The RSTA Squadron: Agile and Adaptive, Relevant and Ready

Local time on the Iraq-Iran border is 2130 hours. “Saber six, this is bravo six. We have GSR [ground surveillance radar] contact with two vehicles moving east to west at 30 mph, approximately five clicks east of Phase Line Nissan,” reported the B Troop commander from his Stryker on the squadron command frequency, forwarding reports from his third platoon. Third platoon, B Troop, was the southern element of the troop screen, with a robust task organization of four Stryker Reconnaissance Vehicles (RV), one ground surveillance radar (GSR) team, and one FM retrans team. Operating three dismounted observation posts (OP) and three mounted RV OPs, the 21-scout recce platoon had good observation of two routes crossing the international boundary, thoroughfares routinely used as infiltration routes by factions supporting the former Iraqi regime. Using long-range advanced scout surveillance systems (LRAS3), the scouts had identified the vehicles from afar distance. As the suspicious vehicles moved west, terrain masked their movement. The GSR team maintained contact, confirming their continued movement along the infiltration routes and into named area of interest (NAI) 116, third platoon’s primary focus. Saber six, commander of the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron, immediately jumped to the brigade command frequency to request diversion of the surveillance troop’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), which was currently flying over a quaint town eight miles west of NAI 116 in support of an infantry battalion in the final phases of a cordon and search operation. The squadron S2 learned from brigade headquarters that an al-Qaeda official would attempt to infiltrate along the route. Caves and valleys within NAI 116 offered rogue bands sanctuary. Saber six intended to use every RSTA asset available to exploit this golden opportunity. Stryker six, the Stryker brigade commander, approved the diversion and soon the UAV was en route to NAI 116 at 6,000 feet above ground level. The two vehicles continued their western movement, stopping briefly about one kilometer east of the border. The LRAS3 from OP B32 easily identified two suspicious adult males who joined the convoy, which then sped across the international boundary into NAI 116. Bravo six alerted his troop mortar section and tactical human intelligence (HUM INT) noncommissioned officer (NCO), that he was moving into better position to command and control the coming fight. As the squadron S2 predicted, the two vehicles stopped outside a cave complex, a suspected weapons cache, and the occupants loitered in the valley, unaware that scouts and ground and airborne sensors were observing them. Three OPs, one mounted and two dismounted, had eyes on the gathering, the GSR team had zeroed in on their precise location, and the UAV loitered at a distance, its camera fo-The RSTA Squadron: Agile and Adaptive, Relevant and Ready by Captain Keith R. Walters — 17 cused on the gathering crowd of insurgents. By the time one of the infiltrators heard the faint drone of the UAV in the night sky above, it was too late. Scouts on OP B33 had called for mortar fire from the troop mortar section while the squadron tactical operations center (TOC), guided by the live UAV video feed, requested and directed artillery fire from the Stryker brigade combat team’s (SBCT) artillery battalion and its 155mm howitzers. The fires were precise and devastating — 120mm mortars and 155mm high explosive shells dropped within 50 meters of their targets. As the scouts on the ground called, “fire for effect,” over the troop command frequency, howitzer fire decimated the two vehicles and their occupants. B Troop and the RSTA squadron had validated a capability that RSTA visionaries had conceptualized only four years earlier. The RSTA squadron had identified a threat out of contact, maneuvered assets into position, and placed lethal fires on its targets without compromising its ground positions. In this vignette, the RSTA squadron conducts a refreshingly traditional cavalry mis sion — a troop with additional task-organized assets establishes a screen to deny a known enemy access to routes across the international boundary. This is a comfortable scenario for all cavalrymen and may even be nostalgic to the old timers who stood guard against the soviets only 13 years ago. In the immediate future, the RSTA squadron is more likely to operate in a support and stability operations environment than in a high-intensity conflict. Most of our lessons learned from RSTA squadrons will be support and stability operations. As the first Stryker brigades operate in predominately lower intensity support and stability missions, we must educate the Army on their vast capabilities to avoid typecasting by leaders at every level as a support- and stability-centric formation. It is important to highlight the RSTA squadron as a formation uniquely structured and equipped to operate across the full spectrum of operations. Many units across the Army use the systems described in the vignette: LRAS3, GSR, and UAV. The RSTA squadron, however, operates with these systems organized under a single squadron-level commander with the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture required to operate over distances required of the “eyes and ears” of the Stryker brigade. Active duty and retired officers and NCOs charged with Army transformation and future doctrine at Fort Knox, Kentucky, designed the RSTA squadron to neutralize or defeat both existing and potential threats across the spectrum of operations. In the coming months, we will learn of the RSTA squadron’s exploits as it continues to conduct basic missions that previous units conducted in sector, but will do so with the unique capabilities of the RSTA squad ron. This article provides a basic understanding of those dynamic capabilities and their potential for expanded use Armywide. Understanding the RSTA Squadron As a large percentage of our Army prepared for and executed critical combat missions, there was little opportunity to educate the entire force on the Stryker brigade’s capabilities. Likewise, there is little understanding within the armor and cavalry community of the RSTA squadron’s capabilities. The Stryker brigade is no longer a mere curiosity; it is no longer a wheeled formation in communities insistent on either riding on a tracked vehicle or simply walking into battle. It is important for the Army, and especially the “The Stryker brigade is no longer a mere curiosity; it is no longer a wheeled formation in communities insistent on either riding on a tracked vehicle or simply walking into battle. It is important for the Army, and especially the armor and cavalry forces, to understand the characteristics that make the RSTA squad ron unique from any other cavalry formation.” 18 — armor and cavalry forces, to understand the characteristics that make the RSTA squad ron unique from any other cavalry formation. The RSTA squadron is indeed the most unique conventional formation in the U. S. Army, and its introduction into combat comes at an opportune time for our nation. As the first of six planned SBCTs currently operates in Iraq, the second SBCT prepares for deployment, while the third fields its equipment in Alaska. With three more RSTA squadrons scheduled for fielding, one in Hawaii, one at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and one with the Pennsylvania National Guard, the Army should no longer consider this a conceptual or fringe element. Organizing the RSTA Squadron Forty officers from eight branches, 176 NCOs, and 221 enlisted soldiers of 18 military occupational specialties (MOS) are organized into three recce troops, one surveillance troop, and one headquarters and headquarters troop. The Stryker RV (13 per recce troop) is the base platform of the RSTA squadron. Each Stryker RV is operated by a two-man crew (driver and gunner) and carries a three-man scout team. Its armor protects the crew from heavy machine gun fire and add-on slat armor protects against rocket-propelled grenades (RPG). The Stryker is also equipped with a Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) system, which provides the senior scout on each vehicle a real-time picture of friendly-element locations and the latest templated enemy locations. Vehicle crews communicate over FM radio with two all-source imagery processing (ASIP) systems, or digitally via FBCB2. Other Stryker variants in the RSTA squad ron carry a similar suite of equipment with a few mission-oriented variations:

• The mortar carrier variant (MCV) (two per recce troop) is equipped with a remote weapons station (RWS) for its M2.50-caliber machine gun. The RWS enables the gunner to fire the weapon from a protected position inside the vehicle with thermal or daylight sights. The MCV is the platform for the troop’s 120mm mortar tubes, although tubes must be dismounted from the vehicle for firing. Future variants will support onboard firing.

• The fire support variant (FSV) (one per recce troop) is very similar to the RV with the few exceptions being a modified array of digital communications equipment and top-mounted ground vehicular laser locator/designator.

• The medical evacuation variant (MEV) can carry four litter or six ambulatory patients and affords squadron medics added protection during evacuation missions when compared to standard high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) ambulances.

• The command variant (CV) is the squadron commander’s vehicle. The CV is armed with an M2 with RWS and has the standard suite of FBCB2 and ASIP digital and FM communications, as well as maneuver control and all-source analysis systems to facilitate the commander’s control of the operation. Three recce troops comprise the nucleus of the squadron’s collection assets. Each troop is manned by six officers, 41 NCOs, and 46 enlisted soldiers organized into three recce platoons, a troop headquarters section, and a mortar section. The recce troop consists of 13 RVs, two MCVs, one FSV, two HMMWV variants, and three M1083 5-ton medium tactical vehicles (MTVs). Scouts are armed with M4 5.56mm carbines equipped with M68 reflex sights and PEQ-2 laser designators. Each scout squad has an M240 7.62mm machine gun. Troops have a total of six Mk19 40mm automatic grenade launchers and 12 M2.50-caliber machine guns. Recce troops are usually task organized with one MEV. In a traditional reconnaissance role, a recce troop can recon up to three routes simultaneously or conduct surveillance of up to six designated areas with both mounted and dismounted observation posts. In a support and stability environment, the recce troop puts HUMINT collectors on the ground with one 97B assigned per recce squad. A senior counterintelligence sergeant assists the recce troop commander in integrating and analyzing human intelligence gathered on the ground. A recce troop can also conduct up to three simultaneous hasty traffic control points and one long-duration deliberate traffic control point on high-traffic routes. The surveillance troop is the element that makes the RSTA squadron a truly unique organization. Six officers, 23 NCOs, and 37 enlisted soldiers of various MOSs man the surveillance troop and execute specialized missions in the ground sensor systems (GSS) platoon, UAV platoon, or nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance platoon. During most tactical missions, GSS platoon assets are task organized throughout the squadron to afford optimal focus of collection assets. The GSS platoon consists of three Prophet signal intercept platforms, three GSR teams, and three remotely monitored battlefield surveillance systems (REMBASS) that detect seis- “In a traditional reconnaissance role, a rec ce troop can recon up to three routes simultaneously or conduct surveillance of up to six designated areas with both mount ed and dismounted observation posts. In a support and stability environment, the recce troop puts HUMINT collectors on the ground with one 97B assigned per rec ce squad. A senior counterintelligence sergeant assists the recce troop commander in integrating and analyzing human intelligence gathered on the ground. A recce troop can also conduct up to three simultaneous hasty traffic control points and one long-duration deliberate traffic control point on high-traffic routes.” — 19 mic waves caused by human or vehicular move ment. When used in conjunction with recce troop OPs, these assets greatly enhance the squadron’s surveillance capabilities. They provide redundant observation when focused on specific areas in relatively open terrain. In restricted terrain, commanders can employ GSS and REMBASS to cover dead space where binoculars or LRAS3 systems cannot reach beyond hill masses or buildings. Adding the Prophet to the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan provides the ability to intercept enemy communications, serving as an enabler of pro active reconnaissance in any area of operations. The NBC reconnaissance platoon enables the SBCT to detect enemy use of chemical and radiological contaminants and some biological weapons, and is the sole element within the brigade that can safely confirm or deny use of such weapons. This is especially critical today. In the past, U. S. forces had a clearer definition of enemy weapons capabilities. We may now find our forces deployed against rogue nations and transnational organizations that have covertly gained weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the means to deliver them. In this capacity, the NBC recon platoon will prove to be a key element to the success of RSTA squadron operations. In most instances, however, our forces will have a clear understanding of enemy WMD capabilities. When the NBC threat is minimal, the NBC recon platoon is the ideal element to provide viable command and control (C2) node security. Its mobility, relative survivability, and mounted crew-served weapons are an improvement over MTV gun trucks in that capacity. The most unique element of the RSTA squadron is its UAV platoon. The platoon consists of four Shadow 200 UAVs. UAV pilots operate these aircraft from stations collocated with the squadron TOC or from a UAV control shelter that can be positioned anywhere on the battlefield, including with recce troop command posts. The UAV can loiter and provide surveillance of specific targets or conduct reconnaissance of assigned routes. In either instance, its payload provides 10- digit target grids to the squadron TOC, a capability that adds yet another observer of indirect fires and an unconventional means of conducting battle damage assessment and target handoff. Despite a fleet of 53 Strykers, an accompanying fleet of 51 HMMWV variants, and 15 MTVs, the RSTA squadron, like each battalion in the SBCT, relies on a combat repair team (CRT) of only 17 mechanics for maintenance support. The CRT is an element of the brigade support battalion (BSB), but has a habitual garrison relationship with the squadron. Conceptually, the CRT provides area support when the SBCT is deployed to a theater of operations. In practice, however, the CRT collocates with the squadron administrative and logistics command post and provides maintenance support from a central location, in a similar manner that a maintenance platoon operates in a unit maintenance collection point, albeit with afar smaller ratio of mechanics to vehicles. With no internal haul assets, the RSTA squadron relies on a logistics support team (LST) from the BSB. Each LST is tailored to fit a particular mission. The LST provides class I, III, V, and transportation support which may include M978 fuelers, a loading handling system (LHS) trail er with fuel blivots, afield feeding team (FFT) composed of a collapsible kitchen and three kitchen company-level feeding (KCLF) units, and a haul package for class V. The CRT also falls under the LST when deployed. Original SBCT doctrine envisioned organizations that would deploy and conduct sustained operations for 72 hours prior to the first logistics package (LOGPAC) arriving in theater. Given the wide range of reconnaissance missions required of the RSTA squadron over the entire SBCT area of operations and the Stryker’s fuel-consumption rates, this has proven impractical. Task organization of the LST within the squadron, however, mitigates inherent logistic strains. The squadron commander can opt to task organize fuel blivots, KCLF units, and contact teams from the CRT for prolonged “Doctrinally, the SBCT is designed to be a full-spectrum early entry combat force. Early entry forces will likely enter theaters through populated urban centers, engaging enemies using asymmetrical means. HUMINT collectors, working in conjunction with scouts on the ground, UAV, and Prophet will provide the brigade commander with situational understanding, enabling the initiation of prompt, decisive operations at appropriate levels of the operational spectrum.” 20 — reconnaissance missions in areas far from main supply lines. Limited assets, however, require the added measure of proactive reporting from troop first sergeants and logistics forecasting from the squadron S4 to meet the supply needs of recce troops deployed to far corners of the area of operations. In addition to logistics constraints, there are, of course, tactical limitations to RSTA squadron capabilities. Technology is an enabler and when digital systems are fully functional across the entire formation, it is a great combat multiplier. Terrain, however has a say in the utility of high technology systems. Terrain is a limiting factor with current near-term digital radios (NTDR) in transmitting data over the digital network. Future SBCTs will field improved systems to overcome this limitation, but for the time being, the RSTA squadron commander must address the same problem that his predecessors, who used flags and standards, faced — making optimal use of terrain while maintaining effective communications across the entire formation. The Firepower Issue The RSTA squadron is designed to detect an enemy out of contact and defeat him with a wide selection of options such as target handoff to an SBCT infantry battalion or the brigade antitank company, indirect fire, close air support, or even naval gunfire. The RSTA squadron is fully capable of doing so. Infantry battalions in the SBCT each have three mobile gun system (MGS) platoons (one per infantry com pany manned by 19Ks and led by armor officers) for a total of nine MGS platforms per infantry battalion. Adding MGS to the RSTA squad ron (organized as one platoon of three MGS per recce troop or as a separate company of 10 MGS) would enable it to fight for information when necessary. Fighting for information is the least desired course of action but is necessary in offensive or defensive operations against a conventional foe. Adding MGS would also provide the squadron commander task organization options for C2 node and logistics convoy security, which are important issues that currently have no solutions outside of reducing the number of troopers and RVs dedicated to the squadron’s primary mission — reconnaissance. During support and stability operations, the MGS would provide a deterrent that is absent in the current structure of a recce troop, especially during TCP operations on high-trafficked routes. Cordon and search operations are ideally executed with the manpower of an infantry company, but the reality on the ground and in future contingencies indicates that commanders may depend on recce troops to execute such missions. During cordon and search operations, MGS platforms would provide tactical flexibility to the troop commander on the ground for both outer cordon missions and for quick reaction forces, should cordon and search missions escalate into higher intensity urban combat. Operational Flexibility No brigade-sized unit in the Army has the luxury of an organic battalion-sized reconnaissance element. The SBCT is the exception. The size and structure of the RSTA squadron ensure the SBCT information dominance on the battlefield. The RSTA squadron executes with the audacity of a traditional cavalry unit, yet is designed to operate successfully across the entire spectrum of operations, like no other cavalry unit. The diverse capabilities of the RSTA squadron beg of further uses for the unique formation, some within the current construct of the Stryker brigade, another with alternative uses within current force organizations. Military analysts have written hundreds of articles over the past decade on the evolving environments in which the Army will conduct future missions. The future has arrived. Operation Iraqi Freedom has become a campaign in which units often conduct support and stability operations and mid-intensity offensive operations within a single 24-hour period. Over the course of weeks, even days, the focus fluctuates between them. The wide range of capabilities of the RSTA squadron make it an ideal unit for operations in Iraq. The structure enables it to conduct tactical HUM INT gathering, intelligence from which the remainder of the squadron can conduct forceful and aggressive reconnaissance operations against known insurgents. The troopers of the RSTA squadron have been trained to conduct exactly that — HUMINT efforts yielding actionable intelligence that leads to decisive reconnaissance operations with battle handover to infantry battalions. In fact, this has been a focus of training for both the first and second Stryker brigades. Conceptually, the RSTA squadron should be quite successful in this capacity. In reality, huge training budgets allocated to the Stryker brigade will pay dividends as well-trained leaders and troopers validate concepts, doctrine, and tactics in Iraq. Doctrinally, the SBCT is designed to be a full-spectrum early entry combat force. Early entry forces will likely enter theaters through populated urban centers, engaging enemies using asymmetrical means. HUMINT collectors, working in conjunction with scouts on the ground, UAV, and Prophet will provide the brigade commander with situational understanding, enabling the initiation of prompt, decisive operations at appropriate levels of the operational spectrum. RSTA Squadron’s Immediate Future The RSTA squadron is capable of providing information dominance in any operational environment on any type of terrain. Successful RSTA operations give the brigade commander unprecedented situational understanding, crucial to decisive maneuver against our asymmetric threat in the information age. Creating a functional unit, such as the RSTA squadron, requires not only developing and procuring high-tech equipment, but a change in mindsets throughout the armor and cavalry communities. Operational realities of the immediate post-Cold War world in places such as Somalia, the Balkans, and the Philippines, were the catalysts of the proactive initiation of Army Transformation. Senior officers and noncommissioned officers at major armor and cavalry posts across the Army mistakenly viewed transformation as the first step toward the demise of our beloved Abrams tanks and Bradley Cavalry Fighting Vehicles. As missions increasingly occurred in urban areas, the tankers-don’t-do-cities mentality prevailed, to a large extent justified by the limitations of our platforms, but mostly due to an unwillingness to tailor our skills and thinking to the necessities of the contemporary world. Many contemplated an Army moving away from the M1 and M2 families of vehicles, which would lead to a decreased role in the future for the armor/cavalry community. On the contrary, transformation has ensured increasing relevance of armor and cavalry formations across the full spectrum of operations. The ferocious dash to Baghdad by the 3d Infantry Division in Operation Iraqi Freedom, spearheaded by its armored formations, demonstrates the overwhelming dominance of our Army’s heavy forces. These forces secured a decisive victory over conventional Iraqi forces. There is no force in the world that would have stopped our heavy formations. The situation in Iraq now and for the foreseeable future requires a different, albeit aggres- — 21 sive, approach — one that the SBCT is tailored to conduct. The RSTA squadron’s assets are already proving to be invaluable in the hunt for high-value targets and leaders of the insurgency in cities such as Samarra. As the transition of power to an Iraqi government approaches, the effort will increasingly become one of nation building. Department of Defense officials have hinted at creating multiservice stabilization and reconstruction units centered on just that. The new units would be made up of engineer battalions, civil affairs and psychological warfare teams, and other units that would help build infrastructure and promote stability. There will be an inevitable need for combat power to serve as a deterrent to potential adversaries of new democratic regimes and, if necessary, to quell insurgencies. The RSTA squadron is perfectly suited to this type of mission — capable of gathering critical intelligence on the ground in support of newly formed governments, providing security for both international organizations and Defense Department units tasked with building infrastructure, all the while possessing the necessary firepower to defeat insurgents in villages and in rural areas. Efficiently Using the RSTA Squadron: Coordination Yields Efficiency In the near future, as more brigade commanders gain access to RSTA squadrons and their immense capabilities, their challenge will be effectively using the squadron. Currently, combat training centers are revealing a general trend: RSTA squadrons and battalion scouts are conducting similar, redundant efforts, indicating a lack of synchronization in ISR planning across the brigade. Collection efforts of the RSTA squadron and infantry battalion scouts should be complementary. This is possible only when we synchronize squadron, infantry battalion, and brigade-level ISR planning at the very onset of the military decisionmaking process. Ideally, as the RSTA squadron completes its zone reconnaissance, its leaders conduct a thorough reconnaissance handover with the infantry battalion tasked with entering a specific area of operations. This is possible when infantry battalion S2s conduct coordinated ISR planning with the RSTA squadron staff and troop-and platoon-level leaders that operate within the applicable area of operations. More often than not, infantry battalion S2s conduct their ISR planning independently of the RSTA squadron and the brigade S2. This results in wasted effort as infantry battalion scouts conduct time-consuming reconnaissance of areas and routes already reconnoitered by recce troops. A coordinated effort between RSTA squad ron executors and staffers, brigade S2 and S3 officers, and infantry battalion S2 and S3 officers, guarantees optimal use of all recon assets. Such coordination provides infantry battalion commanders the flexibility to use scout platoons more traditionally — on flanks or in quick reaction force-type missions — another example of the RSTA squadron as an ideal combat multiplier. The RSTA Squadron: Ready and Relevant Today On 24 October 1999, the U. S. Army broke from the “reactive” tradition of adjusting doctrine and force structure to meet existing threats. Army Transformation officially began during a time of relative peace in our nation’s history. As events over the past five years have demonstrated, transformation was indeed “proactive” and visionary. The initial concepts of Army Transformation are bearing the fruits of success today as the first two Stryker brigades operate in support of the Global War on Terrorism. Some envisioned the interim brigade combat team as the bridge to what was then called the Objective Force. The SBCT, especially the RSTA squadron, is proving to be more than abridge — current events have elevated the relevance of the RSTA squadron and the SBCT to a level that think tanks could not have envisioned in October 1999. The RSTA squadron, designed to be operational anywhere on the globe, guarantees that the Army can have a viable force on the ground quickly. The RSTA squadron has the staying power to fight and win as conflicts progress from one stage to another. The troopers of the RSTA squad ron are trained to fight, win, and succeed in all of these environments. Well-trained, motivated, and cognizant of what they represent to the Army and the Nation at this critical juncture in our history, these troopers form the nucleus of the most flexible unit in the Army today — agile and adaptive, relevant and ready. Captain Keith R. Walters is commander, B Troop, 2d Squadron, 14th Cavalry (RSTA), 1st Stryker Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, WA. He received a B. A. from the U. S. Military Academy, West Point, NY. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Captains Career Course, and Combined Arms and Services Staff School. He has served in various command and staff positions, including tank platoon leader, support platoon leader, and XO, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 32d Armor, Fort Lewis, WA; XO, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry (RSTA), Fort Lewis; assistant S3, 2d Battalion, 72d Armor, Camp Casey, South Korea; and assistant S3 and S1, 2d Squadron, 14th Cavalry (RSTA), Fort Lewis. “The ferocious dash to Baghdad by the 3d Infantry Division in Operation Iraqi Freedom, spearheaded by its armored for ma tions, demonstrates the overwhelm ing dominance of our Army’s heavy forces. These forces secured a decisive victory over conventional Iraqi forces. There is no force in the world that would have stopped our heavy formations.” 22 —