Decisive Leadership: Brigadier General Bruce C. Clarke and the Battle of St. Vith

“Hold the reins loose, and let the armies race.”’ All along the 80-mile front, during the early morning hours of December 16.1944, the screams of the German Nebelwerfer rockets and the crash of heavy German artillery, exploded the quiet of the early morning. Twenty German divisions, with almost 800 tanks, attacked west. The Wehrmacht was on the march again, and this time, they claimed, they, would go all the way to Antwerp and capture the city as a Christmas present for their Fuehret, Adolph Hitler. The fate of the fatherland was at stake, and the Wehrmacht, as in 1940, again seemed unstoppable. General Model’swords on the eve of the assault were: “The f& objective is to achieve liberty of movement for the mobile forces.’’2 For the Germans, it was now or never. It was a black day for the United States Army. Rumor dominakd the battlefield. The enemy’s unsuspected attack had unsettled the defending Americans. No one seemed to understand what was happening. Overwhelmed by the surprise and fury of render and run. The 106th Division, nicknamed the “Golden Lions,” a green division fresh from the United States, was shattered by the fury and skill of the attacking Wehrmacht. Over 7,000 soldiers from the 106th Division surrendered. Some small, isolated units held and fought bravely, but it was not enough. The front was disintegrating. Disaster was in the air. The scene was one of wild confusion the assault, Americans began to sur-and disorganimtion. ’Ihe Allied high command, unable to develop an accurate picture of the situation, reacted slowly to the Wehrmacht’s massive blow. General Troy H. Middleton. VlII Corps Commander, was responsible for a a large portion of the Ardennes area. His information was sketchy. Rumors of Gennan F’anzers, ovemn-ning everything in their path, were rampant. Recognizing the value of St. Vith, a vital road and rail center in the northern portion of the Ardennes (see map), General Middleton asked for reinforcements. He obtained the release of the 7th Armored Division from Army reserve and immediately deployed it to St. Vith. The 7th Armored Division received its orders to move to St. Vith late on the evening of December 16th. The 7th was located to the north, near Heerlen, and was undergoing a umJor shakeup in the command structure.”3 The 7th was a “hard luck” division. Its record of accomplishment on the battlefield was poor. The previous division commander had been relieved for incompetence. Its new commander, Major General Robert W. Hasbrouck, had only been in command since November 1, 1944. But the 7th would have to do. There was no one else. The commander of the 7th Armored Division’s Combat Command “B” was Brigadier General Bruce C. Clarke. He had enlisted as a youth in the New York National Guard and then received an appointment to West Point. Initially assigned as an Engineer, he had volunteered for seMce with tank-mechanized units as m n as the Army began forming them. After 20 years in the Army, he had earned a reputation as an excellent leader and a determined fighter. He took command of Combat Command “B” and was promoted to brigadier general, only 45 days prior to the German attack in the Ardennes. Clarke anived in St. Vith on December 17, 1944, ahead of his command, 26 with only his driver and his operations officer. The scene in St. Vith was sheer pandemonium. Clarke immediately reported to General Jones, the commander of what was left of the 106th Division. Jones was defeated. He talked only of retreat and disaster. He doubted that anyone could stop the Germans. His last words to General Clarke before relinquishing command of the area of operations were: “You take command, I’ve got nothing left. I’ve thrown in my last chips.”4 The sole responsibility for victory or defeat was now Clarke’s. With little over a month in command. and with his command strung out along 96 kilometers of congested, ice caked roads, Brigadier General Bruce C. Clarke was about to fight one of the most difficult battles in the history of American arms. He was outnumbered by the Germans more than eight to one. How was Clarke going to succeed against such odds? Why should his unit fight effectively while the rest of the American forces in the battle area were in head long retreat? Before the Battle Brigadier G e n d Bruce C. Clarke took over the Combat Command “B” (CCB) of the “unlucky” 7th Annored Division on November 1, 1944. But Clarke was not new to combat. He was a veteran commander of the.

Combat Command “A” (CCA) of the 4th Armored Division. His old unit had distinguished itself in combat since the early days of the Normandy landings, five months before the Battle of the Bulge. He had done a terrific job commanding CCA during General htton’s breakout from the Normandy beachheads. He had seen almost continuous combat since D- Day, June 6, 1944. and was awarded the distinguished Service Cross, the Silver Star with two Oak Leaf Clusters, the Bronze Star with Oak Leaf Cluster, and the Air Medal? Immediately after taking command of CCB, 7th Armored Division, Clarke worked and trained his command hard. His style of command was positive, proficient, and no-nonsense. The men of CCB were impressed with their big, barrel chested, six foot tall commander. Clarke later related: “It took a lot of training and coaching to turn this division mund to play the key, successful role in stopping Manteuffel six weeks later at St. Vith.6 In the 4th Armored Division, Clarke had employed the techniques of command that were to be so successful in the St. Vith area. As a v e t m of the 4th Armored Division, Clarke had learned the hard lessons of armored combat. His command style incorporated three essential pre-battle decisions: the decision to organize his forces in self-contained forces capable of independent action to the maximum degree possible; his decision to streamline the information flow to the maximum extent possible: and his strong belief in forward command. Clarke recognized the value of self contained forces. He reorganized his command for built-in flexibility. He recognized the fact that mobile, armored formations required a quick decision cycle to take advantage of enemy mistakes and the fleeting opportunities of the battlefield. His intent was to make his armored combat Effort

, The German Plan 1 command “seem like an armored corps.7 He made sure that the subunits of this combat command, the battalions, had the necessary combat support and combat service support elements to fight independently, if necessuy. This organizational decision gave Clarke’s subordinate commanders the ability to act without active control from above. They had the organizational capability, and were given the operational flexibility, to achieve objectives within their scope of options, without constant supervision. Secondly, Clarke streamlined the flow of information up and down the chain of command. He employed mission-type orders. He believed that “mission type orders were a requirement if the most was to be obtained from a command.* His combat orders technique involved eyeball-to-eyeball verbal orders, issued from a vantage point overlooking the battlefield. His subordinate commanders were expected, and trusted, to make decisions within the guidelines established by his intent. Clarke’s intent was for this subordinate commanders to command their units, and not wait around for instructions. When decisions are made at the point of execution, it is possible to take advantage of battle opportunities as they occur, without losing time. “Time is always critical and mission type orders save time. The command style and staff functioning that contribute most to maneuver warfare is characterized by the application of “‘mission orders.- Clarke’s orders were usually oral, quick, and to the point. He told his commanders what to do, not how to do it. Clarke’s technique of employing mission type orders was not new to the U. S. Army, but was particularly important in creating the short decision cycles demanded of fast paced, maneuver warfare. Genercll Bruce C. Clarke, explained how to give mission type orders in his book, Guidelines for the Leader and Commander. 28

In May 1965, General Clarke places a wreath on the memorial at Vielsalm, Belgium honoring the men of the 7th Armored Division who died in the Ardennes Campaign. To get m e m u m combat power, we must have plans flexible enough to meet rapidly changing situations. But careful planning is not enough; this must be coupled with the readiness to change and adapt to situations as they are, not as they were expected to be. Basically a mission type order needs to cover only three important things:

1. It should clearly state what the commander issuing the order wants to have accomplished.

2. It should point out the limiting or control factors that must be observed for coordinating purposes.

3. It should delineate the resources made available to the subordinate commander and the support which he can enpect or count on from sources outside his command.”lO Lastly, Brigadier General Clarke was a true believer in the concept of “forward command.” “Forward Command‘‘ is an essential element for achieving tactical victory in maneuver warfare. “Forward command” calls for senior commanders to issue orders based upon personal observation and to actually assume command of a subordinate unit during a critical point in the fighting. This concept relies heavily on thinking, independent leaders; unflinching trust in subordinate officers to cany out the mission within the intent of the senior commander, and the clear understanding of the missions of the units two echelons down and two echelons up. Clarke did not believe in a “systems” approach to war, a prescribed logical process leading to a quantified decision. He believed “The commander should be forward as much as possible to detect early the critical situations in all fields and to render help quickly to his units when it is needed.”l* At St. Vith, he seemed to appear everywhere there was a crisis. He frequently visited the front lines to get the true “feel” of the situation. Several times, he personally directed lraffic. At the village of Commanster, when nine artillery battalions tried to displace at the same time, Brigadier General Bruce C. Clarke was there, un-snarling the mess, and getting vital combat power moving in the right direction.12 During the Battle The defense of St. Vith was turned over to Brigadier General Clarke by Major General Jones on December 17, at approximately 1430 hours. Clarke was hardly in an enviable position. In St. Vith, he could hear the crash of artillery and the sound of machine gun and small arms fire. The roads leading to St. Vith were clogged with Belgium refugees and retreating American soldiers. Every kind of vehicle seemed to be heading west, away from the Germans. “...it was a case of every dog for himself; it was a retreat, a rout.93 Movement towards the front was reduced to one mile an hour in many locations. Only a few units were standing to hold back the Wehrmacht, and his own forces were strung out along a 96-kilometer route of march. Clarke’s first combat experience as a brigadier general seemed less than promising! But Clarke did not give up. He took charge and organized everyone he could scrape up to defend the positions around St. Vith. “By midnight of December 17, a fairly cohesive defense had been established in front of St. Vith with three companies of armored infantry, a company of medium tanks, and a troop of cavalry...”l4 He adapted and improvised the defense of St. Vith as fast as his CCB units arrived. At 0200 on December 18,1944, the Germans launched the first of many attacks against the St. Vith positions. “Throughout all this mayhem, only one thing was certain, General Bruce C. Clarke was the sole defending commander of St. Vith.”l5 Clarke did more than just defend. He aggressively employed small unit counterattacks and blunted one German attack after another. “General Bruce Clarke’s 7th Armored men

‘ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ The 7th Armored Division Defends St. Vith 17-23 Dec 1944 showed that men in combat, confronted with a sudden and confused sitnation, could act aggressively, immediately and independently.”16 Clarke continued his mobile defense of St. Vith with determination and skill, giving ground, but killing and delaying the Germans in the process. Brigadier General Bruce C. Clarke displayed decisive leadership during the Battle of St. Vith. His mission-type orders streamlined his command and control system and aided his efforts to employ his mobile reserves with decisive speed. His forward command during the battle ensured the ’ timing of these vital counterattacks. His style of command allowed his subordinate commanders to act without active control. When communications were lost, they fought on, implicitly understanding what their commander expected, and continued the fight. In this fashion, Clarke’s presence was felt everywhere throughout the battle. Between December 17-23, 1944, Clarke’s command fought off continuous German attacks. His aggressive tactics confused the Germans and made them believe that they were up against a much stronger force than merely one reinforced combat command. Clarke orchestrated massed artillery attacks on the advancing Germans, followed by extremely agile, mobile counterattacks. His counterattacks were often composed of as little as a company-size unit of tanks, which swept through the advancing enemy and returned to be used for further action. When General Ridgway questioned Clarke about giving up ground, Clarke replied: “General, I don’t think you know what they are trying to do. This terrain is not worth a nickel an acre to me. In my tactics, I am giving up about a kilometer a day under enormous pressure, but my force is intact, and I am in control of it. A few kilometers advance cannot be of any substantial value to my German opponent... He must, I believe, advance many kilometers to accomplish his mission. The 7th Annored Division is preventing him from doing that. We are winning, he is losing.”l7 On December 23, Clarke was ordered to disengage and withdraw from St. Vith. His men were fatigued from five days of continuous fighting. His ammunition, especially his artillery ammunition, was dangerously low. Issuing verbal orders to his command, Clarke disengaged his forces one at a time. H-Hour was set for O600. No men or operational vehicles were left behind By 2300, he had successfully disengaged his entire command and was regrouping, well behind American lines, in an assembly area in the vicinity of Xnoris, Belgium. His disengagement was skillfully executed. “Covering forces to the east, west, and south fought bitter rearguard actions as the enemy pressed hard on the retreating division’s heels.”l* Defmt, his Combat Command “B” had disrupted the German timetable and marched away, bloodied, but intact. He had lead his command in the most critical test of American arms in the Second World War. Combat Command “B,” under Brigadier General Clarke’s command, was the mainstay of the defense of St. Vith. Because of his gallant stand in and around St. Vith, the Allies were able to regroup and hold at Bastogne. General Troy Middleton, recognized this and later said “In my opinion, it was CCB which influenced the subsequent action and caused the enemy so much delay and so many casualties in and near this important area.”l9 ConcIusIon “It was no small achievement in military history that a reinforced combat command of l0,OOO American soldiers had warded off over 87,000 30 enemy troops and had prevented them from controlling St. Vith for a period of six days.”zO The defense of St. Vith was the turning point in the Baffle of the Bulge. Before St. Vith, the Germans had everything their way. After St. Vith, the failure of the Wehrmacht’s attempt to win a quick, decisive victory in the West was apparent to both sides. The 7th Armored Division held the German onslaught for six critical days. Those six days made the difference between victory and defeat. Decisive leadership is often the key to victory. In this example, the leadership of one man had a decisive impact on the outcome of a battle and, perhaps, the final outcome of the Second World War. General Clarke’s successful leadership depended on his actions before the battle. His organizational and information decisions before the battle, combined with an effective orders process technique, prepared his command for its decisive role at St. Vith. He molded Combat Command “B” into a flexible, self-contained fighting unit, capable of executing mission-type orders, in little more than a month. Clarke trained his unit to conduct mobile operations before the battle. He had coached and developed his junior leaders to effectively employ the elements of combat power. Due to these organizational and informational decisions before the battle, his unit was prepared to conduct mobile, armored operations against the massed might of the Wehrmacht. Brigadier General Bruce C. Clarke’s actions at the Battle of St. Vith are now apart of the proud heritage of a perfect example of the important impact that a commander can have on a combat unit. Guided by Clarke’s leadership, Combat Command Band the other elements of the “unlucky“ 7th Armored Division, held up the most formidable force the American the united states Army. His deeds are

Army has ever had to face. That’s decisive leadership in action! Notes lRobelt E Memam. The Ban& of the Bulge. Hitler’s Last Despemre Gamble ro Win the War!, BaIlantine Books. New York. 1957. p. 79. Zlbid, pp. 77-78. 3Stephen Dominic Borows, C&rk ofst. Virh: Brigadier General Bruce C. Clarke’s C a b a t Command “B” of the Seventh Annorad Divi-swn at the Battle 4Sr. Vith, Belgium. Adrnncs Campaign (Battle of rhe Bulge) 16 December - 23 December 1944, University of Louisville, Louisville. Ky.. May 1984, p. 46. 41bid.. p. a. 71bid., p. 4. Slbid., p 45. 61bid., p. 75. *General BN-

C. Clarke, GuiaWinu for the Leader and the Commander, Stackpole Bwks, Harrisburg. 1963. p. 95. 9lbid.. p. 95. Clarlte g a san to say: “In World War 11, those who served in armored d v k i m - and probably in other unib as well - lcornui thor mission-typc orden were a requirement if the most WDS to be ob-tainedfiom a co -&... As the battle becomes more complex and unpredictable, responsibilities must be more and more decentralized. Thus mission-type orders open will br used at all echelons of command and probably will be the rule at the dvision and higher levels. This will require all commanders to exercise initiative. resourc&lness, and imagination - operating with relativefrccdom of action. In our tactical forces we have hilt-in orgoni-zatioml flexibility. We must recognize this and capitalize on it in our orders.” p. 95. lolbid., p. 95. 11larke. p. 106. lzHugh M. Cole, The Ar&nnes: Bank of the Bulge, Office of the Chief of Military History. United States Army, Washington, D. C., 1965.

p. 417. 13U. S. Army Armor school, The Battle 01 Sr. Vith, Belgium, 17-23 December 1944. A Historical Euunple of Armor in the Defense, US. Army Armor School, Folt Knox. Ky.. 1966. p. 7. 14Charles B. Machald, A Time for T m - pets: The Untold Story of the Bank of the Bulge, William Morrow and Company, New York. 1985. p. 329. 1sBomws, P. 64.

B O O W S.

p. 89. 16Charles Whiting, Drorh of0 Division, Stein and Day, New York, 1980, p. 76. I8lbid., p. 96. l9U. S. Anny Armor School, p. vi. *oBomws. p. 100. Major John F. Anta1 is an Armor officer, on active duty currently as the XO of 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division at Ft. Riley, Kan. He is a 1977 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. A 1990 graduate of the Command and General Staff College, where he earned a Masters Degree in Military Science, he has sewed in tank units for the past 16 years in the following positions: tank platoon leader, scout platoon leader, battalion motor off i- cer, tank company commander, assistant brigade operations officer, battalion operations officer (S), G3 training officer, secretary of the general staff for the 1st Cavalry Division, brigade operations trainer and XO of Operations Group at the NTC, and as the XO, 1st Battalion Armor (OPFOR), where he acted as the chief of staff of the 32d Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment at the NTC. He also writes for military and historical periodicals. Since 1985, he has published over 20 articles in professional journals. Some of the most recent articles have appeared in Army Magazine, Milirary Review, Armor Magazine, lnfantry Magazine, Engineer Magazine, Army Trainer, Marine Corps Gazette and Military History Magazine. In addition his first book, Armor Attacks, the Tank Platoon, was published by Presidio Press in December 1991. This book, an interactive fiction of ground combat, is currently being purchased by the U. S. Military Academy for use as a textbook for military science instruction for cadets. 31