Peer-Competitor Conflict: The Franco-Prussian War Robert W. Lamont

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States has stood alone at the top of the world in superpower status. Our forces have answered the call to engage insurgent and terrorist forces around the globe. In so doing, our nation has gained a talented, courageous and experienced cadre of combat veterans. The Defense Department has also benefitted – this period of open-ended conflict has seen DoD receive significant financial support for the better part of a decade. While we can never be sure of what the future will hold, it seems clear that in an ever-shifting national agenda consistent with a pluralistic political process, the availability of resources for defense will decline, not expand. The purpose of this article is to review the conditions that resulted in the demise of Imperial France and look for parallels in our national position as we enter the second decade of the 21st Century. We should reflect with a sober caution that the French let a similar superiority to our current one slip away in the span of only a decade.

It is incumbent upon anew generation of company-grade officers dutifully focused on the immediate dangers once called “low-intensity combat” to mature into field-grade staff planners who define and shape the defense establishment for future decades. The challenges on the path forward will include fewer resources, an ever-increasing rate of technology change and a more diverse population to mold into our next fighting force. The new generation of company-grade officers will also have to guard against the timeworn tendency of all military establishments to prepare for the last conflict based on personal experience as opposed to the developing threat on the horizon. Prelude to defeat As Imperial France watched the 1860s end, she stood confident as the European continent’s major military power. She triumphed over both Russia and Austria the previous decade and boasted of an experienced regimental cadre, who had been in constant small actions in Africa since the 1830s. Yet, by the summer of 1870, she was defeated in a decisive battle at Sedan by an up-start antagonist that only 10 years earlier lacked both military might and political unity.

France’s complete collapse at Sedan was not just a failure of the military command but also the result of a deeply flawed military system. As Michael Howard noted in his study of the Franco-Prussian War, the military system of a nation is not an independent section of the social system but an aspect of it in its totality.1 The social and economic developments of the past 50 years had been brought about by military advancements and the industrial revolution. The Prussians kept up with this change, while France had not. These changes occurred on three main fronts: the theory of warfare, strategic mobility and a marked increase in tactical firepower.

The protracted campaigns of the first Napoleonic wars provided European military scholars ample operational examples to explore warfare at many levels. Jomini, Willisen, Rustow and Clausewitz all emerged during this period with insightful theories on the conduct of war. However, Clausewitz came to the forefront of Prussian military thought and provided the unifying concept that empowered the Prussian military to operate at the higher levels demanded of large-scale conflict. The introduction of the telegraph and railways changed the strategic operational landscape by improving the ability of army commanders to concentrate their forces where needed. The German rail network improved the economic unity of the nation and its total industrial potential. Also, this rail network allowed Germany to exploit its central position and shift and mobilize troops where needed.2 The telegraph provided the means to coordinate these movements. The combination provided the ability to move supplies in sufficient quantities to meet the larger demand of the forces in the industrial age.

At the tactical level, the introduction of breech-loading weapons impacted both small arms and cannon design of the conflict. The Prussians introduced a breech-loading Dreyse needle-gun as early as 1843. During the conflict with Austria in 1866, they were able to exploit a prone firing position and obtain a six-fold firing rate at a range of 600 yards that drove the muzzle-loading opposition from the field.

In contrast, the French bureaucracy delayed the fielding of this small-arms technology. Concerns about using too much ammunition, lack of testing and the promise of better designs around the corner all served to slow production. This bureaucratic resistance was coupled with the mistaken general belief in the army that French morale would win the next war, not improved weapons.

Peer-Competitor Conflict: Franco-Prussian War by Robert W. Lamont When Antoine Alphonse Chassepot developed a rubber seal forming a gas-tight rifle breech, he was able to both decrease the caliber so soldiers could carry more rounds and extend the range out to 1,600 yards. It took Napoleon III himself to override administrative objections and place the rifle into production.3 Top-level leadership demanded that the French armaments industry overcome the ponderous ordnance machinery to ensure they would have a top-quality rifle. No such intervention was forthcoming on the cannon side of their ordnance development. “La Gloire Militaire” (military glory) preoccupied the French leadership. They believed that marshal prowess would carry the day and, in so doing, they overlooked the significance firepower improvements would have on the tactical level. For example, the French fielded a 26-round rapid-fire weapon called the mitrailleuse. This precursor of the machine gun could generate large volumes of direct fire and disrupt assaults by cavalry or infantry. However, the French classified this weapon with the artillery and, in so doing, reduced the number of cannons available. Also, the French preferred bronze guns over their steel counterparts – this was based on early fielding problems with the steel breech-loading cannon, but both the British and German gun-makers had eliminated most flaws. Consequently, the Prussian cannon had twice the range of the French. In addition, French time-fuses could be set only for 1,200 and 2,800 meters, while the German percussion-fuses suffered no such limitations.4 In one final sense of irony, Krupp, the renowned German cannon-maker, attempted to sell the French a breech-loading cannon, but Marshal Edmond Leboeuf rejected the idea to protect Schneider’s fledging works from the ill effects of a communist strike.5 One final organizational difference between these two antagonists was the Prussian general staff. This body was focused on the study of war by analyzing the past and anticipating the future, and was chartered to provide field commanders information and advice. They looked at the mobilizations errors of the 1866 Austria conflict for better methods to move the army forward. They detailed the problems of rifled firearms’ lethality and increased dispersal on the battlefield in updated tactical manuals.

Equally important, the general staff was the point of entry for common tactical thought. The chief of the general staff trained subordinate staffs to react to unexpected situations as if predicated on a scientific background. This gave the Prussian army a flexibility and unity of purpose when operating on a dispersed battlefield their French counterparts couldn’t match.6 The way these small differences in force structure would play out under the pressure of contact was striking. War phases The Franco-Prussian War divided into five phases. The first was the mobilization phase, which brought the armies forward to execute their battle plans. The second phase was initial contact along the frontier. The third phase was the investment of the Metz fortress and isolation of half the French field armies. This was followed by the decisive battle at Sedan. Finally, these open contests gave way to a prolonged series of siege and guerrilla warfare that characterized the French’s last attempts to reverse the outcome established in the opening month of the war. While first contact took place during a skirmish near Saarbruck-en Aug. 2, 1870, the opening battle along the border occurred Aug. 6, 1870, at Spinchern and Froschwiller (Worth). These two engagements illustrate how the weapon systems of the antagonists interacted within their respective tactical designs over the course of the conflict’s first month. Essentially, the outcomes of these early battles set the stage for the entire campaign in terms of opposing-force positions and total-force morale. A more detailed look at the southernmost of these two battles fought on the approaches to the Vosges barrier at Froschwiller provides an instructive look at how the Prussians were able to maintain their advance, penetrate this obstacle and keep pressure on the defenders.

Prior to the initial contract between the two forces, the French army was one force under the direct command of Napoleon III, who had established his headquarters at Metz. Given the scale and distance involved, this approach for centralized control was deemed unworkable and, on the verge of conflict, the army’s command structure was reorganized. The 1st, 5th and 7th Corps were placed under the control of 1st Corps commander GEN Pa-trice de Mac-Mahon on the right side. On the left, 3rd Corps commander GEN Achille Bazaine was given control of 2nd, 3rd and 4th Corps. Napoleon III retained control of the 6th Corps and Empire Guard. These new commanders were given no more staff resources or control over the administration functions for their organizations.7 While French doctrine was rooted in the decisive results achievable through offensive action, this did not translate well to actions observed along the frontier during the conflict’s opening stages. With the notable exception of 2nd Corps, the French were passive across the front and assumed a defensive posture to develop the situation and determine what course of action their Prussian counterparts were adopting. In 1st Corps’ area, they established strong positions on the eastern side of the Vosges slopes. Mac-Mahon placed his four divisions about 20 miles apart to allow space for each to forage from the countryside. This was a natural outcome given the weakness of the French supply system and its inability to keep provisions flowing. Spacing the corps in this manner precluded mutual support between the divisions and explained how the Prussians were able to concentrate four corps against a single defending division for the opening engagement.8 At the tactical level, the local unit commanders failed to make the best of their time to prepare their defenses for the upcoming assault.

The Froeschwiller ridge was a natural defense system that facilitated crossfire from the spurs that extended down from the main ridgeline. This high ground overlooked a mile devoid of concealment to the Sauerbach River. One weakness in the line was above the village of Morsbronn, where the forest cut into the fields of fire, complicating proper deployment. Poor intelligence regarding Prussian intentions led Mac-Mahon to disregard the threat of imminent attack. This helps explain why the French did not dig in or post sentries.9 The battle opened with inadvertent contact between the French outpost in Worth and advanced elements of the Prussian V Corps. The Prussians opened with cannon fire and sent the forward French back to their main line. The II Bavarian Corps and Prussian XI Corps, hearing the cannon fire, marched to the sound of the guns, placing three corps in motion toward the Froeschwiller ridge.

As the lead Bavarian troops crossed the open ground in front of the French, they were able to drive them to ground with Chassepot rifle fire. This first attack disintegrated into a single unsupported skirmish line that was unable to carry the ridge.10 In an attempt to decide the issue, the French deployed their cannon and fired on V Corps in the valley at the same time the XI Corps was deploying to their left. As this corps was coming into line, their guns were moved forward and quickly silenced the French batteries. While V Corps was unable to progress, they took on the task of holding the French defenders in position by placing all their artillery into the line and engaging the defenders on the ridge. This cannonade silenced the opposing guns and energized the commanding Prussian general to push forward 42

Date Battle engaged Losses French engaged Losses

Troops

Troops

Pr / Fr Battle of the frontier – Phase I Aug. 6

(Worth) 125,000 8,200 1,373 46,500 10,760 6,200 0.56

45,000 4,491 29,980 1,982 1,096 1.58 Metz isolation – Phase II Aug. 16 Mars-La Tour 75,000 17,000

90,000 16,000

1.06

Aug. 18

200,000 20,000

125,000 12,000

1.67 Battle at Sedan – Phase III Aug. 30

3,500

7,500

0.47 Sept. 1 Sedan 185,000 9,000

120,000 12,500 21,000 0.27

Total 0.93 Table 1. Battle summary Phase II through IV. Note: Data for Battle of Sedan from Howard. Others from Morris and Dupuy. with V Corps while XI Corps attempted to envelop the French flank. Only through hard-fought counterattacks by the French Zouaves and cuirassier cavalry were the defenders able to retain their ground against XI Corps’ flank threat. By late afternoon, the II Bavarian Corps had crossed the difficult ground on their right flank, placing the defenders in a double envelopment.11 With the Prussians able to dominate the field with cannon fire and their numbers able to maneuver the French out of their defensive position, the issue was certain and the pattern set for the opening stages of this heated conflict. In reviewing the opening battles of the Franco-Prussian War, it is interesting to note that the French were able to hold their own in head-to-head engagements with their Prussian infantry counterparts. Table 1 shows key battles during the early phases of the conflict. The Prussian-to-French exchange ratio means numbers above one are a marked advantage for the French; those under one indicate the Prussians inflicted more damage on their opponent. In our battle, the Prussians were able to hold the field and secure a large number of prisoners, which tends to distort their performance. When these prisoners are removed from the figures, the exchange ratio becomes a more representative.88, which is consistent with the overall campaign. In fact, it is not until the Prus- sian army engages the undertrained mass conscripts of the French national reserve in and around Sedan that the exchange rates swing strongly in their favor. How Prussians won At the tactical level, range and lethality determined the outcome. The French dominated the small-arms battle with a rifle that had twice the range and more accuracy than its Prussian counterpart did. The introduction of the rapid-fire milraileuse reinforced their ability to dominate the battle line in an infantry-centric struggle. However, the Prussian field cannon was able to outrange, more accurately fire and dominate rate of fire over French artillery. The lethality of their fuse system gave them a wider degree of freedom in employment and ensured they could respond on a wider array of tactical and terrain conditions. The ability of Krupp guns to restore movement to failing skirmish lines, pin defenders in place and silence their opponents (milraileuse and cannon) gave the Prussians the ability to maneuver and exploit their advantage in numbers when possible. (See Table 2.) In short, this conflict gave rise to combined arms that would continue into the modern age. Finally, the Prussians’ consistent ability to generate more combat power at the point of attack was an indication of superior staff Table 1. Battle summary Phase II through IV. Note: Data for Battle of Sedan from Howard. Others from Morris and Dupuy. Dupuy.

Side Name Type Range (m) RoF Caliber mm Fuse

Needle gun Rifle 10-12 0.61 15.4 None French

Rifle 1,200 10-12 0.43 None French

Auto 2,000 0.51 None French Lahitte Cannon 3,000 (-)

Krupp 6-pounder Cannon 4,500 (+)

Impact Table 2. Weapon-system characteristics. Table 2. Weapons-system summary work conducted by a dedicated corps of scientifically trained planners empowered by a common vision and strong professional drive. The Prussian general staff was under the strict tutelage of Helmuth von Moltke. He recruited outstanding cadets from the Kriegsakademie by examination. He kept them under close observation on staff rides, training and planning performance. All these officers rotated in and out of regimental duty prior to promotion to ground their theoretical knowledge with practical experience.12 By the late 1860s, the general staff reorganized into two sections: the “main establishment” and the “support establishment.” The main establishment was focused on training and preparation for wartime operations. This organization was further divided by geographical locations: Russia, Scandinavia and Southwest Europe; Germany, Italy and Switzerland; France, Britain and the West; and railroads. (It is interesting to note that an entire general-staff section focused on the leading strategic-mobility technology of the day.)

The support establishment took on scientific and academic tasking. Chief among these were military history, geographical statistics and topographical studies.13 This body would plan and disseminate to lower-level staff the details needed to mobilize and sustain their armies more effectively than their opponents. To those of us who have worked our way through the material shortages of the pre-Reagan build-up and the personnel challenges of the pre-drug-testing military, many of these issues have a familiar ring to them. The Prussian model of combined-arms integration, technology exploitation and superior staff planning through the study of history and the application of scientific technique should command our attention as we look beyond our current operational commitments to future strategic challenges. Only by deliberate and purposeful preparation will our nation stand ready to emerge from a resource-constrained peacetime establishment and face the next peer-competitor on the international stage.

Retired U. S. Marine Corps LTC Robert W. Lamont served as an exercise action officer for III Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa, Japan, planning Tandem Thrust in Australia and Cobra Gold in Thailand. Other assignments included operations analyst in the Studies and Analysis Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, completing analyses for anti-armor force structure, combat identification and the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle. He also served as a tank company commander and assistant operations officer with 3rd Tank Battalion, Twentynine Palms, CA. His service afloat includes executive officer, Marine Detachment, USS Constellation, and combat cargo officer, USS Cleveland. His military schooling includes the Basic School, Quantico, VA; Armor Officer Basic Course, Fort Knox, KY; and Armor Officer Advanced Course, Fort Knox, KY. He holds a bachelor’s of science degree in management and technology from the U. S. Naval Academy and a master’s of science in operations research from Naval Postgraduate School. He is a silver-level member of the Order of St. George.