Führen mit Auftrag — Mission Command

Engaging in professional discussions with U. S. officers in due course inevitably leads to questions about mission command, “Führen mit Auftrag” or “Auftragstaktik,” as we Germans once referred to it.1 The common understanding is that there should not be too many differences between the German way of developing, issuing, and executing orders and the way the U. S. Army goes about that same business. But very soon during these conversations it becomes clear that although we use the same terms and very similar systematic approaches for our military decisionmaking processes (MDMP), there are many differences in how the details are handled and especially how orders developed using the MDMP are written. It is also impossible to separate troop lead ing procedures from leadership styles. The style of leadership depends on cultural and historical factors, educational systems, and traditions. Acknowledging these differences, this article intends to achieve two different goals: explain the term “Auftrags taktik” and highlight the differences in understanding mission com mand and Auf tragstaktik in both armies. In doing so, this article does not intend to glorify the German army’s system at the expense of the U. S. Army’s MDMP. Lastly, there are different levels of command and control, and there are significant differences in the requirements at the operational and strategic levels, therefore, this article concentrates on command and control at the tactical level. The Roots of Auftragstaktik Auftragstaktik was not a sudden idea or the invention of a genius, and it certainly was not introduced into German military thinking by an order. The adoption of this concept has been along and protracted process. Its beginnings can be traced back to 1806 when the defeats of the Prussian army at Jena and Auerstedt by Napoleon made the necessity for reform and modernization of the old system more than obvious. In the following years, Generals von Scharnhorst and Gneisenau designed anew military system for Prussia, which included the belief that “each citizen of a state is a born defender of the same.” Even today, this belief remains the philosophical hub for Germany’s conscription system. The new concept tried to find a balance between the necessity of control and the recognition of the impossibility of complete control of large armies in the field, a discrepancy that grew bigger and bigger with the development of modern mass armies. Knowing that a subordinate would act correctly, if he only knew what to do, led to the adoption of reforms that included banning corporal punishment, “Freiheit der Rücken” (Freedom of the Backs); the acceptance that a soldier is a knowledgeable, as well as a thinking, individual; and finally, conscription.2 But this was only the start of along transformation process that had several other great German officers as its proponents, which included Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, the Chief of the General Staff of the Prussian army between 1857 and 1888, considered by many in Germany to be the creator of operational level command and control and the “spiritus rector” of operational principles. On the tactical level, he believed that situations under which an officer is required to act on his own view of the situation are manifold, and that it was wrong for an officer to wait for orders at times when no order could be given. Further, he concluded that “most productive are his actions when he acts in the framework of his senior commander’s intent.”3 He also said that commanders should issue only the most essential orders, providing only general instructions outlining the principal objective and specific missions — tactical details were left to subordinates.4 In the following years, two factions of opposite beliefs struggled with the new concept. One side believed in issuing specified orders down to the last detail and that maintaining tight control was the only way to overcome the dispersal effect brought about by modern weapons systems. The other side had confidence in the independence of small units, enjoying and utilizing freedom of action within the spirit of their commander’s intent. They believed the only way to operate successfully in the confusion of modern combat was to provide clearly defined tactical tasks. These visionaries finally succeeded with their view, and thus from about 1914 onward, Auftragstaktik has had a firm place in the German armed forces’ command and control philosophy.5 Historical Vignette In April 1941, the Wehrmacht attacked allied forces in Greece, in the vicinity of Evangelismos, in an attempt to push through to the town of Larissa, which was a major command and control node and thus important for future operations. The 2d Tank Division was advancing along the Pinios River toward the town of Tembi, but could not develop its combat power due to the rugged terrain that only allowed a single column formation to advance on the road along the river. For this reason its advance was stopped in front of the allies well fortified defensive positions. The plan to overcome this deadlock was to attack these positions with units of the 6th Mountain Division, which had to cross Mount Olympus and cross the line of departure along the Pinios River by 1400 hours on 18 April. (See Figure 1) The allies, however, had expected exactly that course of action and had occupied positions that effectively covered the down slope of Mount Olympus with indirect and heavy machine gun fire, with unobstructed overwatch of the river. The allies effectively delayed the advance of the leading unit, Gebirgsjägerregiment

143. The regiment had sent out its first battalion as lead, which, in turn, had sent out a squad under the command of an Oberjäger to reconnoiter a ford over the Pinios River, mark it, return, and report back.6 Adriatic Sea 1587 m

1978 m 1876

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2. PD Situation near TEMBI on Apr.18th, 1130 h

Figure 1 Adriatic Sea 1587 m

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I/143 Situation near TEMBI on Apr.18th, 1400 h JU 88 ( 18)

By 1400 hours, the squad had made it to the river and had completed its task; however, the remaining units of the regiment were inching their way down to the line of departure under allied forces’ heavy fire. At exactly 1400 hours, a close air support mission, which had been coordinated to support the river crossing at the beginning of the attack, was carried out on allied positions by a flight of 18 JU 88 bombers. (See Figure 2) During the air strike, allied defenders were temporarily suppressed until the dust and dense smoke obscuring their vision cleared. The squad leader, realizing this was a unique opportunity, without orders or rather against his original order to reconnoiter and report back, left one soldier behind, crossed the river with his squad, and attacked and destroyed two temporarily blinded positions. This enabled his battalion, and subsequently the whole regiment, to cross the river and overrun the well-organized defense, despite the desperate allied resistance. The next day, the allies withdrew south to Larissa and were subsequently forced to surrender the town. The young Oberjäger acted against a direct order when he decided to cross the river and attack enemy positions. In a deliberate estimate of the situation, his actions might have been judged as hazardous due to the gross imbalance of forces involved; however, he was there, had a direct view on the effects of the bombing, and saw a small window of opportunity. Going back to seek approval for his actions would have certainly closed that window of opportunity. Knowing his commander’s intent, he acted independently and took initiative, trusting that his superiors would approve, even had he not been successful. This is Auftragstaktik in its prime! The Concept Auftragstaktik as defined by German Field Manual 100/100 has a basic set of principles that comprise leadership attitudes, training principles, and troop leading procedures; together, they form the framework in which Auftragstaktik functions:

• The basic principles of Auftragstaktik are based on mutual trust and understanding, as well as a conscientious fulfillment of duties and a dedicated will to achieve given tasks. The concept requires every soldier to possess the ability to take responsibility, cooperate, and take independent creative action in the framework of the mission.

• The military leader briefs his intent, sets clear and achievable goals, and provides the necessary assets. He grants freedom of action for execution to subordinate commanders, which is the prerequisite for fast, determined action and serves to strengthen their self-responsibility. Military leaders must be educated to have this level of latitude; and the style of leadership and supervision also must be considered.

• Auftragstaktik requires the readiness of the commander to accept mistakes in execution of orders. This tolerance, however, finds its limitation where the accomplishment of the mission is threatened or the life and health of soldiers are exposed to unnecessary risks.

• A high level of uniform thinking and action provides the basis for Auftragstaktik and is a prerequisite to success. This presupposes common values, a common understanding of a soldier’s rights and duties, and obeying the law, even in extraordinary situations. In addition, it requires uniform objectives of command, control, education, and training.

• The responsibility of the military leader is indivisible. He is responsible for his own actions and those of his subordinates. Undivided command responsibility requires an appropriate degree of toughness and perseverance, which will enable leaders to lead troops so that common objectives and successes can be achieved. Order and obedience are absolutely essential in this context.

• Despite sophisticated technical innovations, soldiers remain a key factor for the success of operations. The objective of leadership must therefore be to win the trust of the troops, to employ them according to their capabilities, and to preserve their efficiency using all means available. The efficiency of troops will be determined by a soldier’s courage and discipline, his ability to act independently, his will to take the initiative, his psychological and physical capabilities, and his morale. The promotion of individual capabilities by training and education and successful preparation for operational requirements are key to success.

• He is assured of trust who leads from the heart and the mind. A leader who knows his profession; accepts responsibility; sets obtainable objectives; exercis- “The military leader briefs on his intention, sets clear and achievable goals, and provides the necessary assets. He grants freedom of action for execution to subordinate commanders, which is the prerequisite for fast, determined action and serves to strengthen their self-responsibility. Military leaders must be educated to have this level of latitude; and the style of leadership and supervision also must be considered.” — 17 es self-discipline; leads his soldiers with fairness, understanding, and patience; shows the necessary appreciation for their efficiency; cares for them; respects their dignity; provides them with the right information; practices two-way communication; and accepts his soldiers as advisors and comrades will win the hearts and minds of the men committed to his care.

• Nothing is more detrimental to confidence than the feeling of being poorly and improperly led, and of avoidable losses being accepted. Loss of confidence cannot be compensated for through technical skills alone.7 Auftragstaktik is based on decentralization of authority for the execution of military operations. This is based on historical experience, as seen in the example above, that in all the chaos and friction, decisions can best be made at the level directly involved in the engagement. This decentralization provides subordinates with a sense of involvement. Another advantage of Auftragstaktik is that only a limited amount of essential information has to be passed along the chain of command, which encourages the development of short orders. Moreover, it ensures that local commanders make decisions on the basis of the most current information. A general rule should be that the more variable the circumstances, the lower the level of decisionmaking. Therefore, the German process of an estimate of the situation (MDMP) embraces the Clausewitzian factor of the “fog of war.” It is less dependent on the amount of analytical details, relying on the belief that an experienced commander can better adjust his plans on the basis of a good, but short, analysis with a clear and concise mission given to his subordinates, rather than a commander who knows every detail and attempts to regulate and give precise orders for each coincidence in advance. U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, defines mission command in the following way: “Mission command concentrates on the objective of an operation, not on how to achieve it. It emphasizes timely decision making, understanding of the higher commander’s intent, and the clear responsibility of subordinates to act within that intent to achieve the desired end state. With the commander’s intent to provide unity of effort, mission command relies on decentralized execution and subordinates’ initiative. Mission command requires a common understanding of Army doctrine, as well as of the situation and commander’s intent. The fundamental basis of mission command is creating trust and mutual understanding between superiors and subordinates. This is more than just control: commanders must establish a command climate of trust and mutual understanding that encourages subordinates to exercise initiative. Mission command applies to all operations across the spectrum of conflict. Mission command counters the uncertainty of war by reducing the amount of certainty needed to act. Commanders guide unity of effort through the commander’s intent, mission orders, and commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR). Commanders hold a ‘loose rein,’ allowing The fundamental basis of mission command is creating trust and mutual understanding between superiors and subordinates. This is more than just control: commanders must establish a command climate of trust and mutual understanding that encourages subordinates to exercise initiative. Mission command applies to all operations across the spectrum of conflict. Planning Follow up Situational Awareness Issuing Orders Own command Superior Command Subordinate Command(s) Neighbors Allies Coalition Partners Other Military Units and Commands Civilian Agencies and Organizations (GOs/NGOs) Population Reports, requests Reports, requests Orders Orientations, warning orders Information, orientation Figure 3 18 — their subordinates freedom of action and requiring them to exercise initiative. Commanders make fewer decisions, allowing them to focus on the most important ones. The command operates more on self-discipline, rather than imposed discipline. Because mission command de-centralizes decisionmaking authority and grants subordinates significant freedom of action, it demands more of commanders at all levels and requires rigorous training and education.”8 When comparing the German army’s HDv 100/100 and U. S. Army FM 6-0, it is clear that the idea behind their troop leading procedures is nearly identical. Nevertheless, the respective results, such as orders, are very different, not only in appearance, but also in content. But why is this so? To answer this question, we have to look a little bit deeper into the way orders are generated and written. Therefore, the following paragraphs will comprise a description of the German army’s MDMP and compare it to the U. S. Army’s MDMP, where appropriate. The German Decisionmaking Process9 In a systematic approach to troop leading procedures, one may subdivide the process into several steps, which very often are depicted in a circle, indicating the continuousness of that process. The German decisionmaking process comprises the four steps of situational awareness, planning, issuing orders, and following up. Influenced by, and linked to, this process are different players, such as the superior and subordinate headquarters, neighboring units, and other external agencies. (See Figure 3) This is certainly very similar to the U. S. Army’s system of command and control as described in FM 6-0.10 For the purposes of this article, we will look at the planning phase, which is subdivided into three steps: estimate of the situation, commander’s decision, and operations plan. The estimate is based on orders and information received. With this as a foundation, the factors for planning are elucidated. What is known for sure is separated from what is assumed; conclusions are drawn, then the comparison of combat Mission Analysis – superior commander’s intent – essential task – constraints – fundamental change of situation?

– What has to be decided until when? conclusions, elements of own action conclusions, elements of own action conclusions, elements of own action conclusions Own Possibilities development of possible own courses of action Commander’s Decision Comparison of Forces – overall combat power ratio – possibilities in time and terrain – comparison of combat power – comparison of combat effectiveness – elimination of unsuitable COAs best possibility / concept of operation Enemy Situation – overview – single groupings – possibilities – suspected intent – situation of other hostile conflict parties Own Situation – combat power – combat effectiveness – situation of neighbors and friendly forces Environment – terrain – weather/visibility/daytime – population/media – situation of neutral GO/NGO/IO – other relevant factors Comparison of Courses of Action – common elements – advantages and disadvantages – comparison – weighing the possibilities against each other Figure 4 power and effectiveness in relation to time and space is made. This results in the commander’s concept of operations — his basic plan. The development of the concept of operations mainly considers the conduct of combat operations and the use of resources. The detailed considerations made earlier now lead to a plan, which assigns tasks, the basis for orders, and along-term prognosis for the units. The concept of operations and tasks form the battle plan, which is usually documented. The Estimate of the Situation and its Results11 Full planning (as shown in Figure 4) is mainly executed in preparation for combat actions or in the event anew task is received. During combat situations, following an initial full planning cycle, the process might be abbreviated by only addressing those elements that have changed. The starting point, step 2, in the U. S. Army’s MDMP, is mission analysis (MA). There are several differences between how the U. S. Army and the German army conducts this part of the analysis. The German process comprises merely five parts, of which the last one, “is there a fundamental change to the situation,” mostly applies to combat situations such as the one described in the historical vignette. The question the analyst asks himself is: “Knowing this development of the situation, would my commander have given the same order as the one I received, or would he have given a different one?” The next difference is the way the mission paragraph is developed. In the German MA, we consider the superior com- — 19