An Irregular Shade of Blue: Advisory Work with the Iraqi Army

Make no mistake, advisor duty is a tough assignment, but not for reasons that might immediately come to mind. It’s more like trying to solve a puzzle that is one-third crossword, one-third Rubik’s Cube, and one-third Jenga in a dimly lit room — oh yeah, one-half of the crossword puzzle is written in Arabic/Kurdish and the other half in English. If you enjoy a good challenge and consider yourself innovative, then advisory duty is for you. There is also the challenge of overcoming things U. S. soldiers take for granted, such as near-limitless resourcing and unity of effort. This assignment can tax anyone’s mental faculties to the extreme when attempting to figure out how to put square pegs in round holes (although, at times, declaring victory by simply finding the holes — or using a bigger hammer — works). It is a rewarding duty; you will see aside of this war through allied indigenous eyes that few Americans will see — not merely a glimpse caught during a stopover or combined patrol. As a team, we have spent several months living, eating, and working with an Iraqi infantry battalion on a postage stamp-sized combat outpost (COP) located in northwest Mosul. We are about 10 to 15 minutes away from the major forward operating bases (FOBs), but feel secure in our compound with only the Iraqi army for company. We routinely see U. S. forces visiting to coordinate with the Iraqi army battalion. Do we feel safe? You bet, but we have taken additional force protection measures to ensure that safety. Security is one of those things you will have a different appreciation for as an advisor — it comes with the mission. When we first arrived at our COP, we took over from a team that had just relocated the Iraqi army battalion from another installation to its new area of operations. The battalion was close to assuming battlespace (now called “taking the lead”) with a transfer of authority ceremony. The battalion’s commander was charismatic, and a former Iraqi Police veteran (many of the battalion’s successes were triggered by his instincts as he conducted battlefield circulation with his personal security detachment. Overall, the Iraqi army battalion was about 70 percent Kurdish (of which 70 percent of those soldiers were from the bat talion commander’s tribe), and 30 percent Arabic (mostly in one company). The level of proficiency ranged from very high (the battalion scouts were all Kurdish and had extensive training with U. S. Special Operations Forces) to very low (many soldiers never attended basic training, let alone advanced individual training — some officers could not read or write). The logistics system was pretty much dysfunctional, but continually improved, and the battalion is increasingly able to get out and carry the fight to the enemy. Preparing for Advisory Duty The good news is that the U. S. Army’s ethos and belief in empowerment to junior leaders breed good stock for advisors. The bad news is that training any team of disparate members, who have very likely just met, will provide only the most basic introduction to what your military transition team (MiTT) mission will be. The U. S. Army is doing its very best — 19 to resource and prepare teams for skill sets they need to succeed; however, operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and requirements are stacked against advisor teams. This is not a cookie-cutter assignment; because of the cultural and environmental dynamics of a particular Iraqi unit, even MiTTs assigned to the same Iraqi army brigade will have different experiences. The MiTT is made up of members based on basic military qualifications, such as Active/Reserve Component status, military occupational specialties, and work experiences. Later, military qualifications become less important, while actual job skills become more important. For example, our MiTT intelligence noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC), an air-defense artillery first sergeant, is a whiz at air-conditioner repair, judging people, and setting and maintaining soldier standards. He definitely manages detainees, but his work with the Iraqi army on improving living conditions has proved to be a major way of influencing Jundi (soldiers) that we might not have otherwise reached. The U. S. Army should provide the basics, such as technical skills and cross training, to maintain and employ MiTT equipment, which is really the easy part — we all understand individual skill and collective task requirements since they are doctrinal. It is the non-doctrinal stuff that is going to be ambiguous. The left column in Figure 1 depicts what the MiTT task organization looks like on paper; the right column outlines what the team really does, based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civilians (METT-TC) unique to our composition and location. The MiTT should have the most effective configuration possible. Our team is made up of mostly senior folks, which means it is self-sufficient to a degree that most organizations are not. By the time career soldiers reach the rank of first sergeant or major, work ethics and understanding goals should be built in, which places some leaders in uncomfortable positions. Peer leadership can be difficult, and the “I- should-be-in-charge” attitude can be pervasive for everyone, especially for the person accustomed to being in charge. Until teams spread out a bit in country, you will see conventional E8s, 04s, 05s, and 06s put in very unconventional situations — resembling a pack of alpha males. It is who we are and what makes us successful in typical Army leadership roles, but it does not work quite as well on small teams where, in some cases, everyone is required to work independently, keep very odd hours, and there is no clear mark for success. Being Embedded Before this job, my only exposure to the word “embedded” was hearing it on FOX News. I thought it meant same building, same food, and same mission; in fact, it means much more. In my mind, being embedded is just a condition to understanding the real issues and how to best help the unit — it offers a perspective of the Iraqi unit from the inside out, not the outside in. Our team members arrived with perceptions about the Iraqi unit, their missions, and how these missions would be performed. However, after our team members were embedded for about three months, they realized their perceptions were not reality. For example, when our team arrived, we discovered the unit used particular processes to conduct operations. It was easy for us to assume that the unit could not effectively perform its mission because it lacked personnel and training — we totally missed what they were accomplishing and that their solutions were adequate to solve their problems. Embedding allowed our team to see the difference between our perceived problems and their real problems. Keep your eye out for “Iraqi solutions” that are sustainable after the team is gone. Right now, the biggest issue with embedding is force protection; however, with the right resources, the risk analysis can be mitigated to the point where “unlikely” is the frequency and the yield is worth the risk. Anything less than embedding is like building a wall between us and them, which will cause preconceived notions and biases that will influence our observations. It is just human nature. Understanding METT-TC from an Indigenous Perspective Mission. The Iraqi army’s idea of a successful mission is slightly different from ours. They have considerably less resources than U. S. forces, which they must stretch, often indefinitely. They have to maintain certain tribal and community relationships — the “because-I’m-the-commander” response does not always work. This can be very frustrating for MiTT members because they are not used to it, but it is the reality of the Iraqi people, and until they have a professional army (which could be along way off), relationships are a fact of life. Understanding how cultural factors play into the mission will assist the MiTT in helping the Iraqi army get the most out of the operation. The MiTT and the Iraqi unit do share commonalities in measuring success in terms of effect on the enemy, improving the position of friendly forces, and having a positive effect on area security. Enemy. Working side by side with Arabs and Kurds makes it difficult to categorize the enemy as “different.” For example, it is frustrating to have an Iraqi soldier who either knows, or is related to, someone identified as an active insurgent. Iraqi soldiers are not empathetic; they are openly hostile because they are often targets of tribe members, and they realize they share the same ethnicity with these lawbreakers. Much like Timothy McVeigh and his associates — people, who out- “Our team members arrived with perceptions about the Iraqi unit, their missions, and how these missions would be performed. However, after our team members were embedded for about three months, they realized their perceptions were not reality. For example, when our team arrived, we discovered the unit used particular processes to conduct operations. It was easy for us to assume that the unit could not effectively perform its mission because it lacked personnel and training — we totally missed what they were accomplishing and that their solutions were adequate to solve their problems.” 20 —

Team Chief - MAJ, IN, RC (position calls for a combat arms MAJ) Principal advisor to the Iraqi army (IA) battalion commander. While not a commander per se, he takes responsibility for the team’s actions and answers to higher. Primary TC for one of our three M1114s. S3/XO Advisor - MAJ, IN/FA 59, AC (position calls for a combat arms CPT or MAJ) Principal advisor to the IA battalion XO and S3 on roles and responsibilities within the battlefield operating system (BOS); works with the rest of MiTT team on logistics, intelligence, maintenance, training, and leadership development. Works with coalition forces (CF) as an IA enabler and vice versa. Primary TC for one of our three M1114s. Intelligence NCO - 1SG, ADA, AC (position calls for an E7/E8) Principal advisor to the IA CSM and all NCOs; works the detainee facility, and advises the IA battalion commander and leadership on soldier issues, basically role modeling for the battalion’s senior NCOs. Manages the interpreters (pay, hiring, uniforms, leave, and medical). Works with visiting CF patrols to maintain discipline and standards while at the COP. Has also worked with various U. S. contractors and contacts to obtain services or material that can be rehabilitated to fill gaps at the COP. He is also a primary TC for one of our three M1114s. Logistics Advisor - MAJ (P), QM, AC (position calls for a CPT/MAJ in the logistics (LOG) field) Principal advisor to the S4 on logistics. Has proven invaluable in understanding various Multi National Corps - Iraq (MNCI) and ministry of defense (MOD) systems and contracts; works hand in hand with garrison support unit (GSU) and reserve support unit (RSU) CF personnel to obtain needed supplies for the IA. Also works the U. S. LOG systems to obtain the needed supplies for the MiTT — rank, personality, persistence, and humility have all proven to be key in getting things done. He is also a primary TC and alternate gunner for one of our three M1114s. HHC Advisor - MAJ, QM, RC (position calls for a CPT/MAJ in the LOG field) Principal advisor to the HHC commander and battalion maintenance officer. Our guy is a high school teacher in civilian life and has applied much of that toward working with the Iraqis. He has been key in implementing command maintenance, evacuation procedures, driver’straining, preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), and has even turned a few wrenches. He has worked with the MiTTs from the RSU and motorized transportation regiments (MTR) in obtaining CL IX and making things happen. He is also a primary gunner and alternate TC for one of our three M1114s. S2 Advisor - CPT, ADA, AC (position calls for a CPT/MAJ in an intel field) Principal advisor to the S2, however, he spends more time working with the S1 shop. The IA battalion S2 is pretty sharp and mostly just lacks key personnel in his shop, such as the additional analysts to acquire situational understanding. So our ADA CPT turned MI heads up our makeshift analysis cell (includes the XO/S3 trainer, fire support NCO (FSNCO) #1, and the 1SG), as well as working with the IA battalion S1 shop to address personnel and administrative issues. He is also alternate driver and alternate TC for one of our three M1114s. FSO - E5, FA, AC, attached from CF partner as a tasker (position calls for a CPT/MAJ) We have re-rolled this very talented NCO to become an intel analyst. He battle tracks enemy activity in our battalion area of responsibility (AOR) and battalion areas of influence (AI) and keeps the pattern analysis tools up to date. Since he has served here in Mosul on a previous tour, he has some key knowledge about the area of operation (AO). He ensures our information is synchronized with the IAs and CF, and I believe provides better situational awareness as a result. When out on mission, he and our other FSNCO work fires and rotary wing (RW) and fixed wing (FW) close air support (CAS) if needed. Serves as the primary M240 gunner on one of our three M1114s. FSNCO - E5, FA, AC, attached from CF partner as a tasker (position calls for an E6/E7) We have re-rolled this very talented NCO to become an information operations (IO) officer. We are working this one through still, but the bottom line is we have to combat the anti-Iraq force’s propaganda, and we have to help the IA get their IO message out. This is in line with “effects,” but it is challenging. It cannot come across as an “American” message; it must be an Iraqi message and that means it has to sound like an Iraqi message. We are learning you have to target IO based on specific groups of people or tribes. This non-kinetic effect is challenging because it’s hard to assess its effectiveness, and it requires getting into people’s heads. When out on mission, he and our other FSNCO work fires and RW and FW CAS if needed. Serves as the primary M240 gunner on one of our three M1114s. Commo NCO - E6, SIG, IRR (position calls for an E6 or E7) Works in his field. Our commo NCO has some unique challenges given our location. He must maintain FM, HF, TAC SAT, iridium cell phones, commercial cell phones, and a commercial internet. He was called back after 15 years in the IRR, so he had to learn quite a few new systems. He has been making good strides in learning the IA battalion C2 architecture as well and advising them on how to improve. He also helps them with their computers (allocation and distribution and ensuring their antivirus definitions are up to date). He is our communications security (COMSEC) custodian and is a primary driver for one of our three M1114s. Logistics NCO - E6, 88M, AC (position calls for an E6 or E7) Works primarily with the HHC advisor. Getting him recently was a big plus as it allowed us to do some additional driver’straining, recovery and evacuation training, maintenance training, and NCO modeling. His role is very hands on down in the motor pool, instructing and supervising to role model for the battalion’s NCOs. He is also a primary driver for one of our three M1114s and is taking over the role of ensuring services and -20 level maintenance are done on our three M1114s. Medical Advisor - E4, 91W, ARNG (position calls for an E6) This soldier is outstanding. He has worked with and alongside the IA medics teaching them minor sur-geries, combat life saver, supply discipline, etc. He has done the work of a medical PL and PSG, as well as a front line medic. He also takes care of the MiTT, and follows up on special IA wounded through the CF units around the country. He is also a primary driver for one of our three M1114s. Until we got a LOG NCO, Doc ensured the M1114s were serviced on the CF FOB. Before we got the commo NCO, Doc was our COMSEC custodian. Figure 1 — 21 wardly appeared to be normal, killed their neighbors and friends in the Oklahoma City bombing. Our team gained very valuable experience in human intelligence (HUMINT) operations and analysis. As the XO/S3 advisor, I felt a bit out of my lane, but I had to understand the enemy and form my own opinions because my operational solutions could not be tied solely to either coalition intelligence or Iraqi intelligence — the two sources of information had to be combined to do the analysis. Telling an Iraqi what he already knows, or what he knows to be false, is not a good idea — they know nonsense when they hear it. Do not underestimate the value of reassigning a few “excess” soldiers to an intel cell — they catch on pretty quickly. The Iraqis are also aware of the effects current conditions have on the recruiting base for anti-Iraqi forces. Hot weather, limited electricity, limited jobs, limited and expensive fuel, limited educational opportunities, and lack of sanitary conditions and drinking water are all understood by Iraqi army counterparts in regards to the security situation. One cannot help but question what might turn a school teacher into a Jihadist or cause a boy to emplace an improvised explosive device. It is their country, but at the same time, Iraqis remain conscious of the fact they are pulling the trigger on fellow countrymen. Once their trust is gained, they will speak openly about the current conditions of Iraq and the impact U. S. involvement has on it. You cannot understand all the dynamics until you understand their motivations, concerns, and issues. Terrain. Working with Iraqi troops certainly provides a different appreciation of the terrain. The MiTT will find out things about cities, neighborhoods, tribes, and roadways they would never know otherwise. This is valuable to both the team and coalition partners. For instance, the Iraqi troops can explain why certain routes are more prone to IEDs and why others are not — the team will gain an appreciation for the “human terrain,” an understanding as to why certain people are treated differently, and who has influence and why. Troops. Most Iraqis join the army because it pays more than many other jobs, and it allows these men to retain their dignity. Team members need to understand these motivations because they place defined limits on what Iraqi soldiers can be expected to do. Often, their pay system falls short (one soldier had not been paid for eight months and did not exist in the ministry of defense records), and their promotion system is poorly maintained. Their living conditions are impoverished in comparison to those of U. S. forces and their food generally lacks quantity and quality. Iraqi army soldiers do not rotate home in a year; even when they are on leave, they and their families are at risk. We lose more soldiers and officers to assassinations that occur while they are on leave — they are less vulnerable to anti-Iraqi force attacks when they are on mission and their guard is up. Iraqi soldiers are up against along-term fight with no end in sight. Lack of knowledge is rampant — many Iraqis cannot read or write, have not been to basic training, and some of the Kurds cannot speak Arabic. Soldiers of religious minorities or outside of the tribe may be privately ostracized. We have seen acts of contempt and mean spiritedness that develops from ignorance. We have also seen acts of kindness and compassion that would only be associated with close-knit units. Despite all this, these soldiers are improving and performing their mission. Iraqi soldiers are generally good people, and when they understand why something is right or wrong, they often accept it. They are showing great improvement as a result of the embedded MiTT and their partnership with coalition forces. Time. The biggest issue with time is its nonlinear aspect, which does not really effect operations as much as I was led to believe — it is more subtle and philosophical. On 11 November 2004, many Iraqi police and army soldiers deserted their duty positions, causing anti-Iraqi force activity to escalate. A combination of coalition forces and Kurdish Peshmur-ga neutralized the enemy, but a great many Iraqi army soldiers from our unit were killed; those who stayed remember that day as if it was yesterday. At times, all the bad things that have happened will be felt at once and heaped on top of another new problem. Understanding Arab perceptions of time will help rationalize how they view problems. Coalition Partnership Coalition partnerships will be dissimilar and sometimes frustrating. You are not working for the brigade combat team in your area, you are working with them. This does not mean the relationship should be, or will be, adversarial; in fact, it should be anything but adversarial. MiTTs are fairly new; they are different in composition and their mission is unconventional and does not fit well within the limits of more conventionally minded units. The MiTT is comparable to a nongovernment agency/other government agency — not one of the high-speed agencies, but one that is misunderstood and might be a source of friction. Unless some- “Working side by side with Arabs and Kurds makes it difficult to categorize the enemy as “different.” For example, it is frustrating to have an Iraqi soldier who either knows, or is related to, someone identified as an active insurgent. Iraqi soldiers are not empathetic; they are openly hostile because they are often targets of tribe members, and they realize they share the same ethnicity with these lawbreakers. Much like Timothy McVeigh and his associates — people, who outwardly appeared to be normal, killed their neighbors and friends in the Oklahoma City bombing.” 22 —

“Working with Iraqi troops certainly provides a different appreciation of the terrain. The MiTT will find out things about cities, neighborhoods, tribes, and roadways they would never know otherwise. This is valuable to both the team and coalition partners. For instance, the Iraqi troops can explain why certain routes are more prone to IEDs and why others are not — the team will gain an appreciation for the “human terrain,” an understanding as to why certain people are treated differently, and who has influence and why.” one on the MiTT personally knows someone in the unit who can put in a good word for the team, be prepared to spend the first six months building a relationship with coalition forces. If the team arrives in the middle of a BCT rotation, be prepared to build a relationship with the outgoing unit during the first six months, then build anew relationship with the incoming unit during the last six months of the team’s assignment — it’s just reality. Building and maintaining relationships with coalition partners is a critical enabler to the team’s success. Because coalition partners have such an impact on the Iraqi army unit, and they provide the team’s support requirements to keep their austere operation going, the team should swallow its pride, exercise humility, and be satisfied that its mission is succeeding. As one advisor put it, “this is not about you; it’s about them (the success of the Iraqi army).” More than likely, the coalition unit and the MiTT will not measure success quite the same. The coalition unit came to Iraq as a team, trained up on a mission statement, which analyzed and qualified its measure of success. Beginning with a train up, they deployed the unit, carried out effects against the enemy, maintained their area of operation, and redeployed back to home station to prep for the next mission. The MiTT’s mission statement is tied to the long-term effectiveness of the host-nation army, which supports a corps and national strategy; it far exceeds a one-year tour. This article does not cover everything a MiTT member needs to know; it may not even cover most of what one needs to know. However, it is based on our team’s experiences and lessons learned during our seven-month deployment as a MiTT. Many more U. S. soldiers are going to be assigned this unconventional duty, and it is important to know how to work with a MiTT and how to be part of one. It is a rewarding assignment, as much as it is a frustrating one. As an embedded advisor, the key is to have a healthy mindset toward Iraqi allies — there is little room for “us” and “them.” The team cannot go back to the FOB at the end of a patrol and push the concerns of the Iraqi army or Iraqi security forces to the rear. There are no real competing concerns, such as a company, battalion, or brigade, to worry about. Instead, view the team as part of the battalion — this is not “going native,” it is investing hard work to build the best Iraqi battalion, brigade, or division possible. Soldiers are soldiers the world over, and most prefer the company of soldiers over ordinary civilians any day of the week, so you will have a great deal in common with your Iraqi peers. You are going to have to find the contact points between loyalty to the MiTT mission and loyalty to your adopted Iraqi army unit. You will find that you have a connection within a few months of your arrival, which will be apparent when an Iraqi soldier who you knew well is killed or severely injured — you will feel it. You will see the way it affects the unit, and do your own style of grieving. You will not be able to divorce yourself from the unit’s loss simply because you are not Iraqi. A successful MiTT requires being a team player; cultivating adaptation and innovation; exercising patience (at times great patience); and hard work that sometimes seems like a dead end, but nevertheless, you try anew direction. You are probably not going to make a huge dent in the effectiveness of your unit; instead, it may be better to measure it in small dents in multiple areas that collectively add up. You are not going to be as well resourced as if you were part of a BCT. You will be viewed as a distraction at times. You are not going to be front and center — it is not about you. If you are tasked for this very rewarding and challenging duty, there is a website on Army Knowledge Online. Com-panyComand.mil has allowed MiTT advisors to maintain a log where solutions to encountered problems are posted. These may not always have the complete answer, but participation from everyone will increase information flow. Networking among advisors is a powerful tool and may help omit unnecessary steps along the rocky way. Finally, all the cultural training in the world just doesn’t make an expert. Robbie Robinson, a contractor with years of advisory experience, dating back to Vietnam, shared his advice with our team: “be sincere and observe the Golden Rule! You might be surprised, but treating others in accordance with what you think is fair, will go along way in building rapport.” Major Rob Thornton is serving as the XO/S3 advisor for 1st Battalion, 2d Brigade, 2d Iraqi Division, Military Transition Team, Mosul, Iraq. He received a B. A. from Austin Peay State University. His military education includes Infantry Officers Basic Course, Armor Captains Career Course, and Combined Arms and Services Staff School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, A Company, 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), Fort Lewis, WA; assistant S3, 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, 1st SBCT, Fort Lewis; XO, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment (1-187), 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, KY; platoon leader, Antitank Platoon, D Company, 1-187 Infantry, Fort Campbell; and rifle platoon leader, C Company, 1- 187 Infantry, Fort Campbell. — 23