Tankers Without Tanks in Tuz: A National Guard Unit Experiences Full-Spectrum Operations

The U. S. Army is losing the information war in Iraq. At home, the general civilian perception of the war is one of cable news networks’ scrolling tickers relating the latest casualties suffered by soldiers, Marines, and Iraqi civilians; or it is one of images of thick black clouds of smoke following the most recent improvised explosive device (IED) or vehicle borne IED (VBIED) attack in Baghdad. The public depth of actual knowledge usually, and unfortunately, ends there. This prevailing and incomplete understanding of the war is tangible and readily accessible to those who have deployed and subsequently returned from Iraq as members of the U. S. Army National Guard. It is also ill-informed at best and simply false at worst. One advantage deployed National Guard soldiers have is their dual nature as citizen soldiers. Clearly, as soldiers they have had the privilege of deploying to combat zones and now possess the perception of those who have served in Iraq. As citizens (or more accurately, civilians), they have access to the natural perception of the war as is fed to the civilian community at large, as they overwhelmingly live and work on a daily basis with those who have not served. Certainly, IEDs and casualties are a very real part of the everyday experience of those who live and work in Iraq; but to the majority of those who have deployed with the National Guard, these topics present a severely limited view of what they experience and accomplish during deployments. The information provided to (or withheld from) the American public presents a situation in Iraq limited primarily to offensive and defensive combat operations. The reality known within the Army community is that Iraq is the textbook example of “full-spectrum operations.” Within full-spectrum operations, National Guard Soldiers — along with their active duty brothers and sisters — have been called to accomplish missions well outside of their military occupational specialties and training. Friendly Forces The 30th Heavy Separate Brigade (North Carolina Army National Guard) was activated for service in Operation Iraqi Freedom II in October 2003 as the first National Guard heavy brigade to be deployed to combat since World War II. A number of other states, including Ohio, offered units to augment and/or complete the brigade’s personnel requirements. The brigade, known as “Old Hickory” deployed to eastern Iraq (Diyala Province) in March 2004 as part of the 1st Infantry Division. Initially deployed to Forward Operating Base (FOB) Wyatt/Carpenter on the Iranian border in Khanequin, the 30th Brigade’s separate cavalry troop, Troop E, 196th Cavalry, was quickly relocated to FOB Bernstein in Tuz and attached to Task Force (TF) 1st Battalion, 14th (1-14) Infantry, 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, by early April 2004. By June 2004, TF 1-14 Infantry relocated to Kirkuk and the 196th Cavalry remained at FOB Bernstein as an element of TF 1st Battalion, 120th (1-120) Infantry, together with the battalion headquarters and one mechanized infantry company from 1-120 Infantry, 30th Brigade Combat Team (BCT). The 196th Cavalry received 28 soldiers from 1st Battalion, 107th (1-107) Armor, Ohio Army National Guard. We completed the cavalry troop’s ranks by providing a complete tank platoon (4th Platoon) and 12 cavalry scouts to augment the troop’s existing scout platoons. Although the 1-120th Infantry deployed to — 13

Iraq with its Bradley fighting vehicles (BFVs), the 196th Cavalry was mobilized and deployed without the benefit of BFVs or tanks. However, through five hard months of training at Fort Stewart, Georgia, the cavalry troopers began to gain confidence in their ability to accomplish the mission without armor, and quickly learned to effectively and efficiently operate as most soldiers in Iraq have — as Humvee scouts or motorized infantry. Our initial arrival in Tuz was on request from TF 1-14 Infantry for a unit to assume responsibilities in the area of operations (AO) while the TF conducted offensive operations in an-Najaf. For the better part of April, 196th Cavalry troopers proudly and painfully conducted combat operations and stability and reconstruction operations. The unit also took its first casualties as the only coalition presence in the approximate 300-350 square-kilometer battalion-sized AO surrounding Tuz. For the first two weeks, the unit accomplished the mission with only a handful of vehicles — having received only eight or nine non-mission capable M1114s. At the time TF 1-120th Infantry took control of the AO, the 196th Cavalry had an incomplete complement of 14 M1114s, but eventually gained a total of 18 to 20 (miraculously maintained by a phenomenal maintenance section and resourceful operators), which proved to be sufficient (if not ideal) to accomplish its mission. The troop maintained its organic platoon composition, with each scout platoon operating six M1114s and each tank platoon operating three M1114s. In addition to having primary responsibility for the area surrounding Tuz, each platoon was assigned its own area of responsibility in the sectors immediately surrounding the FOB, with each platoon responsible for combat patrols and stability operations in and around as many as 18 separate villages. To assist the unit with its AO, troop leaders developed strong working relationships with the Special Forces team located in Tuz. This relationship proved invaluable to both the cavalry troop and the Special Forces team in accomplishing individual and collective com bat and stability operations. Terrain The city of Tuz is strategically located at the confluence of principle arteries, which connect Baghdad to the northern cities and outlying areas of Kirkuk and Tikrit. Along the main highways, one can generally expect a 45-minute to one-hour drive north from Tuz to Kirkuk, and an identical trip west to Tikrit. Because of this important and equidistant location, Tuz has the fairly unique distinction of natural and manmade symmetry. The main east-west highway connecting Tuz to Tikrit — known as Route Lime to soldiers stationed at FOB Bernstein — provides a physical demarcation in the immediate area of the “Green Line,” which separates the Iraqi Kurdish population from the Iraqi Arab population. FOB Bernstein, located just a few kilometers north of Route Lime, provides an even more accurate delineation. The south gate opens to the Arab world, while the north gate opens to the Kurdish. The city of Tuz is likewise an ethnically symmetrical city of 60,000 to 80,000 citizens, composed of a population that is approximately 50 percent Kurdish (in the northern section), 25 percent Arab (in the southwestern section), and 25 percent Turkman (in the southeastern section). The numerous surrounding villages likewise mimic this ethnic composition, with Kurdish populations dominating in the north and exclusively Arab or Turkman settlements in the south. Enemy Forces In terms of enemy forces and enemy contact, Iraq is a theater of extremes. On one end of the spectrum are cities such as Fallujah, Najaf, and certain parts of Baghdad that merit the vast majority of “Finally, toward the end of our deployment, as the unit began to tighten its grip on enemy activities, and as offensive operations increased in scope, we consequently began to encounter a larger number of coordinated ambushes against U. S. patrols in the AO. These ambushes tapered off as we neared the very end of the deployment and as our replacement units from the 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Tennessee Army National Guard arrived — it was apparent that enemy elements were hoping for more success against anew unit.” All photos: Robert Alt media attention because of the frequency and severity of violence. On the other end of the spectrum are those places seldom, if ever, mentioned due to their lack of newsworthiness — cities such as Sulay-maniya and a thousand other locations known to soldiers but unheard of to civilians. Somewhere in the middle is another thousand places, such as Mosul, which is closer on the spectrum toward Fallujah, and others, such as Tuz, more closely resembling Sulaymaniya. Like so many places secured by coalition FOBs, Tuz had its own “IED Alley,” which is an approximate seven-kilometer span of Route Lime that connects FOB Bernstein to the city. The FOB has also experienced its share of indirect fire attacks in the form of Katyushka rockets, all of which were fortunately ineffective. As such, there was clearly a very real enemy insurgent presence in the area. The nature of this enemy presence, however, was never entirely clear. In the course of the deployment, we did encounter the rare “bona fide” insurgent (possessing terrorist organization-linked documents and training); however, coalition forces in Tuz more frequently encountered the typical “opportunist” insurgent (the ubiquitous unemployed military-aged male who, for various reasons, ranging from personal ideology and angst to the hope of financial gain, chose a violent course of action in opposition to coalition efforts). The primary, and most dangerous, enemy presence within the AO, however, took the form of banditry along main highways, primarily targeting civilian traffic and the Iraqi national forces responsible for curbing their activities. Rarely did these enemy forces risk contact with U. S. soldiers; however, they would not hesitate to engage in firefights if and when they were confronted or cornered by a U. S. patrol. Finally, toward the end of our deployment, as the unit began to tighten its grip on enemy activities, and as offensive operations increased in scope, we consequently began to encounter a larger number of coordinated ambushes against U. S. patrols in the AO. These ambushes tapered off as we neared the very end of the deployment and as our replacement units from the 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Tennessee Army National Guard arrived — it was apparent that enemy elements were hoping for more success against anew unit. Combat Operations It is an oft-stated canon that war is 98 percent boredom, punctuated by 2 percent sheer terror. In the context of operations in the Tuz AO, war was 98 percent stability and reconstruction operations, punctuated by 2 percent combat. Although each platoon assigned to patrol duty was responsible for conducting a minimum of two combat patrols each day, very few of these patrols actually resulted in combat or contact with enemy forces. It is worth noting, however, that the 196th Cavalry conducted numerous other combat operations, primarily cordon and search missions — each month. Additionally, it was common for our patrols to respond to attacks against Iraqi Police or Iraqi National Guard (ING) checkpoints or patrols. Stability Operations On arrival in Tuz, each platoon began work immediately in collecting information and submitting project requests to improve the quality of life of the surrounding population. These “sweat” projects became the primary means by which the unit established relationships with the local population and transmitted information operations (IO) themes of the shared responsibility between coalition forces and local communities for providing and maintaining security and stability. Once it became evident that U. S. forces were concerned with the well-being and prosperity of the Iraqi people, it likewise became much easier to gain the support of those often skeptical of our motives. Altogether, through the course of countless combat patrols and “leader engagements,” the 196th Cavalry helped establish a working city council in Tuz, coordinated and administered a neighborhood council of area Muktars and Sheiks from local villages of all three ethnicities, completed or submitted over $1 million in public works projects, and facilitated the training of the local ING battalions and Iraqi Police units. Of the many important stability operations conducted within the AO, perhaps the most vital mission conducted, in terms of long-term effects, was training and developing the Iraqi security forces. Included in each platoon’s weekly patrol schedule was a requirement to conduct a joint patrol with a platoon from the ING. During periods of particular violence against Iraqi security forces, each platoon had an additional requirement to assist with 24- hour security at the permanent ING checkpoint on the Tuz-Tikrit highway and at the joint command center downtown Tuz. As the months of the unit’s deployment advanced, so did the professionalism and proficiency of the ING soldiers. We detailed one noncommissioned officer (NCO) from each platoon as a permanent ING trainer to direct training management, assist with operational planning of the ING companies, and coordinate the ING’s presence during joint cordon and search operations with the task force maneuver company. On a few occasions, these NCOs fought alongside their ING wards in firefights, which immeasurably assisted with developing an internal es- “It is an oft-stated canon that war is 98 percent boredom, punctuated by 2 percent sheer terror. In the context of operations in the Tuz AO, war was 98 percent support and stability operations, punctuated by 2 percent combat. Although each platoon assigned to patrol duty was responsible for conducting a minimum of two combat patrols each day, very few of these patrols actually resulted in combat or contact with enemy forces.” — 15 prit de corps, as well as a sense of brotherhood with their U. S. counterparts. Throughout stability operations in the Tuz area, the 196th Cavalry met with eager cooperation from the local populace. Initially, this was primarily confined to Kurdish sentiment; but over time — as we developed good will and relationships with leaders of all three ethnicities — this cooperation was seen from Arab and Turkman leaders as well. Although there was certainly a palpable antagonism in the region, evidenced by increasing hostility in a few isolated villages, the vast majority of the civilians in the area wanted U. S. forces to be successful and willingly assisted in our efforts — if for no other reason than the hope of our eventual departure from their country. Without minimizing the real dangers and belligerence experienced throughout Iraq, this general cooperation and goodwill from the Iraqi people is unfortunately one of the best-kept secrets of the war in Iraq. Ethnic Tension The most difficult and persistent challenge facing the 196th Cavalry in general, and 4th Platoon in particular, was the long-festering ethnic tension between the three ethnicities in and around Tuz. Centuries-old ethnic troubles and prejudices — often resulting in violence — are continually evident in daily life throughout the region. An utter lack of trust and latent hatred of each other is a prevalent attitude shared by nearly every civilian, regardless of ethnicity. Because of the city’s strategic location between Tikrit and Kirkuk, the former regime had an active role in perpetuating these problems and sentiments through the Arabization programs of the past three decades. Within ten kilometers of the north gate of FOB Bernstein, in 4th Platoon’s area of responsibility, are the remains of at least five Kurdish villages destroyed by the Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein. Hundreds of such villages, often accompanied by mass grave-yards, are found throughout the region surrounding the city. The primary catalyst for current ethnic tensions in the area is the unavoidable relocation and rebuilding of these hundreds of Kurdish settlements. As these people return to their former homes, there are naturally increased threats and incidents of violence against the Arab communities who have resided on and used the land for two or three decades. The challenge facing the cavalry troopers was to find or create a delicate balance whereby these two opposing groups could live together in peace and security. Fundamental to this issue was the problem of deciphering the claims of each group to determine, if possible, who had the better claim or more truthful account of events. This was nearly impossible in every instance as the Kurdish people have honest and legitimate claims of persecution under the former regime, and the Arab people have legitimate claims under the laws of Iraq for the past 30 years. Further compounding the problem was the overwhelming expectation of both Kurdish and Arab leaders that U. S. forces would naturally act in favor of Kurdish interests as allies in the coalition that removed the Saddam regime. Through consistent application of public works projects and persistent visits and engagements with Arab (and Turkman) leaders, much benefit and progress was gained in convincing these men of the sincerity and genuine concern of the U. S. Army for the security and stability of all people in Iraq, regardless of ethnicity. Without establishing this dialogue, it would have been impossible to obtain further improvements. Although much work was left to be completed by the end of our deployment, the 196th Cavalry secured and maintained a tentative peace in its area of responsibility. Joint meetings were held periodically and well-attended by leaders of opposing villages and tribes, which resulted in a provisional agreement that neither side would attempt to resolve matters independently before the fledgling Iraqi government had an opportunity to hear the claims and issue rulings. Lessons Learned The 196th Cavalry’s presence in Tuz resulted in successful operations that undoubtedly contributed to the objective of security and stability in an around Tuz, as well as the entire theater of operations. This reflects a prevalent, though under-reported, success story that should be told from all parts of Iraq where the U. S. Army is conducting or has conducted operations. Still, there was a great deal left to be done in and around Tuz, and many lessons learned, both at the micro and macro levels, from hard experience, disappointment, success, and failure. It should be noted that a great deal of the 196th Cavalry’s success in Tuz was due in large measure to our status as National Guard soldiers — a characteristic that is all too often seen in the Army community as an impediment. Because National Guard soldiers are by nature civilians first and soldiers second, there was a distinction in our daily interaction with the people of Tuz that was vocally appreciated at every level. Without sacrificing security, the soldiers of the 30th BCT at FOB Bernstein seemed to be particularly suited to the often-nebulous work of patrolling among and interacting with civilians, and particularly suited to understanding and applying rules of engage- “Altogether, through the course of countless combat patrols and “leader engagements,” the 196th Cavalry helped establish a working city council in Tuz, coordinated and administered a neighborhood council of area Muktars and Sheiks from local villages of all three ethnicities, completed or submitted over $1 million in public works projects, and facilitated the training of the local ING battalions and Iraqi Police units.” 16 — ment. Our deployment to Tuz ended without a single incident of either a U. S. soldier wounded or killed as a result of a breach of security, or of an innocent civilian killed or wounded as a result of an erroneous aggressive action or decision. Our experiences in Iraq also demonstrated the particular abilities of National Guard units to succeed in a stability and support operations environment. Again, by its nature, the National Guard unit brings a wealth of experience in civilian fields that greatly assists the military mission. The 196th Cavalry had six construction contractors and subcontractors that inherently understood requirements and intricacies of completing contracts for public works projects. The law-enforcement experiences of a great number of soldiers in the troop ensured a willing and capable base of talent for training Iraqi security forces. The general automotive and industrial mechanic training of our scouts and tankers enabled a level of operator maintenance of the M1114 that was invaluable to sustained operations. Other diverse education and life experiences in fields, such as education, law, and medicine, further contributed to the success of the unit in the stability and support operations environment. From an operational standpoint, we learned a difficult lesson in accurately conducting intelligence preparation of the battlefield when establishing unit boundaries. For the duration of the deployment, the task force boundary remained along geographical lines that seemingly made logical sense from a patrolling standpoint. Unfortunately, these geographical delin-eations did not adequately reflect the political realities of the region. Many of the villages in very close proximity to the city of Tuz did not belong to the Tuz city government. The former regime had re-districted many villages to ensure Arab adjudication of Kurdish villages and an influx of Arab villages within Kurdish-controlled regions. As such, ethnic tensions in the area often required coordination and leader engagements with the mayor and city council of nearby cities located outside the task force’s AO. This reduced the effectiveness of submitting and getting approval of projects for these villages through task force means, as the TF worked closely and exclusively with the Tuz city council in identifying the primary needs of nearby villages. From a big-picture perspective, our deployment to Iraq demonstrated a potential need to reconsider the National Guard’s role in future conflicts, as well as how these units are trained and prepared for future combat roles. Throughout current operations in Iraq, National Guard soldiers have been deployed to perform functions far different from their military occupational specialties and the mission essential task lists of their units. This has not proven to be an insurmountable obstacle. How this fits into the future of the National Guard, and particularly the National Guard armor force, as it deploys in future conflicts is unknown. Currently, National Guard armor forces prepare through the course of each training year for combat operations on their armor platforms. The reality of the contemporary operating environment (COE) may force active duty and National Guard units to re-examine time and resources required to complete training annually. If the reality of the COE determines that the National Guard will likely never deploy armor forces to combat in those roles, the painful decision should be made to restructure these forces to effectively and efficiently meet the needs of the Army in current and future environments. Given the equipment and doctrine to train primarily as mounted M1114 scouts or motorized infantry specifically for stability operations, the National Guard can maximize its effectiveness and reduce the current financial strain on state and federal governments by training units for dual exclusive roles in the same training year. This will have the ancillary effect of eliminating much of the mental and emotional strain on families by reducing overall deployment time. This will also increase the deployment rate of units and provide an overall value to the Army by decreasing the turn-around time required to train and retrain units to tasks that will not likely be performed. Despite the dearth of information provided to the general American citizenry, the citizen troopers of the 196th Cavalry from North Carolina and Ohio, as well as the soldiers of countless other National Guard units from every other state have proven their ability to perform the unique requirements of combat and stability operations in the COE. If given the task and requirements of preparing for these environments as primary missions through each training year, the National Guard will not only be better at responding to domestic crises at home, but, as in the spirit of the Ohio National Guard motto, will be superbly positioned to “respond when called with ready units.” First Lieutenant Barry A. Naum is currently the detachment commander, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 107th (1-107) Cavalry, Newton Falls, OH. He received a B. A. from Malone College and is currently completing his J. D. from The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. His military education includes the Armor Captains Career Course, Armor Officers Basic Course, and Officer Candidate School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include detachment commander, A Troop, 1- 107th Cavalry (Forward), Fort Stewart, GA, and Tuz, Iraq; platoon leader, E Troop, 196th Cavalry, 30th Brigade Combat Team, Tuz; and XO and platoon leader, A Troop, 1-107th Cavalry, Newton Falls. “Although much work was left to be completed by the end of our deployment, the 196th Cavalry secured and maintained a tentative peace in its area of responsibility. Joint meetings were held periodically and well-attended by leaders of opposing villages and tribes, which resulted in a provisional agreement that neither side would attempt to resolve matters independently before the fledgling Iraqi government had an opportunity to hear the claims and issue rulings.” — 17