The Homeland Population as a Center of Gravity

The United States has established itself as the undisputed military power in the world. Opponents are forced to fight the military strength of the world’s only superpower with guerrilla and insurgent warfare. Referred to as “asymmetric warfare,” this age-old partisan, known as guerrilla warfare, was fought by our grandfathers in the Philippines and during World War II. Technology and our ever-shrinking world allow guerrillas, or insurgents, the benefit of new weapons availability. Global communications has allowed these groups to develop a previously protected battlefront. Insurgencies really have four key players: insurgents, government forces, the insurgent target population, and the target population of the government supporter. The population of the country or area of conflict is commonly known as the “sea” in which the insurgent swims, as well as the center of gravity (COG) for both sides on the local front. Little attention seems to be paid to the COG for the government’s international supporters. Coalition forces supporting the local government have a COG as well, which also serves as a target for insurgents to exploit. The home population of the country providing support for the host nation is its friendly COG. In insurgencies, populations of each nation involved provide passive popular support, active support, or opposition for the forces involved. Most strategists and manuals focus on the conflict area, which is the country and population where the action is occurring. What about the population of the sponsoring forces? Examples would be countries that are part of the coalition in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The population of a powerful nation is its COG, which can be its weakest area. In terms of asymmetric warfare, it is this weakness that an opponent can singularly target. In reality, this is the very target that has been sought and exploited by our adversaries since the 1960s. For example, in all conflicts the United States has been involved in since that time, there has been no force on the battlefield that could eradicate or win a war of attrition against the forces employed. The United States military forces were completely superior in all aspects in every conflict and yet the track record shows humiliation and ultimate strategic defeat of a superpower by supposedly inferior forces. Looking at a superpower from the enemy’s perspective shows that it would be foolish to confront its conventional forces in open battle. Inferior forces would face certain annihilation. Contemplate the answer. Looking at past conflicts, it can be demonstrated that insurgents facing a similar dilemma answered it through attacking on a different front — the home front. “The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people.” He [Tse Tung] creates a three-phase model that emphasizes the political mobilization of the people and Army to create a protracted popular war. First, organization of the party and preservation of what little combat power exists. Second, transition to combat is initiated when conditions are met that allow progressive expansion of the influence of the party by achieving the support of the population. These second-phase operations include minor skirmishes against government forces when the guerillas possess an overwhelming advantage. Upon completion of assured victory, the guerilla quickly fades into the population to swarm at a later time. During the third and final phase, the guerilla forces transition into conventional military operations against government forces. Mao’s model emphasizes that the element of time is on the insurgent’s side in order to build resources and support. There is no rush to meet the government forces in fixed battle. The primary emphasis is to live amongst the population, convince the people that the guerillas offer a better alternative, and win their trust and support. In summary, the guerillas must exist like “fish” in the people’s “water.”1 Insurgent leaders since Ho Chi Mihn in North Vietnam realized the futility of open warfare with the western powers. They use the tactics and strategy contained within phase one of Mao Tse Tung’s three-phase model of insurgency to maintain support in the host nation and survive, while terrorizing and striking in a limited fashion against coalition or host nation forces. Rarely since that time has it been necessary to evolve to final phase three, open conventional conflict with the larger force. Eroding the enemy’s will to sustain its forces eventually removes them from the conflict and brings more equilibrium to the combatant forces on each side. Once this is achieved, the completion of the three-phase model can occur. Insurgent attacks against the larger force are intended to frustrate and annoy to evoke a heavy-handed response. These responses are capitalized in the media, by showing selected images and results as oppression and cruelty to people across the globe. It is in this manner that they attack on a different front. This new battlefield is one that western military strategists are not thoroughly aware of and not currently participating in fully. This is a war of erosion. Erosion of the will of populations in nations that support troops and armies deployed to assist host nation forces. Through this protracted conflict, the media assists insurgent forces by continually maintaining pressure on the supporting government and military establishment. This pressure creates hardship for the military and government as they attempt to continue support operations. This creates a second front, one on the home soil of the supporting nation. Media support for this second front is critical. News agencies and press releases that continually replay negative aspects of the host nation and supporting coalition begin to create an adverse feeling for participation in the conflict. Insurgents playing on the softer western emotions and lifestyle continually assault, through media channels, the population that supports the forces it faces. In this manner, they strike at the very foundation of the mightiest nations in the world and erode the support structure for powerful armies. This is how they win. This battlefield is not new. It has gained popularity because it has continually worked against stronger forces. The eventual withdrawal of forces from Vietnam, Beirut, Somalia, and a host of other locations was from an active public opposition, not a decisive military defeat. Erosion of public support through a constant bombardment of media outlets that portray negativity induces a type of mass hysteria in the population that eventually leads to the vocal, and sometimes violent, opposition to the military forces being deployed. The rapid evolution of global media and internet access has developed this battlefront into a viable method to perform ‘information warfare’ that has the potential to turn a country’sown population against government and military goals. The populace is at a disadvantage because they cannot see an issue in its entirety and are fed small ‘blurbs’ or ‘snippets’ in the newspapers, magazines, and on the evening news. This creates an issue of context. Taken out of context, many issues can be portrayed in away favorable to either side. The insurgent has become skilled at manipulating media assets and outlets to further its cause while weakening the stronger power. Factors, such as an aversion to casualties and long-term conflicts, certainly play apart. Having a general population that is not accustomed to dealing with hardship and has a very high standard of living has created a ‘softness’ that has been exploited by opponents from harsher environments and economies. We must take this threat seriously and educate high-risk populations to the fact they are targets on this battlefront. No longer can populations feel they are isolated and removed from combat and conflict. Realize that when a nation commits to conflict and battle, it is total in its scope and reach; all parts of society must be prepared to wage a battle. Military strategists and leaders in particular must be constantly aware of the implications, as well as the second- and third-order effects. Insurgencies are protracted and on average last 10 to 12 years. We cannot hope to win on the battlefields of far-off lands without the support and strength we receive from our homelands. Notes 1Mao Tse Tung, Selected Military Writing of Mao Tse Tung, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1966, p. 260. Captain William A. Ault is serving as the S3 Air, Task Force 1st Battalion, 110th Infantry, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 28th Infantry Division, Al Anbar, Iraq. He received a B. S. from Robert Morris University. His military education includes Officer Candidate School, Armor Officer Basic Course, and Infantry Officer Basic Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include XO, C Company, 1st Battalion, 103d Armor (1-103d AR), Al Anbar, Iraq; support platoon leader, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1-103d AR, Fort Bliss, TX; company commander, C Company, 1-103d AR, Vilseck, GE; and platoon leader, C Company, 1-103d AR, Friedens, PA. “Insurgent attacks against the larger force are intended to frustrate and annoy to evoke a heavy-handed response. These responses are capitalized in the media, by showing selected images and results as oppression and cruelty to people across the globe. It is in this manner that they attack on a different front. This new battlefield is one that western military strategists are not thoroughly aware of and not currently participating in fully.” — 25