Fighting in Built-up Areas

The M1 Abrams showed its muzzle at the corner of the street; its assigned position was the next intersection overlooking the metro station of “Doughboy city.” Friendly infantry elements were already on site, providing information, but they needed armored support badly. The street seemed clear of any threat other than the reported network of single barbed wires crisscross-ing 2 feet above the roadway. The M1 roared forward, 1,500 horsepower spinning its steel tracks, and ground to a sudden halt, surprising both the crew and spectators. Eventually, on camera, the crew spent about an hour disentangling and cutting loose yards of wire and the metallic spokes that jammed the sprockets. Engineers 1 — Tank 0! The place was the U. S. urban training facility in West Berlin, and the year, 1989. The good guys were a French AMX 30, a British Chieftain, an M1 Abrams, and an M88. The bad guys were the three allied engineer detachments tasked to design and implement antitank obstacles, any way they could imagine, and their resources were unlimited. Many commanders have never commanded a tank, a platoon, or company at war or in military operations in urban areas, but Berlin was a good lab, a good place to confront the theory of manuals with reality. There, armored units had the unique opportunity to throw everything at their tanks in an effort to prove many field manuals wrong. The allied exercise was the culmination of experimentation — saved on video, shelved, and never seen again! Personally, I seized that unique opportunity to train my tank platoon in a very different way, to have them experiment with both sides of the armored hull. Incendiary devices were thrown from roof tops at speeding tanks, smoke grenades linked by rope with spreading hooks dropped on turrets, blinding those inside. Simulated sniper fire “killed” the tank commander or the driver, or destroyed the driver’s periscopes; crews had to find away out. We used small electrical sponge marker “cannons” from a training system to simulate mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and rocket launchers. We set camouflage nets on fire with a simple incendiary bottle, fired a.50-caliber machine gun on an armored window, took a flak-jacket and a full backpack to the range and shredded everything with 5.56 and 7.62- mm bullets. Each time we reviewed the results, we came up with a “to do” and “not to do” list. The “Doughboy city” exercises showed us that a simplistic combination of an obstacle and a trap could immobilize the most powerful tanks if the crew is not prepared for urban threats or just unaware of this type of warfare. Furthermore, the ability to train in an actual size mockup city, with its gas and metro sta- 24 — tions, supermarket-like buildings, sewer systems, bell towers, wide and narrow streets, and high and low overpasses, was a blessing. One could order real cars and double-decker buses to crush, tires to burn, anything needed. And we recorded everything on day- and night-vision cameras. Many issues were resolved, more than the length of this article will support; however, it does address issues related to the urban environment and the “traditional tank” strengths and weaknesses when fighting in built-up areas. The Urban Environment The urban environment is defined by its various physical zones, its multidimensional aspect, and its population. Physical zones. The peripheral zone of a city (suburb, outer belt) is often modern and both industrialized and populated. Roadways are wide and straight, and many parks and open areas offer a high permeability. In offense, it is an area favorable for fast approach, observation, and infiltration. In defense, it is best used for observation, concealment, harassment, and canalization of the enemy. This is the “soft zone” of a city, offering good fighting ground for armored units. The “hard zone,” usually referred to as “the historic center or the old town,” is a maze of small, narrow streets and old buildings interspersed with glass and steel high rises. It is often the historical political and commercial center of a town. It is a dense area favoring the defenders; it is the infantryman’s kingdom, the land of close-quarter combat, ambush, autonomy, and initiative — it is the urban terrain often referred to as “the tank trap.” Multidimensional aspect. Contrary to conventional warfare in open battlefields, mostly taking advantage of surface infrastructure and three-dimension assets, urban operations make use of everything, including underground structures and waterways. Both friend and foe must map and list every single access, rate them, and plan offense or defense accordingly. The surface road and railroad network. The main road network (MRoN) consists of freeways, highways, and other peripheral multilane, faster traffic boulevards. Like the main railroad network (MRaN) and its main multiple railroad lines, the MRoN avoids the downtown hard zone and links the soft peripheral zone to the outside. It marks the city’s umbilical cord — allowing quick and easy bypass of the city. Armed units remain organic. The secondary road network or railroad network (SRoN and SRaN) is a pre-filter to the city center. Composed of wide two-way streets, or railroads and other tramway or subway structures, it links the soft zone to the hard zone. Attacking units are canalized and must split into mixed battle groups in this area, which favors the defenders. Finally, the tertiary road network often makes the city center a spider web of short and narrow streets that do not facilitate armored or mechanized engagement. In these streets, the attacking forces will be targeted by small mobile hit-and-run forces, booby traps, and other antitank ambushes. This area is often the scene of the final confrontation between tanks and antitank forces. The underground network. The underground network is a critical permeability factor that both attacker and defender must take into account, especially when fighting in a modern city. For example, Paris has about 1,000 miles of underground structures that are 5 feet high and taller; just think of it as a straight line linking Sacramento to San Diego! Imagine the subway, the tunnels, the underground roads and railroads, the basements, the sewers — it’s a mind-boggling headache for planners on both sides. Furthermore, in modern cities, these subterranean areas are often large commercial places with easy access for hiding large numbers of troops and vehicles. In Stalingrad or Berlin, hospitals, headquarters, refugee settlements, factories, communications paths, and more were underground in existing infrastructure. Allegedly, Hitler ordered the flooding of everything underground in Berlin to slow Soviet advances. Tomorrow, much like yesterday, it is more than possible that surprise and tactical advantage will literally pop up from below the surface. Underground infrastructure could be used to infiltrate and withdraw forces, “mine” the foundations of a building by piling up and detonating large quantities of explosives. Underground infrastructures might revive the Vietnam War “tunnel rat” concept, thus creating the need for highly specialized close-quarter combat units. The fluvial network. The fluvial network can add to the permeability of a city, but is mostly considered as an obstacle to cross, with bridges to hold, destroy, or protect. Often, these bridges are within the town boundaries, within the hard zone, and only the most recent are in the peripheral zone. Along the French Loire river, between Tours and Ghien, one can find about 10 crossing points (100 tons/two-way traffic minimum) and about seven are in urbanized areas. If one chose to “The ‘hard zone,’ usually referred to as ‘the historic center or the old town,’ is a maze of small, narrow streets and old buildings interspersed with glass and steel high rises. It is often the historical political and commercial center of a town. It is a dense area favoring the defenders; it is the infantryman’s kingdom, the land of close-quarter combat, ambush, autonomy, and initiative — it is the urban terrain often referred to as ‘the tank trap.’ ” — 25 seize or destroy the bridges of Orleans, one must be ready to bomb, and possibly inflict major damage to that city of 170,000 souls, and prepare to accept heavy collateral damages. In Baghdad, there are 13 main bridges across the river Tigris. Bridges could be painlessly destroyed from afar (smart weapons), but once the ground troops come to secure the city, they would end up with major obstacles to cross, likely under fire. The other alternative is the more traditional Remagen-type “bridgehead” of special forces, who are inserted by surprise to seize and hold objectives until heavier reinforcements arrive. A combination of these two options offers a third way of dealing with bridges. Therefore, the fluvial network would be a critical obstacle to bypass, if possible, or a critical asset to preserve or destroy, depending on the timing of the battle. The third dimension. With the many high rises, bell towers, and other minarets, rooftop terraces, and uncountable windows that make the framework of a city, the antitank enemy coming from above will not always be airborne. A simple burning or explosive device, antitank grenade, or missile fired from above through the thinner top armor of many older armored vehicles, could destroy or immobilize them. Stealthy snipers may target periscopes to blind the tanks or kill exposed crew members and accompanying infantry. A simple incendiary bomb or smoke screen might also blind and stop armored forces. Tanks and other armored vehicles are blind and deaf when it comes to the third dimension, and without the guns, ears, and eyes of a support tank and the infantry, they are literally doomed, condemned to destruction. Population. With 50 percent of the world’s population living in urbanized areas, it is likely that the human factor will have a critical impact on the issue of combat operations. The simplest 26 —

“Modern armored vehicles are better protected, heavily digitized and computerized, more flexible, and component based. Threat detection sensors, video cameras, and battlefield awareness systems are some of the recent changes that have made them more effective and improved their urban survivability.” — 27 case would be that of a city that has been evacuated. Collateral damage would be limited and moral restraints limited to the rule of wars toward the enemy. Means of massive destruction could be used without restriction to defeat the opponent. When a population has been trapped (Berlin in 1945, Beyrouth in the ’90s, and now Baghdad), combat operations of civilized forces end up being greatly impaired by moral requirements, thus giving an edge to fanatics or other extremist forces that are not bound by any constraints, nor are they concerned with public opinion or polls. Protecting, evacuating, and feeding noncombatants, or providing medical help, ends up being a logistics headache disruptive of critical military operations. On one hand, when humanitarian constraints are gone, military operations become quite simple. Depending on the goal, a city is either totally destroyed, populations included (Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima), or reduced, one street at a time, at a costly military and civilian price (Berlin, Warsaw, Beyrouth). On the other hand, caring for noncombatants may offer positive benefits such as gaining the sympathies of the population that may result in volunteered intelligence, supplemental forces, and labor. The anti-Nazi soviet propaganda was the main motivation for the rise of most of the partisan groups that opened a second front in the rear of the German forces. To safeguard the civilian population is also to safeguard oneself — at least in the eyes of the future historians. To alienate the local population means to throw it into the opponent’s arms to increase rear insecurity, to lose a battle even before it begins. In this multi-zoned environment affecting communications and speed, the tank will be canalized and isolated, condemned to wide streets. It will have to preserve some sort of “range” in an environment where visibility and observation are limited. It will have to make the best of a hostile and multidimensional battlefield and survive a multiform and multidirectional threat. The Tank in Built-up Areas “Those who do not learn from the mistakes of history are condemned to repeat them,” and those who forget the lessons of history are bound to make historical mistakes! By the end of World War II, gigantic over-armored behemoths had been condemned by anew weapon, alight portable rocket launcher built around a tank killer — the shaped charge. It was born in Berlin, long after many famous armored battles had promoted heavier armor and bigger guns. Ferdinand Porsche’s giant tank, “MAUS,” suddenly became an obsolete monstrosity worthy only of the Russian museum it rests in today. This major change in the race between the armor and the bullet did not mean the end of the “conventional” battle tank, but the end of the slow over-armored monsters of steel. The tank was originally designed to quickly bring its gun to the front and break through enemy positions under armored protection. It rapidly became the primary antitank weapon, but was never really designed for the specific requirements of military operations in urbanized terrain. However, from the squash head to the canister, and other “flechette” ammunition (developed at one point in Vietnam, abandoned for awhile, and dug out again), composite “In Baghdad, there are 13 main bridges across the river Tigris. Bridges could be painlessly destroyed from afar (smart weapons), but once the ground troops come to secure the city, they would end up with major obstacles to cross, likely under fire. The other alternative is the more traditional Remagen-type “bridgehead” of special forces, who are inserted by surprise to seize and hold objectives until heavier reinforcements arrive. A combination of these two options offers a third way of dealing with bridges. Therefore, the fluvial network would be a critical obstacle to bypass, if possible, or a critical asset to preserve or destroy, depending on the timing of the battle.”

and add-on armor, there are many historical and effective means to increase the urban lethality and protection of ordinary tanks. If most traditional tanks lack urban capability, it is because they are generic battle tanks, as opposed to the few highly specialized machines, such as the latest Israeli Merkava, which has been urbanized with omnidirectional and movement-activated cameras, remote-controlled external machine guns, gun ports for rear protection, added body and turret kits, forward ram, extra belly armor, and mesh protection of optronics and engine openings. The urban battle ground is characterized by short distances of engagement and higher targets. The current main battle tank was never developed to deal with these two specific factors. The gun elevation is still limited on every known main battle tank. Unless the tank commander takes advantage of rubbles or wrecks to elevate the hull, thus increasing the main gun’s elevation, there is not much that can be done against an enemy at close range and on higher ground in the hard zone of a city without using the external turret-mounted weapons. This is where tactics take over — a tank is never alone and must work within a self-supporting unit. The type of deployment and movement of the group should palliate the weaknesses of the individual! I served 18 years with the AMX 30, and to my knowledge, the AMX 30 B2 was the only tank equipped with an “over-elevation” device. The automatic 20mm coaxial gun had its own mantel that provided a +40-degree elevation independently from the main gun. At a distance of 100 feet, the system allowed the crew to deal with targets located 80 feet high, while the main gun’s elevation, at the same distance, only allowed the engagement of targets up to 30 feet high. This example shows why in recent urban warfare antiaircraft weapons and weapons systems have been extensively used against modern buildings (Russian-made twin or quad 14.5mm heavy machine guns or 30mm guns). Just imagine what a vintage Russian-made ZSU 23/4, a German Guepard, or even an M113 Vulcan could do for supporting infantry or tanks in urban areas! The Traditional Main Battle Tank The traditional polyvalent main battle tank will certainly remain the master of the soft zone in a city where long-range firing and observation are possible. But in the hard zone, highly adapted vehicles or tailored combat teams will be necessary to avoid heavy losses such as the 800 armored Russian vehicles that were destroyed in Berlin in 1945. The common tank is composed of a hull and a turret, a main gun, and some secondary weapons, an engine compartment, and the tracks. Often, the armored vehicle is cluttered with tarps, — 29 “When a population has been trapped (Berlin in 1945, Beyrouth in the ’90s, and now Baghdad), combat operations of civilized forces end up being greatly impaired by moral requirements, thus giving an edge to fanatics or other extremist forces that are not bound by any constraints, nor are they concerned with public opinion or polls. Protecting, evacuating, and feeding noncombatants, or providing medical help, ends up being a logistics headache disruptive of critical military operations.”

camouflage nets, backpacks, and other necessities. Tools, fire extinguishers, and spares are often located in outside storage compartments. During battle, tank crews fight from inside with a somewhat limited vision. The driver can only see the front, basically fender to fender, and must be guided by the tank commander for any reverse movement. Only the tank commander has a 360-degree view of his position. The tank must rely on others to provide close protection, support, and guidance. Modern armored vehicles are better protected, heavily digitized and computerized, more flexible, and component based. Threat detection sensors, video cameras, and battlefield awareness systems are some of the recent changes that have made them more effective and improved their urban survivability. Past weaknesses. Older generation tanks are still highly vulnerable to side, rear, top, or bottom attacks. The multidirectional aspect of the threats in urban areas makes it easier for an attacker to target these weak points. Modern tanks, such as the M1, Leclerc, Challenger, and Merkava have seriously improved their protection with a whole array of highly efficient add-ons, which adapt to the threat and conflict level. Optics. The periscopes and other optical devices are traditionally fragile. They can be targeted by snipers, damaged by shrapnel, occulted by dust, mud, or splashed water. I remember reading that during the Iran-Iraq conflict, 50- to 70-percent of tank optics were damaged daily. Nowadays, bulletproof glass, metallic deflectors, and mesh wire highly contribute to the survivability of optical systems. Outside clutter. Personal equipment, tarps, camo nets, fire extinguishers, and various jerrycans are vulnerable to small-arms fire. Clutter that might pile up on the tank during long movements to contact can be kept during open terrain operations (as long as it does not interfere with the tank’s operation), but must be cleared for military operations in urban areas. Gun elevation. The main gun elevation is limited. Main battle tanks have been designed to find and destroy targets from within their combat range all the way out to 4,000 meters, not to crawl wall-to-wall in a compartmentalized terrain with aline of sight ranging from a couple of feet out to hundreds of yards. The average -10/+25-degree elevation could be a limitation for the urbanized terrain. Crews can palliate this potential technical restriction with the use of remote-controlled superstructure weapons that are powerful enough for suppressive or most destructive fire. For heavier caliber tank platoon tactics, promote self-supporting tank movements at every level; only one tank moves forward when efficiently supported by the main gun and under observation of at least one supporting tank. Traversing the turret. The horizontal movement of the turret can be impaired by walls, light poles, signs, and even manmade traps. The tank crew can avoid such problems by carefully planning a movement and final position, or by destroying the potential obstacles by fire or movement (using the tank to knock down obstacles). Superstructure equipment. Cupolas, night-vision devices, sensors, antennas, and other external weapons systems may also be vulnerable. They can be sensitive to blast, shrapnel, falling debris, and shocks. They may also be impaired by attackers using low-tech weapons and techniques. Again, tactics and good judgment have been designed to remedy this threat; tanks should not be used as bulldozers and move through buildings, unless required for survival or an operation. A tank should not move without support! Limited mobility. In urban areas, the movement of tanks is limited to the width of the streets. Fall-back positions are a luxury and street width may prevent the viable progression of two self-supporting tanks abreast. Furthermore, crashing through walls for infiltration or to take evasive action is not recommended because of possible damage to superstructure devices. Finally, antitank obstacles may immobilize them in the open, making them vulnerable to 360-degree and multidimensional attack. Again, “Older generation tanks are still highly vulnerable to side, rear, top, or bottom attacks. The multidirectional aspect of the threats in urban areas makes it easier for an attacker to target these weak points. Modern tanks, such as the M1, Leclerc, Challenger, and Merkava have seriously improved their protection with a whole array of highly efficient add-ons, which adapt to the threat and conflict level.” At left, a Merkava Mark IV; above, a Challenger 2. 30 — tactics, support, and common sense can prevent or minimize such threats. Vision. At short distances in compartmentalized terrain, the common tank is literally nearsighted. Its optical system was designed to look, target, and shoot far and forward. This handicap can be greatly increased by dust, smoke, and other artificial visual impairments. Modern technology has highly minimized these old shortcomings and digital video, thermal imagery, and battlefield awareness systems now complement the eyes of the crew members and observations of the supporting tank(s). Camouflage. Tanks are usually camouflaged with paint befitting of the nature of the open battlefields they were originally committed to; however, for long, sustained combat in urbanized areas, the camouflage should be adapted. Assets and possible improvements. Protection, mobility, and firepower are the common assets of any main battle tank. Survivability, rusticity, fuel efficiency, reliability, and interchangeability are other sought-after qualities. Possible improvements include:  Removing flammable material from the tank’s superstructure (bags, nets, various oil, and grease); the tank should be invulnerable to any incendiary devices.  Installing urban combat adapted add-on armor designed to defeat and/or deflect shaped charges, blasts, and grenades. Add-on armor should also fit the turret roof.  Installing mesh over any opening, including exhaust pipes and bullet-proof grills in front of optics.  Storing critical hardware spares (periscopes, radio antennas), tools, and supplies inside the tank so the crew does not have to risk exposure for access.  Adapting camouflage schemes to the urban environment of engagement.  Attaching in place and securing tow cables to the front and rear of the hull for quick access and use under fire.  Studying the efficiency of various ammunitions against urban targets or threats. In self-defense, for speed, the crew quickly fires whatever type of ammunition is already loaded, whether or not it is adapted to the threat; the correct ammunition is loaded and fired afterward. The following ammunitions are recommended against specific targets/threats:  Armor-piercing discarding sabot fin-stabilized (APDSFS), a high-velocity sabot, used against tanks and armored vehicles, bunkers, helicopters, and in self-defense.  Antitank (shaped charge), used against tanks and armored vehicles, and bunkers, and in self-defense.  Explosive, used against armored and soft vehicles, houses, buildings, and exposed infantry, and in self-defense.  Squash head, used against tanks, armored vehicles, bunkers, and in self-defense.  Canister (depending on load). Flechette canister is used against infantry, snipers, helicopters, soft targets (building or vehicle), for close-quarter protection of another tank being climbed over by enemy troops, and in self-defense against threatening armor or missile post; explosive canister is used against soft targets; chemical canister is used against exposed infantry or crews and buildings; and flash-bang canister is used against ambushes, missile posts, and snipers.  Smoke is used against buildings, open areas, soft targets and vehicles, and as a incendiary device for self-defense.  Coaxial is used against armored vehicles, soft targets, exposed infantry, and missile or sniper position; and a.30-caliber machine gun can be used to protect another tank being climbed over by enemy infantry. The crew. The tank is an exhausting place to conduct combat: extreme confinement, noise, constant chatter over single or multiple radio networks, smoke, smell, a permanent 360-degree and multidimensional need for battlefield awareness, a constant state of alertness, battlefield stress, and a feeling of deafness and “blindness” are factors that can take their toll. The tank will always be a prime target, and as early as World War II, infantrymen knew their chances of survival were actually higher in wooded areas or behind rubble rather than behind some “reassuring” armor. While a regular foot soldier can actually take a breather almost anywhere and anytime, unseen and protected by some artificial or natural shelter, the tank and its crew is, whether idling and safe in the rear or fully committed on the battlefield, deaf and literally blind, the encased crew relying on radio transmissions and the restricted field of view of periscopes. During urban combat, the line of contact can be anywhere, front, rear, and sides, up and under. Therefore, armored units should not be committed for too long before being relieved and sent to a secure area for necessary resupply, maintenance, and rest. The crew should be cross trained and every member should be able to correctly perform the tasks of the others. Not only is cross-training a combat multiplier, it is a matter of survival, and every soldier should know how to perform every task from standard to emergency maintenance and recovery procedures, driving, firing, maintaining all weapons systems, radio procedures, and tactical basics. The tank commander, regardless of rank, becomes a tank commander the first time he sits in the turret. Rank and responsibilities do not provide any added protection, but do require mastering more skills (platoon/company levels). Company and platoon leaders should be the best tank commanders in the field, during maintenance, and at the firing range. Again, they do not have to do it all, but must know how to do it all. Crew members should all be potential tank commanders — the crew should be a family and the tank its home. Camouflage and protection. The urban environment offers many opportunities for good camouflage and increased protection. Tanks may use the urban infrastructure to hide from view, avoid being targeted, or infiltrate an area. Malls and supermar-kets may have crossed underground infrastructures in which to park or avoid being seen; covered parking lots, garages, parks, “The horizontal movement of the turret can be impaired by walls, light poles, signs, and even manmade traps. The tank crew can avoid such problems by carefully planning a movement and final position, or by destroying the potential obstacles by fire or movement (using the tank to knock down obstacles).” — 31 and stadiums may facilitate the camouflage and protection of an armored vehicle or provide alternate concealed firing positions or infiltration paths. Echoes would also make it more difficult to locate a moving tank, and multiple residual fires would make thermal detection more difficult. At the same time, however, cities can become a deadly trap for tanks unless they are accompanied, guided, and protected by infantry forces knowledgeable of its capabilities and the need to communicate with crews. Dead angles, street corners, upper floors, and infiltration routes should be scouted beforehand and given a green light before committing a tank. For example: could a tank cross a specific wall without destroying its superstructure equipment; could a tank climb stairs or a wall; enter a certain street and use its main gun; control this intersection without being exposed; push through an certain obstacle; turn around; or can that bridge sustain 50 tons? These are just a few of the questions that accompanying troops should be able to answer before leading tanks to locations that could be deadly traps. In the 1980s, every French tank battalion had a company of armor personnel carrier-mounted mechanized infantry specialized in supporting armored units, which could be used organically, as a company, or split into platoons attached to the various tank companies. Tank units and mechanized units were living, training, and working together all the time. Their “mechanized” were all from the armor branch and not “punished” infantrymen transferred from another branch of service. They lived by, and for, the tanks they knew and supported. Unfortunately, budget restrictions eventually killed that concept, and tomorrow, the fate of a tank in an urban area may depend on a soldier with little or no knowledge of tank capabilities. Liaisons. Liaisons include radio, vocal, and visual. If radio communications are not jammed, they may be impaired by the compartmentalization of the urban terrain and by damage to antennas and other exterior communications devices. The crews need to master the basic tactics adapted to urban combat and act independently without radio liaison, if necessary. Initial briefing must include accurate intelligence, detailed limits, well-defined objectives, alternate eventualities, and courses of actions encompassing events such as mechanical problems, loss of radio communications, new situation, fall-back line or position, meeting point, and alternate communications plan. The role of the accompanying infantry would be critical to palliate the eventual loss of electronic transmission. The existence of an external interphone device allows the foot soldier to communicate with the crew under the protection of armor, while avoiding the need for the tank commander to exit the shelter of his turret to communicate. The tank is quasi-blind and its field of vision is limited to the size of its periscopes, the magnification of its sights, the rotation of its turret, the range of elevation of its main armament, and, of course, the distance from any view-obstructing obstacle. This is why the traditional main battle tank is more comfortable maneuvering in open terrain and engaging targets at the 1,000 to 4,000 meter range rather than dueling at close range in inner city streets. If direct hits, shrapnel, debris, smoke, or fluids reduce an already poor visibility, damage the firing sights, or impair the driver’s ability to negotiate obstacles, the crew will have to rely on the few spares that are onboard, resort to rotating periscopes of similar types from one area to another, and engage enemies within the combat range of the selected ammunition. If the driver’s periscopes have been hit and damaged, critical optics must be replaced. Repair and salvaging. Everything that can be repaired should be repaired and everything that can be salvaged should be salvaged! Armored combat in urban terrain is tough on equipment; accordingly, prior to any engagement within city limits, procedures for recovery, destruction, and salvaging should be in place. At every level, from crew to battalion, imagination and resourcefulness are necessary to keep the maximum number of tanks in fighting condition. A thorough “cannibalization policy” will permit damaged vehicles to receive immediate maintenance. A damaged tank may crawl its way back to a “cannibalization center” where crew members help themselves with necessary replacement hardware from piles of salvaged tank parts such as periscopes, road wheels, sprockets, tracks, antennas, and tools. Couriers might take orders, then pick up and deliver parts across the front; only major mechanical issues or repairs would require the use of a recovery tank. The on-site destruction of a tank should be the last resort to prevent it from falling into enemy hands. Still, afterwards, whatever can be salvaged from the wreck should be salvaged. Crew members might also participate in this salvaging as a “shared” components mission; available gunners, drivers, or commanders might be centralized and dispatched on request, regardless of the original unit of attachment. Logistics. The ability to efficiently support armored units is a key requirement in military operations in urbanized zones. Main battle tanks are gas guzzlers and cannot sustain day-long operations without filling up. Furthermore, regular maintenance is nec- “During urban combat, the line of contact can be anywhere, front, rear, and sides, up and under. Therefore, armored units should not be committed for too long before being relieved and sent to a secure area for necessary resupply, maintenance, and rest. The crew should be cross trained and every member should be able to correctly perform the tasks of the others. Not only is cross-training a combat multiplier, it is a matter of survival, and every soldier should know how to perform every task from standard to emergency maintenance and recovery procedures, driving, firing, maintaining all weapons systems, radio procedures, and tactical basics.” 32 — essary to avoid major mechanical breakdowns, and an ammunition shortage is likely since fighting tanks go through munitions faster than they do fuel. The safe setting of an after-dark refueling/resupplying area for tank units operating in a forest or the suburbs of a city is fairly easy. Refueling and resupplying a tank unit fighting its way through the hard zone of a city is a bit more complex; the streets are partially cluttered with debris, fires are burning, and enemies could pop up anywhere at any time. Ideally, entire armored units could be simultaneously relieved and moved to a safe place away from combat zones; however, this is not a likely scenario because a well-orchestrated in-place relief is impossible in an urbanized zone during combat. Delivering fuel and ammunitions to individual tanks could also be considered, but is not a realistic approach because of exposure and the amount of time it takes for crews to reload ammunitions and pump fuel from barrels. The most realistic scenario is to deal with one tank or platoon at a time. Vehicles can be guided to a safe rear resupply point nearby. Ideally, fuel and ammunition should be transported by armored and tracked vehicles that can reach tanks anywhere, regardless of the conditions of the roadways; and infantry should provide close protection. The Purpose of Victory Caen, Stalingrad, Dresden, Moscow, Tokyo, Berlin, Nagasaki, Saigon, Beyrouth, Belfast, Budapest, Panama, Baghdad… From close-quarter combat to nuclear weapons, resistance to terrorism, scorched earth to aerial bombing, every possible means of warfare — tanks, artillery, helicopters, and airplanes — have been used to conquer cities, destroy their economic hubs, or annihilate the will of their citizens. It is common knowledge that about 70 percent of World War II battles took place in urbanized areas, and about 40 percent of those on the Eastern front. What was true 60 years ago remains true today. Areas, such as the Ruhr, the Donbas of Silesia and of Ural, the California coast, and the north of France, compose urban sprawls, which are 20 to 100 miles long and inhabited by 500 to 10,000 people per square mile. In Europe, there is an average of one 50,000-inhabitant city in every 40 miles. If war were to break out again in the European theater, it is a safe assumption that most of the fighting will occur in urbanized terrain and the tank will, once again, spearhead these battles. The recent war in Iraq has once again proven that as long as cities are not pacified, wars drag on and casualty numbers increase. On the other hand, as shown in Afghanistan, controlling the cities and not the countryside fails to bring an end to violence. Cities are the high payoff objectives of wars, the prime targets armed forces cannot afford to lose. Without winning the cities, the war is lost; however, occupying cities and not controlling the countryside fails to achieve victory as well. It seems wars cannot be won with or without the cities! For the purpose of victory, armies must prepare generic armored vehicles, crews, and tactics for this ever-changing environment, which is cursorily studied due to a lack of expensive realistic training infrastructure and the budget flexibility needed for the purchase of specialized weapons systems. Furthermore, at the human level, the emphasis during training for military operations in urban areas should emphasize initiative, decentralization, and inter-branch cooperation — skills that may seem outdated in these modern times where conflicts are micromanaged by poll-driven politicians from their capital cities. Captain Eric Chevreuil is currently a network systems engineer, Endwave Corporation, Diamond Springs, CA. He retired from the French army after 18 years of service as an armor and cavalry officer. He received a bachelor’s degree from the University of Nancy, France. His military education includes ST Maixent Noncommissioned Officer Academy; ST Cyr-Coetquidan Officer Academy; Language and Intelligence Academy Strasbourg; and Staff College Compiegne. He served in various command and staff positions, to include tank platoon commander, tank company commander, long-range reconnaissance patrol commander, intelligence officer, military English teacher, multimedia language course developer, and head of the British and North American Language Studies Department, Strasbourg. “The safe setting of an after-dark refueling/resupplying area for tank units operating in a forest or the suburbs of a city is fairly easy. Refueling and resupplying a tank unit fighting its way through the hard zone of a city is a bit more complex; the streets are partially cluttered with debris, fires are burning, and enemies could pop up anywhere at any time.”