosario to help the 71st Infantry (PA), which had been ordered to secure the Manila north road to preclude further southward movement of the Vigan force. But before the regiment could move, it received reports that the Japanese had landed troops at Banang, just southeast of San Fernando, and at Agoo, southwest of Banang, cutting off the 71st Infantry with repeated attacks from the flanks and rear of the unit dividing it in two. The situation was rapidly deteriorating even though the bulk of the Japanese invasion force was still aboard ship. General Wainwright realized the only hope was to keep the enemy wright moved his Northern Force headquarters to Bamban, ing hours of the 14th, General Wainwright ordered the 26th Cavalry to move quickly to Bamban to plug any gaps in the lines as the Japanese forces advanced. This was very impor- “No fewer than five separate trails, all originating from the Japanese-held Agoo region, entered the road at various points and could allow the enemy to bypass defending units almost at will.” tant now that hostile landings had also been confirm-& inthe west at Vigan, located just north of the Lingayen Gulf. Ifthe main landings were still to come in the Lingayen Gulf area, the 26th Cavalry would be the only trained unit that General Wainwright could throw at them. Also, if the landings at Vigan and Aparri were, in reality, the beginnings of the main landing effort, then the 26th Cavalry would be in position to reinforce other Philippine Army units already en-By 15 December it became apparent that the worst was happening. The untrained Filipino troops were no match for the Japanese forces who were rapidly driving south from Vigan toward Lingayen Gulf. General Wainwright now knew that the main landings would take place at Lingayen Gulf, and if the enemy force at Vigan was allowed to come in contact with the forces defending the gulf, his troops would be fighting on two fronts and would be unable to defeat the landing force. Therefore, the 26th Cavalry was ordered to Vigan, and Colonel Pierce was told to either defeat or delay the enemy long enough to allow the main Japanese landing at Lingayen Gulf to be defeated. During the night of 16 December the 26th Cavalry, now numbering 699 men and 28 officers, began moving toward the town of Rosales, where Colonel Pierce believed he could launch a counterattack against the Vigan force ifthey broke through $he Philippine Army units and continued down the coast toward the gulf. The regiment arrived in Rosales before daybreak on the 18th, where it remained for 2 days. On 20 December the Regiment was ordered to dismount Troop C and send them north of Bowtac to guard the critical mountain road that would connect the Aparri hostile forces with those in the Vigan area. Troop C turned their horses over to Troops A and B, mounted school buses, and moved north, never to rejoin the regiment until they were in captivity. “he fight against the Vigan force grew critical when the gaged.

january-februaty 1983 from advacing farther south and cutting off the remainder of his troops still defending the beach area. General Wainwright also knew that the Japanese were heading for Manila and it was necessary for him to hold up the enemy’s southern advance. The 71st Infantry must be left to fight its own battle.

General Wainwright ordered Colonel Pierce to hold the enemy advance at aline along the Damortis-Roasario road. The scout car platoon was detached and sent to Damortis to gather intellience for General Wainwright’s headquarters, since the enemy that had landed at Ago0 was flooding onto the gulf plain and threatening Damortis. The weary days and nights of marching and counter-marching appeared to be at an end and the 26th Cavalry moved to their positions north of the road and prepared to fight and die to hold the invading force. General Wainwright believed that the 26th Cavalry was his last hope. They had to give him enough time to remove the remainder of his beach defense force before it was encircled. In fact, he remarked to his chief of staff that, The 26th [cavalry troopers] are the only ones sure to stop them (the Japanese) from being in Manila in a few hours.’’

Colonel Pierce knew his regiment would fight, even though they suffered a severe lack of food and sleep. They were under strength, having detached troops, C and G, the scout car platoon, and 85 key NCOs and officers for staffand command duties in other Philippine Army units. They had no artillery, and Colonel Pierce wondered how long they could last. General Wainwright received five tanks of a battalion he had requested for the 26th Cavalry. However, due to a lack of fuel and their late arrival, the tanks added nothing to’the battle of Damortis.

The biggest problem facing the 26th Cavalry in holding the Rosario-Damortis line was the road itself. It was a hard-surfaced road winding through the foothills between the two towns and its curves hindered observation and fields of fire. To the north were the mountains of north Luzon, and to the south was heavily wooded, rolling terrain. Additionally, no fewer than five separate trails, all originating from the Japanese-held Ago0 region, entered the road at various points and could allow the enemy to bypass defending units almost at will. Colonel Pierce decided that the key to defending the line was to move the regiment to Damortis, and delay back to Rosario, rather than to defend the easily breachable line between the two towns. This way, the 26th could keep the enemy forces to their front and prevent them expanding south and west toward Rosario without first defeating the regiment.

It was a dangerous gamble since the enemy might be able to slip forces behind the regiment by infiltrating toward Rosario on the trails from Agoo. Colonel Pierce did not forget those trails, and broke Troop F into three strong patrols, each reinforced with a machinegun section. They were ordered to advance northward along each of the three largest trails until they made enemy contact. Then they were to delay back toward the road, falling back under extreme pressure. Smaller patrols were picketed along the two smaller Ago0 trails. The remainder of the regiment started for Damortis. Colonel Pierce arrived on high ground overlooking Damortis around 0900 and immediately linked up with the scout car platoon. The platoon leader informed Colonel Pierce that he was in contact with strong Japanese forces about 1 kilometer north of Damortis, and that at least 30 enemy ships were in the gulf unloading troops and equipment, with about 45 other ships standing by. Colonel Pierce could mark his regiment's advance from Rosario by watching the Japanese divebombers and fighters attacking the road below him. By 1300 the regiment began closing on Damortis, but losses to air attacks had been heavy. Colonel Pierce ordered the 1st Squadron (-1, to take up defense positions about 600-800 meters north and 500 meters east of Damortis. The 2d Squadron (-) would establish a second line along the road about 3-5 kilombers east of Damortis. The machinegun troop (-1 was supporting the flanks of the regiment and proteding the regimental CP on a hill about halfway between the squadrons. The defensive positions were almost totally lacking in overhead cover and were occupied under a hail of bombs and bullets, but the discipline of the regiment held and no troopers broke under the heavy, continuous attacks. By 1230 the positions were occupied and the thin line of cavalrymen was about to do battle with the entire Japanese invasion force. They did not have long to wait. Shortly after 1300 hours the enemy struck the 1st Squadron with infantry, tanks, artillery, divebombers, and naval gunfire. It soon became apparent that the 1st Squadron could not hold on very long, even though they were extracting a terrible toll from the Japanese attackers. Finally, around 1440, Major Ketchum requested permission to withdraw to the second defensive line, which the 2d Squadron had been preparing. Before the withdrawal could be executed, the machinegun platoon, which had been attached to the 1st Squadron and guarding the regimental left flank, was overrun by enemy tanks. Major Ketchum ordered the withdrawal to continue, but threw a desperate mounted counterattack at the tanks hop ing to save some of the machinegun platoon. A composite platoon from Troop A attacked the enemy tanks with hand grenades and pistols while riding among and past the vehicles. The surprise cavalry charge allowed some members of the machinegun platoon to rejoin the regiment and the remainder of the 1st Squadron to withdraw at a full gallop past the regimental CP toward the regimental lines. The cost had been high for Troop A for it had lost -26th Cavalry Area of Operations about half of the counterattacking force, but the enemy tanks halted in confusion. It is believed that one enemy tank was destroyed. Colonel Pierce found it hard to hold his position and was reinforced by a company from the 12th Infantry (PA), a company from the 71st Infantry (PA), and 5 tanks of the 2d Platoon, Company C, 192d Tank Battalion. These tanks started up the road toward Damortis to support the regiment, but would arrive too late to help. Meanwhile the regimental CP was fighting as the rear guard against the Japanese who had again begun to advance. Fortunately, Troop A's attack had made the enemy hesitant about entering the draw through which the 1st Squadron had escaped, for they feared another attack on their armor while in the contined area. Troop A by this time, around 1500, had successfully slipped east and was headed crosscountry to rejoin the regiment, leaving only the CP and the machinegun section to guard the right flank. Colonel Pierce started moving 4RMOR Japanese 75-mm guns like these battered at the 26th Cavalry during the rearguard fight to Bataan. the remainder of his force back toward the second position, and by 1530 the regiment was in place along their second position, halfway between Damortis and Rosario. The five tanks arrived and moved past the regiment’s defensive position, heading back along the road toward Damortis. Somehow, they ended up a little north of Damortis, headed toward Agoo, when the lead tank was destroyed by enemy tank fire. The other four tanks, each struck by light antitank tire several times, quickly retreated back toward Rosario. No enemy tanks were reported destroyed.

The battle of Damortis ended by 1900 when the Japanese took control of the town and the surrounding area. The battle had not been a victory for the 26th Cavalry, but they had held the enemy for about 3 hours, and the road to Manila was still denied the Japanese. Although the regiment had suffered severely during their baptism of fire, morale was high and they dug in to await the enemy’s new advance. By 1700 hours on 22 December, the regiment had completely closed on its second defensive line, which was now about 5 kilometers west of Rosario, with Troop E astride the road and Troop A farther to the right. The machinegun troop was closer to Rosario and regrouped with the regimental CP.

Around 1730 hours, the four surviving tanks returned to Rosario and their crews informed Colonel Pierce that they had been ordered by the provisional tank brigade commander, to operate forward of the 26th Cavalry to provide early warning until 2000 hours, or until the regiment’s reorganization was completed. No mention was made that the tankers were to also cover the withdrawal of the 26th Cavalry from Rosario to anew defensive line, which appeared to be the basis of the newest orders from the commander of the 71st Infantry Division (PA), to whom the 26th Cavalry was now attached. Contact with Japanese forces along the 26th Cavally‘s front had been lost, but Troop F was resisting increasing enemy pressure along all five of the Agoo-Rosario trails. Colonel Pierce told his squadron commander to quietly prepare to withdraw, for he knew that with Troop F 12 ARMOR slowly being pushed back by superior numbers and massive firepower, their current position could not be held. At 1900 the 71st Infantry Division ordered the 26th Cavalry to march to Agat and guard the right flank of the Division along the Bued River. The four remaining tanks would be the rear guard for the 26th Cavalry. Colonel Pierce was ordered to the division commander for a briefing and would link up with the regiment at Agat. Troop A was to deploy on the road at 1930 in columns of twos and proceed at a slow walk while Troop E moved in behind them. Meanwhile, the depleted tank platoon started moving through the regiment, headed toward Rosario. Lieutenant Colonel Lee C. Vance, regimental executive officer, stopped the tankers and informed them of their new orders to rear guard the 26th Cavalry. The tank platoon leader said he could not disregard his original orders to depart at 2000 hours and that he did not belong to the 71st Division or the 26th Cavalry but, rather, to the Provisional Tank Brigade. Colonel Vance asked him if he had been in contact with the enemy and was told that they had not seen anything, and that the enemy must still be around Damortis. Closely pursued by the motorcycleborne regimental S3, Lieutenant Colonel Chandler, who was intent on getting the tank support straightened out, the four tanks rumbled toward Rosario.

What really happened in the next few minutes may never be sorted out. Some say that a lieutenant from Troop E yelled something about a fifth tank and opened fire on the vehicle as it rounded the corner, moving toward the horseman. Others say it was Captain Wheeler, the troop commander, and yet still others say that all hell just broke loose when enemy tanks suddenly opened fire without warning from point blank range. If nothing else was apparent, there is no doubt that the Japanese tanks had been right behind the American tanks as they moved out, and now were right in the middle of the regiment in the pitch darkness. Individuals attacked the tanks with small arms and hand grenades, but the majority of the regiment was utterly confused. Attempts to get the regiment off the road were thwarted by barbed wire on the left and steep embankments on the right. Near panic broke out as some troopers tried to calm their terrorized mounts in the darkness, lit only by muzzle flashes. The horses were crashing into each other, sometimes unseating riders or running headlong into the enemy tanks. Colonel Vance ordered a retreat to Rosario, and the troopers raced down the road in disarray. Some troopers were seen on top of the enemy tanks, either grappling with other shadowy figures or firing small arms into the open hatches. It seems that Japanese crewmen did not button up, so the open hatches provided the only way for the horsemen to disable a tank. (Later, the troopers would perfect a maneuver to attack a tank with four horse-mounted troopers each attacking from a different direction. At least one might make it to the tank and attempt to disable it with grenades. This maneuver became a Bataan legend and is often told to illustrate the bravery of the 26th Cavalry.)

Troopers died trying to hold the enemy armor with little more than their bare hands while others were unhorsed and trampled by terrified mounts running completely amok. More died from the constant streams of enemy tank fire. There was barbed wire on both sides of the road so they could not deploy. Captain Wheeler heard Major Trapnell “The26th Cavalry was fighting with a stubbornness never before encountered by the Japanese troops and the invaders were being slowly pushed back by the horsemen.” calling his outfit and found him at abridge. Major Trapnell wanted to defend the bridge but he and Captain Wheeler seemed to be the only ones left. At that moment Lieutenant Michelson of the Veterniary Corps came up with the veterinarian truck. The three officers then pushed the truck, which had now stalled, onto the bridge, poured gasoline on it and the bridge, and set it afire. For this action, the three officers were later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

The regiment had hoped to regroup in Rosario but upon arriving there they found Troop F fighting Japanese in the town square and the regiment continued through town t ward the Bued River. Order was quickly restored, mostly as a result of Lieutenant Colonel Chandler, who, while returning to the regiment, was knocked off his motorcycle by a riderless horse, which he wrestled under control and mounted. Lieutenant Colonel Chandler began riding up and down the column, calming the troops. Troop F continued as rear guard until Rosario was cleared. The day’s fighting had been hard for Troop F, since they were only about platoon strength when they broke contact. General Wainwright was very surprised when Colonel Pierce told him that the 26th Cavalry only had 175 effectives upon reaching the Bued River. The next couple of days saw the 26th Cavalry’s strength grow, as stragglers and groups of men cut off earlier slowly made their way back to the regiment.

It is estimated that on 22 December the actual losses were 150 killed or wounded. But General Wainwright had been able to extract his other forces and was ready again to oppose the Japanese advance with what was thought to be a unified line.

During the night ofthe 22d and the early morning hours of 23 December, the regiment was able to stop for a few hours along the Bud River line. General Wainwright instructed Colonel Pierce to hold the river crossing at Agat, and keep the old road to Baguio open to allow any cutoff troops to rejoin friendly lines. Some intact units of the 71st Infantry Division did come through during the night, but would not join the defensive effort and continued to the rear. The depleted 26th covered the withdrawal of the 71st Division until around 0900 on 23 December. Then they blew up the bridge right under the noses of the Japanese and withdrew to Poz-zorubio to reorganize.

General Wainwright was determined to give the 26th Cavalry some rest and ordered them out of the line and moved them about 12 kilometers farther south to a position “A very angry General Wainwright arrived in Binalonan, after almost being killed or captured by a splinter group of Japanese infantry and tanks, which had worked behind the26th Cavalry and cut one of the two roads into the town.” near Binalonan, the headquarters of the 71st Division. Movement began after dusk, and was completed by 0100 on December 24th. The march had been a nightmare; the troops had been without food or sleep since 21 December, and were utterly exhausted. Even though the regiment was behind enemy lines, Lieutenant Colonel Chandler ordered outposts to be established north and west-just in case.

Meanwhile, General Wainwright was planning a counterattack to cut off the southernmost Japanese units and had requested that his old Philippine Division be attached to him. When the request was made to General MacArthur, General Wainwright was surprised to learn that not only was the answer no, but that the old WPO-3, the retreat onto Bataan, was in effect and to be executed immediately. The news was hard for General Wainwright to accept. He knew that the retreat onto Bataan probably meant their death. Also, he had hoped to attack at least once more since “The Japanese admitted, later, that their attempt to cut oi7 the defending forces before they could move onto the Bataan Peninsula was a complete fdlure, due mostly to the delaying tactics of the 26th Cavalry.” he believed that the enemy was disorganized and could be defeated. Years later, a senior Japanese commander bore out that belief when he said, “We feared more than anything one more counterattack from the exhausted Philippine-American troops, since it might have driven us into the sea because of our confused state.”

General Wainwright realized that it would do little good to force the issue with General MacArthur since the order had already gone out, and units were moving toward Bataan. General Wainwright told his aide that, since the next day was Christmas Eve, he would visit the 26th Cavalry and the 71st Division in the morning and personally deliver their orders. This morale-building trip would almost cost the general his life.

The fortunes of war again turned against the 26th Cavalry. At approximately 0500, Colonel Pierce and his staff were awakened by outpost messengers reporting that enemy tanks and infantry were attempting to overrun their positions. A bivouac defense was established and by 0530 heavy fighting was raging. The 26th Cavalry was fighting with a stubborness never before encountered by the Japanese troops and the invaders were being slowly pushed back by the horsemen. januaty-february 1983 -_-In 1941, troopers of the 26th Cavalry fought Japanese tanks like this with their bare hands, pistols, and hand grenades. They had little success. By 1944, however, it was a different story. This Colonel Pierce kept looking for help from the 71st Division and wondered how such a large enemy unit could have bypassed this force. His questions were answered when the enemy had been forced northwest of the town of Binalonan, and Colonel Pierce entered it to find it completely empty-the 71st Division was gone!

Around 1130, a very angry General Wainwright arrived in Binalonan, after almost being killed or captured by a splinter group of Japanese infantry and tanks, which had worked behind the 26th Cavalry and cut one of the two roads into the town. There was supposed to have been a whole division there, and what did he find? Nothing. Major Trap-ne11 and some others who were supposed to have been out on the line were filling soda bottles with gasoline to use on enemy tanks. General Wainwright asked where Colonel Pierce was, and a trooper pointed in the direction of the sound of heavy firing. He found Colonel Pierce at the regimental command post a scant 400 meters from the enemy lines and under mortar, tank, and small arms fire. The mere presence of General Wainwright and the absolute calmness of Colonel Pierce inspired the troopers. By 1300 the fighting had slackened, and General Wainwright ordered the 26th Cavalry to delay to the Agno River where he believed the 71.4 Division had gone. Colonel Pierce moved all of his wounded south by 1400 and began to plan the delay. By this time, General Wainwright had departed unescorted in his Packard sedan. The fighting continued until about 1530, when the 26th Cavalry withdrew by trotting 5 minutes and walking 5 minutes-all the way to the Agno River and the village of Tayug. The last men out of the battle area were Colonel Pierce and Colonel Vance, on foot, and leading their horses. The losses of key personnel during this battle were heavy with Lieutenants Vanderlester, Bowers, and Mark killed. Lieutenant Mark was killed when he singlehandedly attacked a tank which was cutting his platoon to pieces. The tank withdrew after killing him. The most serious loss was Major Ketchum who had gone to the right flank of his squadron during the heaviest period of fighting and was never seen again. All of the regimental records, journals, guidons, and standards were lost when a tank was knocked out on Leyte by an antitank gun manned by soldiers of the 32d Infantry Division who had helped make good General MacArthur’s promise to return to the Philippines. scout car in which they had been carried was destroyed. Despite the losses, the 26th Cavalry accomplished a masterful job and, except for the Japanese troops who had bypassed and almost bagged General Wainwright, they had stopped the Japanese advance cold. This allowed the first defense/delay line, D-1, on the Agno River to be established. General Wainwright, in his after-action report, stated, “I was personally present during a portion of this fight and cannot speak in too glowing terms of the gallantry and intrepidity displayed by Colonel Pierce and all officers and men of the 26th Cavalry on this occasion. This devoted little band of horsemen, weakened by detachments and by heavy casualties sustained at Damortis on the 22d of December, held up the advance guard and caused the deployment of the enemy’s main column. It effected a delay of 9 hours and maintained the best traditions of the American cavalry. The 26th Cavalry clearly lived up to its code name of MIGHTY that day. I speak of this from the point of view of an eyewitr ness.”

The general withdrawal onto Bataan would actually begin on Christmas Day once the 26th Cavalry was in place. Then the 71st Division would withdraw to Umingan while the regiment held the river crassing at Tayug. It was a memorable day, since the troopers were fed for the first time in three days. Colonel Pierce informed General Wainwright that since Damortis, his losses were approximately one-third of his total force. Around 12OO_on Christmas Day, the Japanese attacked the regimental scouts along the northern bank of the Agno, and by the early evening had forced the troopers back to the river itself. The 2d Squadron had already established a defense on the other bank and allowed the scouts to pass through before blowing the bridge. The Regiment knew the river banks were too muddy for enemy tanks to cross, so they continued to harass the enemy as they tried to repair the bridge. By the time the Japanese had repaired the bridge enough to allow some troops to cross, they found that the 26th Cavalry had vanished. They had, just minutes before, pulled out at a trot. The maneuver was best summed up by Lieutenant Colonel Chandler who said, “It was a beautifid exhibition of careful planning, timing, and execution by disciplined troops, permitting the last moment of delay to be extracted from the operation.”

Since the main defending units had now reached the D-3 line, Colonel Pierce found that there was no point in remaining forward of that line, and started moving toward Umingan, and safety. On the way, the cavalrymen played havoc with the Japanese advance by destroying eight bridges between Tayug and San Quintin. Two troopers were lost. The Japanese admitted, later, that their attempt to cut off the defending forces before they could move onto the Bataan Peninsula was a complete failure, due mostly to the delaying tactics of the 26th Cavalry. One Japanese officer said it was like fighting “spirits and devils.” In fact, the delay had been so successful that General Wainwright ordered the 26th Cavalry to move to Santa Rosa to become the Northern Luzon Force reserve. When the regiment arrived at Umingan at 0600 hours on 26 December, Colonel Pierce learned of the new orders. He realized that Santa Rosa was just too far for tired men on horseback to reach without marching day and night and the current physical state of the men and horses would make it impossible. He put the unit in laager and went to visit General Wainwright, who was gone, but his “The door had been slummed in the fmes of the enemy, but for the 26th Cavalry it was the beginning of the end.” chief of staff approved a change of location. Their new bivouac site would be the town of Mexico, well behind phase line D-5. Since the horses and men were in such bad shape, the regiment was told to take its time reaching the new rest position.

Colonel Pierce also received the good news that Troop G would rejoin the regiment at Mexico, and the scout car section would rejoin the unit before it reached Mexico. Except for Troop C, which was still in the northern mountains, the regiment would be back together for the first time since before the war. The regiment left Umingan at 1900 hours on 26 December, and did not reach Mexico until 0130 hours on the 29th.

Colonel Pierce told Colonel Vance as they watched the troops close on their new bivouac that, with just a little rest, the regiment would be ready again. Fate would intervene again as the Japanese made determined attacks against the D-5 line that ran along the Bamban River. Fearing an early breakthrough, General Wainwright ordered the 26th Cavalry north to Porac, 26 kilometers behind D-5. Colonel Pierce immediately sent Lieutenant Colonel Chandler to plead with General Wainwright’s headquarters for a few days delay. A %-hour delay was approved and the regiment left Mexico at 1900 hours on 30 December. They marched over 60 kilometers and reached Porac by midnight. The regimental reorganization was as follows: Troops E and F were combined into one troop, and along with Troops A and G, were horsemounted and under the command of Major Trapnell. Troops Band the machinegun troop were mounted in trucks, buses, and even some British Bren carriers (armored, track vehicles) that had been found. This composite troop was commanded by Captain Joe Barker, Jr. On 1 January 1942, the Japanese attacked D-5 and, by the end ofthe day, the door to Bataan was held open by only two badly battered Philippine Army Divisions-the 11th on the left and the 21st on the right. The 26th Cavalry was determined to hold the center. Fortunately for the 26th, the a b tacks on D-5 slowed and then stopped as the Japanese realized that the city of Manila, only 24 kilometers away, was wide open. The Japanese commander raced to the city for he believed that when Manila fell, Bataan would fall in only a few days. Instead, it took 4 more months. The blow fell on 4 January when fresh attacks broke the line of the 21st Division which, in turn, forced back the 11th Division. By now, the gateway to Bataan was only 20 kilometers wide and closing fast. The 26th Cavalry passed troops through both divisions and covered their withdrawal to Danpe, executing a delay until reaching Danpe around midnight. Early on the morning of 5 January, Colonel Pierce told General Wainwright that the withdrawal would have to be accomplished soon, for he did not know how much longer the gate could be held open. General Wainwright ordered the final withdrawal around 1000 on the 5th. The 1 lth and 21st Division quickly fell back on, and began crossing, the Layac Junction bridge. The 26th suffered heavily all day under airdirected artillery fire, losing about 10 men and 25 horses, but they held. Finally, at 2330, the 21st Division finished crossing, and the 26th Cavalry began crossing the bridge. As they reached the other side, the weary troopers were met by General Wainwright, who thanked them for their efforts. At 0100 the rear guard, with Colonel Pierce crossed, and then the few remaining tanks of the 192d Tank Battalion (who had been overwatching the scouts) rumbled across-the last Americans to do so. General Wainwright then asked Colonel Pierce if all the troops were across the bridge. After a barely audible “yes” was heard, General Wainwright gave the signal and the bridge was blown up, sealing the Bataan Peninsula. The door had been slammed in the faces of the enemy but for the 26th Cavalry it was the beginning of the end.

After the withdrawal on 5 January, the regiment moved to a concealed bivouac on the left flank of the 31st Infantry, a regular US. Army unit, which was on the left of the Layac Line, around Kulis. The regiment arrived at 0330 on 6 January. Late in the day due to enemy air activity and artillery bombardment the regiment moved about 2 kilometers farther west. Due to threat of infiltration by special Japanese shock troops, the 26th Cavalry was fired upon by nervous soldiers from the 31st Infantry when they tried to “Mast historians believe that the delay tactics of the 26th Cavalry were directly responsible for the upset of the Japanese timetable and the removal of their Commander-in-Chief, General Homma.” regain contact with their flank. Attempts to make contact were stopped until daybreak. At 0230 the regiment received an encoded radio message that could not be decoded. The code key list had changed at midnight, and no one had informed the 26th Cavalry! Patrols soon reported that it appeared as ifthe 31st Infantry had abandoned their positions and withdrawn. They had indeed withdrawn. This was the message that the 26th Cavalry could not decipher. Colonel Pierce knew the Japanese had probably already started moving forward and might have bypassed them by this time. He immediately ordered the scout car section out by the only route possibledown the road through the position that the 3 1st Infantry had held. At 0430 Colonel Pierce was informed that the scout car section had been ambushed, and three out of the four cars were destroyed. Now it was confhed that the only way out was crosscountry over very mountainous terrain. The trip was agonizing for the regiment, for the troopers had neither food nor water for themselves nor their animals.

General Wainwright feared the worst when he leaned that the 26th Cavalry had been cut off. While some of his staff assumed that the regiment had been destroyed, he refused to believe that Curt Pierce would not bring the troopers through.

And bring them through Colonel Pierce did, reappearing at Bagac around midnight on 10 January. The last mounted action of the US Cavalry took place in the village of Moran on the west coast of Bataan on 16 January 1942. The composite Troop E-F was sent on the 15th to the vicinity of Moran to relieve Troop G which had been there since 11 January. Early on the 16th, the Japanese attacked and seized the village of Moran, and not even repeated counterattacks could dislodge them. There were about 300 Japanese infantry in and around Moran. Captain Wheeler, Troop E-F commander, knew his troopers would have to close quickly with the enemy to get out of their machinegun-killing zone as fast as possible. Since speed was important, amounted attack was the only way. The one suitable place to initiate the attack was from the point where the road entered the southern edge of the village and the 26th charged in 4 man waves. “First, there was the sound of pounding horses running very fast; then four horsemen abreast with drawn pistols came into view,” said an observer. “They were already disappearing when another wave came in sight, followed by another and “My great respect and deep thanks go to the old horse regiment and its few survivors, and to the glorified dead of that band ofhorsemen goes the salute of a nation for a task well done. ” (General Jonathan M. Wain Wright) another-until the whole troop had thundered by. The Japanese thoroughly surprised, had not fired at the first wave or two, but then fire came from all directions. Groups of four horsemen, yelling and firing their pistols, turned off the road and charged into the enemy. Japanese were running everywhere trying to get away from the horses. Most of the cavalrymen dismounted and fought on foot right in the midst of the enemy.”

It was a very hard fought battle. Captain Wheeler later described i t “Moran was a hail of bullets that never stopped. There were so many in the air that if you had put out a sheet of cloth in five minutes it would have been riddled. We were, however, outshooting them, as we could any day... we fought all day... the scouts were loyal to the nth degree and fought like devils.” The 26th Cavalry, in its last mounted action, was successful in driving the Japanese out of Moran and inflicting heavy casualties on them. Late on 16 January 1942, the regiment was ordered to dismount and the horses sent to Mariveles. The regiment joined sailors, marines, airmen, and other soldiers as line infantry. The end was near, and the defenders knew it. Their feelings were best summed up by the favorite verse of the times: “We are the battling bastards of Bataan, No mamma, no pappa, no Uncle Sam; No aunts, no uncles, no cousins, no nieces; No pills, no planes, no artillery pieces; And no one gives a damn.”

While the men of Bataan continued to fight and die, starvation further weakened the defenders. Finally, the end came for the Cavalry when General Wainwright, on 15 March, ordered the last horses slaughtered for food and 250 horses and 48 baggage mules met their end. Less than 6 months later, on 9 April 1942, Bataan surrendered. The survivors of the regiment would now face almost 4 years of imprisonment but first they would face the inhuman torture of the Bataan Death March.

No records of the regiment exist; however, it is believed that total losses were as follows: 20 out of 28 American &I-cers were killed or missing in action; about 80 percent of the enlisted men were killed or missing in action; and all animals and equipment were lost.

The campaign fought by the 26th Cavalry was a classical use of horse cavalry: Long-range reconnaissance, delaying operations, and violent hit-and-run attacks. Coupled with well-trained and disciplined troopers, these tactics cost the Japanese invaders heavily. Most historians believe that the delay tactics of the 26th Cavalry were directly responsible for the upset of the Japanese timetable and the removal of their Commander-in-Chief, General Homma. The saga of the 26th Cavalry is more than the story of a single campaign, or even of a single unit, but, rather, tells the end of a whole way of warfare. The American cavalrymen, with less than 200 years existence, never had the lengthy traditions of European cavalry, and it can be argued that the American horsemen were never really pure cavalry at all, but rather only mounted riflemen. But the glory of American cavalrymen was always found their horsemanship, pistol marksmanship, and their extraordinary courage in pressing home the attack.

The epitaph of the 26th Cavalry was written in 1946, in a letter from General Wainwright to Brigadier General Pierce (he was promoted during the final days of Bataan) which stated: “From December 22,1941, until about January 16, 1942, this devoted little band of horsemen were in action almost daily, always gave a good account of themselves, and suffered heavy casualties. During these trying days, it was the most reliable unit under my command and so remained during the defense of Bataan where after being dismounted, it carried on its fine tradition of combat excellence, first on the west coast and then on the east coast, especially during the last bitter days before capitulation. My great respect and deep thanks go to the old horse regiment and its few survivors, and to the glorified dead of that band of horsemen goes the salute of a nation for a task well done.” So now the history of the American horse cavalry is complete. Now the horseman’shall of heroes has new names: Wainwright, Pierce, Vance, Chandler, and Trapnell and they are enshrined alongside the likes of Stuart and Patton. It is so important for us to never forget the gallant 26th Cavalry-for they deserve better as America’s last horsemen.

Information for this article was obtained from interviews with members of Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor; articles by Captain Whitehead and Colonel Chandler; from a biography of General Wainright that included his after action reports; after action reports of unit commanders, and fhm the Oficial History of World War II. J. W. W. CAPTAIN JEFFREY W.

WOODALL was commissioned in Armor from Kansas State University ROTC in 1974.

He has served with the 82d Airborne Division, and the 24th Infantry Division (M) in various staff and line positions. He is a 1980 Commandant’s List graduate of AOAC, Fort Knox.

KY and is presently assigned with the Readiness Group, Fort Douglas, Utah as a member of the Armor Assistance Team.