Walk and Shoot: Training Fires in Support of Maneuver
Article
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We discovered that the walk-and-shoot comes in many forms. It serves as a building block in developing the relationships and skill sets necessary for a BCT’s maneuver leaders and fire supporters to maximize all forms of contact with the enemy in high-intensity conflict. The Ironhorse Brigade used a three-event crawl, walk, run progression to develop the walk-and-shoot training event and to certify leaders. This article will detail the three events and provide some lessons-learned to help other units improve on our concept.
First exercise The 1st BCT, 1st Cavalry Division, conducted two walk-and-shoot training exercises in the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2011. The first walk-and-shoot was the culminating event for the brigade’s fire-support team certification. All company FISTs participated in a lane incorporating organic M120s (120mm mortars) from each FIST’s battalion and M109A6 Paladin (155mm field artillery, self-propelled) support from 1st Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery.
The event focused on echeloning and shifting fires as the maneuver element approached the objective. Three phase lines were established. FISTs were expected to echelon and shift fires at each phase line, which notionally represented minimum safe distances upon approaching the objective. While it is unlikely that most fire supporters will ever do a textbook echelonment of fires in combat, doing it in training presents soldiers with complexities that help them to gain greater mastery of the concepts necessary to successfully integrate fires and maneuver. During the first walk-and-shoot, range-control constraints required us to stay 1,000 meters from impact, but this distance was much closer than many fire supporters had experienced and allowed them to get a feel for what it’s like to be close to incoming rounds. The primary objective in this training exercise was to learn the importance of assigning and maximizing priority of fires for an asset whenever Walk-and-Shoot: Training Fires in Support of Maneuver by CPT Erik Sewell 34 possible by using triggers. Initially, several FISTs began their missions with PoF for an asset but did not take the time to lay the guns on a priority target beforehand. When it was time to initiate fires on a preplanned target, the guns would take longer to shoot because they hadn’t been instructed to lie on the target. Until the teams mastered these types of concepts, they struggled to keep continuous suppression on the objective as they maneuvered.
Second exercise The Ironhorse Brigade’s second iteration of the walk-and-shoot was the culminating event for our maneuver-shooter program. The target audience for this training event was maneuver-company commanders/scout platoon leaders and their fire-support officers. The scenario for this lane was much more involved than the first, including a full battalion maneuver operations order with accompanying target-list worksheet and fire-support execution matrix.
Organic M120s, M109A6s and attack-aviation teams from 227th Air Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, supported this training event. The attack-aviation teams consisted of AH64s firing 30mm cannons and 2.75-inch rockets, and UH60s shooting door gunnery.
The maneuver commander developed a company scheme of maneuver, incorporating direct-fire engagements, fire-control measures and intelligence preparation of the battlefield. The FSO was required to develop a scheme of fires that integrated into the commander’s maneuver plan. The scenario presented several planned targets in addition to several targets of opportunity. It was open-ended as much as possible so maneuver elements had the opportunity to use fire-support assets as they saw fit to develop their engagement areas.
Creating a scenario that allows events to occur simultaneously and non-sequentially allows the participant to have a more realistic training event that can test his maneuver and fires plan while forcing him to adjust the plan when he comes in contact. If the events in the scenario are set in one order, the training event becomes a series of fire-support tasks and loses the intended effect of teaching participants how to integrate fires and maneuver effectively.
The key tasks trained during this exercise included:
• Echelon fires on immediate threats while maneuvering to an objective;
• React to contact by calling marking smoke rounds and adjusting close-combat attack on enemy threats;
• Obscure enemy observation assets with smoke;
• Call for and adjust fire on targets of opportunity; and
• Execute final protective fire. However, the most important task (which was implied) was integrating triggers from the maneuver commander’s plan into the actual coordination of fire-support assets.
Challenges and considerations During development of the first two walk-and-shoot exercises, we struggled over deciding whether trainees would maneuver mounted or dismounted. Although dismounted during the execution, many individuals commented that the training would have been better if performed in their combat vehicles. There are advantages to conducting a walk-and-shoot dismounted. In a dismounted setting, planning is simpler and only requires a small training area. Conducting the lane dismounted also provides a more intimate setting for mentoring and professional development. Conversely, conducting the walk-and-shoot while mounted allows trainees to gain confidence and proficiency on their designated platforms. During the second walk-and-shoot, each company commander, with his FSO, participated in the lane under the battalion S-3’s guidance. The 1st BCT commander, COL Scott Efflandt, spent an hour walking side-by-side with each team on the lane. The walk-and-shoot was a rare opportunity for the company commanders to spend time with their senior trainer in an operational setting. The battalion OPORD given to company commanders in the second walk-and-shoot was written for a heavy combined-arms battalion facing a mechanized enemy force. The maneuver commanders had to jump from planning amounted fight to dismounted maneuvering during the training event. This caused some confusion as to the proper approach to the event.
Lessons-learned
Our take-away is that training fires and maneuver in a dismounted setting has benefits and helps trainees learn the basics, but it is best to train as you fight. As a heavy BCT, our future walk-and-shoots will incorporate our organic maneuver platforms.
Include attack aviation. Adding attack-aviation assets to the walk-and-shoot exercise exponentially increases the training’s value. Air-to-ground integration requires much more thought about the area of operations as a three-dimensional environment. Airspace-coordination areas and gun target lines become much more important to the ground commander when aviation is on station. This type of training develops an appreciation for fire-support coordination measures in the maneuver commander’s thought process. Observers with limited experience controlling attack-aviation assets tend to let the Apaches “do their thing” without giving the pilot a clear picture of the situation on the ground. After practicing, our observers became more skillful at giving aviation assets effective task and purpose. The participants learned that most pilots’ primary focus is receiving an accurate location of friendly troops and establishing a target using friendly location as a reference.
It seems intuitive, but early in the training many ground controllers struggled to provide pilots enough information to paint a clear picture of ground activity. Controllers either gave too little information or overcomplicated the process by giving pilots directions in miles rather than giving them a cardinal direction. Successful observers generally used simplistic walk-ons, using cardinal directions and distances from mark to target (i.e., north of mark, 100 meters) or orientation based off the observer’s/Apache’s location (i.e., three vehicles in the open, attack vehicle furthest away from my/your current location).
Also, to avoid fratricide, controllers must understand it is crucial for the pilot to acknowledge the location of friendly positions before authorization to engage targets.
Exercise at platoon level. The next step and the third event in our development of the walk-and-shoot concept was to incorporate multiple fire-support assets into platoon live-fire exercises and/or Table 12 gunnery. The 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, 1st BCT, conducted a platoon LFX incorporating all organic direct-fire assets and 120mm mortars in addition to M109A6 support from 1st Battalion, 82nd FA, and AH-64 support from 1st and 4th battalions, 227th Air Cavalry Brigade. All these assets supported a quick-reaction-force mission, which provided the platoon leader and his fire supporters an impressive array of firepower to manage. The platoon’s mission involved:
• Moving from a forward operating base to the objective;
• Assaulting (dismounted) the objective while M1A2 Abrams, M2A3 Bradleys and M1114 up-armored humvees provided support by fire; and 35
• Engaging the enemy from defensive positions.
The platoons generally excelled at these tasks and were very fluid in their ability to maneuver on the battlefield. By far the most challenging aspect of the exercise was the air-to-ground integration and clearance of fires handled between the platoon leader and FIST team. Range restrictions required all direct- and indirect-fire assets to cease fire when aviation was cleared for attack, so the platoon leader and the FIST team had to talk constantly to control and mass their firepower effectively. Each platoon leader had to decide how he wanted to employ and control his assets. Some platoon leaders preferred to control attack aviation themselves. Others preferred to focus on the ground fight and task the FIST team to control aviation assets. Both ways worked for some and did not for others. In the end, we found it is more effective to find someone who is comfortable controlling aviation than to assign a certain position the task.
Target leader/FSO relationship. A walk-and-shoot can be designed for different target audiences, but we found one of the best targets for this training is the company commander/FSO relationship. Many company FSOs and company commanders commented on the value of the opportunity to plan realistic maneuver and fires together for the first time. This allows the FSO to prove himself to his commander as they work together in their intended relationship for the first time. The same principle held true in the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, platoon LFX between the platoon leader and FIST team. During the platoon LFX, many platoon leaders discovered the lethality potential that fire supporters bring to their platoon when employed effectively. Coordinate early with Range Control. One of the greatest challenges in developing a walk-and-shoot is to develop a scenario that allows each individual observer freedom to create a unique scheme of maneuver and fire-support plan. Live-fire in range training areas will always involve constraints that must be deconflicted. Sometimes these constraints can be manipulated to replicate FSCMs, but often they serve only as training distracters. Therefore it is important to establish a positive working relationship with Range Control to mitigate range constraints as much as possible. Fort Hood Range Control played an integral part in the development of the walk-and-shoot concept. They attended many in-progress reviews and constantly advised us on ways to maximize our capabilities in the range training area.
When developing a walk-and-shoot, it is important to approach initial planning by building a robust scenario instead of asking for the capabilities of a specific range. Our first event was very restricted because we crammed it into one range. When we described the type of event we wanted to Range Control for the later progressions, they were able to help us build a better training event using a number of ranges together.
Desired end state The desired end state of our walk-and-shoot training progression is threefold:
• That FISTs begin to master fire support as a dynamic task instead of sitting on a stationary observation post calling for fire;
• That maneuver elements develop an understanding of what capabilities fire support brings them on the battlefield; and
• That maneuver elements start to think about methods of employing fires into their scheme of maneuver, as opposed to thinking of them as a separate entity operating independently on the battlefield. Using our training model, BCTs can train fires in support of maneuver in a crawl, walk, run-phased training campaign. In the crawl phase, FISTs must become competent using triggers and managing multiple fire-support assets. The walk phase must combine fire supporters and maneuver leaders learning to integrate fires into maneuver plans. The walk-and-shoot concept we’re developing is the ideal tool to train the first two phases and advance to the run phase, which occurs when multiple fire-support assets are integrated into the maneuver training of a platoon-sized element or larger.
Conducting all the prerequisite training to get to this phase of training most likely requires more than 12 months’ dwell time to accomplish. As low-intensity conflict winds down, dwell time increases and our Army prepares for the next high-intensity conflict, the training concepts outlined here can help our Army be successful in the future.
CPT Erik Sewell is a student at the Field Artillery Captains’ Career Course, Fort Sill, Okla. He has served as battalion FSO, platoon leader and fire-direction officer, and will be assigned to 41st Fires Brigade at Fort Hood, TX, following graduation from the captains’ career course. His military schooling includes the Field Artillery Basic Course and the Joint Firepower Course at Nellis Air Force Base, NV. He holds a bachelor’s of science degree in engineering management, U. S. Military Academy, West Point, NY.
BCT – brigade combat team FA – field artillery FIST – fire-support team FSCM – fire-support coordination measure FSO – fire-support officer LFX – live-fire exercise OPORD – operations order PoF – priority of fires Acronym Quick-Scan
Citation
CPT Erik Sewell. “Walk and Shoot: Training Fires in Support of Maneuver.” ARMOR, November-December 2011, pp. 34-36.
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