First Contact: A Brutal Teacher

One night in late December 2005, our battalion, 1st Battalion, 67th Armor, was 2 days from assuming authority for its area of operations in Iraq. We had been in country for about 2 weeks and were conducting right-seat rides with the outgoing battalion. Our patrols had little, if any, representation from the departing unit. We were de facto in charge and soon learned that the enemy wasn’t going allow us time to learn and adapt. Instead, he preferred to hit us hard, which is exactly what he did on the night of 28December, striking with a devastating effect. A deeply buried improvised explosive device (IED), detonated by pressure plate, destroyed the lead up-armored HMMWV in the engineer’s patrol. The blast killed the HMMWV gunner and the local national interpreter. The patrol leader, a relatively new second lieutenant, and the soldier driving were both wounded and evacuated. With all of our training behind us, we now found ourselves wrestling with the second- and third-order effects of what we knew were the outcomes of this conflict: dead and wounded soldiers and local nationals; the organization of the air medical evacuation (MEDEVAC); pursuit of a suspected triggerman through palm groves; security of the IED site and the landing zone; employment of the explosive ordnance detachment (EOD); recovery of a shattered M1114 and our casualties; and the efforts to maintain morale of soldiers directly effected and the battalion as a whole. First Contact The patrol began moving north, paralleling the Euphrates River, along a raised dirt road bordered by palm groves, through an area that had seen little contact over the past couple of months. The insurgents used the concealment of the palm growth and the canals to gain access to the roadway. The construction of the road provided easy emplacement of explosives. The shoulders of the loose soil that formed the roadbed were perfect for emplacing multiple-round IEDs under the center of the road, which allowed the enemy to employ greater destructive power directly beneath the body of targeted vehicles. The sound of the blast reverberated back to the forward operating base; the radio call came in from the patrol that the lead vehicle was on fire after striking an IED. As the initial shock hushed the operations center, the battalion XO took charge in the tactical operations center (TOC) and began simultaneously coordinating with the patrol via FM command net and the brigade through voice over internet protocol (VoIP) line and internet relay chat (IRC). The battalion’s first priority was to get a MEDEVAC aircraft to the patrol to move the wounded to the combat support hospital, which turned out to be a bit more difficult than our training courses led us to believe. Getting the 9-line MEDEVAC request from the unit in contact is difficult under ideal conditions and these conditions were anything but ideal. This was the battalion’s first real contact; it was cold and dark and one of the wounded was our patrol leader. The initial radio calls from the patrol reported direct fire contact, so we relayed line 6 of the request as “troops in contact,” but even though the initial report of direct fire was either incorrect or the enemy had quickly broken contact, we never corrected the request. This caused a sizeable delay in MEDEVAC aircraft arriving at the scene, as it was required to wait for an AH-64 air weapons team escort. Had we been more aware, we would have corrected this report as soon as we confirmed no additional contact at the landing zone. We internalized this lesson and incorporated it into our standard operating procedure for the remainder of our deployment. — 47

We were also challenged to provide the specifics of the wounds to satisfy lines 3 and 5 to the degree requested, we responded with the number and a degree of urgency. In theater, we were often requested to provide details of the wounds to allow for special equipment to be placed on the aircraft if needed. These wound details are often difficult to get from units in contact, especially when leaders are killed or wounded, or the unit is inexperienced. We got much better at this as the deployment progressed; however, we should have been better from the start. Often, the TOC can provide details to assist with the 9-line request without explicitly requiring the private or specialist on the radio to provide the information, and the TOC must be ready to fill in the gaps to expedite the request. After the helicopter lifted off with our casualties, there was confusion on the ground as to how many men remained in the vehicle and how many we sent with the MEDEVAC. This led to additional frustration as the vehicle was searched again for wounded, exposing more men to the remains of our two comrades. We then decided to ensure there was a dedicated leader to manage actions at the landing zone so we would know exactly who had been put on the aircraft. The landing zone manager was required to report on FM command net the number of casualties loaded on the aircraft with corresponding battle roster numbers. As the aircraft departed from the landing zone, we arrived short of the site and spoke with the soldiers involved in the incident, who were, along with the command sergeant major and first sergeant, in the process of retrieving remains. We learned too late that due to continued exposure, it is not the best course of action for soldiers in the patrol to police the remains of their counterparts. We made every effort to ensure that the members of the patrol that had been attacked were returned to the forward operating base as quickly as possible to begin critical-event counseling — chaplains, counselors, leaders, and psychologists (if available) are critical to the success of this effort. Additionally, for long-term care, these events should be noted and soldiers should be required to do follow ups during the remainder of the deployment and after returning to home station. Many leaders falsely believe they are helping soldiers by keeping them inside “The sound of the blast reverberated back to the forward operating base; the radio call came in from the patrol that the lead vehicle was on fire after striking an IED. As the initial shock hushed the operations center, the battalion XO took charge in the tactical operations center (TOC) and began simultaneously coordinating with the patrol via FM command net and the brigade through voice over internet protocol (VoIP) line and internet relay chat (IRC).” “The initial radio calls from the patrol reported direct fire contact, so we relayed line 6 of the request as “troops in contact,” but even though the initial report of direct fire was either incorrect or the enemy had quickly broken contact, we never corrected the request. This caused a sizeable delay in MEDEVAC aircraft arriving at the scene, as it was required to wait for an AH-64 air weapons team escort. Had we been more aware, we would have corrected this report as soon as we confirmed no additional contact at the landing zone. We internalized this lesson and incorporated it into our standard operating procedure for the remainder of our deployment.”

the wire for long periods following catastrophic events, which is counterproductive in the long run. After a short period to refit (3 or 4 days), the unit should be sent back out on patrol; any longer than that, the platoon will suffer and the specter of “outside the wire” will only become worse. Our aerial weapons team in support sighted a figure moving suspiciously away from the road in short rushes. As the majority of our element at the site was securing the vehicle and setting up for vehicle recovery, I found the nearest element to conduct the pursuit and capture the man the Apaches had spotted. Unfortunately, I was (and remain) a prisoner of my experiences. As an armor officer, I was comfortable with commanding a formation mounted, but had given little thought to commanding a battalion while separated from my vehicle, and even less thought to maneuvering my “squad,” my personal security division (PSD), in the dark of night to pursue a bad guy. So, when I dismounted my M1114 with my tank gunner, who headed my PSD, and my tank loader, another member of my PSD, we found ourselves without support and without the proper kit to effectively conduct our mission. It was immediately apparent that my only weapon, the M9 pistol — no long-armed weapons — lessened my fire team’s firepower and served as a clear indicator to the insurgents that I was seemingly important. (In Saddam’s army, carrying a pistol is a symbol of higher-ranking officers, and by doing so, I marked myself.) Additionally, I had no paper map, no global positioning system (GPS), and no suitable communications; we searched for a man in a palm grove and were completely unprepared to do so. After returning to the forward operating base that morning, we made some significant changes in our equipment and organization. First and foremost, my command sergeant major and I decided we would be on the ground away from our vehicles only when we were together. We also added an M4 carbine, with optic and aiming devices, to my kit, along with a map and GPS, and a multiband inter/intra team radio (MBITR) to my PSD chief’s kit. The communications ensured that I could still command the battalion while dismounted, and the weapons and other accoutrement allowed me to fight dismounted, if necessary. The night of 28 December was a singularly traumatic event for the battalion. It was a shock that we had lost our first men even before we completed our transfer of authority. The men reacted as professional soldiers do, but we found many shortcomings that needed to be fixed immediately because the enemy was not going to give us any time to adjust and learn. Not only did we find weaknesses in how we called in MEDEVACs at the point of injury, but also in how we tracked what we had reported from battalion to higher. We found that recovery of destroyed vehicles was a huge undertaking that needed to be thought through and resourced as a mission. As a battalion commander, I discovered that I was woefully unprepared to be separated from my vehicle and that issue was immediately remedied. First contact is a brutal teacher; it’s much better to internalize these lessons during training. Think through the full problem set and be prepared; the enemy will take advantage of the fact that you’re new to the area of operations, don’t have the right equipment, and haven’t planned for the worst. Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Donahoe is currently serving as Bronco 7, the brigade trainer, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA. He is a graduate of Villanova University and earned a Masters Degrees from the American Military University and the Naval War College. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, 1st Battalion, 67th Armor, Fort Hood, TX, and Iraq; S3, 1st Battalion 34th Armor, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, KS; and S3, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley. “As an armor officer, I was comfortable with commanding a formation mounted, but had given little thought to commanding a battalion while separated from my vehicle, and even less thought to maneuvering my “squad,” my personal security division (PSD), in the dark of night to pursue a bad guy. So, when I dismounted my M1114 with my tank gunner, who headed my PSD, and my tank loader, another member of my PSD, we found ourselves without support and without the proper kit to effectively conduct our mission.” — 49