The Army Banks On Its Tanks (Reprinted from The Jerusalem Post)

(Reprinted with permission from The Jerusalem Post)

JERUSALEM (August 15) - When he was chief of General Staff, Am-non Lipkin-Shahak said a major problem in the territories was not how to use tanks, but how to avoid using them. The image of Palestinians destroying a 60-ton main battle tank would wreak havoc on the IDF’s reputation of invincibility and serve as a further blow to deterrence. But tanks have slowly been introduced into the 10-month conflict in the territories, and the IDF believes they have been very effective. Yesterday’s assault on Jenin proved the IDF faces no real barriers when dealing with the Palestinians. It moved into the town center with impunity, some tanks coming under light-arms fire which bounced harmlessly off their armor. Soldiers remained inside with their hatches shut and suffered no casualties. The main impact of a tank in the territories is deterrence. The main effectiveness of a tank is its weapons systems — most importantly, its night vision. Its thermal cameras can pick up targets over a kilometer away and quickly relay the information to engaging forces. Many Palestinian snipers and armed squads have been located and dealt with this way. “Today, most of the successes in the territories are due to the tanks there,” said a senior tank officer. Officers and soldiers alike say that the minute a tank appears on any scene, the shooting stops and the gunmen flee. “They are afraid,” said a senior tank officer. “Not only that, but when our soldiers see a tank they feel more assured.” The major threat to a tank is not from anti-armor rockets; the Palestinians are not believed to have any that could cause serious damage. A tank’s vulnerability is in the possibility that hostiles will clamber onto it and overcome its crew. For this reason, the IDF has a strict doctrine of enforcing a “dead zone” around its tanks, allowing no one to approach. “Remember that photograph of the young Palestinian standing in front of a tank and throwing a stone at it?” said a senior officer responsible for developing the doctrine for using tanks in the territories. “Well, that won’t be allowed anymore.” “There are red lines for every tank position which no one passes. No one will get to a tank. That is the rule,” said another officer. In principle, a tank marks its dead zone with machine-gun fire. In practice, this has yet to be done. In fact, tanks may only open fire with their cannon upon receiving authorization from the brigade commander. They must verify three things: the source of enemy fire; that no civilians are endangered; and that the cannon fire will be effective. When tanks do open fire, their rounds are more lethal than those of attack helicopters. Senior tank officers denied that the increasing urbanization of the “battlefield” seriously hampers the use of armor. “Sure, we are like a bull in a china shop. But that is not going to stop us from being there,” said one officer. The Army Banks On Its Tanks by Arieh O’Sullivan ARMOR — 13 26Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1958), pp. 61- 62. 27Guderian, Panzer Leader, (London: Michael Joseph, 1952), pp. 316-17. 28Subject: Reform of the German Automobile Industry (An Industrial Mobilization Measure), MID Report No. 16,301, Berlin, 1 December 1938, RG 165, NA, pp. 1-5. 29Oral Presentation, “Mechanization and Defense Against Aviation,” G-3 Course, AWC, 1938-1939, Report of Committee No. 5, 7 October 1938, United States Army Military History Institute, p. 11. 30Subject: Policies governing mechanization, and tactical employment of mechanized units, 6 April 1938, AG 537.3 (4-6-38), RG 407, NA, pp. 1-4. 31Henry J. Reilly, “Proving Ground in Spain. Armament Trends as Revealed by the Spanish War,” Army Ordnance (May-June 1939): pp. 333-36. 32Subject: Letters of Transmittal, Re: Proceedings of Board, 27 July 1938; Chief of Cavalry to Chief of Field Artillery, 6 October 1938; Chief of Field Artillery to Chief of Cavalry, 17 December 1938; and Chief of Cavalry to Chief of Field Artillery, 5 January 1939, RG 156, NA, pp. 1-6. 33Subject: Self-Propelled Mount for a 75mm Howitzer, 8th Endorsement, 17 April 1939, OO 472/3496, RG 156, NA, p. 13, and Richard P. Hunnicutt, Stuart: A History of the American Light Tank, Vol. 1 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1992), p. 317. 34Heiberg, “Organize a Mechanize Force,” pp. 24-28, and Chaffee, “The Seventh Cavalry Brigade in the First Army Maneuvers,” Cavalry Journal (November-December 1939): pp. 450- 61. 35Van Voorhis quoted in “Prelude to Armor,” pp. 5-6.

Dr. George F. Hofmann is a history professor at the University of Cincinnati, who served in the U. S. Army (Armor). He is the author of The Super Sixth: A History of the Sixth Armored Division, Cold War Casualty: The Court Martial of Major General Robert W. Grow, and edited with Donn A. Starry Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of U. S. Armored Forces. He is a contributor to History in Dispute, World War II, and a frequent contributor to ARMOR and The Journal of Military History.