Address of General Jacob L. Devers

Here at Fort Knox were developed great leaders of Armor—young and old—who brought order out of the chaos of ideas, equipment, and doctrine. Here the first integration of the fighting forces of the U. S. Army was conceived, went through its birth pains, and came out a team, coordinated in its simplest element and capable of accomplishing the impossible. The Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers discovered that they each had personnel who could command the others—that each was indispensable to the other—and that to be completely successful the fighting unit must also have the best possibly supply services—that the unit was useless unless it was balanced with Signal, Q. M., Ordnance, and Chemical Warfare personnel—and properly supported by the Air Force and the Navy.

Here the Engineers developed the first successful rubber pontoon bridge. Here the Signal Corps learned that there must be better and simpler communications equipment. Here the Ordnance learned about power plants, maintenance, and spare parts. And here the Chemical Corps learned about the use of fire and the protection against gas.

It was here that the first light observer planes with civilian pilots—the Grasshoppers—were contracted for, in order to give eyes to Armor, Artillery, reconnaissance and command; and this act brought forcibly to the Air Command of the Army the necessity of thinking more about the combat soldier. The Armored Force—then the Armored Division—and finally the Armored Corps were born here.

In the Mechanized Headquarters at Fort Eustis, in 1931, General Van Voorhis, a Cavalryman with foresight and imagination, laid down the basic principles for the Armored Force. He was the wise prophet who looked into the future and saw the necessity of integrating the combat arms of the Service into a single team if Armor was to be successful. He was the grandfather of Armor. Later, in 1940, General Chaffee, with a wide open directive from General Marshall, and with foresight and experience in organization, secured this post, created on paper and brought into being the Armored Force as you knew it during the war. He became the father of Armor. Out of this integration of the Services, came the young, aggressive leaders of Armor, each thinking only for the good of the whole.

Here was the first fighting combat team of the Army. If we could only have the foresight to put together today a similar fighting team of the Army, Navy, and Air Force—integrated and ready to go.

So much for history. It has a lesson and a theme song—and it has worked.

Now let me get back to basic principles—for it has been my desire and pleasure, since my retirement from the Army in 1949, to keep after greater fire power, better transportation, air transportability, and the logistics and economics that go with the fighting man. * * *

The combat soldier has a profession second to no other profession of mankind. No longer can it be said that the skills of the other professions require more intelligent and more highly educated men—for there is no greater skill than that required to stay alive on the battlefield and at the same time carry out the mission of defeating the enemy—performing this task in all kinds of weather and under all kinds of conditions. Each man is a potential leader of himself, then of a team, and then of many teams.

You of the Armor Association know how important it is to take a man, no matter where he comes from, and train him to take care of himself, his weapons, and his transportation. It is necessary to give him faith or confidence in himself and, within his capabilities, responsibility to fit him into a team. His weapons must be of the best. They must be as light as possible and must have great fire power. This means that there must be a combination of weapons varying in weight and fire power to give him flexibility in their use under all conditions of combat. Transportation must be of the best in order to transport him, his weapons—both individual and supporting—and his supplies quickly and easily to the point of contact with the enemy.

The basic element, then, of a fighting team is the combat soldier. He is supported by all the arms and services including the Air Force and the Navy.

This combat soldier finally finds himself in what today we call a division. It may be an Armored or an Infantry or an Airborne division.

Just as most industry is tied to its machine tools, in its search for new ideas and new approaches—so you are tied, in your search for better solutions in perfecting the art of fighting, to a division or a combat team. As a result of this organization and training, the fighting leader is frustrated in his efforts to improve his fire power and mobility because of weights and costs of equipment, both of which continue to mount.

As long as we have the present divisions and the equipment, there will always be Armored divisions; they are not obsolescent in any sense of the word and no matter where the battleground is, or what the weather may be, there will always be tanks and they will play a dominating role. * * *

Atomic fire power will not eliminate Armor: it will supplement and improve it, and require it for delivery.

It is a source of great satisfaction to me that I have been able in the past few years to work with people outside the service who are seeking to develop equipment which will give to Armor anew flexibility. * * *

If the transportation now used by the Army, both as weapon and personnel carriers—particularly the tanks and the bulldozers—can be made lighter and still perform their present functions, then the whole concept of the divisional organization could be changed and would result in reductions in types of weapons, trucks, tanks, and tractors and considerable reduction in the amount of manpower required behind the combat soldier at the front.

The big problem is weight. Weight costs money initially, and later, in operations it inevitably limits the use and thus the flexibility of the weapons or vehicles and adds to its complications. * * *

Because of long experience in the development of tanks, their component parts, their maintenance, and the weapons and ammunition they carry, I have come to one fundamental conclusion which I believe is sound: The present tank carries around too much dead weight 90% of the time, costs too much initially, and costs too much to operate. Why do we stick to this design? With all its protection, the turret is the weakest link and the tracks are extremely vulnerable and heavy. In a matter of hours a tank column will destroy a million dollars worth of roads.

For some years, even back in 1941 and 1942, it was my opinion that we should go to wheels if possible. We even tried such a tank, but could not see the solution. We also tried to drive the tank with electric motors, but the design of the motors linked with the track approach was so heavy that it defeated the idea. Also, in those days we did not know too much about waterproofing motors. * * *

In the entire history of military operations the development of new equipment has dictated the evolution of tactics. It is my belief that through... a design philosophy that reflects the marriage of aircraft and ground equipment design must come the next stages of the evolution of all military equipment and new concepts of ground force operations.

If progress is to be made, you, the leaders in the military art, must have enthusiasm and persistence and must be constantly looking for anew and realistic approach... In modern times, with new fire powers already developed and being still further developed, mobility is more important than ever. This mobility must have flexibility and simplicity. Divisions must be reduced in manpower size and still gain fire power. the Division slice now figures at 55,000 for an 18,000-man Division, and is really 90,000; it must be cut in fact to 20,000 for a 10,000-man Division.

With the daily improvements in electronics, and the know-how and training of the individual the “impossible” can still be attained.

Remember the rule of Armor: A hole—a quick thrust which might continue indefinitely—1,000 miles more or less—and gasoline more than ammunition becomes the need. When the momentum is slowed, then stopped, it may take weeks to get going again.

Command is easy because of the men who lead and because of the training beforehand.

Brief directions, a little coordination, plenty of supplies, the will and the permission to go and ultimate recognition of the good work accomplished. These are the responsibilities of the Commander. Results: Casualties—few. Small losses come from deliberate planning and violent execution.

Remember—any great stride forward in the history of civilization—anything revolutionary in art or industry, in physical or medical science—anything of note that has been developed in the past has, in its early stages, been called radical, extreme, far-fetched, advanced, visionary, and impractical. Even anything unusual—anything that does not follow a pattern—is viewed with skepticism or downright scorn. People are prone to view with suspicion anything they don’t understand, even though it has been proved beneficial. Furthermore, people are creatures of habit and inertia, and it takes a lot of prodding to induce them to accept new methods to replace old. * * *

Since the days of Van Voorhis and Chaffee when the principles of Armored warfare were worked out and the necessary equipment was developed—there have, of course, been changes and improvements in equipment. The principles have remained essentially the same. But the overall methods of warfare have changed—and Armor is now faced with two problems that it must solve quickly and well—the problem of weight and the problem of mobility. [We must have] fire power and more fire power with better charges and fuses and better results at the end of the trajectory—mobility adapted to the air age with lighter equipment and lighter planes. * * *

Those of us whose prime interest is Armor must shake ourselves out of the old grooves and make some radical changes to insure that quick thrust forward.