Capitalizing on Stability to Lead Transition in the Rashaad Valley

As we approached Patrol Base Doria, 25 miles south of Kirkuk City, austere and surrounded by Hesco concertainers, I was struck by the proximity of the Rashaad subdistrict council building, which served as the 4th Battalion, 15th Iraqi Army headquarters and the Rashaad police station. They “are all within 100 meters of your hooch,” Captain Jesse Prince, my predecessor, had written me in the weeks leading up to our relief in place (RIP).1 He was correct. Although Doria was lacking some of the amenities the other troops of 6th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, would enjoy on Forward Operating Base (FOB) Warrior, I was grateful for the proximity of my troop’s new home to our soon-to-be counterparts. What Doria lacked in comfort, it would certainly make up for in convenience. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and councilmen were quite literally our neighbors. Captain Prince, the outgoing commander of Apache Troop, 4th Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regiment, seemed to have cracked the code on the direction in which the war was going. Shortly before our troop assumed authority for the area of operations, I asked him, “If you had to choose one thing that would make us successful, what would it be?” After a short pause, he answered quite simply, “partnership.” I would soon learn that although the troop commander’s role in leading partnered missions had diminished considerably in Iraq since my two earlier deployments, there had never been a greater need for a transition troop commander who understood and built on basic relationships, used money as a weapons system, and took full advantage of attachments and reconnaissance capabilities to maximize the potency and effectiveness of combat enablers for our Iraqi brothers. We’re Not in Fallujah Anymore, Dorothy As a veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) I and III, my preconceptions of Iraq were formed in places such as Fallujah and Tal Afar. Fallujah, initially the “wild west” of Iraq, formed my early impressions in 2003 when the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment’s economy-of-force mission in Anbar Province translated to establishing law and order at the platoon and troop level. As a rookie scout platoon leader in 2d Squadron, without even a vague familiarity of doctrinal buzz words, such as full-spectrum operations, it was sometimes difficult to distinguish between offensive, defensive, and stability operations.2 What I did know was that one moment we were securing a vital piece of infrastructure, such as adam on the Euphrates River, and the next, we were engaging in something resembling a firefight with looters directing suppressive fire at us while attempting to make a quick getaway with stolen benzin. On 23 July 2003, I had my first experience with an improvised explosive device (IED) and a blur of 10 months followed, which were marked by raids, counter-IED route reconnaissance missions, and fighting corruption and smuggling. During these 10 months, we became perfectly aware that Iraq lacked a trained, competent, and indigenous security force to claim ownership of its country. We did not fully appreciate the complexity of the tribal structure and the importance of working with sheikhs in 2003. In the wake of a collapsed regime, there was no semblance of governance filling the power vacuum. I remember newly formed members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) casually waving traffic through the heart of Fallujah, with a passivity and complacency that merely reflected a rule of law and institutions that did not exist — and probably would not for some time. My platoon sergeant told me we would be here many years. I did not want to believe him, but stability was clearly lacking as IEDs increased. During my second tour, our squadron returned to Tal Afar, in March 2005, after being redirected from southern Baghdad. As we arrived, IEDs, small-arms fire, and mortar attacks were obviously more prevalent than in 2003 — Zarqawi and al-Qaeda in Iraq were fueling sectarian tensions by pitting Sunni against Shiite. There were certainly more combined operations with the Iraqi Army (IA) than we had seen during OIF I, but the Iraqi police (IP) in Ninewa had abandoned its post in Tal Afar prior to our arrival; it was clear that fear and intimidation — not security — ruled the city. These early experiences shaped my expectations long before deploying to the Rashaad Valley, south of Kirkuk, as commander of C Troop, 6th Squadron, 1st Cavalry, in December 2009. The surge had exceeded popular expectations in creating a stable Iraq and setting the conditions for parliamentary elections, which would take place in March 2010. Security was good enough to capitalize on bringing essential services to the Iraqi people in hopes of perpetuating additional security, increased investments, and ultimately a better quality of life. What was most surprising — and the greatest change from earlier deployments — was the level of independence with which ISF, particularly the IA, were conducting operations. Gone were the unilateral U. S. raids and cordon and search missions involving zip-strips and evacuation of detainees to U. S. patrol bases. We were now almost exclusively executing a follow-and-support mission, where arrests required Iraqi warrants and compliance with Iraqi law. “By, with, and through the ISF” was the catchphrase as we closed Patrol Base Doria at the end of 2009.3 It would remain the slogan until the base closed in June 2010. The Temptation of Mission Creep “You are an enabler, not a battlespace owner, no matter what anyone says. If you understand that and own that role, you will be very successful,” Captain Prince had emphasized prior to his departure.4 Mission creep (the tendency to usurp command authority from the IA leaders we were supposed to mentor) was a challenge he had overcome with his troop, whose role evolved after the security agreement declared U. S. forces were to follow the lead of the IA and do what the Iraqi command wanted to do.5 Not even a month into our deployment, I realized this would be my greatest battle. Assuming a smaller role is often very difficult to accept for most aggressive type-A combat arms officers, myself included. But our Iraqi partners were clearly in the lead, operating independently and consistently, and doing so quite effectively. I was very wary of taking that initiative away from them and injecting myself into the equation, thereby inducing the dilemma of cultural dependency, which the U. S. had struggled to overcome since the war began. But how could I contribute to the cause as a “transition” troop commander? With a more permissive environment that contrasted so sharply with my previous combat tours, what was my role? David Kilcullen believes that “in counterinsurgency, the initiative is everything. If the enemy is reacting to you, you control the environment. Provided you mobilize the population, you will win.”6 Clearly, the 4th IA Battalion had grasped the initiative with the help of Captain Prince’s troop. Now, we needed to maintain that initiative to facilitate a smooth and successful transition and finalize IA control of the operating environment (OE). In an OE where a very proficient indigenous force was already largely holding the initiative for us, the next logical step seemed to be to foster the relationship with that force and reap the benefits. To succeed, we needed to view the ISF as a combat multiplier for our cavalry troop, and they would have to see us as a combat enabler, providing them with the benefits of more technologically advanced equipment and weaponry. Of course, a transition commander cannot start a rela- “I would soon learn that although the troop commander’s role in leading partnered missions had diminished considerably in Iraq since my two earlier deployments, there had never been a greater need for a transition troop commander who understood and built on basic relationships, used money as a weapons system, and took full advantage of attachments and reconnaissance capabilities to maximize the potency and effectiveness of combat enablers for our Iraqi brothers.” 20 tionship with his counterpart under such icy ‘quid pro quo’ terms. Exercising a Common-Sense Approach As a simple gesture, we invited the 4th IA Battalion commander to dinner at our patrol base one evening. During dinner, he paused from his meal to address my soldiers and thanked them for their sacrifices. He then he talked about how the main supply route running through our sector had been the most dangerous in the Rashaad Valley until he had effectively shut down all IED activity! He promised more of the same for our team. Very quickly, a trusting relationship formed, paid huge dividends, and had us working as a team with our neighbors. Such a partnership proved important during our first week in sector when our rapid aerostat initial deployment (RAID) surveillance camera monitor observed a man digging near a road during an odd hour of the night. Picking up the ‘bat phone’ (our direct land-line connected with IA and IP headquarters), we shared the six-digit grid with the 4th IA Battalion tactical operations center (TOC). Within the hour, Iraqi soldiers made contact with the man, who happened to be a farmer digging an irrigation canal during cooler hours of the night, not an insurgent attempting to emplace an IED, as we had suspected. The IA resolved the situation with only a grid from us. Had we reacted instead, we would likely have scared the farmer, immediately been isolated from the population, and yielded no results from a man who was trying to farm his fields with relief from the heat. Like any good relationship, there had to be reciprocation. Logistically, the IA was still struggling to requisition fuel, ammunition, and repair parts, as it had during my previous tours. In this area, we hosted IA noncommissioned officer professional development classes, stressing the importance of paper trails and following up with higher headquarters on supply requests. Our mechanics also helped train the IA maintenance team in the basics of M1114 preventive maintenance checks and services. There are many invaluable commonsense approaches to assist transitioning units. For example, insurgents fire on a Sons of Iraq (SOI) checkpoint and flee; however, the IA security officer manages to recover the shell casings. In this case, our unit would offer to send the casings to a lab for fingerprinting, which certainly aids in prosecution. In the meantime, the commander, 1st Company, detains two individuals he believes are responsible for the attacks. Our unit would arm him with X-Spray and show him how to test the detainees for explosives handling. We would also offer identity detection equipment and search databases for high-value target (HVT) matches. We may have had gadgetry for diagnosing forensic evidence, but one of the most important factors that a competent, indigenous force, such as the 4th IA Battalion, contributed to our initiative was an intimate cultural and tactical understanding of the operating environment. While there was a security vacuum before 4th Battalion established a presence, its soldiers quickly grew to know the area intimately. More often than not, they found IEDs before we did, which was attributed to their close relationships with the local populace. The soldiers of the 4th Battalion were not just stumbling across these IEDs — they were receiving tips from sources. The transition commander who checks his ego at the door and understands this simple fact will do very well. It was a proud day when our Iraqi partners identified an IED, reported it to our unit and the Iraqi ordnance disposal team, and established a cordon until the explosive ordnance disposal team (EOD) arrived and dismantled the threat — all without help from their U. S. partners. Nonlethal Effects: Outbidding the Enemy Relationship building did not stop with our partners; transition commanders also spend a lot of time participating in key-leader engagements. When I was not meeting with Iraqi battalion commanders and S3s to review weekly operations schedules, I was meeting with the Rashaad police and SOI contractors, who had effectively turned the tide of conflict by employing disfranchised, angry insurgents, making them responsible for security checkpoints throughout the Rashaad Valley. While not necessarily as trustworthy as the IA leadership, keeping open lines of communications with the SOI contractors was just as important as maintaining the relationship with the IA battalion commander and his leaders. Hearing their grievances over endless glasses of chai gave us an understanding of the nearly 2,000 SOI in the battlespace, most of whom would begin transitioning to government and police jobs in mid-2010. Incorporating the IP chief into the meetings allowed us to focus on security. Although they were not the most productive meetings from an intelligence standpoint, they were critical to gaining a central understanding of what motivated the SOI to stay at their posts — a source of income. Reassuring the SOI that we and our IA partners were doing everything possible to keep them employed solidified our relationship and ensured the SOI remained decidedly opposed to the insurgent groups from which they came. Catering to the self-interest of our partners also extended to the arena of local governance and the Rashaad District Council. Continuing with commander’s “Assuming a smaller role is often very difficult to accept for most aggressive type-A combat arms officers, myself included. But our Iraqi partners were clearly in the lead, operating independently and consistently, and doing so quite effectively. I was very wary of taking that initiative away from them and injecting myself into the equation, thereby inducing the dilemma of cultural dependency, which the U. S. had struggled to overcome since the war began.” 21 emergency response program (CERP) projects and awarding microgrants enhanced the legitimacy of our neighbors’ local government and contributed to the economic development of Rashaad. Again, this required regular key-leader engagements with the councilmen to build trusting relationships. Kilcullen emphasizes a realist’s approach built on trust: “Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts. Over time, if you successfully build networks of trust, these will grow like roots into the population, displacing the enemy’s networks, bringing him out into the open to fight you, and seizing the initiative. These networks include local allies, community leaders, local security forces, NGOs [nongovernment organizations] and other friendly or neutral non-state actors in your area, as well as the media. Conduct village and neighborhood surveys to identify needs in the community — then follow through to meet them, build common interests and mobilize popular support. This is your true main effort: everything else is secondary.”7 With the 4th IA Battalion having seized the tactical initiative and making possible a permissive environment for public service delivery, our common interests were extensive. These priorities included repairing broken pipelines to enhance water delivery to Rashaad citizens, empowering council members by providing them with humanitarian aid packages to take to their villages, and sponsoring microgrants for Rashaad’s small business entrepreneurs, such as print shop owners, barbers, and grocers, to encourage economic development. We built trust with Rashaad’s representative council and they in turn gained the popular support of con-stituencies, leaving little room for insurgents. Just as attachments can help shape a commander’s tactical advantage, they are also tremendous combat multipliers when tackling issues of civil capacity. The Kirkuk Provincial Reconstruction Team representative, with whom we worked closely, was a remarkable asset to our team as we supervised the Rashaad council’s government proceedings. With the help of the team representative, informed outreach to our local powerbrokers allowed us to capitalize on the stable environment by bringing technical expertise on projects and public services delivery. Maintaining the initiative in this effort entailed being available to provide input on budgeting and project prioritization. U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, describes initiative as it relates to stability conditions. As conditions improve, “Commanders identify objectives that may be nonmilitary, but are critical to achieving the end state. Such objectives may include efforts to ensure effective governance, reconstruction projects that promote social well-being, and consistent actions to improve public safety. All of these contribute to retaining and exploiting the initiative in stability operations.”8 Under the terms of the security agreement, we could not be as proactive with money as past U. S. commanders had once been in Iraq. The Government of Iraq (GoI) and provincial government were the primary institutions responsible for procuring cash for the Rashaad council’s local budget. Just as the impressive independence of the 4th IA Battalion demanded a more laissez-faire leadership style from our troop’s leaders, legitimizing the Rashaad council in the eyes of its people required us to assume a hands-off approach.9 It was their budget, and these were their project priorities. A troop commander’s opinion did not matter as much as it used to in these areas. Still, a close partnership with the council chairman afforded us their confidence as respected advisors to their progress in representative government. While we were very careful not to usurp their authority as council members, we could still provide “away” for the council to consider an issue. The Transition Commander and Reconnaissance: Validating the Cavalry Although our role as a lethal force was much more limited than it had been during previous operations; our new role as combat enablers for the 4th IA Battalion actually enhanced the need for reconnaissance and heeding its fundamentals, including gaining and maintaining threat contact.10 This became especially important with cumbersome platforms such as the mine resistant, ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle. We were no doubt pleased with the increased survivability of our primary fighting vehicle; however, what we gained in survivability, we lost in flexibility and maneuverability. On the restricted and severely restricted terrain of the Rashaad Valley, even our ISF partners left us in the dust as they embarked on objectives in pickup trucks or M1114s. Also, our deployable task organization did not include the M3A3 Bradley cavalry fighting vehicle (CFV) of the organic heavy brigade combat team’s reconnaissance squadron, so we had to adapt. Protecting our lines of communications, with FOB Warrior 25 miles away, was a key task in our mission, regardless of part- “Over time, if you successfully build networks of trust, these will grow like roots into the population, displacing the enemy’s networks, bringing him out into the open to fight you, and seizing the initiative. These networks include local allies, community leaders, local security forces, NGOs [nongovernment organizations] and other friendly or neutral non-state actors in your area, as well as the media.” 22 nership. Captain Prince’s unit had used the commander’s independent viewer (CIV) optics on their CFVs to maintain continuous reconnaissance on potential IED emplacers on the alternate supply route that ran through our area of operations. Although our lack of Bradleys meant no CIVs, we still had three long-range advanced scout surveillance systems (LRAS3) to use. Having only the capability to mount the LRAS3 on M1151s, we needed to innovate. Our mechanics removed an M1114 turret from our fleet of HMMWVs, fabricated it to fit the LRAS3 and M240, and mounted it on our Caimans. This allowed us to conduct area and route reconnaissance missions with a tremendous scouting capability. By mounting one LRAS3 on each of our senior scout trucks, we compensated for the MRAP’slack of maneuverability and turned a liability into an asset. The LRAS3 turret mount modification, used on an observation post in concert with OH-58Ds from the scout weapons team or the troop’s organic Raven unmanned aircraft system, was very effective in allowing our scout platoons to confirm or deny enemy IED activity with little need to action the clumsy, top-heavy trucks unnecessarily. The RAID camera was without a doubt our most important reconnaissance and security asset. It was also a tremendous combat enabler for our Iraqi neighbors. Maintaining both infrared and daytime television zoom capabilities from a 107- foot tower, we had a conservative 6-kilometer radius for a clearly defined line of sight from the patrol base. In our enemy pattern analysis, we noticed that most of the activity in our operating environment was outside of the camera’s 6-kilometer radius. Apparently, the enemy knew its capabilities as well and made a concerted effort to limit its activity to outside of the camera’s scope. Field Manual 3-0, Operations, notes that “The threat of detection often compels the enemy to limit or cease operations. This inaction allows friendly forces to seize the initiative. Interference with enemy command and control through nonlethal means can also limit enemy effectiveness and increase its exposure to attack.11 Through continuous reconnaissance, we could maintain the initiative. About midway through the deployment, we suspected anew enemy IED cell was operating in our area of operations based on activity we observed within the RAID’s security perimeter. One night, we watched two emplacers digging along our alternate supply route well within the RAID’s line of sight; only anew cell would have tested the camera’s powerful security bubble. Our RAID operator in the command post recorded two insurgents as they approached the road, hid in a culvert, emplaced the IED, and ran toward an abandoned building. Meanwhile, we alerted our IA partners, spun up a combined quick reaction force (QRF) platoon, and took action on the threat with MRAPs and a scout weapons team based on a grid we obtained by lasing the building in which the insurgents hid. The next day, we shared the RAID recording with our IA S2 counterpart, who detained two suspects from a neighboring village within the week. Videos were found in the suspects’ home, which illustrated Naqshabandi training and propaganda; following this event, we did not observe any enemy activity within the RAID’s perimeter. As helpful as technology was to the fight, it did not quite take the place of our best reconnaissance — the eyes and ears of our ISF counterparts. On one occasion, the IA battalion commander asked if I could coordinate a scout weapons team in support of a mission he was planning. Local sources had given him a tip on a HVT, again, information our troop would not have been privy to otherwise. His plan was to capture a slippery HVT by using civilian pickup trucks to conduct a raid and defeat the enemy’s intricate early warning system. He was concerned that his use of HMMWVs would give the enemy a chance to escape; whereas, locals would be none the wiser to loitering civilian vehicles carrying IA soldiers. While Kilcullen believes that “the natural tendency is to build forces in our own image, with the aim of eventually handing our role over to them,” he also thinks “this is a mistake. Instead, local indigenous forces need to mirror the enemy’s capabilities, and seek to supplant the insurgent’s role.”12 The IA battalion commander was doing just that — his ingenuity and outside-the-box thinking only enhanced our ability to maintain threat contact and press the initiative. Base Closure On 4 June 2010, the Iraqi receivership secretary landed with a team of Hip helicopters at Patrol Base Doria to sign for the patrol base. The signing ceremony was the final milestone in our troop’s partnership with the 4th Iraqi Army Battalion, but we could leave knowing that our ISF brothers would be just fine in our absence. Placing trust in them and leaning on their competency, which had been foreign to me during my first deployments, we could hand over our patrol base with confidence. I now knew they had the training and ability to continue stability operations in the Rashaad Valley, which was possible by creating a laissez-faire leadership style and giving them our trust from the beginning. The ISF were battle hardened and prepared for assuming responsibility for the area of operations because we had empowered them. The transition troop commander must understand the power of partnerships, how money can be used to bolster governance and de-legitimize the enemy, and the prominent role that reconnaissance plays as a combat enabler. Leaving the isolated Patrol Base Doria, Hesco concertainers surrounding the IA battalion instead of us, I had the confidence not to look back. Notes 1Captain Jesse Prince, e-mail, 25 November 2009. 2For a thorough description of “full-spectrum operations,” see U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, February 2008, p. 3-1. 3“2009 Leaders’ Guide to the Security Agreement,” Multinational Corps Iraq, 2009. 4Captain Jesse Prince, e-mail, 25 November 2009. 5“Leaders’ Guide to the Security Agreement.” 6David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency,” written from field notes compiled in Baghdad, Taji, and Kuwait City, Washington, DC, 29 March 2006, p. 11. 7Ibid., p. 5. 8FM 3-0, Operations, p. 3-3. 9I am indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Canfield, who first suggested to me that a transition commander requires a more laissez-faire leadership style vis-à-vis his Iraqi Army counterparts. 10Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance and Cavalry Squadron, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, March 2010, p. 3-2. FM 3-20.96 describes the fundamentals of reconnaissance in greater detail: ensure continuous reconnaissance; do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve; orient on the reconnaissance objective; report all information rapidly and accurately; retain freedom of maneuver; gain and maintain enemy contact with the smallest element possible; and develop the situation. 11FM 3-0, Operations, p. 3-5. 12Kilcullen, p. 8. Captain Todd R. Hertling is currently a troop commander, C Troop, 6th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, Ready First Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, TX. He received a B. A. from Wake University and an M. P. A. from Indiana University. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course and Maneuver Captain Career Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include executive officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop (HHT), 2d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (3ACR), Tal Afar, and Fort Carson, CO; support platoon leader, 2d Squadron, 3ACR, Tal Afar, and Fort Carson; and scout and tank platoon leader, G Troop, 2d Squadron, 3ACR, Anbar Province, Iraq, and Fort Carson. 23