Highlighting the Most Significant Work of Iraq’s Social, Political, and Military History: Volume V, Part 1 of the Multivolume Collection of Dr. Ali al-Wardi

Foreword Surely one of the lessons of the past decade is that basic familiarity with the tenets and customs of Islam is an essential prerequisite for involvement in a Middle Eastern country. Familiarity with the key events of regional history, and the way the memory of these events helps Middle Eastern people define themselves, is equally essential. Many of the hundreds of thousands of Americans who have served in Iraq know that Iraqis have an intense, if sometimes subjective, awareness of their history. The Iraqis, or at least their leaders, have shown in a number of key decisions since 2003 that they are not prisoners of their history; rather, they are consciously building on their historical foundation, with an emphasis on remedying the worst effects of recent history. In addition to providing a foundation, their history helps Iraqis define and orient themselves within their region, nation, and smaller community. The interpretation of past events may vary depending on the region or community to which a particular Iraqi belongs, but his or her sense of history helps shape self-perception. For this reason, the Iraqi understanding of their history is a major element of the human terrain on which counterinsurgency and stability operations are conducted. Historical remembrance can divide Iraqis, whose nation is formed from a number of ethnic groups, faith communities, and tribes, which were deposited along Iraq’s rivers and in its northern mountains by successive tides of invasion and imperial struggle. For example, three contrasting recollections of events are at the heart of the unsettled status of Kirkuk. But Iraqis also proudly recall events that unified them, such as the events of the 1920 effort to expel the British. The 1920 revolt, for the first time in the modern era, revealed Iraq’s potential to be more than a disparate collection of tribes and sects. Even today, we sometimes get only fleeting glimpses of Iraqis’ aspiration for unity, but pride in the events of the early 1920s shows that a desire for “Iraqiness” to trump other loyalties is still there. But how do we get the often complicated facts on the 1920 events to busy leaders and planners who need them? The extraordinary, multivolume classic history of Dr. Ali al-Wardi is typical in its lack of general availability. Enter Commander Aboul-Enein, who has made this key work accessible in a useful summary forum, and ARMOR’s production staff, who has published it. Anyone interested in Iraq should read what follows, and especially those who are serving or will serve again in Iraq. Commander Aboul-Enein is dedicated to the principle that understanding any operational environment means knowing the religious and historical writings that are most important to the population — in this case, a largely Arab population. We may have other opportunities to stabilize countries with unfamiliar cultures and histories. Let’s resolve to apply Commander Aboul-Enein’s principle from the start. Retired Lieutenant Colonel Christopher C. Straub Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Middle East (2008-2009) 26 —

Iraq’s Social, Political, and Military History: (1918-1920) of the Multivolume Collection of Dr. Ali al-Wardi Events Leading to the Outbreak of the 1920 Revolt (1918-1920) The 1920 Iraqi revolt against the British is a seminal event in modern Iraqi political history. Wardi’s multivolume set devotes two full volumes to this incident alone. His fifth volume is among the most comprehensive examinations of this revolt from a religious, tribal, social, and military vantage. It is also an event charged with emotion, and Wardi recognized that books about Iraq’s 1920 revolt are biased in favor of one side or another. During the 1970s, Arab authors commented and wrote on this revolt through the lens of Arab nationalist movements. The United States remains committed to the future development of Iraq, and as long as we have forces there, it is vital that we have an understanding of Iraq’s human terrain. Those who argue that the 1920 revolt was simply a continuation of tribal rebellions to central rule are dismissing the nuances of what would cause this revolt and sustain the insurgency against the British. The revolt began in the summer of 1920 and was not contained until the end of 1920, with sporadic outbursts until 1922. Wardi devotes more than 800 pages to dissecting the social, tribal, political, and military aspects of this event in his seminal six-volume work, Lamahaat Ijitmayiah min Tareekh Iraq al-Hadeeth, or Social Aspects of Iraqi Modern History. This article, Part 1, assesses the first 400 pages, which focus on events leading to the revolt. Volume V, Part 2, assesses the remaining 400 pages and focuses on how the British ended this revolt through a combination of force and compromise, and will be published in the January-February 2010 edition of ARMOR. Wardi opens this volume with one question that leads into a 1,000- page explanation of the lead up, the events, and the conclusion of the 1920 revolt. In 1918, many Iraqis welcomed British occupation for various reasons — largely to escape Ottoman oppression and minimally to end the crossfire between Ottoman and British forces. During the revolt, 1918-1920, Iraqis submitted to an expression of the times, “may infidelity remain as long as injustice flees.” Wardi’s opening question is an attempt to explore why it took 3 years for the British to isolate a significant part of the Iraqi population — Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis. Some of the societal issues that began eroding British authority were the granting of privileges to those on the fringes of Iraqi society. Examples include using Arab and non-Arab bullies, street thugs, and brigands to police the streets. The amount of money that flooded into Iraq to maintain British forces led to high prices for commodities and rents. This, in turn, led to a vicious competition among Iraqis for access to English funds. The British chose an opposite tribal policy from that of the Ottomans, choosing to unify tribes under one British-appointed official versus the Turkish policy of dividing tribes and clans in order to rule. The British chose a tribal elder, who was made responsible for an area of Iraq. The British were attempting to mirror methods of subjugating Ba-loch tribes in what is now South Pakistan. These methods were short-term, but provided immediate chains of command and subdued large swaths of Iraq; however, the British were eventually seen as part of — 27 The Signing of Peace in the Hall of Mirrors, Versailles 1919 the tribe, clan and sub-clan, in areas they chose to police and tribal backers of those they appointed. Incredibly, the British mirrored tribal succession from father to son or from brother to brother, instead of being sensitive to the tribal consensus used to select a tribal elder. The mechanics of the 1920 revolt were sustained in part by tribes seeking to punish tribes close to the British. Privileged tribes used their ties to the British to tax and lord over other tribes. Another problem was the insensitivity to Iraq’s customs such as the imposition of dogs accompanying British officers into the tent of Bedouins; the animal although used for hunting, guarding, and herding in Iraq, is considered unclean to bring into the home. Also, personal dignity was affronted in cases such as a British officer or official refusing to look up paperwork for an Iraqi. Syria, Egypt, and Iraq’s Effendiah Class: Revolution in the Air In Volume 5, Wardi discusses the Effendiah class, former Ottoman bureaucrats who hung out in coffee shops and stalls sowing dissent. Iraqis would first learn of Napoleon, the French Revolution, European nationalism, and much more through these bureaucrats trained in Turkey. Poets wrote anti-British odes in 1919 and 1920, introducing the Iraqi populace to the eviction of Faisal bin Hussein (of the Hashemite Dynasty), King of Syria, by French forces during the Battle of Maysaloun (covered in a future section of Wardi’s volumes). Then, as today, one could not divorce the nationalist dissent in Syria from Iraq. When Prince Faisal proclaimed Arab independence in Syria and made himself King of Syria, many within his entourage were Iraqi officers, who created cells and independence movements within Iraq. For instance, the Al-Ahd (the Pact) Society, established in Syria, created its first outside branch in Mosul. Another external factor that provided momentum to Iraqis seeking outright independence was the 1919 revolt in Egypt. This revolt engulfed Egypt in rebellion for a week and was stimulated by the British arrest of Egyptian nationalist, Saad Zaghlul, and members of a delegation making their way to Versailles to seek Egyptian self-determination. It would eventually lead to quasi-independence for Egypt in 1922. As a reaction to events in Syria seating King Faisal as ruler in 1918 and Egyptian agitation for self-rule, Iraqis seized the opportunity to declare their independence in March 1920. Those Iraqis called on Faisal’s brother, Abdullah, to assume the kingship of Iraq. These spontaneous declarations of independence in Syria and Iraq, as well as Egypt’s attempt to attain self-rule, would pose serious challenges to agreements between Britain and France to divide Arab Ottoman dominions into spheres of influence. Impact of Turkish Independence on Iraq In Turkey, the Ottoman forces rallied around Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk), who began his defeat of French, Italian, and Greek forces in Anatolia, and declared the formation of the Turkish Republic. Ataturk’s earliest policy was to reverse the Ottoman “Iraqis would first learn of Napoleon, the French Revolution, European nationalism, and much more through these bureaucrats trained in Turkey. Poets wrote anti-British odes in 1919 and 1920, introducing the Iraqi populace to the eviction of Faisal bin Hussein (of the Hashemite Dynasty), King of Syria, by French forces during the Battle of Maysaloun.” policy of considering Arab nationalist movements as treasonous and support these efforts to undermine British and French influence in the Middle East. British intelligence detected Turkish and Arab nationalist groups coalescing in Karbala and Najaf, attempting to form a common insurgency against British forces in Iraq. During World War I in Persia, the Germans conducted robust clandestine efforts to incite calls for jihad against the British and French. This Persian animosity, stoked by the Germans against the British, would remain beyond World War I, and support for insurgents would not only come from Syria and Turkey, but Persia. Of note, Russian Bolshevism replaced the Germans in continuing anti-British propaganda in Persia and Turkey. The Bolsheviks aided the Turkish Kemalists (named after Kemal Ataturk) in their efforts to undermine British and French influence in the Middle East. Moscow spread anti-western leaflets 28 — “…one could not divorce the nationalist dissent in Syria from Iraq. When Prince Faisal proclaimed Arab independence in Syria and made himself King of Syria, many within his entourage were Iraqi officers, who created cells and independence movements within Iraq.” “In Turkey, the Ottoman forces rallied around Mustafa Kemal (Ata turk), who began his defeat of French, Italian, and Greek forces in Anatolia, and declared the formation of the Turkish Republic. Ataturk’s earliest policy was to reverse the Ottoman policy of considering Arab nationalist movements as treasonous and support these efforts to undermine British and French influence in the Middle East.”

and reading materials in Iraq, Syria, and the Arabian Red Sea coast, known as “Hejaz.” Persian pilgrims to Najaf and Karbala, as well as Persian students to these Shiite seminaries, brought with them Marxist ideology and literature. In these Shiite cities of Southern Iraq, one could find booklets entitled, The Fundamentals of Bolshevism, printed at a press in Aleppo, Syria. So successful was Russian propaganda that Grand Ayatollah (Marja) and Mohammed Taqi Shirazi, who would be a key figure in the 1920 revolt, would, in 1919, call Bolshevism, “a friend of Islam.” The first Bolshevist society was established in Iraq in 1920, and as early as 1919, Marxist rhetoric began to appear in Iraq’s newspapers. British security officials looked with concern as Arab and Turkish nationalists com-mingled with Bolshevik agents to plan challenges to England’s control of Iraq. Among the news circulating was the 1920 communist eviction of British forces from the oil city of Baku and port towns in the Caspian. If the British show weakness in the face of Bolshevism, they show weakness if challenged through Arab nationalism. Wardi’s volumes are unique because of his ability to recreate the ideological strands that led to Iraq’s major conflicts. He mar-inates the reader in the mindset of the streets of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra. Understanding human terrain on this level is necessary for any force operating in Iraq to this day. Mosul to Syria Nationalist Pipeline Mosul maintains an important place in Iraq’s nationalist politics. According to Wardi, it contained many unemployed Ottoman bureaucrats, as well as a saturation of schools left by the Ottomans. The city of Mosul is strategically and geographically close to both Turkey and Syria. In 1919, many of Prince Faisal’s entourage were not just Iraqis, but Iraqis from Mosul. These officers stayed with Faisal in Syria and had tribal and family connections in Mosul. Al-Ahd, a secret society dedicated to Syrian independence, established its first external branch in Mosul that would make connections and garner members, connecting Damascus and Baghdad revolutionaries. Mosul ideologically intersected Turkish, Syrian, Iraqi, and Arab nationalist cells, as well as Bolshevism — all of which hated the British. In addition, demobilized Ottoman officers and soldiers of Iraqi origin began arriving at Mosul and started agitating and organizing nationalist cells. Of credit to the British, both Percy Cox and Gertrude Bell were cognizant of some of these anti-British efforts and debated such ideas as placing one of the sons of Sharif Hussein bin Ali of Mecca, in whose name the Arab Revolt was conducted, as ruler of a British-mandated Iraq. Wardi assesses not only external influence leading to the 1920 revolt, but internal issues that may have contributed to the event, including the replacement of General McMunn with Lieutenant General Aylmer Haldane in 1919. The new general in chief in Iraq loathed his diplomatic counterpart, British High Commissioner Arnold T. Wilson. Haldane did not take an interest in political reports, met only a few of Iraq’s political and religious leaders, and did not study or benefit from the experiences of his predecessors. He would spend months vacationing with his staff in the mountain resorts of Persia, leaving behind no command authority. Haldane would view the 1920 revolt, when it broke out, as a minor tribal revolt; however, when the revolt occurred, General Haldane was spending the summer in Persia. Another internal dynamic was the changing of leadership within the Shiites from Grand Ayatollah Karim al-Yazdi, who enjoyed good relations with British authorities, but died in 1919, to Mohammed Taqi Shirazi, who detested British interference in Iraq’s internal affairs. Despite several calls by Commissioner Wilson to Shirazi, each visit was met with frustration. London Attempts to Address Iraqi Rule though a Plebiscite In discussions between Bell, Wilson, and officials in London, the British decided to put the question of Iraqi rule to its tribal, religious, and city notables within Iraq’s major urban centers. London wished to pose the following questions to the Iraqi leaders: do Iraqis wish to have an Arab entity that would extend from Mosul to the Northern Persian Gulf around Basra; do Iraqis desire an Arab leader to rule this Arab independent entity; and if Iraqis want an Arab leader, who should this leader be? Wilson took these questions to notables within the nine regions that subdivided Iraq at the time. The British had the equivalent of an army major in each of the nine regions. In his book, Wardi highlights only three major urban centers — Najaf, Karbala, and Baghdad. He describes how Commissioner Wilson posed the three critical questions and how the city notables of these three major centers made choices on who should rule: Najaf. Wilson flew down to Najaf to meet with Grand Ayatollah Yazdi. The Grand Ayatollah indicated to Shiite leaders that he was political, but advised Shiite representatives to do what was in the best interest of the Muslims when they made their decisions about the questions. In Najaf, 21 leaders opted for direct British rule and ten for Arab independence. Karbala. In Karbala, leaders resented all three questions posed by the British and some split, proposing that a member of the deposed Ottoman-ruling family be made ruler. Shiites proposed that a member of the Qajar Persian royal family be made ruler. The majority in Karbala picked Abdullah or Zaid ibn Hussein, of the Hashemites of Mecca, to rule. In Kazimiyah, Ottoman agitators present, who were viewed as notables of the city, voted for Arab self-rule and a leader from the Hashemites. Baghdad: Wilson considered Baghdad the driving force behind Iraq, where, as voted, the rest of Mesopotamia would go. “The new general in chief in Iraq loathed his diplomatic counterpart, British High Commissioner Arnold T. Wilson. Haldane did not take an interest in political reports, met only a few of Iraq’s political and religious leaders, and did not study or benefit from the experiences of his predecessors. He would spend months vacationing with his staff in the mountain resorts of Persia, leaving behind no command authority.” — 29 “Of credit to the British, both Percy Cox and Gertrude Bell were cognizant of some of these anti-British efforts and debated such ideas as placing one of the sons of Sharif Hussein bin Ali of Mecca, in whose name the Arab Revolt was conducted, as ruler of a British-mandated Iraq.”

Baghdad was also the center of anti-British activity. It would have 32 Sunni and 24 Shiite representatives cast their votes on these questions. The majority voted for Arab independence for Iraq, extending from Mosul to the Northern Persian Gulf, and for the Sharif of Mecca to rule an Arab dominion as king, which would encompass Hejaz, Syria, and Iraq. Iraq would be directly ruled by a son of the Sharif of Mecca, as would Syria. Jewish and Christian minorities petitioned Wilson for direct British rule or construct, such as Egypt, which was a British protectorate. 1919: A Pivotal Year in Iraqi Political History The year 1919 would be an important milestone in modern Iraqi political history. It marked the first time Iraqi leaders were asked what type of government they desired and which ruler they favored. However, many Iraqis were among the disempow-ered because the questions led the minority to express their desire for direct British rule, thinking the questions were a loyalty test designed to expose dissent. After 1919, a host of Iraqi and Syrian nationalist groups coalesced into two major national fronts in Baghdad. One was called Haras al-Istiqlal (guardians of independence), the second was al-Ahd (the Pact), which was first established in Damascus, branched into Mosul, and evolved a second large branch in Baghdad. Haras al-Istiqlal and al-Ahd split over the issue of accepting British economic, technical, and military aid for any independent Iraq. Haras al-Istiqlal asserted that accepting British aid was tantamount to accepting British rule and that such aid should come from another European power. In 1919, Iraq’s leaders in Baghdad reopened middle and high schools that closed when the Ottomans withdrew from Iraq in 1918. The schools became a hotbed for political activity and involved the youth group, “Independence Guard Party,” a quasi-militia. Nationalist reading groups were developed from within these schools to educate anew generation of literate Iraqis in European nationalism, revolution, and the tactics of rebellion. By 1920, cells had been organized from Baghdad to Karbala and the middle Euphrates River. 1920 San Remo Conference and Ignoring the Iraqi Plebiscite On 15 April 1920, details of the San Remo Conference were made public. This hastily organized session was designed to address the final details, such as the disposition of Ottoman Arab dominions, of the Versailles Conference, where the decision was made to make Iraq and Palestine a British mandate and Syria and Lebanon French mandates. Wilson was left to manage the Iraqi population. He issued a public announcement, directed at the Iraqis, stating that the British had been more just and efficient than the Ottomans and signs of progress were self-evident within Iraq over the past 2 years, to include safety under the rule of law. He further explained that a mandate was to guide Iraq toward a path of self-determination to be assessed at a future date. However, many Iraqis viewed the mandate in the words of newspapers as, “children needing guardians for our affairs.” The imposition of a British mandate over Iraq would do much to increase the pace of Iraqi and Arab nationalist movements. Religion and Nationalism Commingle in Iraq Like Baghdad, Karbala, in 1919, would see the emergence of a nationalist group that would mix Islam and Arab nationalism. Mirza Mohammed Rida created a secret society called the “Islamic Group.” Its goals were a rejection of British occupation, immediate independence, and the selection of a Muslim ruler in Iraq. The group was to receive a fatwa (religious opinion) from Grand Ayatollah Shirazi stating that a Muslim cannot select anon-Muslim to rule over Muslims.” The fatwa was endorsed by 17 other clerics and distributed throughout the middle Euphrates region. Karbala would be the earliest instance of religion and nationalism commingling, with slogans such as “Love of nation is a religious duty.” Of significance, 20 days after the fatwa was issued, Grand Ayatollah Shirazi sent a letter to President Woodrow Wilson through the American minister in Persia. The letter, dated February 1919, outlined the Iraqis’ desire for self-determination and independence from British rule. Shirazi’s follow-on fatwa prohibited Muslims from seeking employment or working for British authorities. The British responded by empowering a willing Shiite leader, Mirza Muhammad Bushehri in Karbala, as mayor and civic leader to rival Shirazi; the British backed their leader with public welfare projects, such as regular running water, electricity, schools for girls, and English language schools, to stem the tide on anti-British sentiment that Karbala was taking on a religious tone. The British failed to appreciate the human terrain of the middle Euphrates River culture as this region was Iraq’s second access point after the ports of Basra and Umm Qasr, and where Iraq was accessed landward from the Levant, Egypt, and Arabia. This region contained fiercely independent tribes in which tribal culture and loyalty added another layer of complexity to social relationships. The region is also the heart of Shiism; the city of Kufa is where Ali was assassinated and Karbala is where Hussein was ambushed during the Mongol invasions. Al-Hilla became the center of Shiism before being moved to Najaf. “Grand Ayatollah Shirazi sent a letter to President Woodrow Wilson through the American minister in Persia. The letter, dated February 1919, outlined the Iraqis’ desire for self-determination and independence from British rule. Shirazi’s follow-on fatwa prohibited Muslims from seeking employment or working for British authorities.” 30 —

A little known challenge to governing the middle Euphrates was changing the course of the Euphrates River, leading tribes to resettle land to be close to the water, and with that, tribal warfare. Among the main sources of regular income in the middle Euphrates was rice crops, which so enriched landowners that they soon found time for discussing politics and engaging in the support of nationalist causes. An institution that kept tribes at peace was “Sadah” (singular Sayyid), or leaders that were a mix of religions and landed gently within Iraqi Shiism. Some Sayyids claimed decent from Prophet Muhammad and acted to arbitrate between tribes in Iraq. The Sayyids would play an important role in inciting jihad against British forces in the 1920 revolt. Seeds of the 1920 Revolt The seeds of the 1920 revolt are lost to history, but the village of Abi Sukhair, in the middle Euphrates, is considered the revolt’s birthplace and involved British army Captain Lyle insulting Say yid Alwan al-Yasri, and the method by which he was thrown out of the captain’s office one day in late 1919. Being unable to bring village grievances after being insulted by British authorities, he began to call for armed rebellion. The al-Yasris were the Sayyids of the region of Iraq and were interlocutors between the tribes — the actions of Captain Lyle would slowly ignite a conflagration. Alwan’s cousin was an even more powerful Sayyid Noor al-Yasri, who preached jihad against the unjust British; now the al-Ibrahim tribe would be offended and would bring in a neighboring tribal confederacy, the al-Fatlah. This tribe was upset by the British policy of supporting the older son of the former leader of al-Fatlah, versus the son’s uncle, as the agreed upon leader. These two tribes took their grievances to the al-Shalash tribe in Najaf and petitioned the King of Hejaz and Sharif of Mecca. King Hussein ibn Ali was reminded in these petitions of the tribes’ desire to be governed by one of his sons, and the British were delaying these desires. Talk of revolution was so prevalent in April 1920 that growing tribal discontent, British grievances, the feeling that the British were delaying the installation of Arab rule, and the announcement of the mandate led to a secret conference in Najaf to discuss rebellion. The meeting affirmed the establishment of the Islamic Group, with unity and acceptance of Iraqis who were anti-British under this new organization; its leader would be Grand Ayatollah Shirazi. Fridays (the Muslim Sabbath) would be a day of strike to begin nonviolent resistance in Baghdad, Kazimiyah, and Najaf. Of note, Grand Ayatollah Shirazi was against rebelling toward the British due to his fear that the tribes would suffer massive casualties. Also, he would be bullied by the tribesmen, and realizing they intended to rebel and engage in resistance, the Grand Ayatollah simply said, “If this is your intention, you are unified in consensus, then may God aid you.” Events of Deir Zur Deir Zur is a town located in the Northern Euphrates and is geographically located between Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Towns, such as Deir Zur and Albu Kamal, would pose problems in defining the edges between Syria and would evolve into the modern Iraqi state. The Ottoman withdrawal in 1918 left an administrative void that would be filled by merchants and tribal elders, enforcing tribal law in place of nonexistent civil government. Upon hearing of the Arab Revolt under Prince Faisal’s declaring independence in Syria, the villagers wrote to the Hashemite ruler requesting their town fall under Syria. The Hashemite authority in Syria sent Marahi Pasha as their representative. After a few months, the townsfolk of Deir Zur grew dissatisfied with Marahi Pasha, and lamented that neighboring towns under British control were receiving money, technical support, healthcare, and functioning administrative governance. The town elders convened a secret meeting, and without the knowledge of Marahi Pasha, sent a request to the British sharing their desire to be part of Iraq. Marahi Pasha only realized what the elders had done when a British armored unit arrived to take control of the town. He asked Shukri Pasha in Aleppo for guidance, who advised him to surrender the town to the British until its status was resolved through the Versailles Conference. Of note, the British brought with the armored unit technicians, civil servants, and administrators, who immediately set about bringing a functioning municipal government in Deir Zur. Syria Supports Iraqi Insurrection in Deir Zur In the summer of 1919, Iraqi members of the Damascus-based al-Ahd Party decided it would regain control of Deir Zur and succeed in getting Ramadan Shalash appointed military governor of al-Riqa, the closest village under Syria to Deir Zur. His primary mission was to sow anti-British dissent among the tribes; how much Prince Faisal knew of his objective or plans is unknown. Likely to maintain plausible deniability, Shalash was an excellent choice for military governor, and was an Iraqi from the Albu Sarai Tribe, who attended the Ottoman school for tribal administration. He began by shaming tribal leaders who opted for British administration, citing them as non-Muslims ruling over Muslims. He found tribes divided; those who felt the British were empowering clans at the expense of other clans and tribes at the expense of other tribes. He collected discontented tribes who felt they were not benefiting from British order to form a force of 500 Bedouins and raid Deir Zur in December 1919. The British forces in the village withdrew in garrison, finally surrendered, and were taken hostage. The quick capture of Deir Zur led tribal loyalties to switch toward Shalash; with this momentum, he decided to raid the town of Albu Kamal, located along the undefined Syrian-Iraq border. Prince Faisal sent a cable from Paris, where he was negotiating at Versailles, saying the break down in stability along the Syrian-Iraq frontier could jeopardize negotiations in Paris. Prince Faisal informed the British general staff in London that the Arab Revolt had nothing to do with these events. On 23 December 1919, British planes dropped leaflets containing Prince Faisal’s cable to Prince Zeid, which denounced Ramadan Shalash and warned that aerial bombing would commence if British hostages were not released within 48 hours. The threat worked and the hostages were released. Shalash remained in control of Deir Zur and Albu Kamal until he was replaced by Maolood Mukhlis in 1920. Mukhlis would make it his mission to spread tribal insurrection and oppose the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, demarking the Habor River as the northern border between Syria and Iraq. British forces set about retaking Deir Zur and Albu Kamal. Mukhlis declared a jihad to resist these efforts and organized tribal levies, regular forces, and more than 300 Iraqi regulars in the former Ottoman service who trickled in from Syria to participate in the jihad. General Haldane sent a letter to Mukhlis threatening aerial assaults if tribal attacks did not cease. Mukhlis wrote appeals to jihad in Damascus and Aleppo. Answering the call for jihad was former military governor Ramadan Shalash; both he and Mukhlis had strong personalities and fought incessantly with one another. In Cairo, General Edmund Allenby, commander in chief of British forces in the Middle East, received a note from Prince Faisal informing him that the situation in the undefined border between Syria and Iraq was spiraling out of control. Tribes were divided along the border demarcated by the Treaty of Versailles and a joint Anglo-Arab border delegation was being created to — 31 reconcile these tribal splits and redraw the border. Allenby agreed to the proposal and the issue of Albu Kamal and Deir Zur going to Syria was determined. Of note, Prince Faisal could not control the tribes of northern and middle Euphrates; nor could he keep tribes that demobilized from the Arab Revolt from continuing the tactic of raiding trains. British military logistics trains were attacked along the Mosul to Tikrit line — this included damage to the trains and rail line. The momentum of tribal raids along northern and middle Euphrates would lead to the Arab takeover of the entire region of Tal Afar and would trigger a British retaliatory response. An Iraqi advisor to General Haldane warned, “If you do not assert authority in Deir Zur and Albu Kamal, the tribes will be emboldened and you will face a full-fledged revolt in six months.” On 8 March 1920, hundreds of Iraqi regular officers and troops, previously in the service of Ottoman forces, answered the call of the Sherief of Mecca and fought the Ottomans for Arab self-determination in the Arab Revolt. These Iraqi officers and troops had become disenchanted with French and British designs to carve the Middle East into mandates, and on 8 March, they approached Prince Faisal, then self-proclaimed King of Syria, and expressed their dissatisfaction with the outcome of the Arab Revolt. They opted to leave Prince Faisal and answer the call for jihad in Iraq, fighting the British in Deir Zur. The group of Iraqi officers informed Prince Faisal that the Turks and Bolsheviks were ready to support any and all anti-colonial nationalist groups. Faisal drew 3,000 golden pounds (each gold pound was the size of a $5 gold piece), about $15,000 in gold coins, to give the group as mustering-out pay. The Iraqis raided one of Prince Faisal’s arsenals and helped themselves to weapons. They then proceeded to the Turkish-Iraq border to pick up hundreds of crates of ammo and guns, machine guns, and grenades before heading toward Deir Zur, along the Syrian and Iraqi frontier. Events would spiral out of control and the British would underestimate “tribal mischief ” in what would become a full-fledged national liberation army. Revolt in Tal Afar Abdel-Hamid al-Dabooni served as assistant political officer to British forces in Tal Afar. He was gruffly treated by British officers who questioned his loyalty, so he resigned in disgust and departed for Deir Zur. Dabooni offered Maolood Mukhlis a treasure trove of human intelligence on British locations in the city of Tal Afar. He discussed British positions, defenses, personalities of the officers, provided information on spies within the Iraqi nationalist camp, and convinced leaders that this growing anti-British resistance movement could easily take Tal Afar. Learning of the amassing of forces in Deir Zur, the British took up the matter with Prince Faisal. The newly proclaimed King of Syria summoned representatives of the resistance movement at Deir Zur and was told it would be impossible to reverse the momentum of armed insurrection against the British in Iraq. Faisal asked that his relationship with the British not be compromised and that field guns not be used lest it betray Syrian collusion. The king was naïve and the momentum created by the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans that swept him from Arabia to Damascus and guarded the British right flank as it made its way from Egypt to Palestine and on to Syria to crush the Ottoman 4th Army, found its way partly in attacking British units in Iraq. The assault on Tal Afar began not by assault, but by sending Dabooni to town to negotiate and incite a rebellion from within. He discussed the amassing of the Sherifian army of liberation on the outskirts of Tal Afar and convinced the leader of the Saada tribe “In Cairo, General Edmund Allenby, commander in chief of British forces in the Middle East, received a note from Prince Faisal informing him that the situation in the undefined border between Syria and Iraq was spiraling out of control. Tribes were divided along the border demarcated by the Treaty of Versailles and a joint Anglo-Arab border delegation was being created to reconcile these tribal splits and redraw the border.” Council of Four at the Versailles Peace Conference, 1919. “Prince Faisal could not control the tribes of northern and middle Euphrates; nor could he keep tribes that demobilized from the Arab Revolt from continuing the tactic of raiding trains. British military logistics trains were attacked along the Mosul to Tikrit line — this included damage to the trains and rail line.” 32 — that all honor and glory would go to them if they led an internal assault on the paltry British presence in Tal Afar. The tribal leader consulted with an Iraqi police leader in Tal Afar; Dabooni convinced them both to rebel and participate in the revolution. The British had three regular soldiers and seventy Iraqi levies; and the British major in charge was aided by an Iraqi lieutenant. As the tribes attacked, they withdrew into their fortress and fired machine guns, ceding the town to the internal tribes and townspeople who revolted. When a tribal leader was killed, the British major, who was captured outside the fortress, was killed in retaliation. Dabooni was in a precarious position having promised the arrival of the Sherifian army of liberation; the leaders of the internal revolt suspected Dabooni had tricked them into rebelling and they would now bear the brunt of British vengeance. This was reinforced by British planes and armored vehicles approaching Tal Afar (three armored cars and several troop carriers with Indian infantry). Barricades were set up around Tal Afar and rebels poured withering fire on the British relief force. When an armored car made it past the barricade and into Tal Afar, attempting to make its way to fort, women on rooftops dropped rocks on the car and rebels dropped grenades on its roof, which led to the capture of Indian soldiers. In one instance, an Indian solider, fearing capture by the Iraqis, covered himself in gasoline and set himself alight. This was never before seen by Iraqis, who witnessed this self-immolation with amazement. One armored car made a hasty retreat and was pursued by tribesmen on horseback, who attempted to mount the car, killing one occupant. Upon pursuit, the car became disabled and all four soldiers made a final stand, firing into the approaching mounted tribal fighters. Of note, the fortress was taken when the Iraqi police forces, known as “al-dirk,” turned against the British, taking them hostage and opening the fortress to rebel forces. The Sherifian army arrived on 4 June 1920. Attempts on the City of Mosul As word on the fall of Tal Afar reached Mosul, British authorities, led by a colonel, were forced to reinforce defenses, impose curfews, and demand the surrender of all weapons to security forces, to include swords and daggers. Mosul was then surrounded by barbed-wire boundaries and checkpoints set up on key access points of the city. Tribes emboldened by Tal Afar began joining the Arab Nationalist Revolt for a chance at gaining spoils. British convoys leading to Mosul from the north and west were attacked, and British armories and remote offices were raided. Tribes and regular Iraqi forces, led by Jameel al-Midfai, made their way to the outskirts of Mosul on 7 June 1920. It was estimated more than 1,000 regular and irregular forces attacked the village of Abu Qadur on the road to Mosul. The British made a stand at Abu Qadur, firing a concentration of artillery on the waves of horse-mounted attackers. Fighting an offensive battle in open terrain with the British defending with artillery, reinforced with two biplanes that dropped bombs and strafed tribes with machine gun fire, caused panic and fear among the irregular tribal forces, which led to a retreat. British planes pursued the retreating army all the way to Tal Afar, dropping bombs on them. The harassment of Tal Afar with British planes led to general panic inside the city, with families leaving the city for Turkey and Syria. On 9 June, British forces entered Tal Afar and took the city with minimal resistance, then set about dynamit-ing the homes of known rebel leaders, allowing 3 days of looting to commence before restoring order. The British granted amnesty to the villagers, except those known to have killed British forces. Events in Tal Afar are significant — this land has historic meaning to the Iraqis. It is where those who took a stand against the British mandate of Iraq are buried; these are not merely just points on the map, but hills and forts, and the terrain is important to the residents of this northern Iraqi city. Beginning in 2003, insurgents used Tal Afar as a staging point for attacks against U. S. forces, which led to Operation Black Typhoon with the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division in 2004, and Operation Restoring Rights involving the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment in 2005. The city was mentioned by the late Iraqi al-Qaeda leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in December 2005, when he falsely accused the United States of using chemical weapons, as a means of saving face, as U. S. and Iraqi forces put pressure on insurgents. Ramadan Incidents in Baghdad Baghdad is unique in Iraq’s social history; aside from being Iraq’s center, it has experienced sectarian flare-ups between Sunni and Shiite Muslims since the Abbasid caliphate (750-1258 AD). The leaders of the 1920 revolt understood any nationalist movement must overcome this sectarianism even temporarily. Wardi highlights the methods used to achieve the merger of Sunnis and Shiites against the British. Ironically, these methods included labor strikes, which led to the proposal of merging the Shiite religious observance of Ashoura (commemorating the martyrdom of Hussein) with the Sunni religious observance of Prophet Muhammad’s birthday as a means of increasing participation in mass strikes protesting British rule. Saaleh al-Hilli came up with this idea and added that the British would be reluctant to intervene in a strike cloaked in religious observances. Of note, America’s Continental Congress undertook a similar tactic by declaring a day of fasting and prayer to protest British oppression in July 1775. In the realm of civil disobedience, getting British authorities to react was a tactical victory; however, this reaction came when they detained a popular Iraqi poet. The Guardians of Independence Party organized demonstrations, and when these anti-British demonstrations turned to riots, Iraq’s first national martyr emerged, a man from the al-Akhras family. The Iraqi nationalists organized a funeral procession that included anti-British protests, which led authorities to monitor the procession using cavalry and from the air. British officials called on known instigators in Baghdad, verbally abusing them and threatening exile. Grand Ayatollah Shirazi’s Message Ardent nationalist leader and Shiite, Jafar Abu Timen, wrote Grand Ayatollah Shirazi, leader of the Najaf Marjaiah (clerical cluster) and equivalent to Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, the current highest-ranking religious scholar in Iraq, appealing to the Shiite notion of speaking out against oppression and injustice. The appeal worked and Shirazi wrote a letter urging cooperation with Iraq’s nationalists in the noble project of Iraqi independence, and the establishment of an Islamic government. He wrote that all Iraqis must set aside sectarian differences and come together in this grand undertaking. His letter was mass printed and distributed throughout Iraq. One can argue that this seminal document would place Iraq on a path of independence as it provided the ability of Iraq’s nationalists to unify and submit a list of common demands to Commissioner Wilson in Iraq. Wilson called for the immediate formation of an Iraqi congress, representing Iraq’s people, to determine the fate of the nation, freedom of the press to express all of Iraq’s points of view, and removing mail and — 33 telegraph censorship to allow the free exchange of views on how to establish and create an independent Iraq. Wilson responded by lifting restrictions on Shiite and Sunni religious observances and offered to discuss Iraqi participation at the municipal level only. Another event that exacerbated tensions and was used by Iraqi nationalists during the 1920 revolt was the detention of Grand Ayatollah Shirazi’s son, Muhammad Rida, who was a well-connected Iraqi revolutionary. Rida advocated replicating the Arab Revolt of Arabia that evicted the Ottomans in Iraq against the British. He had connections with anti-British secret societies in Syria and lobbied for Shiite clerical participation in Iraq’s nationalist movement. The British incarcerated him, which led not only to Shiite outrage, but caused the Sunnis to capitalize on Rida’s incarceration to unify with their Shiite brothers. In addition, his arrest led to Persia making diplomatic overtures to Britain to secure his release. Rida would remain incarcerated, and his father, Grand Ayatollah Shirazi, would capitalize on this by playing up the sacrifices he was making, his son being detained in prison, for Iraqi independence. The British asserted and ran a counterpropaganda campaign advertising that they had brought order, rule of law, efficient rail, telegraph, and freedom from tribal chaos. This campaign was unsuccessful due to the British failing to address the long-term issue of the future of Iraq’s governance. This was the golden period — had the British seized and entered into negotiations over gradual independence, the revolt may have never taken place. Instead, their insistence at maintaining a colony through the fiction of a mandate with no clear end, led to the spark that ignited the revolt. Politics or Tribal Insult: The Spark of the 1920 Revolt The British obsession with rule of law led to an incident whereby Chief Shaalan Abu Joun owed the British 800 Rupees. He entered the garrison at Rumaytha to settle the issue and was handled roughly by British authorities. Chief Shaalan, leader of the Zuwailem tribe, warned British officers in Rumaytha, “Your policy will drag Britain into much animosity, knowing you are in Iraq and not Hindustan, Iraqis are not Indians.” A nationalist-coordinated raid on Rumaytha occurred, but the British blamed it on the tribes — chiefly, the Albu Hassan and Zuwailem tribes, which were struck by British forces without warning in July

1920. This only unified the Zuwailem and Albu Hassan, which conducted amass raid on Rumaytha, overwhelming the British. General Haldane cut short his Persian vacation and ordered the redeployment of forces, ordering one division to Diwaniyah to deal with the tribal chaos. British troops inside the fort of Rumaytha would be resupplied by aerial drops; they then planned an aerial bombardment on the town of Rumaytha to allow the British trapped inside the fort to escape, while the populace and tribal forces were taking cover. Village leaders in Rumaytha contacted both the British and Iraqi nationalists to spare them the bombing. Iraqi nationalists would use the aerial strafing and bombing of Rumaytha, and the casualties generated, as a massacre to be avenged — much like America’s propagandizing the 1770 Boston Massacre. The nationalists seized the opportunity to make their demands and Said Muhammad, the designated representative from Rumaytha, carried the nationalist demands to British Brigadier General Frank Coningham, who commanded the division in Diwaniyah. The demands included the withdrawal of British forces and immediate independence for Iraq. General Coningham took the list of demands, threw it on the ground, and stomped it. He moved part of his forces toward Rumaytha, following the known train route from Diwaniyah to Rumaytha, where he was met by 5,700 tribal fighters. These tribes were defeated in the Battle of Ahrdiyaat on 19 July 1920. It makes little difference who wins the battle in nationalist and tribal insurgencies — the harassment inevitably continues. What the British failed to realize in the Battle of Ahrdiyaat was that the tribal fighters were made up not only of the Albu Hassan and Zuwailem, but now included Bani Zareej, Bani Arid, and Ahajeeb, with Ottoman military advisers and former Iraqi officers, who were in the Ottoman service or the Arab Revolt. Two weeks after the Battle of Ahrdiyaat, tribal raids continued daily, with casualties mounting mainly on the Arab side, which led Grand Ayatollah Shirazi to call a cease-fire to be brokered between Iraqis and the British through the Persians. Commissioner Wilson rejected this proposal based on Shirazi’s inflamed letter calling for insurrection, and it appeared that the Iraqis felt the need to enter into negotiations because British tactics were working. The British failed to understand Iraq’s need for self-determination and resentment of the mandate, which led to flare-ups in other parts of Iraq. In the town of Abu Sukhair, a siege of British security forces was conducted by the Ala’ Fatla, Ghaza-lat, Ala’ Shibl, and Ala’ Ibrahim tribes; this siege was particularly distinguished by attacks on British logistics boats and armed riverboats such as HMS Firefly. On 17 July, a 4-day cease fire was negotiated and the demands included the formation of an Iraqi governing council and the release of prisoners, to include Grand Ayatollah Shirazi’s son. These demands were ignored and hostilities continued with the Albu Hassan tribe taking the town of al-Kifl on 22 July. The British realized if their outposts, villages, and train depots fell to these rebellious tribes aided by nationalists that it would breathe confidence into the nationalists and lead to more tribes joining the insurrection in search of spoils. During the Battle of Rarnjiah, a British regiment, on its way toward al-Kifl and al-Hilla, was ambushed as its soldiers rested for the night. During the ambush, 52 machine guns and an 18-pound artillery piece were stolen, and 400 casualties were suffered. This battle would be a turning point in this growing revolt and lead to revolts east of Diwaniyah and attacks on trains by the Ufuk and Aqr’aa tribes, cutting off communications links of Diwaniyah. General Coningham withdrew his forces from Diwaniyah to al-Hilla, using only six engines and 251 rail cars. His withdrawal would extend for miles and he would advance only 8 miles a day, dealing with tribes attempting to harass the rail column, but being beaten back by aerial escort that strafed and bombed the approaching tribesmen. The tribes foolishly attempted to raid al-Hilla, but it was heavily defended and they suffered a crushing blow. Wardi’s Observations on British and Iraqi Strengths and Weaknesses Wardi sees the 1920 revolt in three stages: the stimulus that was caused by events in Deir Zur, Karbala, Tal Afar, and Baghdad; the armed insurrection stage, which began with Rumaytha and engulfed all of central and northern Iraq; and the spreading of the insurrection into Diyala that garnered more tribal support. He writes the middle Euphrates was the spinal cord of the revolt, and where the most treasure and casualties originated. He criticizes the British for not having enough forces and relying too much on the new technology of aerial attacks; leaving post-World War I saturated with weapons, a German Mauser rifle, which cost 25 pounds during the war and 4 pounds during the revolt; failing to exploit the greed of tribes joining mainly for spoils, with independence being a secondary consideration; and Continued on Page 46 34 — underestimating the religious factors that breathed life into parts of the insurrection demoralized by superior British weapons. Wardi writes the tribes were defeated because they joined and left the revolt as they pleased; money from spoils dried up quickly and could not sustain the revolt; spies and informants in the pay of the British permeated every level of Iraqi society; they waited until 8,450 were killed before they realized it was time to consider the prospect of some form of negotiation with the British; and many joined the revolt based on face and honor, and when the public wavered in its support, their face and honor wavered as well, leading to some abandoning the revolt. Spread of Rebellion and Conclusion In Samawah, tribes and nationalist forces attacked British armed riverboats HMS Stonefly and Greenfly. Within urban areas, such as Karbala, the city was divided into pro-and anti-British factions. Neighborhoods established provisional governments that were suppressed by the British. In retaliation, General Haldane cut water to Karbala, much to the objection of Wilson, who understood this would only unify the people of Karbala as they would endure common suffering. In Najaf, the British allowed some self-government, and even an election of market officials occurred on 25 August 1920. An aerial bombardment of Kufa led to damage of the mosque that was capitalized on by anti-British agitators. Wilson finally realized the only means of quelling this insurrection was not by force alone and began to consider discussing plans to transition Iraq into an independent entity. By August 1920, a stalemate developed whereby tribes controlled villages and the British controlled major urban areas. However, it would be along road to the 1921 Cairo Conference that would develop the details of transitioning Britain’s Iraqi Mandate to independence by 1932. Many more casualties would occur on both sides, but the next phase of the 1920 revolt would see increasing violence, as British and Iraqi revolutionaries postured for strategic advantage in world opinion and negotiations. Wardi’s Part 2 of Volume 5 takes us from July 1920 to the conclusion of the revolt when it became clear that King Faisal would ascend to the throne of a newly created nation-state of Iraq in late August 1921. Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein is a U. S. Navy Medical Service Corps Officer and Middle East foreign area officer. He currently serves as a senior counterterrorism advisor, warning officer, and instructor on militant Islamist ideology, Joint Task Force for Combating Terrorism, Washington, DC. He received a B. B. A. from the University of Mississippi (Ole Miss), an M. B. A. and M. A. from the University of Arkansas, and an M. S. from the National Defense Intelligence College. His military education includes the U. S. Naval War College, the U. S. Army War College Defense Strategy Course, the Marine Corps University Amphibious Warfare School, and advanced analytic courses at the Joint Military Intelligence College. His most recent assignments include country director for North Africa and Egypt, assistant country director for the Arabian Gulf, and special advisor on Islamist Militancy at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Washington, DC. This work would not have been possible without the help of YN1 Gavin Irby for his edits and valuable comments and the help of the John T. Hughes Library and Library of Congress for making Wardi’s works available for study. A special thanks to the National Defense University Librarians, who devoted part of their lunch hour to help me. Works of Dr. Ali al-Wardi from Page 34 46 — completed, but the ISF have repeatedly demonstrated both the desire and ability to complete this task in the next few months. This desire is directly attributable to the ISF’s ability to obtain warrants using information obtained during cordon, search, and census operations. Additionally, their relationship with the local community has been significantly enhanced as a result of these operations as they are more adequately able to identify and work with local leaders. During a recent planning session with west Mosul ISF leaders, they proudly showed us revised census information requirements datasheets currently being used in Mosul, which were derived from the original products we used during our combined operations prior to 30 June. More importantly, the west Mosul ISF has demonstrated its ability to unilaterally secure local neighborhoods following the 30 June handover — the most common type of mission remains a cordon, search, and census. Although a census of each neighborhood has been completed at one time or another, the ISF continues to update its resident database, which allows them to obtain warrants and target insurgents more successfully. While the time for fully partnered cordon, search, and census operations in Mosul appears to have passed, this type of operation could be applied to a number of other areas where coalition forces are closely partnered with indigenous forces who lack sophisticated intelligence collection means and knowledge of their AO. We have not yet discovered an operation that gains intelligence so rapidly while simultaneously endearing indigenous forces to the community. By enabling the ISF to “know its AO” through cordon, search, and census operations, its timeline for assuming security responsibility of Mosul was greatly expedited. Captain Bryan Frizzelle is currently serving as company commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3d Squadron, 8th Cavalry (3-8 CAV), 3d Brigade Combat Team (3BCT), 1st Cavalry Division (1CD), Mosul, Iraq. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy. His military education includes Armor Captain Career Course, Cavalry Leader Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, Scout Platoon Leader Course, and M1A2SEP Tank Commander Certification Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, D Company, and S4, 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Iraq, and Fort Hood;; task force mortar platoon leader, 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Baghdad, Iraq; and tank platoon leader, B Company, 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Fort Hood and Baghdad. Lieutenant Jeffrey Gagliano is currently serving as executive officer, D Company, 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Mosul, Iraq. He received a B. S. from Texas Christian University. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Basic Officer Leader Course, Anti-Terrorism Level II, and Anti-Terrorism Level II Instructor Course. He has served in various leader and staff positions, to include platoon leader, D Company, 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Mosul, Iraq; instructor, Anti-Terrorism Level II, Sembach, Germany; instructor, Ground Combat Skills, Sembach; and noncommissioned officer in charge, Crime Prevention, San Antonio, Randolph Air Force Base, TX. Lieutenant Brian Murdock is currently serving as a platoon leader, D Company, 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Mosul, Iraq. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Officer Candidate School, and Basic Officer Leader Course. Lieutenant Nicholas Rinaldi is currently serving as a platoon leader, 2d Platoon, D Company, 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Mosul, Iraq. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy. His military education includes Airborne School, Ranger School, Scout Leader Course, and Basic Officer Leader Courses II and III. Lieutenant Daniel Wagner is currently serving as a platoon leader, D Company, 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Mosul, Iraq. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy. His military education includes Maneuver Officer Basic Course. He has also served as executive officer, D Company, 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Iraq, and Fort Hood.