Tactical Agility: Linking the Cognitive and Physical using Networked Battle Command

The U. S. Army has made great strides in leveraging digital battle command in its tactical operations centers (TOCs) through the Army Battle Command System (ABCS), as well as on its platforms through the Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2). Proof lies in the agility of the Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs), the 3d Infantry Division (3ID), and other networked forces that redistribute combat power and coordinate employment by sharing a common operational picture (COP) that provides locations of friendly forces, common graphics, a means of transmitting digital orders, and away to update enemy activities, enabling all to reach a more common understanding of the fight. This shortens our reaction time to changes in the conditions of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civilians (METT-TC). The article takes some of what has been written and some of what is being applied and turns it into something digestible to assist leaders and staffs at the battalion and below levels in getting the most out of a networked force. Network centric operations are about people sharing information that allows us to be “first with the most” at the decisive points on the battlefield, wherever and whenever they occur, with the systems and soldiers we have. A Network Centric Force: People not Routers Our digital systems are only going to get better. The goal is to provide the U. S. Army with a single system that supports battle command on the move (BCOTM) through the warrior machine interface (WMI). This will enable battalion and brigade staffs to execute their roles and responsibilities on the move using common hardware and systems on platforms down to the lowest tactical levels. Network accessibility down to the soldier level, combined with an increase in unmanned systems, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), unmanned ground vehicles (UGV), and unattended ground sensors (UGS), provides the means to leverage information better and faster. This is a current ongoing effort to support modularity with the best available networks and sensors. Hardware and software programs make these increased capabilities a physical possibility, since they reside in both the physical and information domains. The other part of the equation is in the cognitive domain: how tactical leaders and staffs understand masses of information and filter that information so their decisions give us the advantage over any enemy. As shown in Figure 1, agility crosses all four domains and is generated from understanding the situation as generated from digital and analog sources.1 It then crosses from the cognitive back into the physical through action and execution, or from knowing what needs to be done to doing something about it. In a paper titled, “Network Centric Operations Conceptual Framework,” written by John Garstka, Office of Force

Transformation, and David Alberts, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the authors qualify agility as being six interrelated attributes:

• Robustness: effectiveness across different contexts (the ability to maintain effectiveness across a range of tasks, situations, and conditions).

• Resilience: overcoming losses, damage, or setbacks (the ability to recover from or adjust to misfortune/damage, and the ability to degrade gracefully under attack or as a result of partial failure).

• Responsiveness: the ability to react to a change in the environment in a timely manner.

• Flexibility: identifying multiple ways to succeed and move seamlessly between them.

• Innovation: the ability to do new things and the ability to do old things in new ways.

• Adaptation: the ability to change work processes and the ability to change the organization to take advantage of characteristics of a situation. Recognitional Decisionmaking While a networked force provides part of the means for agility, the execution of agility comes through recognition of changes in METT-TC by staffs and leaders — people — then having the means to take action: units and assets not committed or in contact that have the required combat power to get to the decisive point and do something about it. This requires what is called “intuitive or recognitional decisionmaking.” While we teach troop leading procedures (TLPs) to leaders and the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) to officers and noncommissioned officers who will serve in staff positions, this focus is on an estimate that occurs before the line of departure (LD) is physically crossed. The intent is that through reports, the base plan can be updated (fragmentary orders) to account for new information that accounts for changes in conditions. The problem is that we fail to recognize a change in conditions until it is too late. Addressing three vital issues may help recognize changing conditions as they occur: find a better way to share information (an ongoing technological evolution); avoid perceptions while writing the original estimate or order (often referred to a fighting the plan); and recognize the relevance of new information and how it fits (keys in on agility) and then do something about it. In Malcom Gladwell’s book Blink, he talks about recognitional decisionmaking as the unconscious processes framed by individual experience that go on during the first two seconds when confronted with something new, and how those processes affect our decisions.2 We often refer to it as an intuition that comes through experience, but whatever you call it, it is a key component of network centric operations. The importance comes back to speed or how fast information can be processed and action taken to prevent the enemy from gaining or ever regaining the initiative. Organizational Culture to Network Centric Culture There is a cumulative effect from the strategic, to the operational, to the tactical. Our current military planning culture has a predominantly sequential view of time. Consider the steps of the mission analysis and the MDMP; we are constrained to varying degrees by higher echelons’ ability to turn out products. This is why we observe a 1/3:2/3 planning timeline and squeeze time by conducting parallel planning. Because of the varying “Network accessibility down to the soldier level, combined with an increase in unmanned systems, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), unmanned ground vehicles (UGV), and unattended ground sensors (UGS), provides the means to leverage information better and faster. This is a current ongoing effort to support modularity with the best available networks and sensors.” 36 — Social Domain Cognitive Domain Physical Domain Information Domain Shared Vision and Goals (CMD Intent) Shared Awareness Controlling Operational Tempo Precision Effects Speed and Access Network Centric Operations Plan, Organize, Deploy Employ and Sustain Figure 1 degrees of unknowns, we are limited to varying degrees of sequential planning. The idea of a fully networked force is to achieve a synchronous planning culture. Synchronous meaning that through a collaborative environment and a COP (blue and red feed) that benefits from joint and national asset feeds and analysis at all echelons, tactical echelons will reach similar conclusions near simultaneously and then confirm those conclusions (assuming that all parties believe in the fidelity of what the COP presents). Pushing additional sensors (a higher density of UAVs, UGVs, and UGS organic to every tactical echelon from squad to brigade) throughout the area of operations, the COP fidelity will improve not only because we have more sensors, but because those sensors are continuously refocused based on information collected — confirming or denying changes in conditions. The net gain is a force that once altered, regardless of its location, can begin to plan at every tactical level, and as soon as it has the required amount of combat power physically generated at the aerial port of debarkation (APOD) or seaport of debarkation (SPOD), it can begin offensive operations. During movement to the objective, the force can adapt to changes in METT-TC down to the platform and soldier levels, which is the idea of self-synchronization — those within a networked force will see changes in conditions and react as parts of a whole to achieve the purpose, if they have a common enough understanding of what they see. Cultural Changes: from TOCs to Mobile Command Groups In the Future Combat System (FCS) Unit of Action Experimental Element, Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab, Fort Knox, Kentucky, we have placed leaders and staffs into cells that are on the move (vehicle mockups for simulation) and provided them a COP beyond today’s standards. However, even in this laboratory environment where connectivity (digital and analog) between vehicle mockups is hardwired and the COP is optimal and cells can use chatrooms and instant messaging, an absolute shared situational understanding is still not self-evident. This is due in large part to organizational culture benefits that are hard to reproduce in disparate, but well connected, command and control cells. Organizational Dynamics versus NCO Dynamics: the Bill Making sense of all the information presented on a COP benefits from having a fixed-site command post — a staff in a single location, with access to multiple types of information feeds, can communicate on various levels. Depending on the echelon, you can factor in varying levels of comfort and multiple qualified personnel to pull shifts during continuous operations. Understanding, recognizing patterns, establishing linkages, issuing guidance and recommendations, and giving orders all require cognitive abilities and benefit from human interaction. Achieving the capability to conduct “While we teach troop leading procedures (TLPs) to leaders and the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) to officers and noncommissioned officers who will serve in staff positions, this focus is on an estimate that occurs before the line of departure (LD) is physically crossed. The intent is that through reports, the base plan can be updated (fragmentary orders) to account for new information that accounts for changes in conditions.”

BCOTM from distributed cells for all battalion and brigade elements that is as good as or better than a fixed command post is both the goal and the challenge. Technical solutions will help overcome some challenges, such as sharing information through collaborative chatrooms or being able to collaboratively manipulate planning products, such as graphics or rehearsal tools, in real time. Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), such as cell drills, which equate to TOC battle drills but are built for BCOTM, will help identify friction points and focus battlefield operating systems (BOS) for short durations. However, the real challenge is getting peo ple to share the same intuitive understanding across tens to hundreds of kilometers, while moving across varied terrain, possibly in contact, that they would otherwise enjoy in a fixed-site TOC with coffee. To some degree, we are already doing this through other than strictly military applications. High school and college students, as well as younger soldiers, are spending time with “online” gaming where they work with known and unknown players to execute tactical scenarios in various games. Many of us conduct video teleconferences, WebExs, and teleconferences from separate locations to discuss complex issues instead of bringing entire groups together on every occasion. The skills required to intuitively recognize changes (sometimes subtle) in conditions, make appropriate assumptions, alert connections, and give orders or recommendations to others over digital and analog communications is the skill set required to leverage the TTP, and the technology required to leverage network centric operations. From Information Superiority to Physical Action To take advantage of this information, there is a physical catch. If the idea is to begin movement without committing too many assets to any one course of action, then longer range fires, such as nonline of sight (NLOS) and beyond line of sight (BLOS), become critical. NLOS corresponds to observed indirect fires; BLOS means the shooter still sees the target, but through a sensor (manned or unmanned) other than himself. We are fairly comfortable with NLOS, but BLOS is something new. The closest examples would be somewhere in the middle between armed UAVs, such as the Predator, and UAVs used to observe for fires. Consider it the link between the shooter and the sensor, either a video or targeting chip is sent back so the shooter can see his target and the solution is fed into the missile or round. It is easier and faster to move a missile or around through the air to take advantage of new information than to move a platform or a unit across terrain. Networked fires is the method we will use to leverage BLOS and NLOS fires and other effects. The idea is that every soldier and platform can generate fire mis sions and because every level of command shares the COP, high-payoff targets can be identified and targeted with the right asset (kinetic or non-kinetic), and decisive points can be identified as they are occurring versus where they were templated. Munitions and platforms can be massed to achieve synergistic effects that maneuver can exploit. Consider the vignette below between a combined arms battalion commander and his Charlie Company commander: “Guidons, this is Raider 6, standby.” “Cougar 6, this is Raider 6. IMS [intelligent munitions system] hits in the city core, confirm what the other sensor hits, joint feed indicates the enemy is repositioning several companies worth of mechanized infantry toward your objective from north to south. It is like we discussed a few minutes ago, the enemy apparently knows the decisive point. Over.” “Raider 6, this is Cougar 6. Roger, I see the hits on my COP. We are getting ready to pass through Armageddon Company. I think my lead element will reach the objective within five minutes, but it will take us a few more to kill a platoon’s worth of militia and reorganize into a hasty defense. Over.” “Cougar, this is Raider. You are now my priority. All the IMS fields in the city are active, so that will slow and disrupt them, probably piecemeal them into you. I’m having Shadow [the recon element from the combined arms battalion] reposition some additional CL III’s [UAVs] over the city to support additional network fires. Armageddon will reposition a CL II UAV to your southern flank and overwatch that avenue of approach so you can concentrate on the counterattack. He’ll also provide some additional BLOS fires. The enemy’s lead elements should arrive at your objective in about 10 to 15 minutes. Over.” “Okay, sir. I’m issuing FRAGOs to my lead platoons to bypass the strong points and shift north about a block to set in a couple of blocking positions. It will take me a little longer to seize the traffic circle with just 3d platoon and the sappers you gave me. I think Bandit and Dragon companies can bypass to the south and get to their objectives. As soon as I get my part of the LOC [lines of communications] opened up, I’ll let you know. Any chance I can get the mortar battery to focus on the traffic circles to support 3d platoon’s assault?” “Roger Cougar, Raider 8 just took Mad Dog [the battalion mortars] out of network fires and they are shooting for you as long as you need them. We also got the brigade to retask some of its LAMs (loitering attack munitions) and we’re trying to get some close air support from the south diverted for our use. I’ll hold some of the CA [civil affairs] assets at Armageddon’s position along with a LOGPAC and the MAC [heavy engineer equipment]. You can call them forward when you need them. Bandit and Dragon should take some of the heat off of you when the enemy realizes that they are headed for their objectives. Do you need anything else? Over.” “No sir, I’m going to jump down to my company push and see if my folks have received and understand the graphics and text FRAGO we pushed out. My 5 will be on this push to report and I’ll pop back up when the fight is done. Over.” “This is Raider 6. Roger. All other guidons acknowledge.” In this vignette, the battalion commander only confirmed the last part of what he realized was going to happen. What’s more, prior to his transmission, he shared that information with the element most likely to be effected as an informal warning order (WARNO). The company commander recognized the impacts and gave his battalion commander verbal acknowledgment as to what the impacts meant to his assigned purpose. What is not seen here is the staff executing its BOS functions to reallocate and synchronize combat power for what has become the decisive point. It is fully engaged in leveraging all assets to support the Charlie Company commander. You can take this up and down the tactical chain as brigade assets and higher are tapped into, all the way down to how the company commander will push these assets down to support his platoon leaders. All of this has to happen through chatrooms, analog nets, and other collaborative tools. Since the staff is distributed, it must have a higher understanding of not only its BOS func- 38 — tions, but what the other BOS element impacts are — this all happens on the move, from separate locations. A Recognitional Model for Staffs and Leaders A recognitional model should establish a dynamic (or constantly evolving) process for initial evaluation and continual revaluation of the tactical estimate where intelligence on METT-TC identifies options for maneuver to exploit. Based on see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively, and observe, orient, decide, and act, the idea is to quickly recognize an emerging enemy decision through sensors (includes soldiers), then generate options across the BOS that allow us to fight the fight and not the plan. The idea is that this process will enable leaders and staffs to “self-synchronize,” in net-centric speak, or collaboratively plan in near-real time with minimal products since everyone can access the information on the network. The only things needed are: higher headquarters’ first cut on a mission statement that generates a task and purpose (purpose being the critical of the two), some intent graphics, and any existing graphic control measures. These baseline guidance measures, combined with what is represented on the COP, provide the mechanics for planning; a simple and dynamic process is need ed to join together the disparate cells. The process for a recognitional model will have to provide the mechanics for collaboration. It will need to provide cyclic feedback that assists disparate staff functions in cells and on the move, as well as the opportunity to reevaluate and update BOS estimates while overcoming individual and cell bias. The process has to be simple to account for the friction generated by people in different locations viewing, interpreting, and working together on the information available on the COP. It has to be fast enough to leverage new information and generate options that can be physically taken advantage of before the enemy can compensate for advantages we might have gained. Network centric operations are about people. While the technology promises access to greater amounts of timely information and the ability to access that information from the individual soldier to joint and national levels, without people to control it, technology only provides advantages to individual elements, not the combined-arms synergy we seek. If we have the right people and processes, it does not matter what METT-TC conditions we face or what platform or type of formation we have (heavy brigade combat team, infantry brigade combat team, SBCT, or FCS), we get the advantage of a networked force that gains and maintains the initiative. The advantages are speed and flexibility; the faster you acquire and share information, the more options you can generate before the information has no value. Network centric operations supporting BCOTM will require a cultural shift in the way headquarters elements are designed and think. The TTP for planning and execution need to accommodate the shortfalls that are traded to gain advantages in other areas. Finally, a recognitional model should not be a substitute for an analytical model, such as the MDMP prior to crossing the LD, where assumptions outnumber facts. Even as ISR products increase the number of “knowns” on the battlefield, we still require an analytical process to create a common understanding among BOS. In other words, if there is nothing to recognize because actions have not generated reactions, then there is little value in a recognitional process. Instead, the recognitional decisionmaking process should be used to validate or invalidate assumptions made prior to LD, then act on the facts quick enough to maintain or increase our decision superiority. Notes 1Figure 1, “Network Centric Operations Conceptual Framework” by John Garstka, Office of Force Transformation, and David Alberts, Office of the Secretary of Defense, illustrates the cross-over effects between the cognitive, the information, the physical and the social domains. This illustrates the importance of people over technology and the impacts domains have on one another. 2Malcom Gladwell, Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking, Little, Brown, and Company, New York, 11 January 2005. Captain Robert Thornton is currently an operations officer, Future Combat System Unit of Action Experimental Element (UAEE), Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab (UAMBL), Fort Knox, KY. He received a B. A. from Austin Peay State, and is currently pursuing an M. S. from American Military University. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, A Company, 1st Battalion, 24th (1-24) Infantry, 1st Brigade (Stryker Brigade Combat Team), 25th (1/25) Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, WA; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1-24 Infantry, 1/25th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis; S3, 1- 24 Infantry, 1/25 Infantry Division, Fort Lewis; and platoon leader and XO, 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, KY.

1. ID the Objective of the BLUFOR purpose — is it terrain, friendly or enemy based?

2. Begin to ID the terrain/infrastructure/events/people/services [can be thought of as high-payoff targets (HPTs)] we (BLUFOR) have to have or influence — this is an ongoing battlefield operating systems (BOS) process that accounts for possible enemy reactions to our actions.

a. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) looks at purpose and task of OPFOR, and IDs terrain/infrastructure/people/services [can be thought of as high-value targets (HVTs)] — this is an ongoing BOS process based on BLUFOR reactions — if ISR products give current disposition (or indications of dispositions) then HVTs should match current information; if not, then ask why? What is the enemy trying to do and how will he do it? What did I/we miss? What do I/we not see?

3. Match up the BLUFOR and OPFOR estimates.

4. Look at enemy disposition (templated or confirmed) and give first reactions to BLUFOR contact.

a. What decisions is the OPFOR making and is he applying or redistributing combat power?

b. What are the indicators to confirm the action?

c. What named areas of interest (NAIs) and assets are needed to catch the indicators? What needs to be retasked?

5. What options does this generate for BLUFOR? Staying in front of the observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) loop.

6. What BOS assets can we bring to bear to support the lower tactical echelon?

7. How can we exploit the option (at all tactical echelons)?

8. What is the enemy reaction?

a. Here, steps 1-7 are reassessed to address a dynamic enemy. Figure 2. Leveraging Network Centric Planning in 8 steps or less — 39