Force Projection and Combined Arms

There have been several watershed undertakings in recent history that have occasioned significant changes of direction for the U. S. Department of Defense. For example, at the outset of World War 11, prominent citizens, soldiers, and government officials collaborated to engineer the wholesale transformation of our military and entire economy to a wartime footing, lit-mlly yanking our Army from horse cavalry to mechanization. Another watershed occurred immediately following the Vietnam War when senior military officers and defense planners undertook the task of analyzing that experience and thereafter determined what force-level corrective actions were needed. The watershed event of today is manifested in the June 1993 publication of M 100-5, Operations. Current circumstances differ considerably. This time, there is no one, distinct, monolithic t h a t (such as the Warsaw Pact or the Axis Powers before it) against which we can design our force structure. Military forces taday are expected to be prepared for practically any contingency, from full scale war, through counterinsurgency and international peacekeeping, to local disaster relief. Domestic economic considerations dominate. Emerging technologies such as battlefield digitization, “brilliant” munitions, force protection, stealth, and others hold enormous promise and must be fully exploited. Yet, we are scaling back, not building up. The foregoing me nothing more than some of the conditions under which basic judgments must be made. What force structure best meets the Nation’s needs? What do we retain? What do we eliminate? What risks do we decide to accept? What do we expect of our military forces? Warfighting is the Key. In times of great change, especially with so much at stake, it is wise to start by examining some fundamental truths that must be respected Military forces exist to serve many functions, but their fundamental reason for being is to fight and win the Nation’s wars. Military force is a means by which the Nation influences behavior in the international arena It can retaliate, punish, or demonstrate its preparedness and willingness to do so. It can restore order, deliver humanitarian aid, provide disaster relief, respond to any emergency. But all of that is peripheral - warfghting forms the core. Proficiency in battle is the only measure that counts. Battles are fought and campaigns are conducted to force decision. When the Nation decides to undertake military action and commit its forces to battle, it does so with the full expectation that our decision will be forced upon the adversary. Combat operations will continue until that decision is achieved. To force decision, the enemy’s military forces must be defeated. As long as he has the means to carry on the fight and sufficient freedom of action to employ them, the enemy cannot be expected to yield. To defeat enemy military forces, ground must be taken and held. Friendly forces must either destroy the enemy’s forces or so completely dominate him that he has no choice but to capitulate. T. R. Fehrenbach had it right: “You may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life - but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman Legions did, by putting your young men into the mud.”’ The Example of DESERT STORM. History is replete with examples that confirm these basic truths. Operation DESERT STORM provides the most recent example, where: The military was called upon to wage war. All branches of service - active forces, reservists, and National Guard -were engaged in the effort. Battles and campaigns were fought to force decision. The decision forced in this case was for Iraq to evacuate its forces from Kuwait so that Kuwaiti independence could be restored. To force that decision, the Iraqi military forces were defeated. Iraq began the war with a formidable army that was routed within the span of four days. Iraqi forces were defeated only after coalition ground forces were committed. A month of continuous, merciless pounding from the air neither brought about the defeat of Iraqi forces, nor provoked any change in Saddam Hussein’s behavior, nor forced upon him any decision. What the air campaign could not do in the span of four weeks, ground forces accomplished in little more than four days. Essential Capabilities. But exactly which qualities and capabilities are at a premium, especially in light of 21st Century realities? What should the Nation expect of its armed forces? What combination best meets the Nation’s needs? What can we afford? What should drive our priorities? First, our forces must be capable of forcing decision. If it is ground forces - soldiers and Marines - that ultimately determine victory or defeat in war, then it is ground forces that should be the foundation upon which the Nation builds its defenses, prioritizes its attention, measures its security. Air and naval forces are crucial to a balanced national defense strategy and can accomplish extraordinary feats, but air power and naval power by themselves cannot achieve decision. U. S. Air Force AC-130 gunships and F-117 Stealth fighters nearly wrecked General Manuel Antonio Noriega’s Commandancia during Operation JUST CAUSE, but it was the infantry on the ground that forced PDF surrender. The mining of Nicaragua’s harbors not only failed to change Sandinista behavior, it actually intensified their intransigence. Second, our forces today must be capable of quick, decisive victory. Our Nation demands high standards - quick victory at minimal loss of life. This requires the application of overwhelming combat power that can totally dominate the adversary. Bmte force counts. Combat Power. Combat power, in the abstract, can be expressed as a function of three primary factors - Lethality, Survivability. and Agility. The force that overmatches its adversary in its ability to kill, while at the same time protecting itself from enemy weapons systems, enjoys a preponderant advantage - provided that it is capable of offensive action. Lethality. Lethality overmatch is accomplished through a number of means. Some of these can be measured in terms of weapon system effectiveness. Detection, identification, acquisition, and destruction are important at every level from individual rifleman to corps. At the tactical level - indeed, as at all levels - the overwhelming advantage is to the force that can outrange an enemy’s ability to detect his presence, that can positively identify the enemy force, take it under fire first, and confidently kill it beyond the effective range of the enemy’s weapons. Survivability. The nature of ground force battle is, ultimately, to close with and destroy the enemy. The more survivable the force, the more able it is to press the battle and complete the destruction of the enemy at an acceptable level of risk. Forces protect themselves by seeking first to avoid being detected, then to avoid being targeted by enemy weapons systems, to avoid being hit by enemy arms, and to emerge unscathed when hit by enemy fire. The force that can achieve this relative overmatch in comparison with his adversary - which amounts to a relative degree of invulnerability - will almost certainly prevail. Agility. The concept of agility encompasses the realms of tactical and operational mobility, tempo, and battle command. Relative superiority in ability to gather intelligence on the enemy, to determine quickly its importance and potential for exploitation, to tnnslate immediately the analysis into decisive action, to issue promptly understandable and accurate fragmentary orders, and to have those orders executed in keeping with the commander’s intent is what every army in the world dreams of possessing. But raw combat power alone does not assm quick, decisive victory. There are other factors that either serve to enhance or to diminish the combat power of any force engaged in combat operations. Among these are: Staying Power. Once an attack is launched, it should be pressed relentlessly to its inevitable end. Forces engaged must be capable of continuous operations; they must have adequate organic logistical support to sustain campaigns almost indefinitely, never hampered by insufficient transport, ammunition, fuel, or rations. All- WeatherlClimate Capability. A reeling enemy must be given no time to regroup, no opportunity to rest, no chance to resupply, no hope of taking time to think or plan. War is not apart-time endeavor. In combat, games are never called on account of darkness or adverse weather conditions. Dependability. Commanders at all levels must be certain of the reliability of their equipment. Every piece of equipment on the battlefield must function well, no matter how seemingly inconsequential it may be, or lives may be lost. Radios must communicate. Weapons must fire. Vehi-res can b ies that touay nave a c o m u m g importance all their own: strategic mobility, economy, and versatility. C Strategic Mobility. The concept of power projection has taken on enormous importance as U. S. forces withdraw from bases overseas. Deployability is a virtue: fighting forces have to be able to get to the fight, no matter where it may be, or they are of exceedingly limited value. Economy. There is a limit to what the Nation can afford, both in monetary terms and in the potential cost of conflict as measured in numbers of casualties suffered. The survivability of the force, as noted earlier, helps keep the latter affordable. But skyrocketing costs of modem weapons, combined with an oppressive national debt, make the former a dominant consideration in any debate regarding national military priorities. Versatility. Our Nation has turned toward a national military strategy that relies ever more heavily upon the concept of force projection. It must acknowledge that its military forces must perform missions that range from the most traditional to the most unfamiliar - from high-intensity combat, (potentially fought with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons) to low-intensity conflict, counterinsurgency operations, peacemaking, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and disaster relief (operations other than war). Military forces must expect and prepare to operate in any environment, whether it be desert or jungle, mountains or flatlands, metropolitan or rural, populated or desolate, tropical or polar. They must be prepared to fight as members of a coalition, as a joint force, or to “go it alone.” The Options. All of this is much to ask of a fighting force. What force options are there? The options are many, yet if the field is limited to the ground gaining combat arms, the number is reduced to a manageable few - and all are organic to either the U. S. Army or U. S. Marine Corps. For purposes of comparison, it is convenient and proper to consider each type of force on relatively equal levels of organization; battalion level serves this purpose well. 18 ARMOR - November-December 7993

Basically, the options are: Special Operations Battalions, Light Infantry Battalions, Airborne Infantry Battalions, Air Assault Infantry Battalions, Mechanized Infantry Battalions, Tank Battalions, Cavalry Squadrons, and Marine Amphibious Battalions. Each type battalion has unique capabilities and characteristics. Taken together, they provide to the nation an extraordinary variety of military options to consider if and when military action should be contemplated. Each has a vital role in military missions of every kind, from operations other than war (00“) to high-intensity conflict. But which type (or types), forces best meet the requirements established above? Which best incorporates the essential qualities of Lethality, Survivability. Agility, Staying Power, All WeatherlClimate Capability, Dependability, Strategic Mobility, Economy, and Versatility? Lethality. Measured in terms of weapons system effectiveness, it is the attack helicopter, the Abrams tank, and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle that head the list. All have the proven ability to detect, identify, and acquire targets well beyond the range of comparable enemy weapons systems. All can effectively engage with supporting indirect fires - and the field artillery, responding with MLRS and Paladin, unquestionably delivers the most devastatingly lethal fms of all. The Apache helicopter and the Abrams tank are able to engage and kill enemy systems at ranges that exceed the enemy’s capability to even detect their presence. Best Aviation, Armor, Mechanized Infantry, Armored Cav-Survivability. Mounted combined arms forces, especially tank-mounted, are survivable where others are not. No other arm can dream of withstanding the ferocity of modem combat. Dismounted infantry (light, airborne and air assault), special operations forces, and aviation are vulnerable to artillery fire. Even when tanks sustain damage, their redundant systems often allow them to continue their mission at full capacity. The tank is also the alry. best protected platform on any nuclear, biological, or chemical battlefield And with a citizenry grown accustomed to having its armed forces win wars rapidly with absolute minimum casualties, the force protection capability of the tank is of paramount importance. Best: Armor, Armored Cavalry, Mechanized Infantry, Aviation. Agility. Superior tactical and operational mobility are the hallmrlrks of aviation and modem combined arms forces. Air assault infantry has supe-nor mobility, but relinquishes it when it dismounts from its helicopter transport. In the realm of command and control, digitization of the battlefield holds vast promise, and intervehicular information systems (IVIS) are already a reality in the M1A2 tank. Best: Aviation, Armor, Armored Cavalry, Mechanized Infantry. Staying Power. Only U. S. Army armored forces are designed for continuous operations, with organic logistics capabilities built into battalion-sized maneuver elements. U. S. Marine Corps battalions are by design provided with only minimal support; their specialty is forced entry operations that permit Army forces to follow quickly behind and continue the fight for as long as necessary. Light infantry, lacking transport of,its own, is heavily dependent upon supporting logistical units to keep it supplied and to move it around For aviation, armor, and all infantry, day turns into night with little diminution of combat effectiveness; if anything, the tank and attack helicopter are even more awesome at nighttime. Of those two, however, only the tank can stay in uninterrupted contact to press the attack. The helicopter must break contact often to rearm, refuel, and refit the crew. Best Armor, Armored Cavalry, Mechanized Infantry. All WeatherlClimate Capability. Armored forces are virtually unaffected by weather and climate. The same cannot be said of helicopter, airborne, or air assault forces, which often cannot respond due to high winds of poor visibility. On the second day of the ground war in Operation DESERT

STORM the day of heaviest fighting for many units - adverse weather conditions kept absolutely all aircraft on the ground just when they were most needed. It was on that day that the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment fought the Battle of 73 Easting and the Third Armored Division slammed into the Tawakalna Division of the Republican Guards - without air support. Best: Armor, Armored Cavalry, Mechanized Infantry, Light In-Dependability. Fortunately, all ground combat forces demonstrate ex-traordinaq dependability. There was once a time when the operational readiness of armored and mechanized units could legitimately be questioned, but no more. During Operation DESERT STORM, the Third Armored Division - 350 tanks strong - lost not a single one to maintenance failure. Best: All Infantry, Armor, Armored Cavalry. Strategic Mobility. Getting to the fight in keeping with a force projection strategy is of paramount importance. There is no more deployable force in the world than the 82nd Airborne. and light infantry battalions are equally ready. The Marine Corps can respond nearly as quickly, able to place amphibious forces practically anywhere in the world with little notice. Mounted combined arms forces, though transportable by air, require too much strategic airlift than can reasonably be allocated, and must be bansported by sea. Helicopters are air transportable but require considexable preparation time. Best: Special Forces, Airborne Infantry, Marine Amphibious, Light Infantry. Economy. This category is easy... or is it? In strict monetary terms, there is no better bargain than light infantry when it comes to outfitting and manning combat battalions. Measured in terms of combat power, however - how much “bang for the buck” the tax dollar buys - the matter is not quite so clear. Only four percent of the Army’s total personnel strength is allocated to Armor/Cavalry, yet Armor fantry. - -

- - provides in return more than 40 percent of the Army’s ground combat power. And in terms of materiel costs, one only need compare the price of an AH-64 Apache with that of an M1A2 Abrams. Best: Special Forces, AU Infantry, Armor and Armored Cavalry. Versatility. For so long have we d e signed and fielded forces with special capabilities in mind - (Special Forces, Airborne, Air Assault as examples) - that we tend to forget that we created them to meet a special need. They each possess a unique military skill that serves its specific purpose. But their very uniqueness limits their utility across the continuum of military conflict. Each may rightfully claim exclusive dominion over a particular military skill, yet none can properly claim exclusive dominion over any particular terrain, theater of operations, or type of warfare. The traditionally conventional forces - light infantry, mechanized infantry, armor and cavahy - configured for much less specialized a purpose, have far greater utility across the entire specbum. No one questions the value of mounted forces in high-intensity conflict, but tend to neglect their value on other battlefields. The presence of conventional mounted combined arms forces has been instrumental in the conduct of Operation RESTORE HOPE, a peacemaking operation. Only one platoon of Sheridms participated in Operation JUST CAUSE, but they expended every last main gun round they carried, a clear indicator of mounted force value in MOW. Another example is provided by the 4th Battalion, 6th Infantry (Mechanized), 5th Infantry Division, which was given what was arguably the most dangerous and difficult of missions in the entire operation. And tanks in a jungle? What about Vietnam? Best: Mechanized Infantry, Armored Cavalry, Armor. Return to the Basics. Still, the arguments must always return to the matter of combat power. The unleashing of overwhelming combat power has come to be the American way of war. This principle was one of the bases upon which we formulated our campaign plans in Panama (Operation JUST CAUSE) and Iraq (Operation DESERT STORM. It presupposes complete domination of all battlespace - land, sea, and air. ‘The facts of war are often in total opposition to the facts of peace. The efficient commander does not seek to use just enough means, but an excess of means. A military force that is just strong enough to take a position will suffer heavy casualties in doing so; a force vastly superior to the enemy’s will do the job without serious loss of men.”’ Again - brute force counts. Curiously, the very words “Power Projection” present a significant challenge to national military strategic planners. The most overwhelming combat power available to the Nation is embodied most fully in those military forces that are most difficult to project. Conversely, the most easily projected forces are those that wield the bare minimum amount of combat power. In simple language, it would seem to boil down to this: We can either deploy relatively vulnerable forces very quickly to wherever they are needed, or we can instead deploy a potent force that takes somewhat longer. But as Genenl Nathan Bedford Forrest observed, the secret is to “get there fmt with the most” By opting for anything less than the mounted combined arms team, you might indeed “get there first,” but you by no means have “the most” until the mounted combined arms team arrives. The answer is not to send light forces in harm’sway simply because we can get them there on commercial aircraft; the answer is to acquire and maintain the wherewithal to get the mounted combined arms forces there first alongside them. That means increased sealift, airlift, and a U. S. Army heavy brigade, with all accompanying logistical support, prepositioned aboard ships at sea. There is no panacea in war. No one branch of service is expendable any more than it is superior. From submarine-launched cruise missiles to SOF, each contributes something vital to the nation’s defense. Nevertheless, it is the mounted combined arms forces that constitute the heart and soul of our Nation’s military forces. “Armored troops are multi-purpose forces. Just as the tank is their backbone, the armored troops are themselves the backbone of the entire ground forces... Annor is the essence, it is in the center, it is the backbone and the power of war. Armor is not a subcontractor and it does not operate in the margins. Armor is the fist.”3 And that’s the way it should remain. Notes ‘T. R. Fehrenbach. This Kind 4 Wur: A Stdy ia Unprepredness (New York: Maanillan, 1963). ’Mark Watson in his official history of WWII, as quoted by COL (Ret.) Harry Summers, Washington Times, 28 January 1993, p. (3-4.) (Italics added.) 3MG (Ret) Tal. Israeli Defense Forces, 5 May 1993. in a presentation to the Armor Cm-ferem at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Colonel Donald N. Elder is a 1971 graduate of the U. S. Military Academy. A graduate of Armor Officer Basic Course, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, Command and General Staff College, and Inter-American Defense College, he holds a Master of Arts Degree in Spanish Language and Literature from Middleburg College. He has served as assistant professor of Spanish in the Department of Foreign Languages, USMA; aide-de-camp to USCINCSO,

Panama; XO, 3d Battalion, 70th Armor, Ft. Polk, La.; operations officer, USMILGP, El Salvador; and commander, 3d Battalion, 70th Armor, Ft. Polk. He is currently the Director, Office of the Chief of Armor, Ft. Knox, Ky. 20