Cluster Munitions No More: What This Means for the U.S. Military

The end of American cluster munitions is arriving and the Department of Defense (DoD) has no plans to replace them. In 2008, when the U. S. government committed itself to disposing of cluster munitions by January 2019, this milestone seemed distant. Unfortunately, when DoD implements the final phase of this policy, it will deprive it self of a critical capability without are placement. What are cluster munitions and why are they so impor tant? Cluster munitions are “munitions com posed of anon-reusable canister or de livery body containing multiple, conventional, explosive sub-munitions” delivered by aircraft, cruise missiles, artillery, mortars, missiles, tanks, rock et launchers and naval cannons. DoD developed cluster munitions during the Cold War to saturate likely Soviet mechanized and armored forces ave nues of approach into Western Europe with armor-killing munitions. For ex ample, the typical howitzer-launched cluster munition, the most numerous and, arguably, most important of U. S. cluster munitions, can equal the lethal effectiveness of 15 high-explosive (HE) howitzer shells. The advantages of such a munition are obvious. The cluster-munition debate Presently, no replacement has been identified for the vast stockpile of U. S. Army and Marine Corps howitzer munitions that will be eliminated in just a few years. Elimination of the cluster munition created an important debate within the U. S. military regarding the need for a comparable replacement. The debate hinges on a perception of a very low likelihood of future conflicts involving large enemy armor and infantry formations, leading to the elimina tion of large-scale area artillery fire in combat and shifting toward precision unitary artillery fire. Advocates of this position point to the experiences of the past 13 years of low-intensity warfare, which did not require U. S. forces to employ cluster munitions. Advocates are further bol stered by the downward pressure on the U. S. defense budget, which does not currently support a replacement capability. Supporters also argue that future state adversaries will not apply combined-arms maneuver against the United States because of our over match in technology, particularly when it comes to air superiority. Unfortunately, these arguments are flawed. Proponents of eliminating the cluster munition dismiss the capabili ties of America’s most dangerous ad versaries. If DoD does not invest in a replacement capability, it will leave U. S. ground forces at a dangerous dis advantage on future battlefields. Furthermore, by removing a key American deterrent, current and future adversar ies may become more aggressive. Oslo Treaty The policy to eliminate cluster muni tions was America’s buy-in to the Convention on Cluster Munitions signed in Norway in 2008, commonly referred to as the Oslo Treaty. The treaty has two aims: first, to reduce unintended harm to civilians by minimizing the indis criminate effects of area fires (intend ed to inundate a target area greater than 200 square meters with explosive destruction) on the battlefield. Area fires are more likely to cause collateral damage and civilian casualties. The second aim is to eliminate the large amount of unexploded sub-munitions, or bomblets, commonly found in areas where cluster munitions have been fired. Up to 5 percent of bomblets from cluster munitions may not explode when fired, which can wreak havoc on local civilian populations for years. In response, the Oslo Treaty prohibits signatories from manufacturing, ac quiring, distributing or using cluster munitions. Although the United States is not a signatory to the treaty, the Bush Administration supported the spirit of the treaty, as does the Obama Administration. The Bush Administra tion directed DoD to implement a pol icy to meet the intent of the treaty but to do so without giving up a key capability for an interim period while the services determine how to replace the capability. The DoD policy began to take effect in

2009. All munitions that could not achieve an unexploded ordnance rate of less than 1 percent (which includes all U. S. artillery munitions) were imme diately placed under the release au thority of the combatant commander. No artillery cluster munitions were fired in Operation Iraqi Freedom fol lowing the end of the forced-entry phase of operations (declared by President George W. Bush onboard the USS Abraham Lincoln May 1, 2003) or in Operation Enduring Freedom. The pol icy gave the services a 10-year grace period to determine the requirement for a replacement, conduct research and development, and acquire enough new munitions. To date, the services, with the exception of the Army, have failed to accom plish any of these activities, despite a clause within the policy that acknowledges the importance of this capability. The policy states: “[T]here remains a military requirement to engage area targets that include massed formation of enemy forces, individual targets dis persed over a defined area, targets whose precise locations are not known, and time-sensitive or moving targets. Cluster munitions can be the most effective and efficient weapons for engaging these types of targets.” The State Department agrees. A State Department Webpage explains: “Cluster munitions have demonstrated military utility. Their elimination from U. S. stockpiles would put the lives of its soldiers and those of its coalition partners Continued on Page 41

Figure 1. DPICM M483A1 area effects. Targets Personnel

• Destruction, neutralization, suppression

• Large targets (platoon, company, battalion)

• Crouching, hasty targets

• Stationary or moving

• Fighting position without overhead cover

• Observed or unobserved Tanks

• Neutralization and suppression

• Formations or individual targets

• Stationary or moving

• Defensive or non-defensive posture

• Observed or unobserved Armored personnel carriers

• Neutralization and suppression

• Formations or individual targets

• Stationary or moving

• Defensive or non-defensive posture

• Observed or unobserved Trucks

• Formations or individual targets

• Stationary or moving

• Observed or unobserved Field artillery

• Destruction and suppression

• Area targets (platoon, battery)

• Counter-battery fire

• Stationary, moving, fleeting

• Observed or unobserved Air-defense artillery

• Observed or unobserved Effects The projectile is equipped with a time fuze set to release the cargo at the recommended height above the target and saturate the area with bomblets. The M483A1 carries 88 bomblets (with a shaped charge for armor penetration), each with a lethal radius of about 10 square meters. The dispersion area is one to three hectares, but ideally one hectare. Shaped charges that strike an armored target create a metallic jet that perforates the metallic armor. Generally, 10 or more bomblet strikes are required for an armored-vehicle kill, but one can result in a firepower or mobility kill. Bomblets detonate at surface level. The detonation and most fragmentation travel downward, so most lethal effects are close to the surface. Sweet spot Target

Posture Remarks Personnel (multiple) 1m-250m Crouching 1 st volley HE/VT, 2 nd volley DPICM APC (multiple) Unobserved Moving Saturation of area with shaped charge Artillery (multiple) >100m Fleeting Counter-battery fire at risk. Moreover, cluster munitions can often result in much less collateral damage than unitary weapons, such as a larger bomb or larger artillery shell would cause, if used for the same mis sion.”1 (italics in the original) Specifics of cluster munitions The U. S. Army developed anew war head for its Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System that will service large, soft-skinned area targets such as en campments, infantry in the open and truck formations. But this munition is allocated to corps and division level and may not always be readily avail able to tactical formations at brigade, battalion and company level. For land forces at the tactical level of engagement, the most important sys tem today for prosecuting area targets is the 155mm artillery Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) M483A1 (Figure 1, previous page). The projectile is equipped with a time fuze set to release the cargo of sub-munitions at the recommended height above the target (which varies based on the size and density of the target as well as on the number of howitzers available to mass fires on the target) and saturate the area with bomblets. The M483A1 carries 88 bomblets (with a shaped charge for armor penetration), each with a lethal radius of about 10 square meters. The dispersion area is between one to three hectares2 depending on the height of burst. The higher the height of burst, the broader the dispersion. Harder targets require denser dispersion. Shaped charges that strike an ar mored target create a metallic jet that perforates metallic armor. Some mod ern medium battle tanks of many advanced states (i.e., North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Russia, China, etc.) can take the hit, but others cannot. Generally, 10 or more bomblet strikes are re quired for an armored-vehicle kill, but a single bomblet can result in a fire power or mobility kill. Bomblets deto nate at surface level. The detonation and most fragmentation travels down ward, so most lethal effects are close to the surface. Cluster-munitions elimination studies The Army has conducted four studies and the Marine Corps has conducted one study in 2009, 2010, 2012 – and two in 2014 – to determine the opera tional risk associated with the loss of cluster munitions. Norway conducted a study of its own in 2008 that is argu ably the best of all analyses conducted so far. None has been conclusive or de finitive. All the studies found that there is some reduction in U. S. artillery kills of enemy forces with the removal of cluster munitions. But they don’t agree how large that reduction would be. Estimates range widely from as high as 25 percent to as low as 4 per cent. In the most recent Army assess ment, the lethality of Army artillery actually improved when cluster munitions were removed. What accounts for the erratic results and the inability of the Army and Marine Corps to come to terms with whether or not to invest in a replace ment? The answer is a disagreement about the nature of warfare the United States is likely to encounter today and in the future. All the Army studies have focused on hypothetical regional despots with outdated equipment and doctrine based on Soviet-era technology and principles. The hypothetical enemies lack air parity with the United States. Therefore, all these scenarios assume U. S. air dominance. These studies further assume that these hypothetical enemies have learned the lessons wrought twice on the Iraqi army: namely, the use of Soviet-era armor technology in combined-arms maneu ver against the United States military is a really bad idea. Therefore, the Army cluster-munition assessments assume there will not be many “area tar gets.” In the most recent assessment, the un classified report stated: “[B]ased on intelligence analysis, the following guidance was used to model the behavior of current and future threat in the study: with the exception of a slow-moving medium armor threat, no oth er cluster-munition-designed targets (area targets) are present in the current or projected operational environment within the selected study scenar ios.” Unfortunately, the Army studies contain flaws. None of the Army studies considers the possibility of peer or near-peer competitors. All the studies assume no disruption to friendly-force Global Positioning System (GPS) technology. On a strategic level, all the studies ignore the deterrent effect this capability might have on potential ad versaries’ “go-to-war” calculus. Finally, the studies disregard recent technological advances made by potential peer competitors – such as Russia and China – in both cluster munitions and sensor-fuzed weapons (weapons that seek and guide to specific types of targets). Russia and China are not eliminating their inventory of cluster munitions. Furthermore, none of the Army stud ies offers any qualitative analysis, such as the use of cluster munitions to prepare areas of the battlefield for as sault; shape areas of the battlefield by using cluster munitions for harassment or area denial; and allocate limited ar tillery assets to support various units during a battle (perhaps leaving others without any artillery support other than their organic howitzers). The studies are based strictly on quantitative analysis derived from modeling and simulation and provide only nu merical results, such as reductions in enemy casualties or increases in friendly losses. Qualitative analysis could provide additional important op erational considerations such as:

• The psychological effect on the en emy’s continued will to fight, particularly after witnessing the dev astating effects of cluster munitions on adjacent units.

• The shaping effects of the munition on the enemy’s ability to maneu ver or occupy terrain that can influence enemy decisions and actions on the battlefield.

• Employment of the cluster muni tion based on unavailability of oth er fire-support assets due to other f i r e - s u p p o r t p r i o r i t i e s. Despite these shortcomings, the stud ies have still validated the U. S. Army’s Continued from Page 39 Continued on Page 44

Figure 2. HE point detonation/quick (precision or near-precision). Targets Personnel

• Destruction, neutralization, suppression

• Point targets

• In fighting position with overhead cover or hard-point

• Observed with low TLE Tanks

• Neutralization and suppression

• Individual targets

• Defensive or non-defensive posture

• Observed with low TLE Armored personnel carriers

• Neutralization and destruction

• Individual targets

• Defensive or non-defensive posture

• Observed with low TLE Trucks

• Individual targets

• Observed with low TLE Field artillery

• Individual targets

• Observed with low TLE Air-defense artillery

• Observed with low TLE Effects The M795 HE projectile has a high-fragmentation forged steel body. It is filled with 24 pounds of cast explosives. When used in point-detonation mode, the fragmentary effects are most lethal within 25 meters. The concentrated explosive (pressure and heat) effects when employed on or very close to targets are devastating. A combination of good TLE and CEP (PGK and Excalibur) is used to concentrate effects directly on hardened, stationary, singular targets. Because of the reduction in impact variability, precision and near precision are less effective against imprecisely located or moving targets. Effective against stationary medium-armored and soft targets. Sweet spot Target

Posture Remarks Personnel <10m Hard Bunker, building, fighting position

<10m Stationary Ideal for precision/near-precision High-value target <10m Stationary Personnel, vehicles, equipment, etc.

Figure 3. HE variable time/proximity (near-precision, area). Targets Personnel

• Destruction, neutralization, suppression

• Large targets (platoon, company, battalion)

• Standing and prone targets

• Stationary or moving

• Fighting position without overhead cover

• Observed or unobserved Tanks

• Formations or individual targets

• Stationary or moving

• Defensive or non-defensive posture

• Observed or unobserved Armored personnel carriers

• Formations or individual targets

• Stationary or moving

• Defensive or non-defensive posture

• Observed or unobserved Trucks

• Destruction and neutralization

• Formations or individual targets

• Stationary or moving

• Observed or unobserved Field artillery

• Destruction and suppression

• Area targets (platoon, battery)

• Counter-battery fire

• Stationary, moving, fleeting

• Observed or unobserved Air-defense artillery

• Observed or unobserved Effects The M795 HE projectile has a high-fragmentation forged steel body with the same aerodynamic profiles as DPICM. It is filled with 24 pounds of cast explosive fill. When used variable-time or proximity mode, the fragmentary effects are lethal out to 100 meters. The explosive (pressure and heat) effects are diffused because it detonates relatively high above the ground for best fragmentation. Combination of good TLE and CEP (PGK) are used to efficiently saturate targets (areas) with fragmentation. HE VT is a viable munition for area, high TLE and GPS-denied environments but with reduced effects and higher number of volleys required for similar targets. Not effective against armored targets. Sweet spot Target

Posture Remarks Personnel (multiple) 1m-250m Prone 1 st volley HE/VT, 2 nd volley DPICM APC (multiple) Unobserved Moving Saturation of area with shaped charge Artillery (multiple) >100m F l e e t - ing Counter-battery fire investment in precision technology over the past 10 years. However, these investments, numbering into the sev eral billions of dollars, are unfortunate ly heavily reliant on GPS technology and assume the availability of GPS sig nals against all adversaries. If adversar ies are able to somehow render GPS unavailable, the vast majority of precision advantage the U. S. Army enjoys will cease to exist. That said, those advantages are signif icant and prolific with considerable secondary benefits, such as reducing the risk of collateral damage and civilian casualties in major combat opera tions. They are the basis for under standing the argument against pursuing an artillery cluster-munition re placement. There are three main areas of improvement: the ability of forward observers to determine a precise GPS location of targets; the ability of munitions to guide to a precise grid location; and the ability of indirect-fires platforms to determine a precise grid for their own location. These improvements to artil lery technology, together with dominance of the air and enemy reluctance to mass and maneuver against U. S. forces, is what has led to assessments that show minimal impact with the loss of artillery cluster munitions. It is important to note that none of these improvements account for moving tar gets or large massed targets, both of which are by definition imprecisely located targets. None of the assessments conducted have included an enemy capable of challenging U. S. air dominance, put GPS availability at risk or field ground-force technology equal to or superior than U. S. ground forces. The Norwe gian military assessment of cluster munitions conducted in 2008 did consider peer competitors for obvious reasons. That assessment disclosed that traditional cluster-munition target sets could now be more effectively prosecuted using non-cluster munitions due to improvements in precision and in creased effectiveness of unitary HE ar tillery projectiles. For example, the ability to actually strike a target with the first round fired and the ability to tailor munition effects by using fuze settings that vary detonation to a height of burst, point detonation or de layed detonation significantly improve lethality (Figures 2 and 3). Capability gap However, reliance on precision creates anew capability gap when prosecuting hardened targets that cannot be pre cisely located (i.e., armored fighting vehicles and tanks) (Figure 4). Cluster munitions, with their saturative effects, were designed for exactly this purpose. Furthermore, the effective ness of engaging concealed, hardened targets is reduced when using unitary munitions. Potential consequences include decreased lethality, increased munitions expenditure and increased targets requiring engagement with di rect-fire weapon systems, thus increas ing risk to Soldiers and Marines. Mitigating capability gap Thankfully, there may be a means for closing the gap against imprecisely located hardened and armored targets that does not involve a one-for-one re placement of the stockpile of cluster munitions currently in the inventory. The answer may be sensor-fuzed mu nitions. This is a family of munitions employed by firing them in an area where enemy vehicles are thought to be located; the munition fuze will then seek out objects on the ground for which its sensors are designed. Having located a target, moving or stationary, the munition then guides to and deto nates precisely on the target using its own sensors and without reliance on GPS. The United States fielded such a munition to great effect during Operation Desert Storm in the form of Sense and Destroy Armor (SADARM). However, the munition was not pursued be cause at the time the large quantities of cluster munitions made the acquisi tion of this relatively expensive bou tique munition unaffordable. That calculus has changed. The num ber of SADARM-type munitions that would be required in today’s war re serve would be comparatively small – probably less than 10,000 – because of the relatively small number of targets that would be needed against the low likelihood of a conflict within which such weapons would be employed. This solution would do nothing to mitigate the decreased effectiveness against soft area targets, but with more reliance on corps, division and direct-fire assets, it is safe to assume U. S. ground forces could probably accept the associated risk. Conclusion Artillery cluster munitions continue to be a highly effective capability when employed against the right target types under the right conditions. No amount of quantitative analysis against less-than-peer competitors will illustrate the overall risk to U. S. and coalition ground forces when artillery cluster munitions are no longer available. What the sum of U. S. and internation al assessments has confirmed is that technological advancements have greatly reduced the need for cluster munitions and, when taken in the con text of collateral damage, it just makes sense to phase out this capability. However, doing so creates more operational risk in our ground forces that has been mitigated by cluster muni tions since the 1970s. Advances in precision technology, coupled with development of anew sensor-fuzed artillery munition, will not only close the gap but will arguably increase the lethal effectiveness of ground-force indirect fires. LTC Mike Jacobson is a fire-support analyst at the Army Capabilities Integration Center, Headquarters U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Eustis, VA. He also commands 55th Special Troops Battalion, an Army Reserve battalion based at Fort Belvoir, VA. Previous assignments include Army human-terrain team leader, Task Force Helmand, U. S. Forces Afghanistan, Helmand Province, Afghanistan; and executive officer, 437th Civil Affairs Battalion, Fort Story, VA. His military schooling includes Intermediate-Level Education; Combined Arms and Services Staff School; Human Terrain System Course, Fort Leavenworth, KS; Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course, Fort Sill, OK; and Field Artillery Basic Course, Fort Sill. LTC Jacobson holds a bachelor’s of science degree in political science from Christopher Newport University and a master’s of arts in Continued from Page 41 international relations from Old Dominion University. His awards include the Bronze Star. This article is adapted from an article that appeared in War on the Rocks (www.warontherocks.com), a platform for commentary and debate on Acronym Quick-Scan strategy, defense and foreign affairs. Used with permission. Notes 1 http://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/ c25930.htm; accessed Sept. 10, 2014. 2 A hectare is 100 meters by 100 meters. DoD – Department of Defense DPICM – Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition GPS – Global Positioning System HE – high explosive SADARM – Sense and Destroy Armor TLE – target-location error Figure 4. Matching artillery munitions to targets and conditions.