Post Hoc, Ergo Propter Hoc (A Logical Fallacy)

Before any military operation, information is gathered on the enemy and the terrain on which the operation is to be conducted. Collecting this information is called reconnaissance, and almost every commander knows that the probability of mission success is greatly increased by successful reconnaissance. Our Army senior leaders apparently think reconnaissance is important enough to create a battalion-sized reconnaissance unit for each maneuver brigade. Unfortunately, there is no single proponent within the Department of the Army wholly responsible for training and developing these soldiers — soldiers who develop the situation for the U. S. Army’s maneuver brigades. The Armor School trains the armored reconnaissance specialist; the Infantry School trains select infantry soldiers to perform in the capacity of reconnaissance as a special skill; and the Military Intelligence School trains human intelligence collectors and numerous other occupational specialties to collect, analyze, and interpret information. Because of this decentralization of responsibility and authority, reconnaissance soldiers are ill-prepared to conduct wartime missions. Deep-rooted tradition could very well be the largest contributor to this problem. The “Army Lineage Series, Armor-Cavalry” documents the history of cavalry and the birth of armor.1 Prior to 1942, the Army had an Office of the Chief of Cavalry, which was responsible for the mission of reconnaissance. The last Chief of Cavalry, Major General John K. Herr, was unwilling to move forward into the mechanized age of combat and wanted to keep men on horses. Shortly after General Herr gave testimony to a Congressional committee regarding his viewpoints, his office was eliminated and his forces absorbed by the Armored Force. General Herr stated “[those] who wish to reduce cavalry to a purely reconnaissance arm, are entirely wrong, unless reconnaissance is the only mission which cavalry can perform.”2 Oddly enough, this attitude is prevalent even today; nearly 66 years after General Herr’s testimony, senior Army leaders still argue the roles of cavalry, armor, and infantry, and who gets to own which force and the distinction between armored mechanized and motorized. These debates rarely address the aspects of reconnaissance; no one is interested in developing the situation. There is no glamour in never being seen or heard. Real leaders do battle — they do not hand off the fight to another branch of the Army. And so perpetuates the lack of focus for the reconnaissance soldier’straining and development. The split between armor and infantry has driven a large proverbial wedge between the two branches. Many leaders want to bring the two together to smooth their differences, strengthen armor soldiers and improve their infantry skills, and improve the infantry soldier’s concept of implementing armor into his fight. Eventually, the two branches will merge and become one combat arms branch; ironically, it hasn’t been that long since it was one branch. Every year, the Department of the Army Post Hoc, Ergo Propter Hoc (A Logical Fallacy) by Sergeant First Class Phillip K. Trainer 40 — publishes its “Department of the Army Historical Summary,” and as it turns out, the fiscal year 1977 edition summarizes some military occupational specialty (MOS) changes.3 These changes would occur with the creation of a separate armor management field; for example, the previous 11D, armor reconnaissance specialist, would be assigned the new 19D series in the armor management field. Similar actions occurred for the 11E, armor crewman, except that this MOS was broken down into five different, and more descriptive, MOSs.4 These actions were recommended by the chief of staff-established Tank Forces Management Group, which recognized that the tank force needed its own career management field to properly focus training and development of the tank force; and that the tank force was significantly different enough to merit separation from the infantry force. However, here we are today, about to merge the two forces together again, when it was only 29 years ago that the two were split from the same management field. While marrying the two forces to the same branch might end the dispute of awarding tankers the combat infantryman’s badge, it does not address our shortcomings in reconnaissance, nor will it ever do so. Today, our reconnaissance force is still divided, as it was back in General Herr’s chief of cavalry days. We still have light and heavy reconnaissance and, of course, the same concerns persist: should the cavalry be able to fight while executing its reconnaissance mission; or do reconnaissance forces need to defend themselves during a chance encounter with the enemy? However, as we look to the future, we begin to see a change in the focus of reconnaissance. The Army is placing an even higher level of importance on reconnaissance. Take for instance this excerpt from a Future Combat System overview, “The hallmark of UA [unit of action] operations will be the ability to develop situations out of contact, engage the enemy in unexpected ways, maneuver to positions of advantage with speed and agility, engage enemy forces beyond the range of their weapons, and destroy enemy forces with enhanced fires and assault at times and places of our choosing.”5 If you are unfamiliar with military operations, this concept is achievable today through detailed and deliberate reconnaissance. However, this is often unattainable due to insufficient training of appropriate soldiers in appropriate tasks, which is partially due to the fact that there is no general-level leadership with a direct responsibility in the development of these soldiers. In closing, the future combat system will place a heavy burden on reconnaissance soldiers. Unfortunately, these soldiers will still be secondary efforts to either the infantry or armor forces. Until a pure reconnaissance branch is created and the proper focus given to the development of effective reconnaissance soldiers and doctrine, the future combat system may take even more work to make work than did the old ways of yesterday. Notes 1Mary Lee Stubbs and Stanley Russell Connor, Army Lineage Series, “Armor-Cavalry, Part I: Regular Army and Army Reserve,” Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, DC, 1969. 2Ibid., p. 70. 3United States Army, Center of Military History, “Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1977,” U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1978. 4Ibid., p. 19. 5BG (P) Charles A. Cartwright and Dennis A. Muilenburg, “Future Combat Systems – an Overview,” Future Combat Systems, accessed online at www.army.mil/fcs/articles/index. html, 2006. Sergeant First Class Phillip K. Trainer is currently serving as an assistant operations mentor, 4th Kandak, 2d Brigade, 205th Corps, FOB Wolverine, Zabul, Afghanistan. He received a B. Ain Terrorism Studies from American Military University. His military education includes Advanced Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Course, Basic NCO Course. Scout Leaders Course, Automated Airlift Planner Course, Airload Planner Course, Safety Officer Course, and Unit Movement Officer Course. He has served in various duty assignments, to include scout platoon observer controller, Joint Multinational Readiness Command, Hohenfels, GE; scout platoon sergeant and operations NCO, G Troop, 1st Cavalry, 2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division (1AD), Baumholder, GE; scout platoon section sergeant, 3d Battalion, 66th Armor, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, TX; and Bradley gunner, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood. “Today, our reconnaissance force is still divided, as it was back in General Herr’s chief of cavalry days. We still have light and heavy reconnaissance and, of course, the same concerns persist: should the cavalry be able to fight while executing its reconnaissance mission; or do reconnaissance forces need to defend themselves during a chance encounter with the enemy?” — 41