The Tactical Communications Revolution

Digiral Technology Advantages for Everyday Field Operations The Tactical Communications Revolution by Second Lieutenant Wliiam D. McComack The introduction of lVlS (Intervehicular Information System) reflects the U. S. Army’s grasp of the fundamental reality of the digital revolution, a revolution every bit as pregnant with possibilities as were the revolutions brought about by the introduction of printing, the internal combustion engine, and radio.’ The ability to command and control is a direct function of the efficiency of the mechanism of communication. Alexander the Great was a master of sophisticated tactics, strategy, and logistics, but his plans were set prior to battle and, once combat was joined, he had no control over his subele-ments? The Romans’ innovation of the battle standard increased a leader’s ability to articulate his subordinate units, although still within the confines of a set-piece plan. Throughout time, runners provided commanders the ability to send orders and receive reports, but time spent traveling limited their tactical usefulness until the advent of enormous conscript armies. By that time, the sheer size of armies allowed slower reaction time and made runners a feasible communication mode? Wire communication, beginning with the telegraph,’ offered a vast increase in strategic command and control, but had only limited value in the tactical defense, and none in the tactical offense. The advent of portable, wireless, receiver-transmitters (radio) permitted both mobility and simultaneous communication. Radio, while offering instantaneous voice transmission over great distances, is limited to vetbal communication. But some things are better seen than explained. That’s why we rehearse on the actual terrain, or at least a sand table. Moving blocks of wood around tends to remain in our minds because it is closer to what we will really be doing than simply hearing ’We’ll move in a wedge until phase line Blue.” Similarly, using a map is easier when one can simply point and say, “I’m here.” Now, for most professional soldiers, map location reporting is relatively quick. But what about updating a graphic overlay? Or changing an axis of advance? “A picture is worth a thousand words” is an overused, yet true, cliche. The digital revolution brougM about by the development of computers offers information that is accessible, readily editable, easily stored, transferable between various systems, displayed in a variety of formats (text, graphs, graphics, animation, video, sound), and disseminated via a variety of sending modes (wire, wave, magnetic media). Since lVlS represents the fruits of this revolution, what does it all mean for the armored force at the tactical level? Let’s look at the advantages of digital communications: Access Information in digital form can be accessed on an “as-needed” basis. For example, instead of simply reporting and waiting for an update from battalion on the enemy situation, a company commander can have as much situational awareness as is available in the battalion data pool. He’ll have the scout‘s latest report, appended with the S ’ s assessment, even if he missed the last voice transmission on the battalion net: the data will be in the system, and therefore available as he needs it. Besides tactical information, the data pool can provide access to supply status, MEDEVAC availability, replacement histories - any information which can be stored and retrieved on an “as needed” basis. Edit Changes in an electronic environment can be made and stored immediately. Anyone who has used a typewriter and a word processor knows the difference in editability! Up-to-the-minute changes may be incorporated into any document, picture, graphic, map, list, or order. This means operational graphics can be changed to reflect FRAGOs, TMs can be posted immediately, and map changes can reach the field in hours instead of years. Store One CD-ROM can hold literally thousands of pages worth of textual information, or hundreds of full-color images, or sounds, or video clips. In addition, other storage media are now available which can store gigabits and terabits of data, enough to 32

In Ihe current model, each line represents a discrete exchange of information. There is no 'hard' link to ensure all information is disseminated. Current Tactical Information Model Dlssemlnate Perhaps the most promising feature of digital communications on the battlefield is the dissemination of information. Francis Bacon said, "Knowledge is power." S. L. A. Marshall, in his study of World War I1 combat effectiveness, Men Against Fife, wrote, "... Full and accurate information becomes most vital at the point of impact, for unless it is correctly applied there, the wisest plans of the ablest general will likely fail. But the organization of tactical information during combat runs directly counter to this principle, almost as if it followed an unwritten law - the lower the rank of the commander, the less he is entitled to know about his own affairs.* Digital hold all the FMs, TMs, ARTEP manuals, and SOPS in the armor force. And, as mentioned previously, all this information can be instantly accessible. In a tactical situation. reports can be stored data will help change this by reducing the darkness in which a lower echelon commander must operate, and by providing him with the information needed to amlv his initiative with the assurance of to provide a steadily growing body of information about the enemy's whereabouts and intentions. Maintenance data can be collected on every vehicle in a battalion or brigade, stored on a single disk. In short, if it can be read, seen, or heard, it can be stored on magnetic media, which is more compact, and usually more durable, than paper. Transfer Display As stated earlier, some information is better seen then said. Digital data can be displayed in any format supported by the display device. Overlays, enemy locations, obstacles, unit locations - all can be displayed and updated constantly, increasing situational awareness, and therefore multiplying combat effectiveness (with the ancillary, but by no means secondary, effect of reducing fratricide). understanding his unit's efforts within the "big picture." In Mask of Command, John Keegan wrote, "Particular knowledge of the enemy's whereabouts, strength, state, capabilities and intentions is... the material on which effective command thrives."' S. L. A Marshall, in a similar vein, wrote, "... Action, if it is to be decisive, must develop according to the distribution of enemy forces... a first responsibility of a tactical commander at every level is to determine, as exactly as possible, by all means Once placed in digital format, data can be transferred to an unlimited number of display devices, whether terminals, handheld computers, fax machines, or television^.^ This means space will not be a problem. Chopper pilots and tankers, scouts and support platoon leaders, each can have a display device suited to his needs, and be able to display the data in the format he requires. Bn Staff t FAC, Etc. scouts

B Co I D Co - information to and from data pool. co New Tactical Information Model

S. L. A. Marshall spoke unwittingly of the advantages of the digital revolution when he wrote, *Information is the soul of morale in combat and the balancing force in successful tactics. within his power, where that heart (of enemy force) is located, and then plan his battle or arrange his plan accordingly." Currently, if the enemy situation changes between the time the reports are received and the time the plan is disseminated (which is highly likely), the commander must depend upon reports being submitted to higher, received and analyzed, and then retransmitted to him (along with the accompanying FRAGO, without the benefit of updated graphics). Often what the company commander wants to know is not included in the S2's brief, for a variety of reasons. Yet, having all reports stored in a data pool will allow the company commander to add his own analysis to the IPB done by the battalion staff. This possibility vastly increases the ability of the company commander to adjust to and prepare for fighting his battle within the overall plan, of which he can now be aware. R became an axiom in the volunteer Army of the 1970s that volunteers needed to know not only how, but why. While often much more an ideal than a promise, the technological leap of digital data communication will help every commander, platoon leader, tank commander, and crewman understand his role in the '%big picture." If anyone still doubts the truly revolutionary nature of digital data communications, as represented by IVIS, and what it may mean in a future conflict, consider France in 1940. Despite having the largest, best-equipped army in the world, with excellent tanks (both the Char Band SOMUA were nearly impervious to the German PzKW Ill's 37-mm gun)? and despite defending a partly fortified border, France fell in weeks. While many historians argue over the cause of the fall, one tactical reality was certain: the French were not prepared for the speed of blitzkrieg. Each German tank had its own radio set, allowing for better command and communication contr01, but few French tanks were equipped with radios. Commanders issued orders face-to-face, based on set-piece battle plans. They were attuned to the pace of World War I operations, and were, therefore, unprepared for the tempo of blitzkrieg.l0 The Germans' ability to maneuver was a direct function of their superior strategic and tactical communication distribution mechanism. S. L. A. Marshall spoke unwittingly of the advantages of the digital revolution when he wrote, "Information is the soul of morale in combat and the balancing force in successful tactics."" Fortunately, forward thinkers in the armored force know this, and are working to harness the fruits of this revolution today. Notes 'Major General Paul E. Funk, The Right Technology at the 2Jones, Archer, The Art of War in the Westem WoM, 1987, 31bEd, p. 90. crhe first electrical signaling device used by the Army was the Beadslee Magneto-Electric Telegraph, nicknamed 'The Flying Telegraph." It was a portable, hand-operated device that could send signals over several miles of insulated wire laid along the ground or strung aloft on poles, and was used extensively during the Civil War. 'Soon, these dsparate electronic devices will be merged into a single device that will incorporate the advantages of the telephone, television, pager, cellular phone, modem, personal computer, and fax machine. 'Marshall, S. LA., Men Against Fire. 1978, Peter Smith, Massachusetts, p. 101. 'Keegan, John, Mask of Command, 1987, Penguin Books, NY, p. 325. 'Macksey, Kenneth, Tank Versus Tank, 1991, C r e m t Books. NY, p. 78. 'DiNardo, Richard, "he Armored Fist", Straregy 8 Tactics, 'IVlacksey. p. 65. "Marshall, p. 92. Right lime," ARMOR, MayJune 1993, p. 5. Oxford University Press, NY, p. 82. SepIOct 1984, pp. 6-12. Second Lieutenant William D. McCormack is currently a platoon leader in C Co., 6-68 Amor (Reserve) and served as his AOBC dass leader. He is a 1997 Distinguished Military Honor Graduate from the Pennsylvania Army National Guard Academy OCS and holds a BA in history from Houghton College. He sewed four years on ao-tive duty in the Air Force as a nuclear weapons technician and six years in the Air National Guard as a command post controller. As director of software publishing for Continental Press, he is responsible for developing new products, and designing, maintaining, and upgrading the company's Macintosh pre-press and administrative network, which includes across-country link with the editorial office in San Francisco. He holds three copyrights: SchoolPRO: Student Data Manager; SchoolPRO: Discipline Monitor; and SchoolPRO: Elementary. 34