Cavalry for Irregular Warfare

6 — American military experience has certainly taught us that irregular warfare demands extreme flexibility. Units must gather their own intelligence, have high mobility, and hit hard when necessary, and simultaneously serve as an area stabilization force while other elements, such as civil, military, and nongovernment organizations, are building local communities. Traditionally, theses roles are filled by cavalry; however, our current modular organization lacks a unit with these capabilities. Given our current and probable future operations, the time has come to create anew cavalry organization that draws from our own military history to meet the needs of today and tomorrow — the medium cavalry squadron (MCS). While the current emphasis within the Army is on task-based units, there are intrinsic benefits to be gained from the formation of dedicated units like the MCS. In addition to training together and honing its core capabilities, the modular composition of the MCS allows it to expand or contract with relative ease. Lighter than a brigade, the MCS can deploy more quickly than a larger unit and possesses enough organic firepower and reconnaissance capability to take the place of a larger unit in most irregular warfare situations and many higher-intensity conflict scenarios. If necessary, two (or more) MCSs can be combined to form a medium cavalry regiment (provisional), giving a corps commander a valuable asset in almost any combat situation.

J. Bryan Mullins argues that cavalry may need to separate again into a “medium/heavy” and “light” configuration, with light cavalry dedicated to almost pure reconnaissance and intelligence missions.1 This runs the risk of creating a force that is optimized for a single battlefield environment and dependent on high-tech systems that may or may not function in operational conditions. It also renders cavalry next to useless in an irregular warfare setting. While “boots on the ground” are necessary for irregular warfare, there is also a clear need for a force that can both find the enemy and, to paraphrase the famous Nathan Bedford Forrest quote, “Get there first with the most.” Alight reconnaissance force might be able to do this, but a combined arms force with armor certainly can — and it has utility that is not limited to one region or conflict framework. The MCS is not limited to irregular warfare environments, it serves well as a medium reconnaissance formation in any conventional conflict with the ability to deploy its air and ground assets to locate enemy formations and even launch limited strikes. With its training focused on battlefield reconnaissance and reaction, as well as the organic headquarters capability to conduct limited intelligence collection and development, the MCS provides commanders with a flexible response tool they currently lack due to limitations in the Army’s organization. In his 2007 Monograph for the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), Major George Stewart III examines the role of the armored cavalry regiment in low- and high-intensity combat and determines that it takes two different modular units (a heavy brigade combat team and a Stryker brigade combat team) to replicate the effectiveness of the armored cavalry regiment (ACR), and both of these units need organizational changes to fill the role vacated by one unit.2 The MCS provides one unit that can fill both roles and “hold the line” until an ACR or other major combat unit arrives on the scene. Within the irregular warfare framework, a cavalry unit must develop its own intelligence and then act on that information. It should also be prepared to serve as a heavy reaction force in support of light infantry and military police-type units that often form the backbone of any counterinsurgency (COIN) effort. The famous “Blackhawk down” incident in Somalia is the most notorious example of what can happen to alight unit (no matter how elite) when it gets into a combat situation that requires more firepower and armor than it has on hand. A single MCS could have provided both rescue assets (its organic armored ground troops) and air cover and fire support (two air cavalry troops combined with the mortars assigned to the ground troops). Even with the present modular brigade organization, there is no single standing formation that could provide that level of support on short notice. There has been much discussion regarding the role and organization of cavalry in the future force, including a proposal to convert cavalry to a purely reconnaissance force.3 These debates pay little attention to the cavalry’s role in COIN operations and irregular warfare, focusing instead on possible future near-peer competitors.4 Many analysts also consider cavalry in the aftermath of World War II and selectively draw on Vietnam, which ignores the bulk of U. S. military history regarding the use of mounted forces and their valuable role in many forms of conflict over the years. It also ignores the need for a multipurpose “heavy” force for irregular warfare (“heavy” is used in quotation marks because in an irregular warfare context, heavy does not always indicate a force with a large armored contingent). The MCS is, in some ways, a direct philosophical descendant of the powerful cavalry corps led by James Wilson in 1865. Composed of cavalry and horse artillery units, Wilson’s Corps cut its way “…it takes two different modular units (a heavy brigade combat team and a Stryker brigade combat team) to replicate the effectiveness of the armored cavalry regiment (ACR), and both of these units need organizational changes to fill the role vacated by one unit. The MCS provides one unit that can fill both roles and ‘hold the line’ until an ACR or other major combat unit arrives on the scene.” 8 — through Alabama, accomplishing a strategic mission previously thought unattainable by mounted units.5 Cavalry: The American Context The role and “type” of cavalry within the U. S. military has been debated for some time. Most arguments look to Europe for definitions of cavalry roles and types, such as heavy, light, and dragoon, without examining the actual evolution of cavalry in the United States. Although given three different designations before the Civil War (dragoons, mounted riflemen, and cavalry), the few mounted regiments in U. S. service were more similar than not. Their roles remained surprisingly consistent, often at odds with the European terms and customs used to define them, and their own tactical manuals and drill instructions.6 This stems from their original operational role as explorers and mobile reaction forces. Instead of remaining in garrison training for the “next war,” the mounted units of the pre-1861 Army were in the field conducting hard service in roles ranging from exploration to peacekeeping and nearly everything in between. However, we must also look beyond the mechanization debate in the 1920s and focus on the role of cavalry (regardless of mode of locomotion) in the Army. Their role, at least in the context of the U. S. Army, has remained remarkably consistent in most combat situations — whether their mobility comes from horses or mechanized transport. Mounted formations in the U. S. Army typically performed two functions: reconnaissance (either tactical or strategic) and serving as a mobile strike force. Although pressed into service for route protection (wagon train escort) during the Civil War, this was not a core cavalry mission on the frontier before or after the war. Cavalry provided frontier commanders with two unique capabilities: the ability to conduct area reconnaissance missions in most terrain; and a strong, mobile force to use against hostile concentrations. Although infantry had more staying power in the field, even critics within the Army admitted that only cavalry could realistically close with and engage a highly mobile adversary under most circumstances.7 Cavalry at this time also had enough firepower to get themselves out of trouble as quickly as they might have gotten into it, a legacy of lessons learned during the Civil War. The historical role of cavalry as a reconnaissance force in the Army requires brief discussion because the MCS is in no small way shaped by the historical realities of the Army’s cavalry use. Many critics (both in and out of uniform) assert that American cavalry has rarely been used in its ‘true’ reconnaissance role because it is too combat capable.8 This statement ignores the realities that shaped how cavalry conducted reconnaissance in the field. Chronically understrength, the U. S. Army, both before and after the Civil War, had to make do with what it had. In many locations, cavalry was the only force available for quick action and was not seen as an auxiliary or supporting force to a main effort. Rarely able to meet its opponent in traditional combat, such as mounted force-on-force engagements, American cavalry developed a style of operations stressing the ability to fight “There has been much discussion regarding the role and organization of cavalry in the future force, including a proposal to convert cavalry to a purely reconnaissance force. These debates pay little attention to the cavalry’s role in COIN operations and irregular warfare, focusing instead on possible future near-peer competitors.” — 9 mounted with pistols or (more often) on foot with carbines, if they managed to find and fix their elusive opponents. They also came to rely on information gathered and developed by civilian or Indian scouts, although cavalry did from time to time conduct area reconnaissance (indicating where hostiles were not more often than actually making contact).9 This divergence in cavalry roles and missions found its best expression in Vietnam. Large Army units were committed in a combat role starting in 1965, with the stated objective of closing with and destroying the main force Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army elements in South Vietnam. This, in theory, allowed the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) time to secure the countryside and the population of South Vietnam. Although the nature of this mission is outside the scope of this article, it does have bearing on the story of American cavalry and the need for an MCS. Under the division organization in force at the time, the Army brought its cavalry to Vietnam as divisional squadrons and a separate ACR. There was a great deal of opposition in some quarters to the deployment of armor in what was seen as a jungle conflict dominated by infantry, but armor quickly proved its utility and value in such a conflict.10 Vietnam saw cavalry returning to many of its earlier roles — out of necessity rather than choice. Cavalry units were route-protection forces, quick-reaction elements, and strike forces in terrain originally determined impassable for armor. The ability of cavalry units to be tailored for almost any mission (and an overall lack of cavalry units in the theater of operations) led to fragmentation, with squadron assets divided among a division’s various brigades and separate battalions. Some commands also developed a fixation with using cavalry units for route security at the expense of other missions (which was occasionally dictated by the terrain in particular areas of operation; for example, the 4th Infantry Division’s area of operations in the Central Highlands), while others got the maximum possible use out of their cavalry troops and squadrons.11 One major illustration of the cavalry fragmentation in Vietnam is the air cavalry troop. Under the Vietnam-era table of organization and equipment (TOE), a division cavalry squadron contained three ground troops and an air cavalry troop. While in theory this allowed ground troops to act on contacts developed by the more mobile air troop, it also created the temptation for higher headquarters to split off the air troop. This proved to be a constant practice in Vietnam, with D Troop usually attached to a division headquarters or aviation battalion while ground troops were parceled out to various brigades. Some squadron commanders complained about losing their main reconnaissance force, as well as the ability to react quickly and strongly to any enemy contacts, but their concerns were usually dismissed.12 MCS Organization The notional MCS retains many of the basic aspects of earlier division cavalry squadrons, organized most recently with three ground cavalry troops and two air troops.13 In keeping with its proposed role as an irregular warfare reaction force, the MCS would contain five troops: two ground troops (A and C), two air troops (Band D), and one headquarters troop with an attached forward support troop. Like its Vietnam predecessor, each ground platoon would contain a platoon leader’s vehicle, a scout section (four scout vehicles), a tank section (three tanks), a rifle squad (one vehicle), and a mortar carrier.14 With three platoons per troop, the MCS would possess a robust ground combat capability based on ample armored assets (nine tanks and fifteen armored troop transports) and fire support (three mortar carriers). Instead of the M2/M3 Bradley, the MCS could use light armored vehicle (LAV) variants or a similar wheeled vehicle. Malone’s study found that wheeled vehicles operated well in most irregular warfare environments; although they are vulnerable to tire damage, there is agreement that they do less damage to roadways than most tracked vehicles.15 Alternately, the MCS could be organized in tracked and wheeled variants. The idea is to provide “One major illustration of the cavalry fragmentation in Vietnam is the air cavalry troop. Under the Vietnam-era table of organization and equipment (TOE), a division cavalry squadron contained three ground troops and an air cavalry troop. While in theory this allowed ground troops to act on contacts developed by the more mobile air troop, it also created the temptation for higher headquarters to split off the air troop.” 10 — as many mobility options as possible and not restrict deployment based on artificial considerations. Equipment for the MCS (except for aviation assets) would come from existing brigade combat teams (BCTs) where possible. Adding a tank section and rifle squad to the MCS cavalry platoon is necessary for its function as a reaction force. Tanks have the ability to push through most roadblocks, move at night without lights, break trail for personnel carriers and reconnaissance vehicles in rugged terrain, and give the force “the ability to intercede without firing” based on the tank’s physical size and ability to absorb small-arms fire without taking damage or being forced to return fire.16 This intimidation and protection allows the MCS ground troops to go places HMMWV-mounted scouts or infantry would find too dangerous. The rifle squad gives the MCS platoon the ability to put at least some dismounted “boots on the ground,” a major consideration in most irregular warfare situations. Foot patrolling and reconnaissance is essential — the rifle squad preserves each platoon’s ability to do both for at a minimum, local security. As the MCS supplements existing ground forces, and does not routinely occupy areas on its own for other than a short time, it is not critical that it have the ability to field large numbers of organic dismounts. For cordon and search missions, other ground elements would be attached to the MCS in its standard configuration, or the MCS ground element could be augmented with the air cavalry troop’s aero-rifle platoon. In either case, the proper role of the MCS would be as a quick-reaction force or supporting element for an infantry unit forming the cordon. However, it would still field more organic dismounts than existing cavalry or reconnaissance units. The air cavalry troops are a combination reconnaissance and fire support asset, controlling both rotary wing and unmanned aerial vehicle assets to fully support the squadron’s activities and those of other units in the area. Specific platforms are not discussed here, although the MCS air cavalry troops would function well with either the OH-58D or MH-6 scout helicopter and the AH-64 or AH-1 attack helicopters. Based partially on experiences in Vietnam and the First Gulf War, each air cavalry troop is composed of a scout section, an attack section, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) section, and a lift section capable of transporting at least a platoon of ground forces. The lift section should be composed of MH-60s to allow for greater landing zone flexibility. Other outside air assets may be available, but the organic reconnaissance capability needs to be as flexible as possible.17 A combination of manned and unmanned airborne reconnaissance assets, backed up with the firepower of attack helicopters, allows the air troops to function in almost any situation. Each air troop in the MCS would also have a dedicated aero-rifle platoon on call to serve as either a rapid reaction force (to cover downed helicopters and quick reinforcements for MCS troops in contact) or a deep patrolling element. The aero-rifle platoon could also be attached to one of the ground troops, although this should be the exception rather than the rule. Lift for the aero-rifle platoon would come from organic MH-60s or other attached aircraft. The MH-60 option is preferable, and additional aircraft would provide airborne command and control for MCS elements. Organic lift assets would allow the MCS to react to far-flung contacts and information quickly without the lag that might be required to shift any attached assets to a proper response position. A lift section could also bring in attached ground units to help develop a contact initiated by either the aero-rifle platoon or another element of the MCS. The aero-rifle platoon is trained to accomplish both basic light infantry tasks and specific reconnaissance and patrolling functions. Given the nature of the MCS, the aero-rifle platoon could provide reinforcements to a ground troop in contact, cover a downed helicopter, set up a hasty cordon around a village or quick vehicle checkpoint, and conduct limited patrolling from a base area on the model of Vietnam-era long-range reconnaissance patrols (LRRPs), if required. The aero-rifle platoon gives the squadron additional “boots on the ground,” as well as a ground element that can develop its own intelligence, exploit contacts, or provide reinforcements as needed to ground troops. As mentioned above, the air cavalry troop should also operate the squadron’s UAV assets. UAVs can act as additional scout helicopters and, in some configurations, as an additional attack el- “Tanks have the ability to push through most roadblocks, move at night without lights, break trail for personnel carriers and reconnaissance vehicles in rugged terrain, and give the force ‘the ability to intercede without firing’ based on the tank’s physical size and ability to absorb small-arms fire without taking damage or being forced to return fire. This intimidation and protection allows the MCS ground troops to go places HMMWV-mounted scouts or infantry would find too dangerous.” — 11

“The air cavalry troops are a combination reconnaissance and fire support asset, controlling both rotary wing and unmanned aerial vehicle assets to fully support the squadron’s activities and those of other units in the area. Specific platforms are not discussed here, although the MCS air cavalry troops would function well with either the OH-58D or MH-6 scout helicopter and the AH- 64 or AH-1 attack helicopters.” ement. Although some might wish to place UAVs under the control of squadron headquarters, keeping them with each air cavalry troop preserves organization integrity and ensures that the assets will be available when and where needed without delays for coordination. The activities of the UAV section, and indeed air cavalry troops in general, may be coordinated by the intelligence section in the squadron headquarters element, but they should not be stripped from each air cavalry troop unless no other air assets are available, and even then it should only be done if absolutely necessary and on a case-by-case basis. The headquarters troop and combat service support troop recognizes the special needs of a mechanized unit configured for independent operations. A high concentration of mechanized vehicles and aircraft requires a robust support network, to include dedicated vehicle and aviation maintenance assets and tank recovery vehicles. Recent unit deployments have exposed weaknesses in the current organization of the headquarters and support troop, and the suggestions made by Major J. D. Keith, in his article, “3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry Up Front: Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned,” would work well with the MCS.18 Keith recommends increasing long-range communications capability, vehicle changes, and adding a forward area support company (FASCO) or team (FAST) to deal with the needs of cavalry in extended operations. Some of these changes have already occurred, but it is critical for the headquarters troop to move with the rest of the MCS, protect itself, and provide in-house intelligence support to ground and air troops. This includes liaison personnel working with local law enforcement offices and various nongovernment organizations that are involved with relief efforts in many irregular warfare situations. The headquarters troop contains its own intelligence section, with teams pushed down to the troop command level as required by the tactical situation. This organic capability allows the MCS to develop and maintain a level of competency in intelligence operations that might prove lacking in any ad hoc force, or supplement the activities of a larger unit headquarters. The combat service support troop has an organic aircraft maintenance troop serving as a centralized support element for the two air troops, as well as sufficient resources to manage the squadron’s maintenance, supply, and service needs. Although the MCS is an armored element, it has a relatively small logistics footprint when compared to other units that could fill its role. It is also designed to ensure its operational impact is at least as great as the effort required to field it in less-than-optimal conditions. With robust armor and air assets, and an organic intelligence collection and analysis capability, the MCS is effective in multiple dimensions of conflict, as opposed to a single capability unit. Designed to provide a major combat and reconnaissance punch in limited warfare situations, the MCS is a valuable force multiplier with firm roots in the American cavalry tradition. Why Include Tanks? Armor is no stranger to irregular warfare, serving in many roles before and after Vietnam. The U. S. Marine Corps Small Wars Manual, published in 1940, specifically states that, “[t]he morale effect of tanks and armored cars is probably greater in small wars operations than it is in a major war.”19 Terrain is the only major limitation mentioned in the manual regarding the employment of armor. This is, however, one of those lessons that seem to need constant relearning, as Vietnam clearly demonstrates. The U. S. Army’s 1967 study of armored operations in Vietnam comments specifically on the psychological impact of tanks and mechanized forces.20 Armored forces have proven themselves capable of operating in a variety of terrain conditions, and the relatively light nature of the MCS (when compared to other mech- 12 — anized units) makes it a natural fit for many operational areas that might otherwise be closed to heavy forces. Including tanks in the MCS structure allows it to be used in situations other than irregular warfare without being too light to function. While mobile anti-armor platforms are effective, the battlefield survivability of the main battle tank is still beyond dispute. It remains relatively immune to rocket-propelled grenades and is unaffected by small-arms fire; the two major considerations in most irregular warfare deployments. It is also critical to remember the psychological impact of tanks in most combat situations, as well as their ability to remain among the best anti-armor platforms — the possibility of encountering hostile armored units in an irregular warfare situation cannot be completely discounted in today’s strategic environment. It is often forgotten that the North Vietnamese fielded armored elements after 1967, and it is always possible that rogue elements within a failed state could either buy or gain control of tanks (Africa is a prime example of this, although there are other possibilities as well). And in any situation that escalates beyond the framework of irregular warfare, the armored MCS would be able to develop intelligence and hold its own until the arrival of heavier units.21 One study consulted for this article evaluates the performance of armor (both tanks and infantry carriers such as the LAV, M113, and M2 Bradley), in operations ranging from Lebanon in 1982 through the 1994 Haiti intervention. Looking at both U. S. Army and Marine units, Major Jean Malone concludes that “[a]rmor is an exceptionally effective asset to have in MOOTW [military operations other than war]. It has an impact far out of proportion with the size of the units and the number of vehicles involved... [it] is a very effective tool to send a message or create a desired climate.”22 The study also highlights the possibility of designating “certain units to be the initial MOOTW contingency units.”23 This was a role once filled by cavalry and there is no reason why it cannot do so again. Thoughts on Roles and Missions An MCS organization would deploy to an irregular warfare situation as an independent unit. Given its four-line troop organization, an MCS can be broken down into two reaction forces, each with a ground troop and an air troop. With the ability to develop its own intelligence, the MCS acts on, or passes off, information to other elements for action. It can escort aid convoys or respond to calls for help with equal speed and flexibility, bringing enough organic precision firepower to accomplish its mission with minimal collateral damage and maximum shock power. In short, it is a return to the historical model of American cavalry — a critical element we appear to be short of in today’s unsettled world. As configured in this article, the MCS is not a traditional replacement for the heavy ACR, but it can serve in most roles covered by the ACR, and it is an ideal choice for many initial deployments. It functions better in an irregular warfare environment than the heavier ACR, and can hold the line in a high-intensity conflict until heavier units, such as the ACR, arrive. At five troops, it is slightly smaller than a traditional ACR, making it easier to sustain in less-than-ideal logistics situations. It does retain many of the capabilities of the larger ACR, and can take its place in many conflict environments. Given the structure of its air troops and a command troop that contains robust intelligence capabilities for its size, the MCS may even be a better fit in some environments and situations. It is hoped that the concept for a medium cavalry squadron, however imperfectly it may be articulated in this article, spurs more serious discussion about the role of, and need for, cavalry in America’s force structure. Cavalry units in the U. S. Army must be prepared to fight for information, conduct a wide variety of combat operations, and serve as quick, hard-hitting reaction forces in a crisis. Any unit that does not have these capabilities is something less than cavalry and will fail to accomplish most traditional American cavalry missions — the MCS is only one part of the answer. Notes 1Major Bryan J. Mullins, “Defining the Core Competencies of U. S. Cavalry,” Monograph, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2004, pp. 84-88. 2Major George A. Stewart III, “The Last Cavalry Regiment: The Corps Commander’s Requirement for the 3d ACR,” Monograph, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2007, pp. 52-53. 3Mullins, pp. 81-88. 4Mullins deals mostly with lessons learned during the First Gulf War and National Training Center (NTC) experiences; Major Thomas W. Cipolla, “Cavalry in the Future Force: Is There Enough?” Monograph, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2004, pp. 16-17, bases his comparison on the current opposing force; Major Louis B. Rago II, “Cavalry Transformation: Are We Shooting the Horse Too Soon?” Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2002, pp. 3-4. 5Stephen Z. Starr, The Union Cavalry in the Civil War: Volume 1 From Fort Sumter to Gettysburg 1861-1863, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, LA, 2007, pp. 3-46, provides a concise and entertaining summary of the Selma campaign; Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2007, pp. 64-65, contends that “the last year of the Civil War was the high point for the cavalry, and the benchmark by which it measured its mission, tactics, weaponry, and self-identity.” I would question the sweeping nature of this assessment, but find the observation interesting. 6Robert Utley, Frontier Regulars, Bison Books, Lincoln, NE, 1984, pp. 44-47, contains a good overview of the problems of doctrine faced by the Frontier Army; for conditions prior to the Civil War, as well as brief discussion on the European roots of U. S. Cavalry, see Starr, pp. 49-55. At one time, drill was referred to as “tactics” by most military manual writers. 7Utley, pp. 49-50. 8Major Curtis D. Taylor, “The Transformation of Reconnaissance: Who Will Fight for Information on the Future Battlefield?” MMAS Thesis, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2005, pp. 26-27. In short, the subject of Taylor’s interview believes that a cavalry force that is augmented with more combat power becomes more aggressive and thus reluctant to carry out true reconnaissance missions. 9See Utley, pp. 52-55, for a short discussion about scouts in the Frontier Army, both white civilians and Indian auxiliaries. 10There were also separate air cavalry squadrons, as well as those that were part of the two airmobile divisions that eventually served in Vietnam. Pure air cavalry is outside the scope of this article, but it might be noted that it comes the closest to filling the traditional light cavalry role. 11Donn Starry, Armored Combat in Vietnam, The Ayer Company, Salem, NH, 1982, pp. 221- 222. 12John J. McGrath, Scouts Out!: The Development of Reconnaissance Units in Modern Armies, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2008, pp. 157-158, mentions this practice; Starry, p. 221, cites the need for integration of air and armored cavalry elements (as opposed to removing the air cavalry troop from squadron control and holding it at division or higher) as one of the major lessons of Vietnam. 13Cipolla, p. 37. 14See Major Brian D. Kerns, “Not Just an Infantryman’s War: United States Armored Cavalry of the Vietnam War,” MMAS Thesis, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2006, p. 92, for Vietnam organization numbers. 15Major Jean T. Malone, “Armor in Military Operations Other Than War,” MMAS Thesis, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1996, pp. 172-173. 16Major Thomas S. James, “Big Tank Little Bridge: Is there a Position on the Peace Operations Team for Heavy Armor?” Monograph, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1997, p. 39. 17Rago, p. 51. 18Major J. D. Keith, “3d Squadron, “7th U. S. Cavalry Up Front: Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned” ARMOR, September-October 2003, pp. 26-31. 19United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1940, pp. 2-44. 20Starry, p. 87. 21Stephen A. Bourque and John W. Burdan III, The Road to Safwan: The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, University of North Texas Press, Denton, TX, 2007, p. 243; the authors also discuss the difficulties of integrating tanks “on the fly” on pages 47-48. 22Malone, pp. 189-190. 23Ibid. William Van Horn is a Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) administrative associate III, Montana State University, Bozeman, MT. He is currently pursuing a B. A. from Montana State University. His previous employment includes interlibrary loan technician, Montana State University; and researcher, U. S. Cavalry Memorial Research Library, U. S. Cavalry Association, Fort Riley, KS. — 13