Future War Paper: A Modern Medium Tank for Future Battlefields

On 3 October 1993, in Mogadishu, Somalia, the U.S. Army’s elite Rangers and a Special Forces detachment engaged in a firefight with Mohamed Farrah Aideed’s forces. The firefight was so intense that the Task Force Ranger commander requested Pakistani and Malaysian M48 medium tanks and M113 armored personnel carriers (APCs) to assist a 10th Mountain Division quick reaction force in rescuing the elite forces.1 Implausibly, some of the best forces in the U.S. military were trapped by a ragged band of fighters whose weaponry consisted of rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), assault rifles, and machine guns. Immediately following the so-called ‘battle of Mogadishu,’ critics asked why U.S. mechanized forces were not available to extract the Rangers. In short, the reply revealed there were no U.S. armored forces in theater because then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin determined heavy armor sent the wrong message for humanitarian missions.2 In other words, armored units were not sent to Somalia because of political concerns, at the cost of lives.

The Army’s experience in the urban streets of Mogadishu provides an excellent example of how the firepower, protection, and mobility, provided by a modern medium tank, would have dramatically changed the outcome of the mission. Now, and into the foreseeable future, the U.S. military will be fighting forces that do not have a tank capable of destroying a medium tank. The U.S. military requires a medium tank to fill the capability gap between the Abrams main battle tank (MBT), which provides too much firepower, and the recently acquired family of wheeled and infantry fighting vehicles that fail to provide the precision firepower, protection, and mobility necessary to dominate a determined enemy. As the U.S. Army transitions to an expeditionary force, future operational requirements will drive the development of a modern medium tank, which will provide future commanders with the flexibility to fight, survive, and win in a variety of complex environments. A modern medium tank will provide commanders a flexible force multiplier that can rapidly respond to almost any situation in any environment. The Inspiration for the Tank The original inspiration for tank development stems from a need to cross the machine-gun swept and barbed-wire choked battlefields of World War I.3 The British developed the tank in response to the problem they encountered when infantry attempted to cross ‘no man’s land’ between the trenches, or ‘the beaten zone’ created by machine gun and artillery fire. From its debut at the

Battle of the Somme, in August 1916, to the daily engagements U.S. Armed Forces currently face in Iraq, the basic premise of the tank has not changed; it provides overwhelming firepower, protection, and maneuverability to enable military forces to fight and win in close combat.4 The German army learned from its World War I experiences and developed the tank into a weapons system that allowed its soldiers not only to cross the beaten zone, but operationally outmaneuver its enemies. The German combined arms approach, centered on the tank, allowed the Germans to dislocate the French army in 1940. The Germans, through superior maneuver, defeated the French army in less than 6 weeks despite being numerically and materially inferior.5 The tank was at the heart of the German “blitzkrieg;” its firepower, protection, and mobility permitted tactical and operational surprise. It was the shock of armored columns thrusting deep into their rear areas that overwhelmed the command and control capabilities of the French army, preventing them from reacting effectively to the speed of the German attack.6 The United States achieved similar results during Operation Iraqi Freedom; the Iraqis were often completely surprised to find a column of U.S. tanks attacking their defensive positions from an unexpected direction. During one engagement alone, more than 30 Iraqi tanks and vehicles were destroyed defending the wrong direction.7 While the United States used the Abrams to achieve this success, the German army used a light tank, the Panzerkampfwagon (PzKpfw) II, to achieve the same effects. The PzKpfw II comprised the bulk of the tanks for the German offensive of 1940.8 One lesson to be drawn from this experience is that the tank used within the context of maneuver warfare does not have to destroy every enemy tank on the battlefield; through superior firepower, protection, and mobility, it has the unique capability to destroy every other threat on the battlefield. The Canadian army’s recent experience in Afghanistan demonstrates the need for a medium tank in a small-war environment and provides useful illustration regarding fielding a one-dimensional, lightly armored force, which relies on sensors and standoff weapons to dominate the battlespace against irregular forces. The Canadian army’s approach was to build a force able to maneuver against the enemy and strike from long range without having to close with the enemy.9 However, in October 2006, Canadian forces deployed tanks to Afghanistan, which was at odds with the Canadian army’s earlier decision to eliminate tanks from its army’s inventory.10 Fortunately, once the Canadians realized they needed the capabilities that tanks bring to the battlefield to defeat the Taliban, they shipped Leopard I tanks to Afghanistan. The Taliban appreciated the futility of fighting NATO forces in the open and established sophisticated defenses inside villages, which could not be penetrated by the light armored vehicle (LAV) III or any other Canadian vehicle. To penetrate these defenses, the Canadians required a vehicle that could maneuver cross coun- “The U.S. military requires a medium tank to fill the capability gap between the Abrams main battle tank (MBT), which provides too much firepower, and the recently acquired family of wheeled and infantry fighting vehicles that fail to provide the precision firepower, protection, and mobility necessary to dominate a determined enemy.” 8 November-December 2010 try, reduce berms, and penetrate the one-meter-thick walls of the compounds used by the Taliban. In short, they needed tanks. The Leopards enabled the Canadians to close with the Taliban and destroy it without the collateral physical and political damage caused by airstrikes.11 Moreover, the Leopards protected Canadian troops from the weapons the Taliban had at its disposable, almost exactly the same types of weapons used by Aideed’s fighters in Mogadishu during 1993. Indeed, “Leopard tanks and their crews, deployed to Afghanistan, have survived numerous improvised explosive device (IED) and antitank mine strikes, as well as recoilless rifle, RPG-7, and suicide attacks, which may have been catastrophic to other fleets of vehicles.”12 The second battle of Fallujah (Operation al-Fajr) provides another convincing example of the effectiveness of the tank against irregular opponents, this time in urban terrain. U.S. forces in Fallujah used the tank’s capability to endure enemy fire and deliver precision fires to defeat a highly motivated enemy.13 The ability of the tank to move through and fight in highly contested and congested urban terrain was missing in Mogadishu. The 1st Cavalry Division’s M1A2 Abrams tanks faced the same weapons systems employed by Aideed’s forces in Somalia, with the addition of complex IEDs. Nevertheless, the Abrams broke through the defenses of the enemy and led the attack that led to the rapid recapture of Fallujah, a town with a pre-assault population of more than 350,000 people.14 The enemy was estimated to have more than 3,000 fighters, of which 1,200 were killed in battle and another 1,000 were captured. Interestingly, the Army’s most modern weapons system, the Stryker, was only used in a supporting role outside the city.15 The tank had proven yet again that its unique capabilities are still critical on today’s battlefields. War in the Future: General War and Small Wars “First, operations in the future will require a balance of regular and irregular competencies.” — General James N. Mattis, USMC General and small wars will continue. Small wars will undoubtedly be the more frequent of the two; however, the U.S. military must remain prepared for major combat operations. In that regard, the enemies of the United States will continue to adapt to U.S. strategies and work to mitigate the strengths of the Nation and exploit critical vulnerabilities. Opponents who cannot match the material and economic strength of the United States will leverage small wars to defeat the will of the American people, while ‘peer’ opponents will seek to exploit the U.S. military’s overreliance on networks and airspace dominance. In both types of war, the enemy will use urban terrain to negate the strength of U.S. sensors and standoff capabilities. Urban terrain also places a premium on infantry, of which the United States does not have an abundance, to defeat enemy forces and produce casualties we cannot afford. To win either type of war, the United States will need systems that effectively operate in both types of wars. Small Wars As noted, small wars will be the most prevalent form of conflict. The efficacy of U.S. forces fighting these small wars, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, will directly affect performance expectations that the U.S. civilian population has of the military. The U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan was given the benefit of the doubt in the first few years of the war; however, as operations dragged on, American patience waned. The strategic ‘stop-watch’ that the public places on the duration of small wars is a significant planning consideration.16 In his briefing to the Joint Urban Warrior Conference, David Kilcullen described the strategic stopwatch as an “Electoral timeline, [sic] interacts with domestic political support, drives intervening government commitment, and directly drives troop levels.”17 As the influence of the Internet and communications technology grows, so will the role of the global mass media, which will dramatically change the battlefield dynamic. The most significant change is that American people will have access to more information from the battlefield. This, and other factors, will affect the way U.S. forces fight small wars. Within the context described above, IEDs, explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), and RPGs will continue to be the preferred method of attacking U.S. forces. These weapons allow the enemy to hide among the people and negate the superior standoff capabilities of current and future U.S. systems. Moreover, these weapons produce dramatic images, which translate well in the global media environment and keep the war in the news cycle on the home front. The enemy will use these images to attack America’s center of gravity: the will of its people. In this regard, political considerations will drive U.S. decisionmaking, including more restrictive rules of engagement (ROE). Given the need to minimize collateral damages, U.S. forces will be forced to close with the enemy, exposing them to direct fire before hostile targets can be identified and attacked. British forces in Afghanistan are already operating under such ROE; thus, in tactical terms, restrictive ROE will require the capability to first survive enemy fire and then return precision fire while in contact with the enemy. The tank is the only system that fulfills this requirement. Casualties will continue to be a U.S. vulnerability that enemy forces continually seek to exploit. Casualties affect the morale of U.S. forces, as well as the will of the American people and political leaders. Likewise, the will of the indigenous people will remain a primary factor in winning small wars. To win over the will of a foreign population, U.S. troops will live among the “The Canadian army’s approach was to build a force able to maneuver against the enemy and strike from long range without having to close with the enemy. However, in October 2006, Canadian forces deployed tanks to Afghanistan, which was at odds with the Canadian army’s earlier decision to eliminate tanks from its army’s inventory. Fortunately, once the Canadians realized they needed the capabilities that tanks bring to the battlefield to defeat the Taliban, they shipped Leopard I tanks to Afghanistan.” November-December 2010 9 people in small, austere bases and combat outposts, which place them in contact with the people while simultaneously exposing them to greater risk of enemy attack. The enemy will make every attempt to destroy these outposts in an effort to get the dramatic news story in the global media. This occurred in Afghanistan recently when the Taliban attempted to overrun an outpost in the Helmand province.18 Several casualties were taken before the Taliban were finally beaten back. The Taliban attempted a similar attack on a large U.S. base in Khost just one month later. If the enemy destroys enough of these outposts, the will of the U.S. population may force a withdrawal of U.S. forces from among the people, eliminating the vital proximity within the local populace and providing a victory for the enemy. General War General wars will still occur; however, they will be less frequent than small wars. Nevertheless, the U.S. military seems to base its acquisitions programs and operational concept on two assumptions about the future: air superiority and information networks availability.19 The brigade combat team (BCT) modernization is the U.S. Army’s principal modernization program for BCTs from 2009 to the present. Its purpose is to build a versatile mix of mobile, networked BCTs that will leverage mobility, protection, information, and precision fires to conduct effective operations across the spectrum of conflict. Key to modernizing Army BCTs is to enable soldiers with increased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Unfortunately, the future battlefield is likely to be in urban terrain where the standoff capabilities of U.S. systems are severely reduced, if not completely negated. The importance of air superiority may matter little and information may be difficult to acquire. To exploit U.S. vulnerabilities, a peer enemy would attack U.S. satellites and information networks to destroy or disable the system of systems that U.S. forces depend on to see the enemy. For example, the electromagnetic effect generated by a high-altitude nuclear explosion could render multiple networks useless. This would degrade the ability of U.S. forces to ‘see’ the battlefield and thereby dominate the enemy. In short, commanders would not know the exact location of enemy formations, thus creating the need to develop intelligence through the use of ground reconnaissance. However, current systems will prove vulnerable in carrying out this mission. The most recently acquired armored vehicles employed by U.S. forces provide some idea of where the United States is headed with its future armored systems. Few vehicles in the U.S. military’s inventory are capable of surviving direct fire contact with Soviet-era tanks, infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), and antitank (AT) systems, which will continue to be the choice of vehicles and weapons for future enemies. Moreover, current U.S. vehicles are designed around the assumption of air superiority and information dominance; with the loss of one or both, current and future land systems, except for the tank, will be extremely vulnerable to the older Soviet systems. Antiarmor systems will continue to improve, but missile systems will still rely on chemical charges to defeat armor. Since the first tank appeared on the World War I battlefield, there have been antitank systems to defeat tanks at the tactical level; however, on very rare occasions can enough antitank systems be massed, much less maneuvered, to defeat enough tanks to make a significant operational difference. Additionally, current antitank systems lack the ability to shoot on the move, which severely restricts an antitank system’s ability to react quickly to an attacking tank formation in an unexpected location. Since the next general war will be fought outside the United States, it is more than likely that U.S. forces will conduct offen- “…the Abrams broke through the defenses of the enemy and led the attack that led to the rapid recapture of Fallujah, a town with a pre-assault population of more than 350,000 people. The enemy was estimated to have more than 3,000 fighters, of which 1,200 were killed in battle and another 1,000 were captured. Interestingly, the Army’s most modern weapons system, the Stryker, was only used in a supporting role outside the city. The tank had proven yet again that its unique capabilities are still critical on today’s battlefields.” 10 November-December 2010 sive operations. These operations require rapid movement along obvious avenues of approach that expose U.S. combat systems to direct fire from an enemy located in hidden defensive positions or urban terrain. Therefore, it is imperative that U.S. systems have the ability to survive close combat with enemy systems without air superiority and information dominance. Moreover, ground forces will have to move rapidly over extended distances, which will enable U.S. forces to operate inside the enemy’s observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) loop and deny the enemy timely and accurate information to make decisions that could lead to the defeat of U.S. forces.20 As a defeated Iraqi commander noted: “The speed at which you maneuver armor is hard to understand. Your ability to isolate Iraqi forces so that they cannot react is unbelievable. And most importantly, you did not give the Iraqi army any chance to think or understand.”21 Well into the foreseeable future, U.S. forces will be required to fight across the full spectrum of conflict — from small wars to general wars. Regardless of venue, U.S. forces will be required to move rapidly and close with the enemy, necessitating combat systems that are fast, survivable, and deliver a punch; in other words, the U.S. military needs tanks. Armor’s Projected Future — the Replacement for the Tank The outcome of battles and engagements depends on Army forces’ ability to prevail in close combat.22 — U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations The brigade combat team ground combat vehicle (GCV) program is the U.S. Army’s replacement program for armored fighting vehicles in heavy and Stryker brigade combat teams. The GCV is organized under the follow-on incremental capabilities package of the BCT modernization program. The first variant of the vehicle is to be prototyped in 2015 and fielded by 2017. The GCV program replaces the canceled future combat systems manned ground vehicles program. The GCV will be operable with the current battle command control and communications suite, but would gradually use a more state-of-the-art networked integration system, known as the ‘BCT network.’ It will provide exportable electrical power and a battery charging capability for external hardware, including vehicles and electronics from the BCT soldier subsystems. The system is expected to be capable of integration with unmanned systems and dismounted soldiers. This system of systems concept will work well if the United States ever has to fight the Soviet army on the North German Plain; however, in an urban environment where the enemy has learned to hide from sensors and blend into the population, networks will not provide much protection. The U.S. Army’s own Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, states, “Close combat is frequent in urban operations.”23 Fitting a Medium Tank into the Future During this critical time, when ground forces need a platform that does many things well and survives unexpected enemy contact, the United States may yet again be on the road to acquiring a system that is, at best, ready to fight the Cold War. The solution would seem to be a compromise — the medium tank, which would provide a unique balance of regular and irregular competencies to the operating environment. As a ‘system,’ the medium tank would need to provide 360-degree protection from high-explosive enemy weapons, the ability to close with and destroy the enemy with fully stabilized precision fires, the ability to penetrate and survive in highly contested and congested urban terrain, and the speed to exploit ‘breakthrough operations’ with a reduced logistics requirement. The concept of 360-degree protection for a tank is revolutionary. The tank has always saved weight by sacrificing armor protection on the rear, top, and belly of the tank. In conventional war, this was not a problem because the enemy’s direction of attack was generally predictable; however, with irregular forces and in urban terrain, this is no longer the case. To meet these challenges, the tank must have 360-degree protection from chemical energy rounds and must have the ability to employ active countermeasures to defeat sophisticated antitank missiles. However, the majority of protection should come from armor protection, given that active systems are a threat to friendly infantry in the vicinity of the tank. This would be achieved through the combination of traditional armor and the use of explosive reactive armor, which would defeat chemical energy weapons, including antitank missiles, RPGs, and EFPs. Additionally, armor packages could be adapted to threat levels, which would permit rapid deployment and protection upgrades as newer armor becomes available. As noted before, a key capability of the tank includes the ability to close with and destroy the enemy with fully stabilized precision fires and multiple machine guns. This capability, as demonstrated by the Abrams tank, benefits light forces fighting in urban terrain where tanks can be employed to cross the ‘beaten zone’ to destroy buildings or enemy bunkers, thus allowing friend-Artist impression of the infantry fighting vehicle variant of the BCT ground combat vehicle program. Note: the twin missile launcher and rubber band track; the turret appears to be unmanned. November-December 2010 11 ly infantry to continue forward. Moreover, with its cross-country mobility, the tank can approach towns and villages from unexpected directions, avoiding enemy defenses and kill zones. In rural areas, a medium tank, with the right gun and sight, could acquire and engage targets at ranges out to 3 kilometers in all weather conditions. Thus, a medium tank would add firepower and protection to isolated outposts, making them less vulnerable to enemy attack. Finally, the tank’s dynamic versatility in various environments provides numerous options to the ground commander, such as blocking streets, dynamic entry, or disrupting lines of communications, in either heavy contact or a security role. A modern medium tank could employ state-of-the-art power systems, which would significantly reduce fuel consumption and allow it to operate for extended periods of time (compared to a MBT) without the need for fuel. Combined with a modern hybrid power plant, the medium tank could travel extended distances with minimal refueling assets. A hybrid power plant that could potentially power a medium tank has already been tested.24 A reduced logistics requirement would provide the operational range to conduct deep envelopments, long-range pursuits, and raids — a capability the U.S. military does not currently possess. Reduced logistics requirements would certainly make the use of the medium tank in an austere theater more feasible. This would allow the medium tank to be employed during the counterinsurgency fight, as well as stability and support operations, in areas such as Somalia or Afghanistan, where fuel resupply can be an issue. Another benefit of the medium tank is its size and weight — it is small enough and light enough to offset serious damage to the infrastructure of underdeveloped countries, enabling U.S. forces to operate without alienating the indigenous population. A medium tank is much lighter than a main battle tank; therefore, for instance, the U.S. Marine Corps could transport more tanks via amphibious ships than currently possible, which would provide Marine commanders with greater flexibility, firepower, and protection during forced entry operations. The Benefits of the Medium Tank As the U.S. Army transitions to an expeditionary force, future operational requirements will drive the need to develop a modern medium tank that provides future commanders with the flexibility to fight, survive, and win in the variety of complex environments that U.S. forces will deploy to today and in the future. These environments demand the need for a modern medium tank to fill the gap in capability that exists in the current inventory of U.S. ground platforms. The enemy U.S. forces face will continue to adapt to negate the U.S. advantage in air and standoff firepower. The enemy’s adaptations will force the United States to employ ground forces in close combat across the full spectrum of conflict. For the U.S. Army to counter the enemy’s ability to hide from the air and blend with the local population, the military needs a new ground platform. The United States needs a ground combat system that can withstand enemy fire, like the Abrams MBT, without the costs, weight, fuel consumption, and logistic issues that come with a 70-ton vehicle. Moreover, the U.S. Army needs a vehicle that can operate in the lower end of the spectrum of conflict to project power, protect the force, and preserve the infrastructure of the host nation. The U.S. Army is moving forward with the brigade combat team GCV program as a solution to fighting and winning on future battlefields. However, in light of the recent future combat system program, the Army has yet to develop a combat system to replace the unique capabilities of the tank. The desired lethality and capabilities, such as the ability to kill from long range, passive armor protection, and the capability to close with and destroy the enemy, are not only foreseeable in a medium tank, but are key capabilities on the battlefields of today and well into the future. A medium tank built for the battlefields of today and the future would provide all the capabilities of the Abrams MBT, with the benefit of reduced costs in logistics and weight and with only a modest loss of lethality and protection. A medium tank could be employed across the full spectrum of war, giving U.S. forces the firepower, protection, and mobility required to fight and win on current and future battlefields while requiring less support and minimizing collateral damage. It is time to drop the institutional prejudice against the tank and recognize it for the utility it provides — the ability to fight and win in any environment. In the end, mission success does not depend on how quickly forces get to the battlefield, it depends on their ability to dominate, survive, and complete the mission. Notes 1Michael Green and Greg Stewart, M1 Abrams at War, Zenith Press, Saint Paul, 2005, p. 11; and Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War, Atlantic Monthly Press, New York, 1999, p. 135. 2Bill Gertz, “Aspin’s decision on tanks was political; Report says he gave in to U.N.,” Washington Times, 3 October 1995. 3Heinz Guderian, The Development of Armoured Forces Their Tactics and Operational Potential, Arms and Armour Press, London, 1992, p. 48. 4Ibid., p. 52. 5Karl-Heinz Frieser, The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2005, p. 2. 6Ibid., p. 345. 7Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2004, p. 298. 8Karl-Heinz Frieser, p. 42. 9Canada, Department of Defence, Advancing with Purpose: The Army Strategy, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, May 2002, pp. 20-21. 10“Tank: the Canadian Army’s Four-Letter Word,” available online at http://www.army.forces. gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_04/iss_4/CAJ_vol4.4_14_e.pdf, accessed 9 December 2008. 11Trevor Cadieu, “Canadian Armour in Afghanistan,” Canadian Army Journal, Vol. 10.4, Winter 2008, p. 4. 12Ibid, p. 12. 13Kendall D. Gott, Breaking the Mold: Tanks in the Cities, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2006, p. 105. 14Ibid., p. 105. 15Ibid., p. 109. 16David Kilcullen, “Strategic Stopwatch, Tactical Jeng: Issues for Transition in Iraq,” Briefing to the Joint Urban Warrior Conference, 8 April 2008. 17Ibid. 18“A Surge in Pessimism,” The Economist, 18 October 2008, p. 55. 19Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington DC, 2008, pp. 7-12. 20HQDA, FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, GPO, Washington DC, 2003, p. A-1. 21Jim Lacey, Take Down: The 3d Infantry Division’s Twenty-One Day Assault on Baghdad, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2007, p. 142. 22HQDA, FM 3-0, Operations, p. 1-17. 23Ibid. 24Http://tardec.army.mil/newsdocs/FCS(BCT)%20Unveils%20Manned%20Ground%20 Vehicle%20(MGV)_18July08.pdf, accessed 16 Nov 08. Major Stuart M. James is currently serving as the XO and S3, Task Force 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, 172d Infantry Brigade (Separate), Grafenwoehr, Germany. He is a graduate of Dickinson College, West Virginia University, and Marine Corps University. His military education includes the U.S. Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, and Armor Captain Career Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include instructor, Maneuver Captain Career Course, 3d Squadron, 16th Cavalry, Fort Knox, KY; commander, C Troop, 5th Squadron, 15th Cavalry, Fort Knox; commander, A Company, 2d Battalion, 69th Armor, 3d Infantry Division, Fort Benning, GA; XO, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, Budingen, Germany; and scout platoon leader, C Troop, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, Bosnia. 12 November-December 2010