Lessons from Exportable Combat Training Center Rotation 14-02

With the successful conclusion of a combined Reserve Component (RC) and Active Component (AC) combat train ing center (CTC) rotation, the Army Total Force Policy (ATFP)1 has a major victory on its path toward being fully manifested. The training event, clearly replete with intrinsic value, was in fact the seed of something much greater: the initiation of a partnership joining Active and Reserve components into a singular force. Background In May and June 2014, 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division’s 1st Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment Desert Rogues slugged it out with Tennessee’s 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) Sabers at Camp Shelby, MS, as part of Exportable Combat Training Center (XCTC) Rotation 14-02. The exercise was a proof of principle for multi-component integra tion and 278th’s annual training (AT). The results were exceptional, resulting in both units being undeniably better trained for war. We will highlight the tremendous benefits of this experi ence in this article as lessons-learned to be shared among the force. This article views the XCTC from the lens of the AC, specifically 1-64 Armor, a combined-arms battalion. The bri gade combat team (BCT) partnership program sees 28 National Guard (NG) BCTs partnered with 20 AC BCTs. Of the 20 AC BCTs, 50 percent are either ar mored BCTs (ABCTs) or Stryker BCTs, who will glean directly applicable les sons from this article. Regardless of the BCT type, however, most of the les sons-learned and best practices are universal. XCTC is not anew training model; the XCTC concept and application have been around since 2005.2 The differ ence in this particular event was the 278th commander’s directive to train in the decisive-action training environment (DATE), which necessitated a mechanized/motorized opposing force (OPFOR) not easily replicated by con tract support. This necessity fashioned an opportunity to fully meld the AC/RC in a premier training event. This par ticular mission set created a window where we were able to see the XCTC’s genesis and to plan for future oppor tunities.

Lessons learned Lesson 1: Use the Army Synchroniza tion and Resourcing Conferences (AS RCs) to seek out XCTCs for your forma tions early and do not be confined by the “partnership patch chart.” Early planning enabled through ASRCs will create the greatest situational under standing, allow the greatest level of synchronization for AC and RC stake holders and enable both parties to exploit the greatest number of training opportunities. Division operations officers and mission-support-element G-3s should not underestimate the val ue of XCTCs for tactical-level units. As the ATFP expands and evolves, OPFOR troop lists for partnered NG brigades may not be able to be fully resourced by their doctrinally aligned partner AC BCT. G-3s should seize opportunities to “round out” troop lists for XCTCs for di visions whose BCTs cannot fill the requirement. In recent history, 1-64 Armor has not deployed to Camp Shelby and was therefore wholly ignorant of this regional training center’s massive capabilities across virtually all the warfighting functions. Lesson 2: Widen the range fans for your training event beyond the XCTC script and sharpen your mission-essential task list (METL) skills. As the name implies, XCTCs will not occur at the “dirt CTCs.” XCTCs will occur, for the time being, at RC regional training sites such as Camp Shelby Joint Forces Training Center in Mississippi and Camp Atterbury Joint Maneuver Train ing Center in Indiana. AC units are not subject to limitations on the number of allowable training days, as RC units are. AC units should arrive early and exploit training opportunities resident at these highly capable training sites. The 1-64 Armor, for example, was able to conduct gunnery-skills test training and gunnery Table I using a Camp Shel by motorpool; unstabilized gunnery for the scout and distribution platoons; rifle-squad Tables I-VI; gunnery Table II for one tank and one mechanized infantry company; and tank-gunnery sus tainment training using the Mobile Advanced Gunnery Training System in the week before the XCTC. Other resources available at Camp Shelby that 1-64 Armor did not have an opportunity to use, but which illustrate other significant capabilities at locations such as Camp Shelby, were the Medical Simulation Training Center, Close-Combat Tactical Trainer and a multipurpose range complex, to name a few. Units need to understand that XCTCs will occur during AT periods and train ing centers will be very busy with oth er units, so coordinate early. The bot tom line is that AC units will seldom have such nearly uninterrupted time “away from the flagpole” to exploit such a myriad of resources; make the most of it and be aggressive! Logistic lines of communication will be a major concern for any unit operating more than 300 miles (average cruising range and one-day planning factor for the M1088 tractor-truck3) as it plans how it will sustain itself. Camp Shelby is about 550 miles from Fort Stewart, GA. With only one organic battalion (-) in the field, daily military long-haul for resupply was impractical. Lesson 3: Take required classes of sup ply and sustainment enablers and identify local assets, too. Our parent brigade, 2 ABCT (Spartans) set up our battalion for success in several ways. First, the brigade-support battalion Figure 2. A platoon of M1A2 SEPV2 main battle tanks surges out of the wood line after an attack mission. Both 278th ACR and 1-64 Armor became adept at maneuvering their platforms in the heavily vegetated areas of Camp Shelby. (Photo by SPC Merrick Harding, 1-64 Armor)

17 (BSB) deployed a support-operations officer (SPO) liaison with our pre-de ployment site survey (PDSS) team. This lone Army captain paid huge dividends and laid the foundation for what was a well-resourced mission as he gained the initial understanding of what Camp Shelby could provide sustainment-wise. His personal reconnaissance formed the basis for our concept of support. As an example of what units may have to plan for, we deployed one entire container of Class III package products (petroleum, oils and lubri cants) to ensure effective operation of our equipment. Second, based off the type of forma tion we are and the vehicle density we enrolled on the Deployment Equipment Listing (20 M1A2SEPV2, 27 M2 series family of vehicles, five M88 Hercules and two M1064 mortar carriers – about 3/5 of the battalion’s total roll ing stock and many containers), our parent brigade and BSB (26 BSB) provided us with two critical assets. We received a “Supply Support Activity (SSA) Forward” Class IX sustainment package housed in an M1087A1 that consisted of 113 lines of property and line replaceable units (LRU) totaling $3,165,690.19 dollars’ worth of property. During our rotation, we con sumed $523,708.22 dollars’ worth of the SSA Forward, resulting in 17 vehicles repaired. The other critical asset was the Direct-Support Electronic Test Set (DSETS) van and a two-Soldier team that 26 BSB de ployed with us. The DSETS team was another homerun as they repaired 29 LRUs over 30 days, resulting in 20 pacing items repaired. We would not have been able to sus tain 278th ACR’straining without both these assets. Third, our forward-support company (FSC) commander and the BSB SPO shop designed a unique parts-delivery arrangement using a system of scanned purchase requests and FedEx. Purchase requests were generated for ward, signed by the battalion commander and/or the battalion executive officer, approved by the home-station brigade, resourced from SSA Rear or Forward, and then processed for shipment via FedEx from Fort Stewart to Camp Shelby. Using this system, we re ceived 14 push packages (combination of one freight shipment and 13 over night shipments), resulting in 26 pacing items repaired. The one improvement we would offer to this system is to make it available over weekends and holidays when home-station installa tion activities are closed but deployed units are still training and generating logistics requirements. Under the theme of “identify local lo gistic enablers, too,” we did not fully exploit a key asset: the Maneuver Area Training and Equipment Site (MATES). MATES – which was established to preposition selected pieces of combat and tactical equipment – provides as sets to units conducting AT and inactive-duty training at Camp Shelby.4 MATES are found on many NG training sites. In essence, MATES is akin to the blue and gold fleets from National Training Center days of old. The fleets are not unassigned equipment; rather, certain RC units are “donor” units whose stored equipment, with proper coordi nation, can be requested using a Forces Command (FORSCOM) 156-R form. With proper coordination, equipment can be signed for to support a unit rotation, and reimbursement may be achieved through the use of a DD448 form, the Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request. MATES have an exceptional level of maintenance capability that units will likely need to call upon. Depending on where units train, MATES may offer other services, too. Some sites allow units to sign for property ranging from OE-254 frequency-modulation communications antennas to ground-mounted machineguns to M1 tanks. Some sites allow units to conduct maintenance training on site, side by side with MATES personnel. The point is, as part of a units’ planning and PDSS, a visit to the MATES to meet the superintendent is a must. XCTC was a genuine deployment for 1-64 Armor. We deployed 203 items consisting of 168 pieces of rolling stock and 35 containers, 500 Soldiers, two field-service representatives and one logistics-assistance representative. We used multi-modal systems of deploy ment, including air, rail, bus and line-haul. Lesson 4: Train special teams in advance, rehearse critical home-station deployment events and engage rele vant home-station deployment points Figure 3. An Abrams tank moves into the attack position just before an attack mission. (Photo by SPC Merrick Harding, 1-64 Armor) of contact early in planning. To deploy successfully, the single capability units can’t do without is the unit-movement officer (UMO). Go beyond just having a single UMO; create as much depth as you can. We used an S-3 liaison-officer (LNO) lieutenant and our fire-support officer as the battalion UMO team (both were school-trained). One seem ingly small issue such as a frustrated Forward Repair System will temporarily consume one UMO; having two dedicated UMOs maintains momentum. Companies must have at least one UMO but should try to have two. Early on, we requested that a brigade LNO be assigned the XCTC mission as our link to the division and installation. Immediately, the LNO established two critical linkages for the battalion. First, he got the brigade movement officer abreast of our requirements, who in turn built our strawman deployment timeline and communicated our re quirements to the Division Transporta tion Office (DTO) and the installation’s Unit Movements Branch. Getting divi sion and installation visibility on our mission well in advance proved vital and eliminated almost all last-minute turmoil. Lastly, the LNO actually deployed with the unit (keeping the Spar tan brigade abreast of our requirements), developed branch plans and facilitated redeployment. The DTO performed analysis and deter mined that it would actually be more cost-effective and time-efficient to contract rail-load operations on the near and far end. As a result, once ve hicles arrived at the rail-marshalling areas (RMA) at Fort Stewart and Camp Shelby, rail upload and download proved to be an anti-climactic nonevent. The two highest-payoff home-station events were the scaled deployment exercise (DEPEX) and the subsequent movement-preparation activities (MPA) operation. The DEPEX was scaled due to time. We were not able to perform a full load-out, but we recommend doing so if time is available. We loaded out one type of each vehi cle and one type of each container to proof systems, test UMOs and build re liable deployment-planning factors. Each company had load-out require ments that, again, tested and trained UMOs, and identified to battalion UMOs where they would have to place more emphasis. The DEPEX addressed the overall deployment sequence – including pax manifesting and verifying bus rosters – and therefore included a rehearsal of the critical MPA opera tions. The MPA operation preceded move ment to the RMA and was done ac cording to 3rd Infantry Division’s de ployment handbook/standard operat ing procedure. Institutionally, we had not performed this type of event in many years; the requisite skills had atrophied badly, and for many personnel were non-existent. The use of the multi-station MPA process greatly re duced the number of frustrated vehicles at the RMA and, again, made RMA operations an anti-climactic event. As part of the deployment sequence, companies were “missioned” to per form specific critical tasks. The FSC, for example, had responsibility to run the MPA. Company C ran RMA operations at Fort Stewart, and Company D ran RMA operations at Camp Shelby. This enabled the battalion to maintain focus on the big picture while the companies ensured smooth operation of individual steps in the sequence. Units that fail to deploy do not fill the annals of history. Those annals may be filled with units that failed to deploy smoothly and de ployed with extreme frustration, b u t gen era l l y speaking, we all make it to the fight – eventually. Lesson 5: Heed Lesson 4 so you can focus on the reason you are go ing to XCTC in the first place: to build combat skills and readiness. The commander was very concerned that, due to the lack of institutional knowledge on con ducting this sort of deployment, we would have major issues with the deployment sequence. Therefore, we focused an inordinate amount of energy in this area – at the expense of so lidifying and preparing for our “box” training objectives. Do not underesti mate the level of concurrent activity that Army formations can sustain. Battalion-sized elements can easily do five things at once – and do them well. Our deliberate shift to intensely focusing on the training objectives came too late and resulted in delayed achieve ment of advanced-level tactics. Lesson 6: Request First Army observ er-coaches/trainers (OC/T) to get the most from your training. It is an old adage in the Army that training that is not observed is not training. For an XCTC, there is no reason for that to oc cur. First Army has a robust and highly capable contingent of OC/Ts. We were outfitted with a complement of ser geants first class and captains assigned to all our companies and platoons. Their focus on the fundamentals of doctrine and obvious grooming as OC/ Ts significantly increased our training progression. Tactical lessons Over the course of 30 continuous days of operations in a DATE environment, we identified many tactical lessons-learned. Following are just a few. Mission command: Troop-leading Figure 4. A foreign-language speaker from 1-64 role-plays as an enemy prisoner of war for Saber military-police Soldiers. (Photo by SPC Merrick Harding, 1-64 Armor) procedures (TLP) are a highly perishable skillset; repetition is the key to success. TLPs started at extreme sub-par levels but rapidly improved due to repetition and OC/T coaching, with one notable enduring shortfall. Unlike traditional “dirt CTC” rotations, the XCTC’space was not as extreme and allowed just enough time between iterations/lanes to train TLPs correctly. This thoughtful exercise-design model proved critical in allowing platoon leaders an appropriate amount of time to “re-do” TLPs and “see what right looks like first” to prepare quality orders while progressively refining operations-order (OPORD) delivery techniques. What we never fully achieved was the use of platoon standardized hard-copy pre-formats for OPORDs. The use of platoon formats down to tank-commander and squad-leader level allows the platoon leader to give his finished order to his subordinates, who can then copy it down on their pre-format prior to the actual order. Then, during the OPORD, instead of furiously trying to copy the OPORD (and missing large portions of it and the intent), subordinates can actually pay attention to the platoon leader’swords and movements as he briefs and indicates key locations on the sand table, map, etc. Mission command: When you tell company-level leaders to “focus on TLPs,” specify which step; we selected the warning order (WARNO) and OPORD. Our assessment was that the crucial step in TLPs was the WARNO. The WARNO is your first and best chance to achieve parallel planning, which in turn enables doctrinally correct pre-combat checks as well as the initial understanding of mission vari ables. Next, we assessed that the order itself, “the plan,” was the second most important step. Either the OPORD is the foundation of mission success, or it is where the train starts coming off the tracks – depending on its quality and delivery. Lieutenants need massive repetition to become expert at this skill, but the one real nugget we (re) discovered is an old one: keep the plan simple. If no one can remember the plan, there is no plan. Mission command: Use doctrinal principles to frame operations first; the troops on the ground will figure out the tactics, techniques and proce dures (TTPs) on their own. First Army trainers were extremely helpful as they coached during hotwashes and after-action reviews. Before conducting a defense, avoid letting leaders delve into the TTPs of building target-reference points, decoys, etc. Instead, teach them first to consider how their plan will address the characteristics of the defense (disruption, flexibility, maneuver, massing effects, operations in depth, preparation, security and syn chronization); the TTPs will come after that. In other words, don’t pick curtains for a house that isn’t built yet. Mission command and intelligence: Leverage old and new technology to get the best picture on the ground. Young leaders with experience in Iraq and Afghanistan have become adept at employing imagery to provide precise views on objective areas and to assist in conducting intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Sustain this tactic but combine it with the requisite Military Grid Reference System (MGRS) maps that enable controlled movement into the objective area and accurate calls for fire. When possible, make this the map set on Blue Force Tracker (BFT).

Regarding maps, we saw initial resistance to making use of detailed graphic control measures (GCM) on MGRS, imagery map sets and BFT. GCMs are vital for controlling and syn chronizing forces, describing the situ ation to higher echelons and enabling fire distribution and control. Graphics became a reportable and inspectable item. Mission command and sustainment: Use the Combat Service Support Automated Information System Interface (CAISI) to increase your efficiency and timeliness of logistics reporting. We did not employ our CAISIs but wish we had. Our logistics reporting was essentially done using old and drawn-out processes of sending reports back with the daily logistics packages. If units do not employ their CAISIs, they are accepting the condition of no digital connectivity between battalion- and company-level command posts (CP) except BFT. Battalions possess only one CP node (CPN) dedicated to the main CP and one Very Small Aperture Terminal dedicated to the Standard Army Maintenance System clerks. It is essentially implied that either your other nodes (combat-trains CP (CTCP), unit-maintenance collection point, etc.) will either be consolidated with the main CP and will leverage the battalion’s CPN for digital connectivity, Figure 5. A mortar crew from 1-64 Armor fires in conjunction with 278th‘s fire-direction center. The 1-64 Armor was able to make use of the varied live-fire and other training facilities available at Camp Shelby to target METL tasks. (Photo by SPC Merrick Harding, 1-64 Armor) or they simply won’t be able to use the Army’s Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T). Using the CAISIs alleviates this and enables companies and other entities such as the S-1, S-4 and medical platoon to leverage WIN-T and tap into systems like Electronic Military Personnel Office, Battle Command Sustainment Support System and Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced. A battalion not using CAISI directly erodes – or at least delays – BCT-and-above situational awareness and understanding of subordinates’ needs and status. Mission command: With the advent of the FSC, the role of the headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) commander is largely undefined in a DATE scenario. Determine a role for your HHC commander early so he/she understands his/her task and purpose and how he/she enables the battal ion. Prior to modularization, the field-trains CP was the HHC CP, and the HHC commander provided the oversight for logistics from the brigade-support area to the combat trains. Now the FSC commander is clearly the best choice to perform this task, and the battalion essentially has an extra company-level CP and commander to employ as the battalion commander sees fit. The HHC commander, in our case, was used to provide oversight for the CTCP and to supervise the training of the scout pla toon and sniper section. But the real lesson is that the role of the HHC com mander will not be fixed; what we did was based off mission-specific factors, not a doctrinal model. Final lesson: Make the XCTC experi ence a means to an end, not the end. Our goal is to use the relationships we built with 278th ACR at Camp Shelby to serve as a springboard for a true, last ing partnership. Our goal moving for ward is to attend leader-professional-development sessions together, enable subsequent RC AT, share TTP, establish recurring touchpoints and develop long-range training calendars that see integration of each other’s key events. For our part, we are already working to see how we can integrate into an up coming 278th warfighter exercise. In short, quoting former FORSCOM com mander GEN Daniel B. Allyn, “The key is to leverage our collective leadership capacity to make us all better.” XCTCs will most certainly change in the future; the Army is always changing. Clearly, though, this is a major opportunity for all parties involved – that fact is not changing. XCTCs provide a chance to train the way most com manders have always wanted to: free, unrestricted and with more than adequate resources. It’s a chance to solid ify our AC/RC partnerships, and it’s a chance to build overflowing confidence at the individual Soldier and platoon level. It’s a chance to be better prepared for war. LTC Sean Hunt Kuester commands 1st Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment, 2nd ABCT, 3rd Infantry Division. His past duty assignments, all at Fort Bliss, TX, include installation G-3; brigade execu tive officer, 4th Brigade, 1st Armor Division; brigade operations officer, 4th Brigade, 1st Armor Division; and battalion operations officer, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor Regiment. His military schooling includes Command and General Staff College, Armor Captain’s Career Course, Close Quarters Battle Course, Armor Officer Basic Course and Army Airborne School. LTC Kuester holds a master’s of arts degree in human relations from Oklahoma University and a bachelor’s of arts degree in history Figure 6. An M1A2 Abrams main battle tank moves to a firing position in a gunnery-qualification exercise during an XCTC at Orchard CTC in Idaho Aug. 18, 2014. XCTCs, which provide a cost-efficient, time-efficient option for delivering combat-readiness training to Soldiers at or near their home stations, are a chance to train the way most commanders have always wanted to: free, unrestricted and with more than adequate resources. They are also a chance to solidify AC/RC partnerships. (Photo by SGT Leon Cook, 20th Public Affairs Detachment)

For more discussion of the future of armored warfare, please also see “Whither Armor?” by retired COL Clint Ancker III, published in ARMOR’s November-December 2012 edition, http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/eARMOR/content/ issues/2012/NOV_DEC/Ancker.html. from The Citadel. MAJ Nathan Guthrie is an infantry officer serving as 1st Battalion, 64th Armor’s executive officer. Previous assignments include brigade plans officer, 2nd ABCT, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart; worldwide plans officer-in-charge and team leader, Joint POW/ MIA Accounting Command, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, HI; company commander, companies C and HHC, 1-506th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade, 101st Airborne (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY; and assistant S-3 and plans officer, 1st Battalion, 61st Cavalry (Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition), 4th Brigade, 101st Airborne (Air Assault). His military schooling includes Field Artillery Officer Basic Course, Infantry Captain’s Career Course, Intermediate Level Education and Ranger, Airborne and Air Assault schools. MAJ Guthrie has a master’s of business administration, with a concentration in international business, from Hawaii Pacific University and a bachelor’s of arts degree in business management from Norwich University. He is the recipient of the Bronze Star, Defense Meritorious Service Medal and Meritorious Service Medal. Notes 1 Secretary of the Army, 2012. 2 SRI International, 2014. 3 Federation of American Scientists, Military Analysis Network, 1998. 4 Mississippi National Guard, 2010. ABCT – armored brigade combat team AC – Active Component ACR – armored cavalry regiment ASRC – Army Synchronization and Resourcing Conference AT – annual training ATFP – Army Total Force Policy BCT – brigade combat team BFT – Blue Force Tracker BSB – brigade-support battalion CAISI – Combat Service Support Automated Information Systems Interface CP – command post CPN – command-post node CTC – combat training center CTCP – combat-trains command post DATE – decisive-action training environment DEPEX – deployment exercise DSETS – Direct-Support Electronic Test Set DTO – Division Transportation Office FORSCOM – (U. S. Army) Forces Command FSC – forward-support company GCM – graphic control measure HHC – headquarters and headquarters company LNO – liaison officer LRU – line replaceable unit MATES – Maneuver Area Training and Equipment Site METL – mission-essential task list MGRS – Military Grid Reference System MPA – movement-preparation activities NG – National Guard OC/T – observer-controller/ trainer OPFOR – opposing force OPORD – operations order PDSS – pre-deployment site survey RC – Reserve Component RMA – rail-marshalling areas SSA – Supply Support Activity SPO – support-operations officer TLP – troop-leading procedures TTP – tactics, techniques and procedures UMO – unit-movement officer WARNO – warning order WIN-T – Warfighter Information Network-Tactical XCTC – exportable combat training center Acronym Quick-Scan