Clausewitz’s Theories of Fog and Friction of War: Are they Obsolete in the Realities of the Computer Age?

Over the past 15 years, a growing number of opinions have surfaced in military communities to suggest that some of Carl von Clausewitz’s theories may no longer be valid. The purpose of this article is to determine the effect current technology has on the fog and friction of war. Despite increasing the precision of lethal effects and access to timely information, computer-age warfare remains subjected to Clausewitz’s theories of friction in war, in that modern armies still operate at the mercy of intangible and uncontrollable factors such as the weather, adaptability of the enemy, and fallibility of the human dimension, which Clausewitz illustrates in his definition of friction. Despite popular notion, Clausewitz never actually defined a separate, distinct concept known as the “fog of war.” In On War, book 1, chapter 7, “Friction in War,” Clausewitz attempts to explain why real war diverges from the ideal war that strategists design on paper. In real war, there are immeasurable, uncontrollable factors that can alter the course of a campaign. These include adverse actions of individual soldiers, weather, responses of society, and counteractions of the enemy. Commanders will try to influence or mitigate these factors, but will never fully control them. Clausewitz categorizes this lack of control as “friction.”1 Taking the entire chapter in context, the reader can deduce that Clausewitz was really describing the intangibles of the operating environment. He wrote that “friction… is everywhere in contact with chance and brings about effects that cannot be measured.”2 To illustrate this concept to readers of his day, Clausewitz describes the effect of weather on the battlefield. Nineteenth-century military leaders would have understood how fog reduces the visibility of the enemy, causes weapons to malfunction, and delays reports to the commander. However, fog was just one illustration that worked for Clausewitz. What matters is how we interpret this illustration to understand his concept of friction; unfortunately, the popular argument is that an increased flow of accurate information on the battlefield and the precision of modern tools have reduced this friction. However, this interpretation of friction is too literal, too narrow, and ignores the ground truth.3 The truth is that despite technological advances, armies of the computer age still operate at the mercy of the weather and other intangibles in the operating environment. It is true that communications technology has expanded our understanding of the battlefield and our weapons are more efficient in the modern age, but are still susceptible to the elements. For example, Blue Force Tracker and other digital assets fail without cooling systems in extreme heat; our attack aviation cannot fly in low-visibility conditions caused by frequent dust storms in desert environments; tracked and heavy combat vehicles find themselves mired in mud after heavy rains; tank targeting systems are rendered useless by fog despite thermal imaging; and most of our radio equipment is still affected by storms, line-of-sight terrain, and solar activity. Clearly, physical weather continues to have a considerable effect on our modern equipment. Even so, physical weather is just one example of the unpredictable factors of war. Cyberspace contains its own virtual weather system. Clausewitz describes action in war like movement in a resistant element, like walking in water.4 The computer age has delivered massive flows of information that can become great tides of white noise through which commanders must swim to make sense of their operating environ-Napoleon retreating from Moscow after a disastrous French invasion of Russia. 44 Gari Melchers, Mural of War, 1896.

ment. This would be tolerable if our automated systems kept up with our expectations, but they do not. Commanders are inundated by e-mail and other automation systems nearly as often as they are enabled by them. Still, weather and intangibles are just the beginning of friction. These abrasive points would be nothing, if they were not exploited by an enemy. Armies of the computer age still face adaptable enemies. Our enemies have not only adapted to the physical battlefield, they have altered the battlefield in cyberspace. Even before 9/11, Osama Bin Laden understood that “rhetoric and satellite propaganda can be on equal footing with unmanned bombers and cruise missiles.”5 When al-Qaeda’s base of operation in Afghanistan was physically squeezed, its terrorist network virtually expanded operations by increasing its global reach through cyberspace.6 Cyber-terrorists even have the ability to shut down emergency services and entire power grids in the Continental United States without firing a single shot.7 By exploiting our dependency on automated systems, our enemies can inflict deadly effects without detection. Our military effectiveness in cyberspace is still trying to catch up with our evolving understanding of the environment and threat. In contrast, we are quite comfortable operating in the physical environment and believe that advances in technology have given us a marked advantage over our enemies. However, adaptive enemy deception tactics have periodically mitigated our command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), and precision weapons advantages. No one will deny the usefulness of modern enablers on the current battlefield. Nevertheless, precision does not necessarily equate to battlefield dominance. In 1999, NATO flew more than 11,000 strike missions against Serbian forces. Using satellite and aerial imagery, NATO combat forces claimed they had destroyed 120 tanks, 400 artillery pieces, 200 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 5,000 to 10,000 Serbian troops. NATO peacekeepers had a different story on the ground. Serbian forces used decoys and repositioned previously destroyed vehicles to deceive NATO air assets. In the end, the reality was that less than 20 tanks and a “few dozen” other vehicles were destroyed.8 The enemy has also adapted by exploiting our reliance on using precision weapons to reduce risks in the commitment of ground forces. For example, at the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, coalition forces (CF) targeted Iraqi ammunition supply points for precision strikes to reduce the threat of Iraqi artillery strikes on CF. Although the ammunition supply points were precisely hit and reported destroyed, the effects actually scattered munitions. Without the commitment of ground forces, these scattered munitions later became raw materials for improvised explosive devices (IEDs).9 Even with precision munitions, the effects can be precisely wrong. Likewise, we must remember that precision warfare is still conducted by imprecise humans. Modern armies are still susceptible to the fallibility of the human dimension. In The notion that modern technology has rendered Clausewitz’s theories of fog and friction obsolete is unfounded. Intangible and uncontrollable factors, such as weather, enemy actions, and human failures, will continue to cause friction in the 21st century. As such, commanders must be able to exploit current capabilities, anticipate limitations in the operating environment, and safeguard technological vulnerabilities on the modern battlefield. Notes 1Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Indexed Edition, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Parret, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1984, pp. 119-121. 2Ibid., p. 120. 3Ibid. 4Ibid. 5Marc Lynch, Al-Qaeda’s Media Strategies, National Interests Online article, 1 March 2006, available online at http://national interest.org/Article.aspx?id=11524, cited from Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2004. 6Ibid. 760 Minutes, “Cyber War: Sabotaging the System, Former Chief of National Intelligence Says U. S. Unprepared for Cyber Attacks,” www. cbsnews.com/stories/2009/11/06/60minutes/ main5555565.shtml?tag=mncol;lst;1, 8 November 2009. 8America’s Defense Monitor, “Lessons of Kosovo: The Limits of Air Power,” online transcript, Show Number: 1248, 8 August 1999, available at www.cdi.org/ADM/1248/transcript.html. 9Defense Talk: Global Defense and Military Portal, “U. S. Contractors Work to Destroy, Recycle Munitions in Iraq,” 14 November 2005, available online at www.defencetalk.com/us-contractors-work-to-destroy-recycle-munitions-in-iraq-4667. 10Bryon York, “Guantanamo and the Question of Terrorist Recruitment,” The Examiner, 24 May 2009, available at www.washingtonexaminer.com/ opinion/blogs/beltway-confidential/Guantanamo-and-the-question-of-terrorist-recruitment- 45969047.html. 11Scott Bronstein and Jamie McIntyre, CNN, “Investigation Reveals New Tillman Questions,” 28 May 2006, available at www.cnn.com/2006/US/05/27/pat.tillman/index.html. 1260 Minutes, “Cyber War: Sabotaging the System.” Major Aaron B. Dixon is currently a student, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. He received a B. S. in civil engineering from the Colorado School of Mines. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Captain Career Course, Scout Platoon Leader Course, and Combined Arms and Services Staff School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include, assistant professor of military science and battalion S3, Colorado State University; assistant brigade S3 (plans), 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Ramadi, Iraq; commander, B Company, 1st Battalion, 37th Armor, Sinjar, Iraq, and Friedberg, Germany; brigade S4, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Friedberg; and assistant brigade S3 (plans), Division Support Command (DISCOM), 2d Infantry Division, Camp Casey, Korea. Battle of White Mountain, 1620, an early battle in the Thirty Years War. describing friction, Clausewitz argues that no component of war is made up of one piece and “each part is composed of individuals, everyone who retains his potential of friction.” In 2003, the adverse actions of a handful of soldiers at Abu Ghraib exploded across the internet and compelled more zealous foreign fighters to engage CF in Iraq.10 We are still feeling the effects today as more detailed evidence of torture is released. In 2004, despite modern communication equipment and state-of-the-art technology, Pat Tillman fell victim to fratricide in Afghanistan.11 In November 2007, one individual with an infected thumb drive enabled the penetration of U. S. Central Command’s operational net and allowed enemy access to ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for at least 3 days.12 The human dimension will always remain a major source of fog and expose systems vulnerability in warfare. 45