Digital Battle Command: Baptism by Fire

26 — The 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division, recently returned from 13 months of training and combat operations in Kuwait and Iraq. Task Force 1-15 Infantry fought eight major engagements during 21 days of intense combat during Operation Iraqi Freedom and was the first U. S. unit to attack across the Euphrates River toward Baghdad. Converting to Digital Battle Command There were 13 separate map sheets in the bustle rack of my Bradley when I crossed the line of departure (LD) into Iraq. Each was specially cut and numbered so that my task force operational graphics lined up correctly on the map. I had the current map sheet on my 18- by 24-inch map board while the extra map sheets were stored away in a map case. When I reached the end of a particular map sheet, I had to take the map board apart, pull the adjacent map sheet out of the map case (hence the numbering system), and attach the new map to the map board. Invariably, these map changes usually happened on the move and at night. My driver and I spent nearly two days cutting, aligning, and marking these map sheets prior to the start of the war. Leaders everywhere were doing the same drill. We were using 1:100,000- scale map sheets for the operation. When you have to travel over 700 kilometers, you sacrifice detail to limit the number of map sheets you have to carry. We compensated for the lack of detailed maps by using imagery and engineer terrain team products. I had to simultaneously juggle my map board and the imagery just as when we began our attack into Talil airfield on the first day of the war. We crossed about 200 kilometers of open desert en route to our objective and then attacked right into a dense urban environment. I was using the 1:100,000-scale maps for the long approach march and imagery for the actual attack. Since it was a night attack, I was also trying to maintain control of a small flashlight so I could see all these battle command aids. I should have spent the entire time focusing on the small screen attached to my coax door. The screen had been accurately tracking my location as well as the location of my key leaders and adjacent units throughout the attack. It had a map database of various scales and satellite imagery for the entire country of Iraq. Of course, I am describing the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) system. The 3d Infantry Division received a “dumbed down” version called the BLUEFOR tracking system. It did not have all the “bells and whistles” like the full FBCB2 suite, but it did offer basic messaging and situational awareness capabilities. Contractors installed the systems in key-leader vehicles throughout the division. They also gave crash courses on how to use the system. I did not use the system very much on the first attack of the war because I had only received a short burst of training on the system and had never really put it to the test. I knew how to use it, but lacked the level of experience that I needed to give me the confidence to rely on it during combat. As a result, I fell back on my “old school” battle command techniques of juggling maps in the turret of a Bradley. I didn’t completely ignore the new system; I just didn’t fight with it. I managed to survive the first couple days of combat using my trusty map sheets, but little did I know that my days of relying on paper map products were about to come to an end. My own personal transformation to digital battle command would be during operations in a little Iraqi hotspot called, “As Samawa.” Task Force 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry (1-15) initially was not supposed to fight in As Samawa. We were headed northwest to linkup with the 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT) south of Karbala. However, shortly after we began our movement west, I received a fragmentary order (FRAGO) to move to As Samawa and relieve the 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry. Our mission was to isolate As Samawa from the V Corps main supply route to the south. Sadaam Fedayeen forces had infested As Samawa and were a tremendous threat to logistics units moving along the supply route. The problem was that I did not have any imagery of the town since there was no plan to fight there. This meant we had to use our 1:100,000-scale maps to produce operational graphics. The graphics were almost useless since the maps showed virtually no detail of the As Samawa urban area. Fortunately, one of my company commanders was getting pretty skilled at using the FBCB2 graphics feature and he transferred my acetate graphics to digits. What an amazing difference — we could switch map scales and even use digital imagery to see every street in the town relative to our graphic control measures. We used the mission data loader (MDL) to transfer the graphics to every system in the task force. I was impressed with the abilities of the FBCB2 system, but was still not confident enough to go fully digital, so I continued fighting from my map board. My complete conversion to digital battle command would not happen until the infamous sandstorm of 25 March 2003. — 27

We were conducting a reconnaissance in force to find and destroy Sadaam Fedayeen forces. I was planning on using the sandstorm as cover for our movement and we would use railroad tracks as a handrail to guide us into our positions. I had two scout sections along to provide surveillance on the objective. Both company commanders and the scouts had FBCB2, as did my track. We were all using FBCB2 1:50,000-scale maps to track our movements since the sandstorm created zero-visibility conditions. We were literally dead reckoning through the sandstorm using the FBCB2 system. We ran into problems about halfway through the movement when we tried to navigate around the As Samawa train station. Even the 1:50,000 maps did not show all the details of the train station. Vehicles were getting stuck on the converging tracks and had to maneuver around several buildings that were not identified on the maps. The sandstorm made it impossible to see our surroundings and we had several breaks in contact. To help us get around the train station, one company commander suggested we all switch from maps to imagery to see the details of the train station. We were literally maneuvering by instruments like pilots in bad weather, but the imagery and global positioning system (GPS) functions of the FBCB2 system allowed us to bypass the train station in the middle of a sandstorm. The experience of being forced to use and rely on FBCB2 during a combat mission under impossible weather conditions completed my conversion to digital battle command. I did not use another paper map product for the remainder of the war and fought every fight thereafter using FBCB2. Digital Battle Command: What Works Well FBCB2 has revolutionized tactical battle command in many ways. The digital maps and imagery were a tremendous capability — I literally had the entire country of Kuwait and Iraq at my fingertips. I could pan across the maps, zoom in, change to imagery, zoom in on the imagery, change scale, and even change the color of the gridlines on the map — a very handy feature. I did not have to worry about changing map sheets — the screen updated as I moved. I did not need a flashlight to read the maps and imagery because the screen had an adjustable backlight. The FBCB2 imagery was not quite as clear as a hard copy product, but it was definitely suitable for every mission we executed. It enabled us to navigate through the narrow streets and alleys of Baghdad or determine if a canal road was suitable for tracked vehicle movement. I relied solely on FBCB2 imagery for all urban operations. If I had to pick the single best thing about FBCB2, it would be the maps and imagery capabilities. Even though I had a limited number of systems in my task force, FBCB2 greatly improved my ability to battle track friendly units and improve my overall situational awareness. I not only knew where my scouts and company commanders were, I knew the location of all adjacent units and command posts. This greatly facilitated linkups. I did not have to call to get a company commander’s location, I saw his icon on the screen and FBCB2 guided me to his location. I am certain that FBCB2 battle tracking capabilities were instrumental in preventing fratricide. This was particularly important in urban areas where friendly units frequently converged and were often masked by buildings and other structures. Finally, FBCB2 allowed me to track the progress of the battle and know if things were going according to plan. When my task force seized a key highway intersection south of Baghdad, I could see the company commanders’ icons at each blocking position and I knew we had control of the objective. That cut down on a lot of radio traffic and allowed leaders to concentrate on the fight instead of giving frequent situation reports. Shortly after arriving at As Samawa, my task force received a mission to send a company-sized force to seize a section of terrain to the west and establish blocking positions. This mission was similar to the one the task force was given in As Samawa: isolate the built-up area and protect the V Corps supply route to the south. I had four companies (two armor and two mechanized infantry), so the loss of combat power would not degrade my operations in As Samawa. The problem was that the company’s objective was 70 kilometers west of As Samawa. I would have no way to communicate with my separated company using organic FM radios. Even using a retransmission station, the distance was too far — FM radios were typically good for about 10 to 20 kilometers. The company enlisted tactical air controller had satellite communications, but could only be used for controlling close air support and emergency medical evacuations. The only way to maintain daily communications with the company was through FBCB2. The FBCB2 system was satellite based, so distance was not an issue and I sent and received text messages to and from my separated company. The task force was eventually pulled off As Samawa and we moved about 200 kilometers to linkup with the 2d BCT south of Karbala. I still had a company securing the separate objective, but we were able to maintain continuous communication and FBCB2 allowed them to later linkup with us south of Karbala. The entire separate company mission simply would not have been possible without the satellite communication capabilities of FBCB2. Digital Battle Command: What Needs Fixing The biggest problem with FBCB2 was that our digital pipe was too small. This caused several problems with communications, “I had to simultaneously juggle my map board and the imagery just as when we began our attack into Talil airfield on the first day of the war. We crossed about 200 kilometers of open desert en route to our objective and then attacked right into a dense urban environment. I was using the 1:100,000-scale maps for the long approach march and imagery for the actual attack. Since it was a night attack, I was also trying to maintain control of a small flashlight so I could see all these battle command aids.” 28 — battle tracking, and navigation. We were forced to limit our message size to a few hundred bytes. Much of that allocation was consumed just by message header information, which limited the typical free-text message to only a couple of paragraphs. Even the most simple FRAGO had to be segmented and sent in several messages. The effect on sending graphics was even worse. A standard set of battalion operations graphics required several separate messages to comply with bandwidth limitations. Obviously, every digital system is going to have some limitations, but FBCB2 must allow the transmission of basic FRAGOs and operations graphics to be a truly useful battle command tool. The lack of bandwidth also hampered navigation and battle tracking. My position would update about every 10 to 15 seconds, but all the other friendly icons would update about every few minutes. This really made battle tracking on the move difficult. For example, during one of our attacks, my icon appeared to be leading the task force even though there were other elements in front of me. FBCB2 was updating my position faster than the other systems around me. Even the smallest delay in updating my position caused problems while navigating in dense urban areas. It was easy to miss a turn because the FBCB2 updated too slowly relative to the actual position of the vehicle. Ironically, my low-cost civilian GPS (my digital backup) was updating my position in real time, down to one-meter accuracy, while my sophisticated digital battle command system could not keep pace. One of the FBCB2 technicians told me that this was a software problem as well as a bandwidth problem. Either way, it is a serious shortcoming and should be fixed immediately. FBCB2 should have the capability to update all friendly unit positions in real time. Everyone I talked to about FBCB2 complained about the operating system and graphic user interface (GUI). It is about the most non-intuitive operating system and interface that I have ever used. Even the simplest task took multiple steps to accomplish and some of the procedures simply did not make sense. Useful features like “drag-and-drop” and “right-click menus” are nonexistent in the FBCB2 GUI. FBCB2 developers really need to work on making the GUI more intuitive and user-friendly. You should be able to customize the interface and put links to frequently used applications right on the desktop. Perhaps designing it to resemble a web page would help. Nearly every U. S. citizen knows how to navigate the Internet and is very familiar with the functions of a web browser. The operating system also appeared to be very unstable. If users failed to follow the shutdown procedures explicitly, bad things happened the next time the system was turned on and booted. Somehow, improper shutdowns created bugs in the system and we had to wipe and reload hard drives several times to correct the problem. The operating system simply needs to be more robust and forgiving. The time it took for the system to boot up was also annoying. The message applications need to be improved. The messages were so cumbersome that nobody used them. The only formatted messages I received throughout the entire fight were the chemical-downwind messages from the 3d Infantry Division’s main command post. Everything else was a free-text message. One of the FBCB2 technicians told me that 90 percent of the messages sent by Fort Hood units during FBCB2 testing and training were free-text messages, which I believe completely. The other message formats are too complicated and time consuming to be of use. The easiest fix for this problem would be to eliminate standard messages completely and design the system so units could install their standard operating procedure (SOP) message formats. Units train with their SOP message formats and use them to communicate information quickly and effectively. FBCB2 would only enhance the utility of unit message SOPs. Combat messages, such as medical evacuation and spot reports, were more useful but they too need to be simplified to make them user-friendlier. The FBCB2 graphics application also needs a drastic update. It did not contain all the graphic control measures and unit symbols found in U. S. Army Field Manual 101-5-1.1 Many of the symbols could not be manipulated. For example, I could not label my attack by fire (ABF) positions. I used a work-around involving other graphic symbols but it took a lot of extra time just to perform this simple task. The graphics application also needs more free-form drawing tools and it must incorporate “drag-and-drop” features. Users should have the option to quickly duplicate graphic control measures and rotate or flip them as required. If this sounds like basic PowerPoint features, you are right on track. “Shortly after arriving at As Samawa, my task force received a mission to send a company-sized force to seize a section of terrain to the west and establish blocking positions. This mission was similar to the one the task force was given in As Samawa: isolate the built-up area and protect the V Corps supply route to the south. I had four companies (two armor and two mechanized infantry), so the loss of combat power would not degrade my operations in As Samawa.” Continued on Page 50

Digital Battle Command from Page 29 “Digital battle command must be fully integrated into our doctrine and our institutional training. Officers and enlisted soldiers should be trained at every level on these systems and how to use them to enhance planning and execution of military operations. … Our training and doctrine should allow our soldiers to master digital battle command systems so they are not forced to convert to using it during combat.” 50 —