A German Offi cer’s Perspective on the U.S. Army’s MDMP

mander’s intent to identify what he wants to achieve with combat, forces, time, and space. But his intent is not interpreted into a restated mission. The intent, as stated in No. 3a (commander’s intent), of the higher headquarters’ operations order (OPORD), is quoted, not interpreted, in No. 1b (own situation), of the order. This gives subordinate headquarters unchanged knowledge of the commander’s intent two levels up, thus enabling them to better react to unforeseen developments. The mission, paragraph 2 of the OPORD, is quoted from number 3b (unit tasks), or the respective paragraph 3 number that refers to the unit, on the higher headquarters order. (See Figure 5.) In addition to the effect of transparency, this leads to very careful language in the respective paragraphs of higher headquarters orders. Most of the differences described in this article are linked to how orders are written because many of the estimate “products” are used in the operation plan (OP) and in the order that accompanies the OP. This process is particularly true for developing the essential task. The MA of the German system does not require developing a list comprising all specified and implied tasks, it concentrates on “what does my commander want me to achieve; what is my essential task?” Thus, it focuses analysis and is instrumental in keeping the process as short and concise as possible. The next big difference between U. S. and German army doctrines are the analysis of terrain and own and enemy situations. The German process does not have an intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). The rationale is that terrain details are best handled by those at the lowest level, such as company and platoon leaders, who set foot on the terrain. Therefore, the analysis of these factors concentrates on developing possibilities for own and enemy actions, and identifying the single worst-case scenario for enemy courses of action (COA), and looking at possibilities to counter enemy COA. The amount of detail in conducting such an analysis is limited; no decision support matrices are developed, and as a rule, you are not looking further than two levels down. This means that at brigade level, you are only looking down to company level. You will not find a more detailed picture on a brigade operations map. Again, this is reflected in the OPORD A German Officer’s Perspective on the U. S. Army’s MDMP by Captain Ulrich Humpert, German Army The key to doctrinal understanding of an army is its military decisionmaking process (MDMP); this process leads to decisions and tactics applied on the battlefield and discloses how an army and its leaders are thinking and acting. Having attended the Armor Officers Captains’ Career Course at the U. S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky, I gained deep insight into the U. S. Army’s MDMP. Naturally, during the course, I frequently compared the German and U. S. Army systems. It may be interesting for ARMOR readers to have a German perspective on the U. S. Army MDMP; after all, the origin of the U. S. Army’s MDMP is German. U. S. Army Major Eben Swift created the MDMP in 1897 based on a French interpretation of a book on tactical decision games by Prussian officer Verdy du Vernois. The irony is that the French, and consequently Swift, misinterpreted the German system, searching for methods and means, rather than ends, as the Prussians emphasized.1 At first glance, and very unusual for a German officer, is the lengthy and detailed U. S. Army process; the German MDMP emphasizes speedy decisionmaking, focusing on the essentials of making a decision and not getting wrapped up in details. The key to the German system is faithfully adhering to, and understanding, a commander’s intent; the details — the how — of the execution is (ideally) left to subordinate units or commands that have (ideally) maximum freedom of action and maneuver. This is the core of Auftragstaktik. The mission analysis, step 2 of the U. S. Army MDMP, consists of 17 steps, while the Germans are content with merely 5 steps. Significantly, the Germans exclude discussing specified and implied tasks, risk assessment, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais sance, as well as warning orders, stressing in their mission analysis higher command’s intent, essential task (only and exclusively one essential task is accepted, which is the essential task to fulfill higher command’s intent), and conclusions for further analysis in the process. Generally, there are many and lengthy briefings involved in the U. S. Army’s system, which include a mission analysis briefing, courses of action (COA) briefing, and a decision briefing. Not surprisingly, the U. S. Army’s mission analysis briefing is highly detailed, sometimes consisting of more than 100 slides, and taking frequently up to 2 hours to complete. A higher German commander would hardly accept such a lengthy and detailed briefing, and certainly not in a combat environment. Instead, German staffs are drilled to brief shortly, concisely, and to the point. At battalion level, a situational or decision briefing normally takes no more than 15 to 20 minutes. The U. S. Army’s intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is very thorough and detailed. German officers do not produce modified combined obstacle overlays, enemy situation templates, or high-value target lists. Instead, they focus their analysis on quickly determining possible COA by addressing, evaluating, and concluding enemy dispositions and compositions. For friendly forces, the most disadvantageous enemy COA is mainly taken into consid eration — the U. S. Army’s system produces a most dangerous COA (MDCOA) and a most probable COA (MPCOA), with primary focus on MPCOA. The enemy COA is formulated as “decision” during the German MDMP, and is so concise that it can be included in paragraph 1a of the operations order. Most importantly, evaluating the enemy’s situation produces conclusions for friendly actions. Terrain and other environmental conditions are analyzed in the same manner as the enemy’s sit uation — addressing, evaluating from enemy and friendly forces’ point of view, and eventually concluding for friendly forces’ action. The key to step 3, COA development, in the U. S. Army’s MDMP is the COA sketch and statement. Again, the sketch is highly detailed; in fact, doctrinally speaking, the sketch is more detailed than the operations overlay, which is one of the final products of the MDMP. At a minimum, the COA sketch includes the array of generic forces and control measures, such as unit boundaries, unit movement formations, forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), line of departure, phase lines, reconnaissance and security graphics, axes of advance, assembly 20 — where the detail in the situation paragraph (1) is limited as well. A final difference occurs in the COA analysis and comparison; there is no wargaming in the German army process. This certainly can be regarded as a shortfall, as valuable insights might be produced during this event. The German army estimate leaves this to its staff, which compares the enemy COA to various developed friendly COA and develops a conclusion. This, on the one hand, keeps the process short and focused, but on the other hand, might fail to include valuable outside views. At the end of the process, the commander makes his decision based on the results of the estimate; however, he always keeps in mind that after the first shots have been exchanged, the plans might be obsolete. This decision is his intent and follows the questions: “Who does what, how, when, where, and why? Thus, the commander concentrates on portraying a clear and deductible intent, formulated as the concept of operations, which becomes paragraph 3a of the OPORD. In doing so, he is giving his subordinates enough freedom of action to enable them to react to the unforeseen or to exploit opportunities. This keeps orders short, easy to read, and easy to understand, which in my opinion, is of predominant importance in the high-speed environment in which we are operating.12 Mission command — Auftragstaktik — requires more than just providing subordinates with an elaborated description of what you want to achieve. Therefore, the MDMP and the writing of orders are closely linked in the German system. The commander’s intent, as a result of the estimate of the situation, is portrayed in paragraph 3a, it is short and concise and, in its essence, concentrates on the key points of who does what, how, when, where, and why. The tasks to the subunits are given in the subsequent parts of paragraph 3. The fact that paragraph 2 is a quote from the higher headquarters’ task paragraph (3b, etc.) leads to the necessity that this paragraph be written very carefully while focusing on the essential task, which is accompanied by very few other important tasks. Implied tasks are not mentioned at all, as they are regarded as what they are — implied. They are part of standard operating procedure, or as routine, and are handled as such. All of the above-mentioned techniques serve one purpose, which is to keep the order short, concise and comprising only necessary detail, as was requested by Field Marshal von Moltke. areas, battle positions, strong points, engagement areas, objectives, obstacle control measures, fire support/coordinating measures, decisive operations, shaping operations, command post locations, and known or templated enemy locations. The German model sketches are very rough, merely depicting terrain very generally, and only visualizing own and enemy forces in their respective COA. Whereas, the U. S. Army’s COA statement is a lengthy description, which includes mission, intent, decisive operations, shaping operations, sustaining operations, and tactical risk, and is usually one page in length. On the other hand, the German COA statement is formulated as a decision — merely one phrase for each COA respectively. The wargame, Kriegsspiel, a Prussian invention introduced into the Prussian army in the early 19th century, is not, ironically enough, conducted in the German system.2 The wargame allows the staff to synchronize battlefield operating systems (BOS) for each COA, identifying the COA that best accomplishes the mission. The upcoming operation is ‘played’ in detail and thoroughly. Whereas, in the German system, only advantages and disadvantages of pos sible COAs are compared, weighed, and evaluated. Essentially, the decisive advantage of a COA — the COA to be selected — is reasoned by its highest probability to accomplish the essential task, thus fulfilling the higher command’s intent. Another actual German concept is the U. S. Army’s nested concept, which is the means to achieve unity of purpose whereby each succeeding echelon’s concept is included in the other. This concept is usually visualized during the planning process by using the nesting diagram in which task and purposes of higher command(s) and neighbors are described. Again, the U. S. Army is more Prussian than the Prussians. It connects very formally, strictly, and explicitly tasks and purposes not only of higher commands, but also of neighbors. Moreover, the purpose stated in the concept of operations (as part of the commander’s intent — the extended purpose) is not the same as stated in the decisive operation. In the German system, there is only one purpose of the operation as part of the higher command’s intent, which guides MDMP throughout the process to the decision. There is no commander’s guidance in the German system; however, the commander’s guidance is crucial to the U. S. Army’s MDMP. Usually, with determining employment of forces in area — 21 Scheme of a German OPORD No Title Source Destination Remark 1 Situation 1a Enemy Situation Result of the enemy estimate 1b Own Situation Partly from higher 3a 1c Task Organization Often given as an annex 2 Mission From higher 3b 3 Execution 3a Commander’s Intent Result of the estimate process Becomes part of subordinate’s 1b 3b Unit Tasks Results of the analysis of the terrain and the own and enemy situation Subordinate’s 2 3c Special Tasks 3d Coordinating Instructions 4 Logistics 5 Command and Control Figure 5 }

Finally, in an environment where computers and data links are ubiquitous and information on the tiniest details is available at the highest levels, another danger arises — the “5,000 mile long screwdriver” or the commander who wants to influence each and every detail from afar, always having the omnipresence of the press and the effects of the decisions of his “strategic corporals” in mind. Availability of information works both ways; not only does a commander have access to information, but many, if not all, of his superiors do as well. So information management, not interference, is the reaction required to enable subordinates to act in the right way, at the right time, and at the right place, knowing their commander’s intent. The following quote puts it all in a nutshell: “When information is concentrated at the top, leadership or management is more directive; you will do this or that. The issue is getting people to do what you want them to do. Whereas, if people have the ability to contribute to the decision, leadership changes. That leads to the creation of the mission-type warrior who works most effectively not when he’s told what to do, but when he’s given a goal. In other words, “don’t tell me what to do — tell me what you want accomplished.”13 Auftragstaktik, as it is currently used in the Bundeswehr, does not stand alone, it is paired with the concept of “Innere Füh rung,” which requires a certain style of leadership, and the acceptance that in combat, the human factor, in all its aspects, is the most decisive one. Notes 1There are different English and German terms, such as Auftragstaktik, Führen mit Auftrag, mission command, mission-oriented command, and mission-type tactics, that have been used in the same context. As Auftragstaktik in its use of the term “taktik” (tactics) falls short of the contemporary understanding of military leadership on all levels, recent German field manuals use the term, “Führen mit Auftrag.” In this article, the author uses the traditional word, “Auftragstaktik,” as this is the term most U. S. soldiers are familiar with when discussing German troop leading procedures. Furthermore, this is the term used in U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 2The Freedom of the Backs has been the origin for the current concept of “Innere Führung” of the Bundeswehr, which is inseparably linked to Auftragstaktik. The term cannot be translated, but it means the soldier is regarded as a free person. His individual dignity is respected, as well as his basic rights. This image is translated inside the Bundeswehr into a concept of leadership and civic education called “Innere Führung.” This is our corporate culture and integrates the Bundeswehr into society. 3Moltke’s tactical-strategic essays from 1867 to 1871, on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the birth of Field Marshal Graf von Moltke, the Great General Staff, Department of the History of War, ed., Berlin, Germany 1900, as published in Verordnungen für die höheren Truppenführer, (Guidelines for Higher Commanders), as quoted by Major General Millotat, “Auftragstaktik, the Paramount Principle in the Army of the German Armed Forces — its Development and Representation in German Military Publications,” lecture delivered during German Armed Forces Command Commander’s Conference, 29 November 2000. 4Headquarters, Department of the Army, U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D. C., August 2003, Chapter 1, pp. 1-15 and 1-16. 5For additional information and a brief and concise analysis of the origins of Auftragstaktik see Lieutenant Colonel John L. Silva, “Auftragstaktik, Its Origin and Development,” Infantry, September-October 1989, p. 6. 6Oberjäger is a rank equivalent to sergeant (E-5). The term was used by the mountain infantry and the paratroopers of the Wehrmacht. 7German Field Manual HDv 100/100 VS-NfD, Truppen- führung, December 2000, Chapter 3, 301 to 306, translated by author. 8FM 6-0, pp.1-18 (Figures 1-72 to 1-74). 9German Field Manual HDv 100/200 VS-NfD, Füh- rungsunterstützung im Heer, Bonn 15, October 1998, 602 and Annex 11, translated by author. 10FM 6-0, Chapter 1, p. 1-2 (Figure 1-1) and p. 1-8 (Figure 1-2). 11German Field Manual HDv 100/200 VS-NfD, Füh- rungsunterstützung im Heer, 630 to 640 and Annex 14, translated by author. 12Captain Brian Hayes, “Simplifying the Heavy Brigade/ Task Force Operations Order,” ARMOR, November-December 2003, pp. 18-21. 13Irving Lachow, senior research professor, Information Resources Management College, NDU, as quoted in Barry Rosenberg, “Technology and Leadership,” Armed Forces Journal, July 2007, p. 20. Lieutenant Colonel Klaus-Peter Lohmann is currently serving as the German Army Liaison Officer, U. S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox, KY. His education includes NATO Staff Officer Course, Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Hamburg, Germany; Army Advanced Leadership Course, Führungsakademie der Bundes wehr, Hamburg; Staff Officer Advanced Course, Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Hamburg; Staff Officer Basic Course, Führungsakademie der Bun deswehr, Hamburg, and U. S. Army Armor Officer Advanced Course, Fort Knox. He has served in various command and staff positions to include tutor and lecturer for land force tactics, Command and General Staff College of the Bundeswehr (Führungsakademie), Hamburg, Germany; military advisor to the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Estonia, and head of department and tutor for land force tactics, Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia; G4, Armoured Infantry Brigade 1, Hildesheim, Lower Saxony, Germany; XO and deputy commander, Tank Battalion 24, Braunschweig, Lower Saxony; headquarters commandant and commander, Headquarters Company, Activation Staff of the Multinational Division Central (airmobile), Brunssum, Netherlands, and later in Rheindahlen, Germany; and aide de camp to commander, German Army Armor School, Munster, Germany. and time, the commander’s guidance is virtually the actual decision in a directed COA scenario. Therefore, in this case the U. S. Army’s MDMP is meant to prepare and execute, rather than make a decision. Consequently, only one COA is involved in COA development. In comparison, the demands of the two armies’ MDMP differ significantly. The German system, which is based on Auftragstaktik, requires well-trained and experienced subordinates with initiative, as they are expected to make independent decisions according to the higher command’s intent. The commander must have a well-developed sense of subordinates’ capabilities, trusting his subordinates to fulfill missions independently and without detailed interference by the higher command. The U. S. Army system requires much more time, demanding detailed and thorough staff work (its not surprising that U. S. Army staffs are larger than German army staffs). In my experience, the U. S. Ar my’s MDMP takes roughly more than 3 times longer than the German army’s system to accomplish. This is mainly due to the U. S. Army’s strong adherence to details and thorough preparation by wargaming. Subordinate units and commands are relieved to a great extent from making decisions; they are rather ‘pushed’ by command (command push). In the end, though, both systems are merely means or methods. The practical application and outcome of decisionmaking depends mainly and eventually on the human factor. Tactics is a question of character. The commander’s leadership quality, his experience, and his common sense determine the quality and success of the decision. Notes 1Donald E. Vandergriff, “We are Stuck in the Past, Military Education, January 2005, online at www.military. com/Opinions/0,,Vandergriff_011305-P1,00.html. For the historical background and evaluation of U. S. MDMP as a ‘French misinterpretation,’ see “FORSCOM Commander’s Conference at National Training Center,” online at www.d-n-i-net/fcs/pdf/348_forcecom_brief.pdf, p. 3. 2Bill Leeson, “Origins of the Kriegsspiel,” a very informative article on the historical background of the wargame, online at www.kriegsspiel.org.uk. Captain Ulrich Hans Humpert, German Army, is currently an armor/cavalry instructor at the German Army Battle Training Center, Letzlingen, Germany. He received a M. A. from the University of the German Armed Forces, Munich, Germany. His military education includes Panzertruppen-schule (German Armor School), Offizier-schule des Heeres (German Army Officer School), and Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr (Staff College of the German Armed Forces). 22 —