Maintaining the Edge — Soldier-Level Initiative and Ingenuity

Unlike other professionals, military leaders cannot test or verify with exact certainty the effectiveness of tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment short of actual combat. Leaders at every level of this hierarchical organization are constantly reviewing, analyzing, and adapting their operations to succeed. Failure is simply not an option we are willing to accept on the battlefield. At the highest level, military leaders are faced with the challenge of validating operations in two distinct theaters. Although strategically faced with the same mission in both Iraq and Afghanistan, defeating an extremist insurgency, the fundamental differences in these locations and the methods by which we fight are evident. Even within the narrower scope of operations in Afghanistan, there are a surprisingly diverse number of distinct tactical operating environments. Much of the scrutiny and emphasis in the analytical studies of how we are fighting in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) focus on adaptations in our tactics, techniques, and procedures; however, little formal analysis focuses on how we physically adapt our baseline equipment to increase our ability to project combat power in a unique battlefield situation. Department of the Army-level logistics agencies are constantly working to improve equipment in their inventory to ensure the warfighter is outfitted for success from the ground up. As the workhorse of ground maneuver elements, military vehicles are constantly being evaluated and improved in efforts to develop our fighting capabilities. Recent efforts in this area include augmenting vehicle armor; fielding the mine resistant ambush protective (MRAP) vehicle, which is specifically 42 — Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity. — George S. Patton designed to withstand improvised explosive devices (IEDs); and mounting heavy weapons on these stalwart vehicles so they may protect, as well as project, power. While the goal for developing this equipment is to create a quality baseline product for replication and wide distribution to all theaters, it is unreasonable to expect vehicles with the same specifications to fight equally well in the streets of Baghdad and the mountains of Afghanistan. Therefore, there is an expectation that within each distinct tactical environment there will be further modifications to provide maneuver elements with vehicles capable of operating successfully in all situations. As the focus narrows to a distinct tactical area of operations, the shortcomings of standardized equipment becomes increasingly apparent. To achieve success at the tactical level, the burden of adapting not only tactics, but also physically adapting equipment, relies on the flexibility of first-line leaders and the ingenuity and initiative at the soldier level. The challenge and all associated obstacles to physically alter vehicles for action in new environments are not unique to contemporary operations in OEF. There are instances of soldiers developing deceptively ingenious modifications to dominate the fight in nearly every major conflict in American military history. During the Normandy campaign of World War II, American forces were faced with the daunting task of fighting their way through the Bocage country. Characterized by hedgerows, which are denser, thicker, and higher than any areas in which they trained prior to actual combat operations, the terrain of the Bocage was more formidable than the defending German army. The hedgerows were too steep to drive over, too long to go around, and provided excellent defensive positions for the enemy. Mother Nature nearly neutralized the same tanks that had raced easily and successfully across the open desert of Africa in prior campaigns. After attempts to blast through the hedgerows with dynamite and munitions failed to efficiently open the battlefield, Sergeant Curtis G. Culin developed a hedgerow-cutting device by mounting the remnants of a German roadblock on the front of a tank that cut through the hedgerows “as though they were pasteboard, throwing the bushes and brush into the air.”1 General Omar T. Bradley was so impressed with the results that he ordered the First Army ordnance section to weld and mass-produce these hedgerow-cutting devices for installation on all available tanks; two weeks later, more than 60 percent of the First Army’s tanks had these devices installed. More than 60 years later, the breakout and pursuit from Normandy is a testament to soldier innovations and the undeniable fact that standard equipment must be adapted to meet specific needs in each area of operations.2 Similar ingenuity and initiative are requisite for success in contemporary military operations. For more than 6 years, anti-coalition military (ACM) forces in Afghanistan have continued to stave off arguably the greatest military ever by choosing to fight in locations that limit our ability to maximize superior combat power. Whether choosing to take a stand in the streets of Kabul, where soldiers must restrain weapons usage to prevent unacceptable collateral damage, or making a stand the mountainous terrain, where our weapons and vehicles cannot physically overcome the severity of the surrounding terrain features, the ACM maintain an undeniable positional advantage. While, enjoying the benefits of a defensive posture, our enemies demonstrate a large degree of adaptability and resiliency. As the main element of Task Force Saber, the 1st Squadron, 91st United States Cavalry, 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team, took on the responsibility for controlling combat operations in the Konar and Nuristan Provinces along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in May 2007. This remote northeast region of Afghanistan, dominated by the Hindu-Kush Mountains, is hardly ideal for staging mounted operations in bulky military vehicles loaded down with heavy armor and crew-served weapons statically mounted on top. The terrain is so severe that mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles (MRAPs) were deemed unsuited altogether for operations in this area because they could not effectively maneuver on the few trafficable roads and represented a risk for noncombat-related injury from vehicle rollovers. In The Art of War, Sun Tzu touches on the importance of terrain in waging war.3 He describes six types of terrain, accessible ground, entangling ground, tempo-rizing ground, narrow passes, precipitous heights, and positions at a great dis- “As the focus narrows to a distinct tactical area of operations, the shortcomings of standardized equipment becomes increasingly apparent. To achieve success at the tactical level, the burden of adapting not only tactics, but also physically adapting equipment, relies on the flexibility of first-line leaders and the ingenuity and initiative at the soldier level.” — 43 tance from the enemy, and their varying influences on the ability to successfully fight and win.4 The rugged terrain of the Hindu-Kush Mountains presents challenges within the realm of each of these aspects. The most prevalent and battle-shaping feature in this area is perhaps the precipitous heights and the seemingly endless sea of mountain peaks. Sun Tzu’s thoughts on precipitous heights were simple: if you reach the high ground before your enemy, you should occupy it and wait for your enemy to come; however, if your enemy reaches it first, you should not follow, but instead should try to entice him away.5 ACM fighters rapidly learned that by taking positions high enough on the slope face of the mountain, they could evade retaliatory fire by nothing more than our inability to shoot high enough. Even when the enemy was in the open, the direct fire weapons systems mounted on the vehicles could not physically elevate to a steep enough angle to engage ACM from their trucks located on the ribbon of road hugging the side of the mountain below. As prescribed by Sun Tzu, the enemy occupied the high ground and American forces were without away to entice him from his vantage point without calling in support from indirect fires systems.6 Facing an enemy force that relied on natural defenses that occupied the high ground while operating along a poor road network winding along the valley floors, the Airborne Cavalry literally faced an uphill battle. However, just as soldiers during World War II modified the standard Army tank to break through the Bocage, soldiers in Afghanistan devised a modification that would allow us to elevate heavy weapons and focus direct fire against enemy forces on the mountainside. Assigned to D Figure 1. Left: the bare weapons mount showing the original location of the mount and the new location of the mount. Right: the mount with a MK19 automatic grenade launcher in the fully elevated position. 44 — “ACM fighters rapidly learned that by taking positions high enough on the slope face of the mountain, they could evade retaliatory fire by nothing more than our inability to shoot high enough. Even when the enemy was in the open, the direct fire weapons systems mounted on the vehicles could not physically elevate to a steep enough angle to engage ACM from their trucks located on the ribbon of road hugging the side of the mountain below. As prescribed by Sun Tzu, the enemy occupied the high ground and American forces were without away to entice him from his vantage point without calling in support from indirect fires systems.” Old Mount Site New Mount Site With weapon in new rear mount location, elevates to 38 inches, as opposed to 27.5 in standard mount position.

Company, 173d Brigade Support Battalion, Darkhorse Forward Support Troop, WO1 Charles Klein, Sergeant Carlos En-ciso, and Sergeant Gary David exhibited the same determination and battlefield ingenuity in the remote mountains of Afghanistan that Sergeant Culin and others did during those desperate days in the French Bocage. The gunner’s protective turret, standard on the up-armored HMMWV (UAH)- series of vehicles, is constructed in such away that crew-served weapons systems cannot elevate beyond 60 degrees because the front windshield impedes the ammunition can. Forward maintainers took on the challenge to modify the mount to allow greater range of motion without degrading the level of protection the turret provides the gunner. The first proposal was to push the front windshield forward; however, this modification changed the turret’s basic form and exposed gunners to additional enemy fire from more angles. After several iterations of modification failed to achieve the stated intent, Darkhorse welders designed an acceptable solution for both MK19 and M2 machine guns. The new mount was characterized by attaching an additional pintle mount offset to the rear of the standard mount location. This effectively moved the weapons system back to create a separation between the ammunition can and the windshield, allowing full-range motion. As an added value, it actually increased the gunner’s protection by positioning him further into the vehicle’s body when operating the weapon at increased elevation. After installation, these modifications increased the potential angle of elevation by more than 20 degrees, which allowed for near-vertical elevation. Near vertical is more than enough in this case, as the weapons systems would fail to properly function if fired from a true vertical position. Prior to taking on the challenge of modifying the crew-served weapons configuration, the welders developed a swing-arm mount for the gunner’s secondary weapons. The swing-arm mount includes a buttstock mount for stowage, and has the ability to traverse the weapon in a 360-degree pattern of horizontal movement and achieve vertical elevation with the light machine guns. While not nearly as intimidating as a.50-caliber machine gun or automatic grenade launcher, the swing-arm mount provided gunners with the critical ability to engage the enemy at any angle and disrupt their fighting tactics while primary systems modifications were still in development stages. The undetectable safety bubble previously enjoyed by ACM fighters suddenly disappeared! Commanders took immediate notice of the innovation and the schematics and ideas rapidly made their way up to the commanding general of the U. S. task force in Afghanistan. Just as the plans for the hedgerow cutters became blueprints for mass-produced modifications during World War II, Darkhorse Troop’s swing-arm mounts went into production on a large scale for distribution throughout Afghanistan.7 Although they may never become “standard issue equipment” at the Army macro-level, they are making their way throughout theater to increase the combat posture of all forces involved in Operation Enduring Freedom. Eventually, like all new equipment, these swing arms will become commonplace for vehicles operating in northeastern Afghani-Figure 2. Left: the swing arm with M249 attached being used by the gunner at near-vertical elevation and unimpeded horizontal motion. Right: the M249 attached to the buttstock holder for stowage. — 45 Completed mount fully extended showing the 360-degree high-angle precision engagements. Buttstock holder, used to secure the gunner’s individual weapon can be moved to secure the secondary weapon during transport. Stabilized weapon position during transport  out of the way of the crew weapon and easily accessible.

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Total Distribution: 4,866. Copies not Distributed: 234. Total: 5,100. 46 — United States Postal Service Statement of Ownership, Management, and Circulation stan, and will undoubtedly become obsolete and ineffective, which will require future soldiers to physically adapt their equipment to meet the needs of the ever-changing battlefield environment in this volatile region. Besides swing-arm and large-weapons mounts, the welders constructed gates, doors, and other force-protection measures, fabricated mounting systems for the tactical operations center’s automation equipment, and worked creatively to make life better for everyone. During their tenure in Afghanistan, D Troop maintainers of every variety worked to keep the maneuver forces equipped to successfully complete their combat missions. In a region where roads are little more than dirt paths, generally free and clear of major obstacles, it is likely that a vehicle will roll out the front gate and return broken through no fault of the operator, but from the stress and damage of driving over the daunting terrain. While the contributions of support soldiers may not be glamorous and often go unnoticed, the vital role they played in physically adapting standard issue Army equipment to meet the distinctive needs of the light cavalry squadron operating in the Hindu-Kush Mountains is undeniable. Although we may spend months in the field training environment, whether it be the National Training Center in the California desert or the rolling hills of the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany, there is no simulated environment that can fully replicate the challenges endemic to the tactical constraints of Operation Enduring Freedom. Our ultimate success hinges on our ability to learn from our mistakes, adapt promptly to anew and unfamiliar environment, and be more adaptable than our enemy.8 It is often said that “necessity is the mother of all inventions,” and whether it be the Bocage region of France during World War II or the mountains of Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom, necessity drove seemingly ordinary soldiers to do extraordinary things to regain the ability to fully use American military might. Notes 1Martin Blumenson, “Breakout and Pursuit,” U. S. Army in World War II European Theater of Operations, Center of Military History, U. S. Army, Washington, DC, 1961, p. 3. 2Michael Howard, “Military Science in an Age of Peace,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, March 1974, p. 3-9. 3Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Ralph D. Sawyer, trans., Basic Books, New York, 10 February 1994. 4Ibid. 5Ibid. 6Ibid. 7Walter S. Zapotoczny, “Breakout from the Hedgerows: A Lesson in Ingenuity,” 22 August 2005, Military History Online, http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/articles/ hedgerowbreakout.aspx. 8Howard, p. 3. First Lieutenant Ashley M. Ritchey is the squadron maintenance control officer and maintenance platoon leader, 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry, 173d Airborne Combat Team (ABCT), Forward Operating Base Bostick, Afghanistan. She received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy. Her military education includes the Quartermaster Officer Basic Course. She has served in Europe and in support of Operation Enduring Freedom as a general supply officer for support operations, 173d ABCT, Forward Operating Base Fenty, Afghanistan, and Bamberg, Germany. There are no secrets to success. It is the result of preparation, hard work, and learning from failure. — Colin Powell