Echoes from the Past

“In the past 81 years, warriors in the Armor and Cavalry field have derived many good ideas. Unfortunately, as the lessons from Panama, Desert Storm, and Somalia get farther away with time, many fade into history, along with the totally forgotten lessons from earlier wars. These are the very same lessons we continually learn and relearn at the combat training centers (CTCs).”1 This article is not tactical or doctrinal; it’s the cold hard facts of leadership. It comes from observations over the past 6 years, based on three different organizations and 28 months of deployment to Iraq. Since 11 September 2001, we have raised a whole new generation of very capable combat noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Combat experience is more prevalent now than it has been since the Vietnam War, which is both good bad. From a good standpoint, our troopers have become NCOs and we are passing on the hard lessons learned in combat to our newest troopers. However, from a bad standpoint, many of the basics that our senior NCOs learned from their predecessors are not passed on to new NCOs. Fundamentally, standards and discipline are among these critical shortfalls, as well as other things — now is the time to deal with these issues. Standards and discipline are the foundation of what we do as an Army. When those standards and discipline are compromised, for whatever reason, the organization will suffer. The honest brokers for the organization have gotten lazy: “When unit leaders do not conform to established policies pertaining to the wear and appearance of the uniform, they take away authority from our junior NCOs to make uniform corrections on their soldiers.”2 The honest brokers are the senior NCOs in the unit. This quote originates from the same article where (now) Sergeant Major of the Army Kenneth Preston drew parallels between uniform discipline and other unit deficiencies such as wearing earrings and piercings in violation of Army Regulations, lax safety standards, deficient preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) on equipment, and inattentive weapons accountability. Guess what? Over the past couple of years, the same problems he spoke of 10 years ago have raised their ugly heads. The problem with enforcing standards and discipline boils down to three words found at the end of a quote from Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-2, The Armed Forces Officer, February 1988: “Much has been written about the supposed demise of discipline in the latter stages of the Vietnam War. Cause of the deterioration has been placed largely at the feet of a permissive society. The feet do the walking — the head does the talking. Deterioration of discipline has one root cause… lack of leadership.”3 This article poses that a lack of leadership recurs in conjunction mostly with wars that have dragged on or directly following the end of war. As it happens frequently, all leaders must apply leadership to make positive course corrections. Besides uniform standards, many things suffer as a result of a lack of leadership. Various observations in many units at combat training centers have included disrespecting the flag, disrespecting officers and NCOs, hand-waving risk management, and committing safety viola- 24 tions, including speeding and not wearing seat belts. These deficiencies were often corrected by observer controller-trainers (OC-Ts), but should have been corrected by the NCOs in charge of these troopers. Another universal casualty of deteriorating standards and discipline is maintenance. All you have to do is check an operator’s 5988-E to know whether or not maintenance is being performed. During one training rotation as an OC-T, it became so apparent that PMCS was being overlooked that I began asking to see operator’s licenses, dispatches, and 5988-E forms, which led to the discovery of 34 other M1151s that had not even been dispatched for the exercise. They had been ‘borrowed’ from another unit and never entered into the unit’s unit-level logistics system boxes. Although the problem was fixed within hours, it does not negate the fact that unit leaders failed to ask the right questions or put in place preventive measures to avoid these types of malfunctions. The morning following this incident, as I walked through the unit area in the brigade support area, I saw what appeared to be an operator performing PMCS on his vehicle. As I approached the soldier to congratulate him on his efforts, he gave me a funny look and told me he was not the operator. He clarified, “We are mechanics doing spot checks on vehicles because the engine in one of our vehicles seized up last night due to lack of antifreeze.” I sighed and told him to carry on. Later on, as I passed by again, the mechanic showed me a dry transmission dipstick, which belonged to a transmission that had a Class III leak that had caused the failure. This is indeed the ultimate deadline maintenance — the NCOs in charge did not check or supervise their soldiers in the conduct of a regular daily duty. The lack of pre-combat checks and precombat inspections (PCCs/PCIs) is another frequent problem among units. This can be a single point of failure for an organization and can lead to serious predicaments such as running out of fuel before the mission is complete or running out of ammunition in the middle of a firefight. As leaders, we have all seen deployed units become complacent in conducting PCCs/PCIs; however, to reinforce productivity, leaders should spot check these things from time to time to reinforce the notion of “honest broker.” U. S. Army leaders are moving at a very fast pace while simultaneously fighting two wars and continuing the Army’s transformation. While these things keep us very busy, we need to reestablish leadership of our units; there are no good reasons for abrogating our responsibilities as leaders. Another critical discussion is leaders failing to hold subordinates accountable for shortfalls and deficiencies. During my tenure as command sergeant major (CSM) of 6th Squadron, 9th U. S. Cavalry, we built our squadron from the ground up. I was constantly and consistently making on-the-spot corrections, deficiencies that were happening in full view of NCOs. Instead of one deficiency, there are now several — in addition to correcting the original deficiency, there now exists problems with the NCO and his supervisor. We have NCOs at several levels of the Army to supervise at their levels and learn the next level of supervision (or higher). To reinforce the process of accountability, I enlisted the aid of my first sergeants, who enlisted the aid of their platoon sergeants, and so on, until we were down to the lowest level of leaders. This top-down approach made it clear to our troopers what was expected of them. I also introduced the tenet ‘don’t expect what you don’t inspect,’ into conversations with my NCOs, and soon the squadron CSM was making fewer on-the-spot corrections because his junior NCOs were getting the idea. We also introduced an NCO professional development (NCOPD) program and the first class was made up of all NCOs in the squadron. It was on duties and responsibilities of the NCO and I interwove the squadron commander’s command philosophy into the class. It was lengthy, but drove home the point. Most soldiers do not go out of their way to do the wrong thing; in some cases, you just have to show them what ‘right looks like.’ As a general rule, I never propose micro-management; “The officer must guide his subordinates, answer questions, and supervise them. But over-supervision indicates a basic mistrust and creates undue friction. The officer must learn when it is wise to be present and when to be absent.”4 This is a quote by an officer about an officer, but holds true for an NCO supervising enlisted personnel. NCOs need to set the standard, teach the standard, enforce the standard, and retrain the standard as required. There are times that NCOs will be required to accomplish other missions concurrently and be present elsewhere. If subordinates know that NCOs will check their work, they will most likely do it right the first time. This process of trust builds better relationships and mutual respect between NCOs and soldiers, who will not only complete the mission, but consistently complete it to standard without direct supervision. This relationship is ideal for identifying new leadership prospects among E4s and below. Supervising also implies that leaders will be present to check work; there should be only rare occasions when NCOs are not supervising soldiers and assisting them in mission accomplishment. This method has been tried and true for more Continued on Page 49 “Standards and discipline are the foundation of what we do as an Army. When those standards and discipline are compromised, for whatever reason, the organization will suffer. The honest brokers for the organization have gotten lazy: ‘When unit leaders do not conform to established policies pertaining to the wear and appearance of the uniform, they take away authority from our junior NCOs to make uniform corrections on their soldiers.’ ” 25

Echoes from the Past from Page 25 49

“My many years in the Army have demonstrated that whenever confidence in NCOs is lacking and wherever they are continuously bossed by officers, you have no real NCOs and no really combat worthy units.”13 Are we at this point yet? Of course not; however, leaders must take action to fix what is broken in our formations to avoid dark periods such as post-Vietnam. That means NCOs must enforce and reinforce standards and discipline as set by officers, which means officers must include NCOs as part of the team and allow them to do their job. In Military Intelligence Magazine, Major General Julius Parker stated, “The success of the U. S. Army is directly related to the quality of the professional relationships between its officers and noncommissioned officers.”14 Throughout military history, specifically directly after the Spanish-American War, during the Pacification Campaign of Cuba, to relatively present times, there exists an undeniable pattern that reappears several years at the beginning of a war, at its completion, or within a few years of its completion. Here is how General Carl Vuono sees it: “Noncommissioned officers are the heart and soul of our force. They are the heart because they determine the pulse. …If you look at the history of our Army and you look at the peaks and valleys of the efficiency of our force, look at the status of the NCO Corps at that particular time.”15 In my opinion, we are in a draw, which leads down to one of the valleys that General Vuono spoke of in his collected works. In the following quote, General Creighton Abrams speaks on the improper use of the chain of command, which can be directly equated to over-supervision and lack of trust: “The Army’s readiness depends upon the effectiveness of its leaders and their ‘ready’ spirit. Our leaders function best when the chain of command is used properly. Thus, we must concentrate efforts on making it work; used properly, the chain of command is a lifeline; used improperly, it becomes a choker, snuffing out initiative; it will also throttle the Army’s effectiveness as a fighting force. To be fully ready, the Army must maintain a chain of command, which provides freedom for junior leaders, commissioned and noncommissioned, to make decisions, lead their units, and care for their men in their own way, consistent with professional standards. They must be granted a chance to operate without a senior looking over their shoulders, making decisions for them or second guessing them. …It has been my observation that senior commanders are often surprised at how well their juniors operate when given appropriate freedom. When it frees junior leaders, the chain of command multiplies and enriches their effectiveness. Our readiness to fight depends on the professional ability, experience, and self-confidence of all of our leaders, but especially our junior commissioned and noncommissioned leader, and the strong and responsive bonds of support and encouragement in the chain of command.”16 This passage was written toward the end of the Vietnam War, proving that micromanagement was a fact of life even then, which creates a basic mistrust and undue friction. In 1921, Major B. G. Chynoweth stated, “During World War I, we lost our old noncommissioned officer group. They have become officers or they are gone. Did we appreciate them fully? We must surely do so now. It was they who helped make our tasks so easy before the war. It is their absence that so complicates matters now. …Now is the time to commence the building of the noncommissioned officers for the next war.”17 This statement was made between World War I and II. We currently have much of our NCO Corps intact, but are bleeding them daily. We have some course corrections to make before we lose the old generation of NCOs and the new one takes over. In 1954, at the end of the Korean War, U. S. Army Regulation (AR) 615-15, Enlisted Personnel, published this quote: “The position of respect and leadership accorded the noncommissioned officer in the chain of command depends directly on the degree of authority that he is allowed to exercise.”18 Senior NCOs are responsible for ensuring junior soldiers are held accountable for their mistakes so that we may continue forging that po- “The lack of pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs) is another frequent problem among units. This can be a single point of failure for an organization and can lead to serious predicaments such as running out of fuel before the mission is complete or running out of ammunition in the middle of a firefight. As leaders, we have all seen deployed units become complacent in conducting PCCs/PCIs; however, to reinforce productivity, leaders should spot check these things from time to time to reinforce the notion of ‘honest broker.’ ” U. S. Army Sergeant Drudge inspects his troop’s dog tags, weapons, and equipment during a precombat check, Kirkuk, Iraq. 50 which will be continued far into the future, no matter when we leave this old organization. After World War II, the Infantry Journal had this to share: “Putting stripes on a man’s sleeve doesn’tin itself make him a leader with assurance. The promoted private may have given signs of having the stuff a NONCOM needs. But you, as the leader from whom he has received his authority, are still the man he must look to for his backing and specific instances of the way to lead men. And some company or platoon commanders never seem to learn their own faults of leadership are usually reflected in those of their assistants, though many NONCOMs do rise above ineffectual or uncertain leadership. …Anew NONCOM needs some words of encouragement and advice from you — and he should not have to seek them. As his leader, it’s your job to keep an extra close eye on him for awhile after he is made — and more for the purpose of finding things to explain and praise than to blame. …The way to help him most is by praise within the hearing of his men. …Nothing helps an uncertain leader more than a clearly spoken expression of appreciation.”19 If a leader encourages junior leaders and instructs them, disciplines in private, and praises in public, he can shape a diamond in the rough into a jewel to be admired and emulated by the enlisted men following him. If not, the following quote may ring true within the halls of your organization: “The normal desire of the veteran who has won his stripes by hard service is to support his officers and reduce the friction down below. Whatever is done to lessen his dignity and prestige, damages morale and creates new stresses in the relations between the officer corps and the ranks, and the military machine loses its cushion and becomes subject to increasing shock.”20 So whether it be by micromanagement, stifling initiative, laziness by not enforcing standards, not affording NCOs appropriate degrees of authority and responsibility, not training junior leaders how to lead, not giving NCOs proper resources, or simply not forcing junior NCOs to do the right thing, it all boils down to a lack of leadership on the leader’s part. This problem is nothing new; it has weathered decades of peaks and valleys for more than 235 years. Our NCO Corps is not functioning properly in some areas and many others are at risk; our junior NCOs need guidance and training. They deserve nothing less than what we had as we grew up in the Army. By putting in place a dynamic NCOPD program, paying attention to detail, or simply holding these young soldiers accountable, we can quickly overcome our shortfalls. It will take commitment from our senior NCOs and officers: Lieutenant General Paul E. Funk is quoted as saying, “More than any other group, NCOs ‘made me,’ and I’ll never forget that.”21 Let it always be so; let us heed these “echoes from the past” before the problem gets so out of control that we have to spend years to fix it. “Take a look at your unit and assess its leadership. Are you moving into a valley, sitting in the draw, or on top of the peak? What will you do to start the climb to the high ground to ensure the professional and quality leadership of the NCO Corps that has given us, the United States Army, the ability to make it happen?”22 Notes 1Sergeant First Class Paul E. Thompson Jr., “Light/Heavy Integration at the Joint Readiness Training Center,” ARMOR, July-August 1998, p. 12. 2Command Sergeant Major Kenneth O. Preston, “Uniform Discipline: A Good Indicator of a Unit’s Deeper Problems?” ARMOR, July-August 2000, p. 57. 3Headquarters, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-2, The Armed Forces Officer, U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, 1 February 1988, para 15-6a. 4Major Herald F. Stout, “The NCO Meets His Junior Officer,” The Officer/NCO Relationship: Words of Wisdom and Tips for Success from Senior Officers and NCOs, The Information Management Support Center, Pentagon, Washington, DC, 12 September 1997, p. 2. 5Major General Aubrey S. Newman, “Follow Me,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 1. 6Headquarters, Department of the Army, U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 6-22, Army Leadership, GPO, Washington, DC, 12 October 2006. 7Encarta Dictionary, English, North America. 8General Crosbie E. Saint and CSM George

L. Horvath, “Sergeants Time Paces Readiness in USAREUR,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 27. 9General Bruce C. Clarke, “Clarke of St. Vith,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 24. 10Lieutenant General John M. Schofield, Address to the United States Corps of Cadets, 1879, “Manual for Noncommissioned Officers and Privates of Infantry in the Army of the United States,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 36. 11General Bruce C. Clarke, “Clarke of St. Vith,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 36. 12Sergeant Major John G. Stepanek, “As a Senior NCO Sees It,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 3. 13Marshal of the Soviet Union G. Zhukov, “Reminiscences and Reflections,” The Officer/ NCO Relationship,” p. 24. 14Major General Julius Parker, “Vantage Point,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 39. 15General Carl E. Vuono, “Collected Works,” The Officer/ NCO Relationship, p. 26. 16General Creighton W. Abrams, “Readiness: To Fight A War, To Keep The Peace,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 28. 17Major B. G. Chynoweth, “The Enlisted Apprentice,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 28. 18U. S. Army Regulation (AR) 615-15, Enlisted Personnel, GPO, Washington, DC, 1954, is quoted by General Matthew

B. Ridgway in The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 28. 19“The Noncom,” Infantry Journal, September 1945, is quoted in The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 29. 20Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, “The Armed Forces Officer,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 36. 21Lieutenant General Paul E. Funk, Letter, dated 8 September 1997, The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 38. 22Colonel Michael F. Pappal, senior brigade observer controller-trainer, Joint Multinational Readiness Center. Command Sergeant Major Paul E. Thompson Jr. is currently serving as the command sergeant major (CSM), Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Mustang Team, Hohenfels, Germany. He received a B. S. from Excelsior College and his military education includes the U. S. Army Sergeants Major Academy. He has served in various leader and staff positions, to include interim CSM, 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX; CSM, 6th Squadron, 9th U. S. Cavalry, Fort Hood; operations sergeant major, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor, Schweinfurt, Germany; and first sergeant, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Battalion, 63d Armor, Vilseck, Germany. “Following the Korean conflict General Bruce C. Clarke stated, ‘If you diminish an NCO in public, you’re cutting off your own legs.’ In Army Digest in 1967, Sergeant Major John Stepanek sheds light on why an NCO might fail to provide his best in situations, ‘Remember one thing. Very few noncommissioned officers were awarded their stripes without showing somebody something, sometime, somewhere.’ ” 51