The Mounted Training Strategy: Baseline Training for the Armor Force

Baseline Training for the Armor Force

“We must develop a technique and method so simple and so brief that the citizen soldier of good common sense can readily grasp the idea.” General George C. Marshall1

As we enter the 21st century, the Army of the United States is confronting uncertain adversaries, limited training resources, multiple and extended overseas deployments, and the threat of downsizing. The most positive aspect of this new era is the improved relationship between the regular Army and the National Guard.

Current doctrine divides Army combat formations into three levels of readiness: active duty, Guard enhanced brigades, and divisional brigades. Each level is provided different levels of resources.

The Regular Army is provided funding to prepare it for immediate deployment. But active duty combat formations are currently stretched by the Army’s many commitments, and would be insufficient to fully implement its role if it were called on to fight in two major regional conflicts, as the national security strategy requires. It would have to be reinforced by National Guard combat formations.

The enhanced Guard brigades (ESBs) are next in line for funding. They receive enough funding to train brigades and battalions for deployment after a period of limited post-mobilization training.

The lowest priority of resouces go to the divisional Guard brigades, which are charged with training combat platoons in basic skills prior to mobilization. These divisional Guard formations would require substantial post-mobilization training prior to deployment. Our challenge in this decade will be to weave these three “strings” into an integrated combat formation. Back to Basics Army doctrine dictates that peacetime training should focus on the requirements of a unit’s wartime mission. Armor and infantry battalions have only one basic mission: to close with and destroy an enemy with fire, maneuver, and close combat. In simple terms, these battalions must be able to shoot, move, and communicate. All other missions utilize the skills that fall within this combat mission, whether peacekeeping, military support to local law enforcement, humanitarian relief, or high-intensity combat. Our training strategy should ensure that soldiers at all three levels of readiness have mastered the same core skills. Platoons and companies must be highly proficient in battle drills, movement techniques, and direct fire gunnery (shoot, move, communicate, and small unit leadership). Brigade and battalion staffs must be able to focus combat power at the decisive place and time (synchronize the battlefield operating systems). In order to ensure that the team has the depth to handle all contingencies, the entire team is trained in the basics. We need an Army-wide mounted training plan that focuses on the core skills. Overall training and validation requirements should be the same for all three “strings.” It should be built upon the base of the lowest priority formation. Establishing A Baseline Training is currently driven by Field Manuals (FM) 25-100, Training the Force and FM 25-101, Training the Force: Battle Focused Training. These two excellent manuals explain the Army Training Management System (ATMS). The ATMS forms the foundation on which the Mission Training Plans (MTPs) build the mounted force’score battle tasks. It has long been a central tenet of the mounted force that small unit excellence is accomplished by mastering the MTP battle tasks. The ATMS, as currently published, is a good system to focus training of the mounted force,2 but in an unconstrained training resource environment. It does not identify the baseline battle tasks that the entire mounted force needs to be able to perform to standard. Prior to our recent extended peacekeeping operations, this may not have been a problem. Now the limited training time, due to peacekeeping and other distracters, has eroded the combat skills of our Abrams and Bradley crews, squads, sections, and platoons. Due to limited training resources across the mounted force, mastery of all of the battle tasks found in the MTPs is beyond the ability of any component of the mounted force, regular or Guard. Many mounted force units attempt to accomplish all the tasks and normally end up failing to achieve the Army standard on any of them. This frustration is evident in the entire mounted force, not just Guard combat units. To correct this training deficiency, it behooves the leadership of the mounted force (both NCOs and officers) to focus limited resources on the baseline battle tasks that we need to defeat America’s enemies and survive.

This training technique is not new. Before and during WWII, General George C. Marshall believed that simplicity was the best counter to the complexity of battle. He insisted that units train to standard one simple task — the holding attack. This training strategy was implemented from platoon to division. As an officer progressed through the ranks, he was well versed in one basic combat operation; he simply mounted the attack on an ever-increasing scale.3 Like the holding attack of old, the modern battle task of “Offensive Operations” contains all of the critical core tasks.4 A review of the battalion and brigade training matrixes dictates that even performing a hasty defense is found within the “Offensive Battle Tasks.”

Training to standard in basic gunnery and maneuver tasks are the keys to a successfully trained force. The task and standards must be achievable by all three “strings.” DA Pam 350-38, Standards in Weapons Training developed realistic gunnery goals and standards for the entire mounted force, based 28 ARMOR — upon resource levels. However, the Army has not provided a similar document for maneuver training. Establishing a baseline training strategy is the responsibility of the Army’s mounted force leaders. The Directorate of Training and Doctrine Development at Fort Knox has recently produced a draft training strategy. The battle tasks identified in the directorate’s draft, entitled “Combined Arms Mounted Training Strategy,” are remarkably similar to those previously identified in the “Standardized Platoon Training and Validation Program”5 published in September 1999 by the 40th Infantry Division (Mech) (CA ARNG). The 40th ID (M) is a divisional unit. Its Baseline Training Strategy is focused at platoon level for all of its combat, combat support, and combat service support platoons. The Fort Knox plan links the armor and mechanized infantry platoon battle tasks to the tasks at company, battalion, and brigade level. (See Table 2) The 40th ID (M) plan currently links platoon function within a battalion task force. (See Table 1) The advantage of implementing amounted training strategy,6 based upon the entire heavy combined arms team is realistic battle-focused training. All three strings of the mounted force would train their platoons on the same core battle tasks. Each string would train at company, battalion, and brigade levels, based on resources. Guard divisional combat brigades would focus on platoon field training and train company/team, task force, and brigade battle tasks in simulation. The live training for battalion and brigade operations would become post-mobilization training tasks. Enhanced Guard and Regular Army combat brigades would conduct virtual and live training on the company, battalion, and brigade level.

The results of such training would be a three-string force that could quickly mobilize and deploy into a combat theater with the depth to sustain extended deployments or replace casualties. Regular brigades could be quickly deployed, followed by Guard enhanced brigades. Guard divisional battalions and brigades arriving at mobilization stations could provide certified combat platoons to their “Teamed” regular brigades and divisions to round them out and bring them up to full strength before or after deployment. The performance of the 8th Marine Reserve Tank Battalion and other Marine Reserve combat units during the Gulf War validates this strategy. If the Marines can integrate their armor force in such short order and be successful in battle, so can the Army.7 The need for a baseline combined arms mounted training strategy has been evident for the past 10 years. The development of one strategy with three different resource levels is the key to making this program successful. A training program of this type will develop “killer” platoons and companies thoughout the mounted force. This will ensure that the Army of the United States has ready access to its entire heavy combined arms team force for its national strategy.

40th Infantry Division (CA ARNG)

Combat (M2) Infantry Plt.

Armor Plt.

Scout Plt.

Perform AA Activities Move Tactically Breach Operations Overwatch/Support by Fire Assault Consolidate and Reorg.

Perform AA Activities Move Tactically Attack by Fire PLT Fire and Movement Assault Consolidate and Reorg.

Perform AA Activities Move Tactically Route Recon Actions on Contact Consolidate and Reorg.

Combat Support Motor Plt.

Communication Plt.

Occupy AA Occupy Firing Position Move Tactically Fire Hip Shoot Fire Adjust Fire Fire Direct Lay Occupy AA Establish Communications Establish Remote Communications React to Jamming

Maintenance Plt.

Support Plt.

Medical Plt.

Precombat Checks Plan and Conduct Convoy Quartering Party Tow Disabled Vehicle Consolidation and Reorg.

Precombat Checks Plan and Conduct Convoy Defend Against Ground Ambush Secure and Defend Unit Position Establish Aid Station Casualty Evacuation Triage Patients

Table 1

Platoon Tasks Company Tasks Battalion Tasks Brigade Tasks Assault Attack By Fire Overwatch/Support By Fire Breach Operations Platoon Defense Attack By Fire Assault Support By Fire Breach an Obstacle Defend Battle Position Meeting Engagement Assault Attack/CATK By Fire Defend Hasty Attack Deliberate Attack Area Defense

Table 2

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