Between Doctrine

Between Doctrine by Lieutenant Colonel Darrell D. Darnbush When did tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) become the default “doctrine?” Doctrine may be our tactical compass, but the course of combat operations is not a straight line. During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 3, the manner in which the 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) planned, prepared, assessed, and sustained combat operations on a nonlinear battlefield was not to be found in previous doctrinal templates — a paradigm shift had occurred. Background When the 278th ACR received its alert notification on 1 March 2004, to conduct combat operations in support of OIF 3, we were confident of our basic skills as lethal cavalry troops. We looked forward to conducting traditional cavalry operations such as screen, guard, or cover. We spent the previous four years (two years active duty time) conducting operations to support our ACR mission essential task list (METL). However, when instructed to reorganize as a brigade combat team, we reached deep into our cavalry doctrine, and with tongue in cheek, discovered mounted infantry doctrine to find our place in life. Our cavalry world and ego was turned upside down. Fortunately, a tank was still a tank, an M109A6 was still a Paladin, and a .50-caliber machine gun was still a .50-caliber machine gun. To compound matters, we were on at least three different courses of action for task organization, to include being attached to a Marine division. During the first three months of our alert phase at home station, we developed a generic METL, based on lessons learned from the 101st Airborne Division. In late June 2004, it became official that we would be part of the 42d Infantry Division — at least until we got in theater. We made modifications to our METL and battle tasks to support the 42d Infantry Division’s METL, which was approved by 1st Army. Our post-mobilization training tasks were generic and developed on the requirements of Forces Command (FORSCOM) and Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), which did not take into account our premobilization training and experience. It was an upside-down approach to METL analysis — we had only one of the five primary METL inputs until we were en route to the National Training Center (NTC) for our mission rehearsal exercise. Perhaps this is why the Army published U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 7-15, Army Universal Task List.1 We were given individual, platoon, and company tasks, and it was the regiment’s responsibility to develop a METL for future combat operations. These platoon- and company-level tasks became the “how” of our new METL.

The METL development and subsequent approval in July 2004 was just in time as we began staff-level training for the leader training program, brigade command battle staff training (BCBST), mission rehearsal exercise (division brigade command and training program), and mission rehearsal exercise at the NTC. The commander’s training strategy had to be changed several times for these events because our OIF 3 mission, higher headquarters, and our assigned area of operations were developing at a slower pace than expected. “Emerging Doctrine” As always, doctrinal terms, definitions, symbols, and graphics are still a valid part of our daily Army vocabulary. Many of us are aware of the need to change the set of guidelines as our missions change or evolve. For the most part, the way a unit conducts tactical tasks is found in its mission training plan or Army training and evaluation plan manual. Fortunately, the flexibility and adaptation of our predecessors in OIF 1 and 2 gave us many TTP to bridge the gap. Those TTP became the way to conduct operations — observer/trainers from BCBST and observer/controllers at NTC were slinging TTP as fast as they could read their emails. For example, targeting meetings were divided into two groups: one lethal and the other nonlethal. Then someone invented the information operations working group, and “effects” became a hot topic. All these TTP became “emerging doctrine.” I felt like Rip Van Winkle — I had just completed a BCBST a year earlier in June 2003 and didn’t recall any of these buzz words. Brigade-Level Operations For our unit, OIF 3 did not involve the continuous movement of brigade- or battalion-size formations (except the initial ground assault convoy into Iraq) as trained at BCBST in 2003; nor did it include maneuvering battalions to close with and destroy opposing forces. Instead, the functions of the regimental headquarters, in addition to command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), was to primarily resource and synchronize subordinate squadrons. The company/troop/battery commander should get all the credit for ensuring success. One can even argue that the platoon leader and platoon sergeant were the foundation of combat operations. After all, the minimum amount of vehicles allowed to travel was three. Instead of fighting two levels down, the measurement of tasks was based on platoon tasks, which in our case, was three levels down. We supported squadron/battalion missions with division or echelon-above-division assets such as Army attack aviation, close air support, and unmanned aerial vehicle platforms. For the most part, it was the company commander or platoon leader maneuvering the air weapons team or coordinating close air support; and it was the platoon leader training the Iraqi army company commander. The regimental tactical operations center (TOC) accomplished its task of providing the commander with the common operating picture. This was accomplished through the extraordinary efforts of proficient noncommissioned officers and attention to detail by professional officers. However, during steady state operations throughout a 12-month period, there were not many major tactical decisions to be made at the TOC. Rest assured that when our soldiers were in enemy contact, they had the undivided attention of the commander and TOC. The regimental TOC requested and coordinated resources for battle handover to the on-scene commander (OSC) to accomplish missions during attacks. Lessons Learned TTP Troop-to-task list (TTL) is a valuable tool that allows you to “see yourself.” It identifies specified and implied tasks the brigade is required to perform. It displays tasks down to platoon level, which allows commanders to continually assess mission critical events. It also allows flexibility to transition from steady state operations to surge operations. Troop-to-task information provides a priority for critical resources and is a method to schedule refit and rearm as part of a unit’s consuming tasks. The TTL ensured our subordinate squadrons were achieving critical tasks as prioritized by the commander. The key question is: are troops gainfully employed or waiting for employment? Consequence management identifies gaps between battle drills and current capabilities. Battle drills may only reflect coalition forces actions, but this tool also identifies the capabilities of the host nation. Information is usually provided by the civil affairs detachment and the subordinate unit from its area of operations. For example, U.S. Army forces are rehearsing battle drills for a suicide bomber at a polling center, but they need to in- “We supported squadron/battalion missions with division or echelon-above-division assets such as Army attack aviation, close air support, and unmanned aerial vehicle platforms. For the most part, it was the company commander or platoon leader maneuvering the air weapons team or coordinating close air support; and it was the platoon leader training the Iraqi army company commander.” 42 — November-December 2006

Publication Title: ARMOR. Publication Num ber: 0000-2420. Filing Date: 29 September 2006. Issue Frequency: Bimonthly. Number of Issues Published Annually:

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Extent and Nature of Circulation: Average No. Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months: Total Number of Copies (Net press run), 10,684; Paid and/ or Requested Circulation: (1) Outside-County Mail Subscriptions on Form 3541 – 5,145; (2) Paid In-County Sub scriptions Stated on Form 3541 – 0; (3) Sales Through Dealers and Car ri ers, Street Vendors, Counter Sales, and Oth er Non-USPS Paid Distribution – 0; (4) Other Classes Mailed Through the USPS – 80; Total Paid and/or Request ed Circulation: 5,225. Free Distribution by Mail: (1) Outside-County as Stated on Form 3541 – 4,181; (2) In-County as Stated on Form 3541 – 5; (3) Other Classes Mailed Through the USPS – 64. Free Distribution Outside the Mail (Carriers or other means) – 698. Total Free Distribution: 4,948. Total Distribution: 10,173. Copies not Distributed: 511. Total: 10,684. No. Copies of Single Issue Published Nearest to Filing Date: Total Number of Copies (Net press run) – 10,400; Paid and/or Requested Circulation: (1) Outside-County Mail Subscriptions on Form 3541 – 4,941; (2) Paid In-County Subscriptions Stated on Form 3541 – 0; (3) Sales Through Dealers and Carriers, Street Vendors, Counter Sales, and Oth er Non-USPS Paid Distribution – 0; (4) Other Classes Mailed Through the USPS – 55; Total Paid and/or Requested Circulation: 4,996. Free Distribution by Mail: (1) Outside-County as Stat ed on Form 3541 – 4,116; (2) In-County as Stated on Form 3541 – 0; (3) Other Classes Mailed Through the USPS – 94. Free Distribution Outside the Mail (Carriers or other means) – 629. Total Free Distribution: 4,839. Total Distribution: 9,835. Copies not Distributed: 565. Total: 10,400. November-December 2006 — 43 clude how the local government and its security forces will respond. Pertinent questions should address how the local hospital or clinic would handle the death or injury of 10 civilians; will it be overwhelmed, and if so, where and how far is the next facility? The local government identifies necessary resources for key events, which includes coalition forces, local security assets, and all local agencies involved. In our case, the local Iraqi city mayor, joint communications center director, Iraqi security forces, and coalition forces had the same visibility for a true “joint” or Iraqi-led operation. Consequence management may provide decision points for necessary troop movement to reinforce or follow and support. Whereas crisis action planning may be reactive, the consequence management tool allows the commander to reallocate resources and better prepare his forces based on known information and analysis. Condition check ensures specific details are complete prior to an event such as an election. It provides the commander a visualization tool to make decisions. Consider it the mother of all precombat inspection checklists. The condition check helps synchronize the staff’s efforts. As subordinate units report the necessary daily/weekly status, the TOC is updating the staff during the shift change brief and briefing the commander during the battle update brief. The condition check is a single coordinated staff product that reduces the requirement for every staff section to have its own internal “tracking” device. It defines roles and responsibilities of the subordinate unit and staff proponent. Further, it provides the common operating picture for subordinates, adjacent units, and higher headquarters. As the U.S. Army continues to transform and assess doctrine that enables us to conduct full-spectrum operations, it is necessary to continue developing TTP to fill the doctrine gap. Currently, the Army has issued several interim field manuals for modular brigade combat teams to use. Soon to follow is the plethora of mission training plan/Army training and evaluation program modifications. Many of these changes are a result of the TTP developed and tested in OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom combat operations. We must also preserve the flexibility and adaptation to use multiple field manuals, such as FM Interim (FMI) 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations and FM 3- 06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain, in conjunction with our respective organization disciplines to succeed in full-spectrum operations.2 Notes 1U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 7-15, Army Universal Task List, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D.C., 31 August 2003. 2FM Interim (FMI) 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations, GPO, Washington, D.C., 1 October 2004; and FM 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain, GPO, Washington, D.C., 28 February 2002. Lieutenant Colonel Darrell Darnbush is currently serving as commander, Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 278th Cavalry Brigade Combat Team, Tennessee Army National Guard (TN ARNG), Lebanon, TN. He received a B.S. from Middle Tennessee State University. His military education includes Field Artillery Officer Basic Course, Chemical Officer Advance Course, Armor Officer Advance Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, and U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions, including commander, 278th Chemical Company, TNARNG, Oak Ridge, TN; assistant RS1, 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), TNARNG, Knoxville, TN; assistant S3, 1st Squadron, 278th ACR, Athens, TN; assistant RS3, 278th ACR, TNARNG, Knoxville; XO, 1st Squadron, 278th ACR, TNARNG, Athens; RS4, 278th ACR, TNARNG, Knoxville; and RS3, 278th ACR (OIF 3), TNARNG, Knoxville.