Direct Fire Planning

by Major Derek MIIIer and Captaln Rick Avema A unit must be engaged in accordance with a definite plan. It must not be permitted to drijl aimlessly into battle. -InfMry In Battle introduction Our doctrine provides no clear procedure specifying how direct fire is planned or controlled, leaving company team commanders in a dilemma. To a limited extent, there are techniques or methods that can assist the commander in controlling his fires in the offense or the defense. This article will discuss these concepts, principles, and techniques, and offer a logical procedure for a commander to follow in developing his fire plan. This plan must follow a logical process, based on MEl’T-T, that maximizes the principles of fire control for each unique situation. Concept The ultimate goal of direct fire control is to mass fires, but the concept of massing direct fires is widely misunderstood. Frequently, it is mistaken for volume. Volume of fwes does not equal massing of fires. Massing of fires is defined by the terminal effect on the enemy, not the number of systems fving or the number of rounds fired. Mass is not parking vehicles hub to hub and all fuing at the same target. If every vehicle in a CO/ru engages a single target simultaneously with five rounds per system, volume is achieved; mass is not. Rather, the result is overkill, which wastes ammunition and may allow other unthreatened enemy weapons systems to engage the CO/Iu and inflict heavy losses. Massing fires means placing accurate fires on multiple enemy threats simultaneously. Firing at multiple targets in depth prevents the enemy from dealing with any single thnxt and maneuvering or massing his fires against it. An enemy forced to respond to multiple threats simultaneously cannot mass against any single threat without ignoring another. As we force the enemy to face multiple t h t sand divide his efforts against each, we shatter his command and control, divide his mass, and - relatively - increase O W. The fire control plan must allow the commander to focus and distribute the fires of all available friendly systems at all critical points, but especially at the most dangerous targets. Fires distributed throughout the enemy’s formations or positions will destroy his systems, force him to react to the effects of our fires, and make him lose the initiative. Developing a C o r n fire plan to mass fires is based on the factors of MEIT-T. The commander must fully understand his mission, the enemy, terrain, own troops, and time. To achieve the required m a s to accomplish his mission, the commander may have the majority of the force fight to get key systems in position where they can unquestionably influence the critical point. For example, a mech CO/Iu may have the BFV platoons fight for key terrain, allowing the tank platoon (main effort) to occupy a position where it can accomplish the CO/Iu mission of suppressing an

MRP.

The basic objective of fwe control at the company level is for the commander to control the fires of platoons and to mass them on the enemy. In order to mass fires, the C O m fire control plan must clearly focus platoons on the enemy, to distribute the fires of the C O F lover different parts of enemy formations or positions. Additionally, it must allow the commander to shift the fires of platoons to different enemy threats as initial targets are destroyed or the situation changes. At the same time, the toons to fight their own battle against clearly defined targets so the platoon can exercise its own fire control. Distributing fires is the process of engaging different enemy threats simultaneously, to avoid overkill by multiple systems engaging the same targets, and to degrade the enemy’s ability to deal with single threats one CO/Iu fire plan should allow pla- at a time. Proper distribution ensures critical targets are engaged first, and the enemy is engaged laterally and in depth. It determines which weapons will fm at which targets, and in what ordm fires will be initiated and sequenced. For example, instead of the entire COm firing at the same or closest vehicle in an MRP, fms are distributed so each platoon fires at a different vehicle, engaging the entire MRP simultaneously. To properly distribute fires, the fms must be focused of oriented on the area of the desired distribution. Focusing fires means accurately directing fires to hit specific targets, points, or areas, and is the most difficult task of controlling fires. The commander focuses fires by clearly conveying instructions (either preplanned, or hasty) to direct the fires of individual platoons on specific targets or areas that support his plan for distribution. For example, in the defense, the commander might focus one platoon on the left MRP in an MRC, and another platoon on the center MRP, etc. Platoons must be able to recognize the point at which to focus their fires. Failure will result in multiple platoons engaging the same targets, while other targets are not engaged. Focus is accomplished through the use of recognizable control measures that platoons can see and understand. Control measures to focus fms can be friendly-, enemy-, or terrain-based Proper training, unit SOPS, and thorough planning are required to achieve successful focus. Training develops standard methods and a common language to describe control measures. OPORDs and rehearsals must paint the visual picture of how the commander wants the fms focused and What the platoons will see and use to focus their fms. Shihing fins is the process of refocusing weapons systems to change the distribution of fires as targets are destroyed, or as the situation changes (i.e. the introduction of new forces on the battlefield). At the CORM level, this is accomplished by shifting the fms of platoons and focusing them on new areas to maintain the desired distribution. The commander must be able to accurately shift the required number of systems by identifying how to distribute fires and focusing platoons on new targets. The objective of a platoon fm plan is essentially the same as a C O m fire plan; however, the platoon leader is distributing, focusing, and shifting the fms of either sections or individual systems. Once the COD34 commander focuses the platoon on a specific area, the platoon leader must then distribute, focus. and shift his fms to mass fires on specific targets and be prepared to shift the platoons fms to anew area as directed by the commander. Platoon fire plans should include details of how a sustained rate of fm will be maintained (fire techniques), and types of weapons or ammunition, as applicable. Platoon leaders should follow the same logical process as the commander in developing platoon fire plans. Prlnclples of Fire Control When developing a direct fm plan, the commander should attempt to maximize the principles of direct fire control. These principles are discussed in FMs 71-1, 23-1 and 17-12-1. Although the description and definition varies slightly between references, the general concepts are the m e. Paraphrased from the above manuals and expanded to CORM level, the principles of dmct fire are:. Avoid target overkill.. Use each weapon system in its best. Concentrate on long range targets. role.. Take the best shots and expose only those combat vehicles actually needed to fm.. Destroy the most dangerous targets first. Avoid target overkill. The direct fm plan must minimize engaging targets that axt already destroyed or disabled. Avoiding overkill allows friendly weapons to engage multiple enemy targets simultaneously, saves ammunition, and prevents the unnecessary exposure of friendly combat vehicles. Avoiding overkill is key in defensive operations, but also important in the offense. It is best accomplished by a fire plan that evenly distributes fms by providing a clear technique to focus fires. Use each weapon system in its best role. Different weapons systems and types of ammunition have specific characteristics which maximize their capability to kill specific enemy weapons systems at different ranges. The direct fire plan should direct the use of specific friendly weapons systems against specific enemy systems. Commanders can accomplish this by planning to initiate, sequence and distribute fms based on the factors of MElT-T. For example, the commander might initiate with TOWS against tanks at 3750 meters, and at 2500 meters have tanks engage tanks and BFVs kill BMPs. While it may not assist in focusing fires, designating engagement priorities may help to maximize this principle. Destroy the most dangerous targets first bemuse they pose the greatest threat to friendly forces. A thorough estimate process considering range, terrain, and weapons capabilities allows the commander to determine which enemy weapons systems he must destroy first. Detailed planning is the preferred method to maxi- 6 mix this principle: however, in actions on contact, engagement priorities followed by a hasty estimate and FRAGO (fire command) may have to suffice. In either case, proper focus, distribution, and fuing first are key to maximizing this principle. It is important to remember that each of these principles of fire control are applicable at crew/soldier through C O m level. At the crew level, the most dangerous target may frequently be the closest, and the same enemy vehicle may be the most dangerous target for multiple crews in the CO/TM. Leaders must control fires to simultaneously engage different dangerous targets. Allowing individual crews to select their own most dangerous target will result in multiple systems engaging the same enemy vehicle, while leaving other dangerous targets free to maneuver and engage friendly forces. Concentrate on long range targets to gain the advantage of stand-off and destroy enemy systems prior to coming under the effects of their fire. The commander uses this principle to his advantage by engaging with weapons systems matched to the capabilities of his crews, because not every crew can hit consistently at maximum range. During the development of the direct fm plan, the commander determines the range at which to engage, based on weapons capabilities versus gunner/crew proficiency. Maximizing this principle will increase the C o r n ’ s engagement window, and protect the force by destroying enemy targets before they can bring effective fire on friendly forces. Take the best shots and expose only those combat vehicles actually needed to fire. This maximizes the probability of hitting and killing enemy targets and protects friendly forces as long as possible. The commander may maximize this principle by a detailed estimate pracess that develops a plan to sequence and time his fire and maneuver in accordance with the factors of ME’IT-T. Control of vehicles firing, according to a definite plan, will allow the commander to determine the number of systems required for most engagements and order only those systems to engage. For example, as the CRP enters the CO/Iu engagement area, only one platoon is required to destroy it. If the commander has considered this in his estimate, he is prepared for this event. As the CRP enters the EA, the commander directs only the platoon in the best position to kill the CRP to engage, and other platoons remain hidden. Fire Control Many of our doctrinal references contain sections on fire control. Few of them completely agree on planning, practice, or terminology. F M s 71-1, and 23-1 list some or all of the following in their sections on fire control: 71-2, 71-123, 7-7J. 17-15, 17-12-1. Target Reference Points (l”s). Engagement Areas @As). Fire Patterns. Fire Techniques. Fire Commands. Engagement Wonties The above terns are found in dac-trinal references as techniques or methods to control fire. They are actually tools to be used by a commander in applying or developing techniques to control fires. These tools may be used to help control fires, either individually or in combination; however, they do not alone constitute a fire plan. The actual fire plan must explain how the commander intends to use these tools to direct his fires against the enemy, and must include the technique to be used to distribute and focus fires. Doctrinal references do not completely agree how each of these tools are used, or even what they are, but here are some basic ideas. The Target Reference Point is a control measure that assists the commander in focusing fms at a specific point on the ground. TRF% are generally terrain oriented, but can be oriented on the enemy. The TRP aids in defining engagement areas, trigger lines (points), or maximum engagement lines (MELs). Trigger lines are specific places on the ground that are tied to an event in the fire plan ( k c t or indirect): crossing these lines by a friendly or enemy element triggers the firing event. MELs are the defined limits on the ground for the maximum range of a given direct fm weapon. MELs are based on the location of the weapon(s) and the planned maximum range of engagement. Commanders can establish TRPs using a man-made visual aid (as in defensive engagement mas), an existing temin feature, an enemy position or formation, or any other feature recognizable by platoons during the direct fire fight. TRPs may be designated during a battle by selecting a recognizable feature, or creating one (e.g. a burning enemy vehicle, or a ground burst illumination round). TRPs should be easily recognized by the crews of the weapons systems whose fires they control. This is a ME=-T determination based on visibility, weather, weapons ranges and capabilities, etc. (e.g. tank and BFV TRPs should be visible through thermal sights to allow the weapons to engage in thermals, day or night). Engagement areas are terrain oriented control measures. An EA is the area on which the commander plans to focus his fires according to his fire plan. Engagement areas may be either offensive or defensive. Although a company EA may assist in limiting the fires of the O / l M to a specific space, it does not assist the commander in focusing or distributing the fires of platoons. Engagement areas are selected based on the estimate process. Fire Patterns are an enemy-oriented method of engagement by which focus and distribution are determined by the enemy's formations or location. Fire patterns determine the specific distribution and focus in relation to the enemy in both the offense and defense. The fire patterns are: frontal, cross, depth, and (near, far, left and right). Several manuals list fire patterns or discuss their use at platoon level. None, to include FM 71-1. does little more than hint application at the CO/ru level. Fire patterns are equally effective to control the fves of platoons within a Corn, and are essentially the sane as they are for platoons. Note: The use of crossfire may achieve an oblique angle of attack, and hit the enemy from an unexpected direction; however, it may also decrease the actual effective range at which you engage the enemy, while providing the enemy an oblique angle of attack. Its use should be based on the factors of MElT-T, not SOP for every situation. Fire techniques are methods of controlling the volume or the rate of fire, and the numbers of vehicles fung. differ on the exact terms and definitions but, as synthesized from the above references, the fire techniques are: observed, simultaneous (volley), alternating, and mass. The method to use is a h4ETT-T determination based on the balance required between accuracy, control, and rate of fire. Although fire techniques may be applied at the platoon or company level, they should normally be used only by platoons to control rate of fue once as-FMs 17-12-1, 23-1, 17-15, and 71-1 signed a clear mission (task and Purpose) by the corn. Fire Commands are verbal orders used to control direct fires. They are standard for-.:.,!,".:..

A1 Rd-Fw, White-Nm Simultaneous At my command Standby

FIRE!

A2 Simultoncous At my comrmmc Standby gure 1. CO/TM Fire Commands and Fire Pattern: mats, rapid and concise, that articulate the fuing instructions for single or multiple engagements. Fire commands are not used just once to initiate an engagement, but repeated or adjusted by the commander throughout the course of the battle. At the company team level, it is vital that commanders not assume that the command of 'Fire!" issued to his CoD'M will suffice to synchronize his unit fight. If this one command is the extent of the CO/ru fire control, the result may be all elements fuing at whatever they feel appropriate - usually the closest or most easily detected target. In this case, fire distribution has failed and mass cannot be achieved. Fire command procedures must be rehearsed and understood by all. FMs 23-1 and 17-12-1 contain a detailed explanation of fire commands for crews, sections ing format for a company fire command to be used when two or more sections or platoons fires must be synchronized: and platoon^. FM 71-1 has the fOllOW- *Alert (call sign) *Weapon ammunition (optionel, MEIT-T) *Description *Location/target, dr method to focus ControUpattem technique (optional, *Execution (my command, your command, event) The major difference between a CO/ru fire command and a platoon or lower level fire command is that the CO/lM must control the fires of multiple elements with different weapons systems (e.g. tank and BFVs). COm fire commands should platoon tires concentrate more on ensuring platoons are accurately focused and understand their portion of the COKM distribution, and less on ammunition, weapons, and fire techniques/patterns. Platoons will add the appropriate ammunition, weapons, etc. if they understand the focus and distribution. An example of a CO/ru fire command to control multiple platoons against multiple targets is shown in Figure 1, (the commander has omitted weapons and ammunition because the platoons already know that areas A1 and A2 are TOW/120-sabot E& based on range). Engagement priorities are a means to distribute and focus fires in which specific friendly weapons are assigned priorities of engagement against specific enemy weapons systems by type. This tool attempts to maximize the principle of using each weapon in its best role. Engagement priorities are assigned as a product of the estimate process. not by SOP. It is important to note that engagement priorities may assist in controlling fires in some situations, but may not be effective in every situation. Engagement priorities alone do not constitute a fire plan. Commanders should not rely solely on this technique. Experience shows it is frequently difficult to identify targets by type, particularly at extended mges. Failure to identify targets by type is almost always a contributing factor to fratricide, which demonstmtes the difficulty of target identification by type on the battlefield. At close range (less than 1500 meters) tanks can probably be identi- a fied from BMPs and BRDMs, but little more: the difference between C2 vehicles and other vehicles is nearly impossible to determine at extended ranges through a thermal sight. Procedure The standard commander’s estimate is a procedure applicable for every mission. It provides a logical process which guides planning at every level and in every situation. The estimate process (ME‘IT-T) guides direct fire planning in conjunction with and to support the scheme of maneuver. Using the estimate process, the commander develops a scheme of maneuver as described in FM 71-1, Chapter

2. During the development of the scheme of maneuver - and particularly actions on the objective - the direct fm plan is designed to accomplish the mission. During mission analysis, it is crucial that the C O m commander determines his unique mission (task and purpose). He must understand how his mission fits into the TF plan, the TF commander’s desired effect of the CO/Ius fires, and the higher commander’s intent. This guides the planning of the entire operation. For example, TM A’s mission is to sup press a specific enemy force to prevent it from placing fires on TM B while TM B assaults. TM A’s mission analysis should yield the following results to guide the direct fire planning process: *The desired effect of TM A’s fires is to place fires simultaneously on all enemy elements in the assigned area capable of engaging TM B *TM A does not have to destroy enemy weapons systems, only prevent them from placing effective fires on TM B *Enemy systems which cannot range the friendly force do not necessarily have to be suppressed *As TM B maneuvers, it will come within range of other enemy weapons and TM A will subsequently be required to suppress these systems. In this example, the TM A commander would plan his fires differently than the TM B commander, who would plan to destroy the force he is assaulting. Detailed Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (PB) - considering the weather, terrain, disposition of the enemy, his strength, and likely COAs - is the foundation for developing a fm plan. Based on this information, the commander determines the likely disposition of the enemy force, and plans how he will distribute, focus, and shift to mass his fires. The enemy situation dictates where and how to direct fires, and which fms to use. If the commander intends to engage most dangerous targets first, engage targets with a high probability of hit, concentrate on long range targets, and use each weapon or platoon in its best role, he must be able to determine each of these factors in relation to that enemy and that terrain. For a more complete discussion of IPB, see, FMs 71-1, 71-2, and 71-123, chapter 2, or FM 34-130. FM 17-12-1 discusses the relationship between IPB and the fue plan: however, it leads us to believe that the TF level IPB by the S2 goes directly to the platoon leader for incorporation into his fire plan. In pm, this is true. Platoons do consider IPB in their plan, but what is missing in our direct fm doctrine is the role of the commander in processing the S2’s IPB products before the platoon gets them. The COD34 commander must analyze the information provided to him by the TF S2 and determine how the enemy will fight, given his unique situation. For the purposes of direct fire planning, he must answer several specific questions regarding how the enemy will fight. For an offensive fire plan, the commander must determine as a minimum: *How long the enemy has been in position (the degree of defensive preparation) *The location of enemy EA and which systems can hit where *Key terrain considerations in and around the enemy’s BP, including any terrain that may be used to control fire. Specifically, what is the actual key terrain for the CO/TM versus the TF? *The location of enemy weapon systems by type (tank, BMP, dismounts, etc.) down to individual vehicle location. This last item is key in controlling and directing fires to maximize the principles of fire control; specifically, to ensure most dangerous targets are engaged first, and that the proper rys-tems are used to engage them *Expected range of engagement. (Thio helps the commander determine at what range to boresight and zero, and what range to index as battlesight.) *Friendly avenues of approach *Location of enemy obstacles *Location and avenues of approach for enemy reserves. For a defensive fm plan, the commander must determine as a minimum: *Enemy avenues of approach *Enemy rate of march, (which determines how quickly the enemy will enter and cross the EA) *Key terrain at the CO/TM level that will allow for an advantage on specific avenues of approach *What formation(s) the enemy m’ll use, and at what point he is likely to change formation *Expected range of engagement. (By considering the EA the CO/TM plans to fire into, the commander can determine ranges to zero, and index range for battlesight) *When the enemy will begin engaging *Use of enemy indirect fires, (effect of the fire plan) *Tactics that the enemy will use, (firing lines, etc.) *Where the enemy is likely to dismount and assault *Where there is deadspace, and how it can it be covered by adjacent platoons. A thorough IPB allows the commander to determine his PIR. The selection of PIR is critical to the commander in determining the enemy’s COA. The goal of IPB is not to guess exactly what the enemy is going to do, but rather to determine what he might do, or is capable of. This analysis may yield several possible COAs for the enemy. The commander selects his PIR to provide him information which allows him to determine which COA the enemy will actually execute. For example, if the commander has two AoAs in his area, it is possible that the enemy may use either. For the commander to merely guess which one the enemy will attack on, and design his plan for just that AoA, would be a mistake. Rather, he determines the indicators that would signal one or the other AoA. He then designs his PIR to help him make the determination. In this case, presence of tanks on either AoA would indicate that a MRC or larger force, rather than just a CRP, has been committed in that AoA. Additionally, a FASCAM or persistent chemical agent on either AoA would indicate that the enemy did not intend to come that way. Considering this, the commander would select these indicators as PIR to help him decide which AoA the enemy will attack on, and adjust his fire plan accordingly. Once the commander has determined these factors for his specific mission, he can plan which enemy systems to engage, from where, and in what order. The commanders IPB is continually updated as the situation changes, and his fire plan (and scheme of maneuver) should change accordingly. One of the most important, but most frequently overlooked steps of the estimate is the consideration of friendly troops. To ensure adequate direct fire planning, the commander must consider the following factors concerning the available forces, before developing his scheme of maneuver and direct fire plan: *Task organization, available woapon systems, InaintOnMCO, and ammunition status. (A platoon with only two operational vehicles should not be assigned a mission as critical as a p l a toon with four.) *Training level of his tom *Affect of weather and battlefield obscuration on his forces (i.a if tanks and BFVs can shoot through smoke or darkness, will Dragons and small arms have the same capability? Are we attacking into the sun? Will It effect our target acquisition?) *Number of rounds (length of time) bo-fore weapons must be reloaded (1.0. how many TOWS are available to fire? How long will it take to reload? Who can reload? How many tank rounds are In the ready rack? How many 25- mm rounds are uploaded? How long will it tako to reload?. Weapons control staus. What & the appropriate weapons control status for my COfrM, and how will I control it?. Support available from othsr units. Combat support assets available, Including type and quantity of ammunition, etc. Combat service support available and rsquired. The commander must consider friendly troops when he develops his plan. For example, if the commander knows that he has only three operational tanks in one of his tank platoons, and each has 17 rounds in the ready rack, that means that platoon has 51 rounds ready to fire (ready load). Additional rounds will have to be loaded from the semi-ready rack or from prestock, both of which are time consuming. This consideration must enter into the commander's planning process, because it helps him determine the rate of fue his unit can sustain over time. Based on this analysis, he may want to include a reloading plan so one platoon will continue to fire while another platoon stops firing to replenish their ready load. This consideration applies at platoon level also. It is applicable for BFVs, tanks, and other weapons systems. Additionally, the commander should consider the training level of his crews and platoons. Platoons and crews should be d g n e d tasks at ranges they can reasonably be expected to hit. For example, an M1 tank crew firing Distinguished has an 86 percent probability of hit/kill with training sabot against a T-72 frontal at 2000 meters: an average crew has a probability of 62 percent.1 Although service ammunition in both Mls and M2s has a determined maximum range capability, the training level of the crews (reticle aim, et.) may not be at the Same level. Considering this, the commander would develop his fire plan and assign missions to platoons based on the probability of their hitting at a given range. Weapons control status (WCS) is an important command and control consideration. Careful planning may assist in preventing fratricide by controlling when units are uploaded, and when they can shoot, This is also a consideration based on level of training. For example, when will tanks u p load around, and when will BFVs load rounds into the feeder? When will weapons be taken off safe? The commander should consider these factors and how he will communicate and control WCS in his fire plan. Time is also a consideration of direct fire planning. The commander must consider: *How long will H take the COm to achieve the desired effect of fires, (0.g. how much earlier must we arrive at the SBF than the company we will s u p Port)? *How long will we be able to sustain fires on the enemy? (e.g, based on the expected rate of fire and target density, especially for a suppressive mission, our ready load of ammunition will determine how long we can continue to fire, and ultimately, how long we can maintain a terminal effect on the enemy). *How long will it take for the enmy to cross the EA? *How much early warning will I haw for the enemy's CONAOA (When do we leave the hide position)? *When will the C O m be within rang. of enemy direct and indirect fires? *How long can we stay in position before enemy reaction (artillery, counter attack, direct fire, etc)? *How much time will there be between echelons? 10

Time considedons are key to every mission: failure to properly analyze time may result in a loss of synchronization. For example, the commander planning a support-by-fire mission with the task of suppress, must consider the amount of time his CO/zu will take to initially achieve suppressive fm on the enemy. Then, based on ammunition available and the enemy reaction to his fires, how long he can continue to effectively deliver suppressive fires? Arrival too late means the supported unit may come under effective enemy fires. Arrival too early may mean the CO/ru cannot continue fires long enough for the supported tern to achieve its mission. After the commander has analyzed the factors of METT-The is prepared to select courses of action and develop his concept of the operation (scheme of maneuver). The direct fire plan should be made in conjunction with the scheme of maneuver because they are inseparable. If not developed together, each is likely to fail separately. When considering COAs, the Commander must consider how his fire plan and maneuver will work against the enemy’s likely courses of action, and how the enemy will react to the effects of our fires and subsequently alter his come of action (e.g., will our fires cause him to orient on and assault our position: if so, are we preprrred for this?). The commander selects the best COA. This analysis forms the basis of the concept of the operation. From it he assigns missions (task and purpose) to platoons. Through course of action analysis and updated intelligence, the scheme of maneuver (including direct fire plan), scheme of fires (indirect), and other portions of the concept of the operation are refmed. The process should dso be followed for contingency missions or alternate and supplementary positions at the appropriate level of detail as time permits. A scheme of maneuver and supporting fire plan should be developed for each. When the direct fire plan is complete the commander should be able to answer the following questions: *What is our CO/TM mission and the desired effect of our fir-? *Where is the memy, or how will he enter our EA? *Where are his tanka or other dangerous weapons systems? *How will I determine which COA he haa selected? What is my PIR to determine his actions? *Where are we going to kill the enemy? *Where will we engage him from? *Which enemy systems do we want to *How will we initiate fires with each *Which weapons will fire first? *What will each engage? *What is the desired effect of fires from each platoon (platoon missions)? *How will we distribute the fires of platoons to engage the enemy laterally and in depth? *What will platoons focus their fires on? (How will platoons know where to engage? Will they be able to sue and understand the control measures)? *How will we mass fires to deal with multiple enemy threats and achieve the desired volume of fire? *Where will I be positioned to control fires? Can I see the battlefield from there? *How will we shift fires when necessary? How will we t o w our firas on new targets? *How will we deal with likely enemy reactions to our fires? *At what range will we boresight and zero weapons? What range will we index as battlesight for each weapons system? *How will we control weapons control status? When will we upload weapons? When will we take them off elec-tical and manual safe? *Does the plan avoid overkill? Use each weapon system in its bed role? Concentrate on long range targets? Engage targets that have a high probability of hit? Take the best shots? Expose only those vehicles needed? Destroy the most dangerous targets first? engage first? weapon system? Once the plan is complete and the commander is ready to issue his operations order, he must ensure that the OPORD clearly allows subordinates to understand the entire plan, including the control of direct fires. Because the control of fires involves spacial relationships between friendly and ‘ enemy units, it is important that the commander use graphic aids that allow soldiers to understand his visualization. Soldiers must understand how the enemy will fight, and the effects of the enemy’s fires. They must be completely familiar with the aspects of terrain in the area of operation, so it is not a surprise to them when they get there. The better the commander can visualize the enemy, terrain, and friendly units, the higher the probability that his unit will be able to execute the plan. If soldiers are not adequately prepared to fight on a specific piece of terrain against a specific enemy, each will come as a surprise, and no matter how good the original plan, they will not be able to execute it. Ideally. when soldiers finish OPORDs, mons and rehearsals, they should be prepared to fight the battle without looking at their maps or referring to their notebooks, as though they were fighting on familiar terrain. This internalization of the plan allows soldiers to fight the battle according to the plan without looking at maps, which frees them to fight their platoon or individual vehicle. Defensive Fire Planning Discussion The goal of a CO/Iu building the engagement area is to be able to mass two-thirds or more of the company’s firepower in any piut of that engagement area. The desired outcome is to destroy the maximum number of targets with the fewest rounds in the least amount of time. Continued on Page 39

Continued from Page 11 Distributing and focusing fires proprly are the most difficult tasks in the defensive fire plan. Without them, mass cannot be achieved, nor can fires be easily shifted. Without a proper distribution of fires and a clear, easily recognizable method by which to focus fires A2 at the desired point, numerous weapons will engage the same target while laving others free to maneuver. Defensive fire planning is difficult because most of the available tools employed to distribute and focus our fires are fixed on the terrain. They are static, emplaced, while we built our engagement area (TRPs, and the EA). The enemy forces, however, are not static; they will enter our EA and begin moving through it, and at some point, if we do not stop them, they will exit it. In defensive fire planning, the challenge is to maximize the principles of fire control and use our static fire control meassures to orient our fires on the enemy while they continue to move. Techniques Techniques are the way that we actually use the tools of fire control (TRPs, etc.) to focus and distribute fires on the enemy. There is no single technique to do this in the defense, but there are several to choose 6om. We discussed tools for controlling fires earlier. Tools ae of no use without away to use them. We don't want to shoot at a TRP. We want to shoot at the enemy near it; therefore, we must have away to use the TRP to focus our fires on the enemy. We will briefly discuss six possible techniques to control fires in the defense: Figure 2. Dividing the EA into Sections. Dividing the EA. Sectors. Closest TRP. Target array. Fire patterns. Quadrants. Which of these techniques to use is situationally dependent. The first defensive fire control technique is Dividing the EA. This technique uses terrain to focus and distribute fires. Once we have selected an EA that we believe the enemy will pass through during their attack, we divide it into geographical regions in which to focus and distribute our fires. The number of areas is a determination. For our example, we will use four divisions: two far, and two near, labeling them A1 (far left), A2 (far right), B1 (near left), and B2 (near right), respectively. The regions iue delineated on the ground either by marking boundaries (corners) with manually emplaced m s, by the use of available terrain that naturally divides the area (roads, etc.), or by other appropriate methods (obstacles, digging a furrow, etc.). This gives subordinates a basic orientation on which to focus fires, and assign primary and alternate areas of responsibility in the EA. Dividing the EA is generally predicated on range and terrain; the EA might be divided with afar area for TOWS. intermediate area for tanks and 25mm, and a near area for dismounted weapons. The use of this technique to focus fires is demonstrated in Figure 2. The left BFV PLT (Red) is responsible for A2 long range with TOWs, and B1 short range with 25mm. The right B M PLT, (Blue) has long range responsibility for A1 (TOW) and short range for B2 (25mm). The center tank platoon (White) has primary responsibility for B 1 and B2. In addition to- primary responsibilities, each platoon is assigned the alternate responsibility to fire into other areas of the EA, (i.e. Blue must be prepared to fire TOWs into A1 and 25mm into B2). If the EA has been built properly, and the vehicles positioned correctly, the majority of each Figure 3. Sectors of Fire Figure 4. Closest TRP Method the areas of the EA. The direct fire plan must focus and mass fires. avoiding overkill even if the entire enemy force is in one area of the EA. The area that his formations cover are situationally dependent, and will be different if MRBs or MRCs are in column, pre-battle, or battle formations. The Sector Technique for controlling fires is discussed in several doctrinal references, including FMs 71-1, 7-7J and 17-15. Sectors is a ternin-based technique that allows the commander to assign platoons responsibility for an area on the ground between two control measures (usually TRPs). This technique also allows the commander to Specify alternate areas of responsibility to each platoon. Sectors may also be used to designate right and left limits to avoid fratricide of adjacent units. Disadvantages of this method m that sectors do not provide the necessary flexibility and control required to accurately focus and distribute fires to achieve true mass. When platoons axe assigned sectors that do not completely overlap, the commander may be unable to focus two-thirds of his combat power in the m of the EA where the enemy is; if sectors do overlap completely, then fires are not appropriately distributed, and target overkill may result. Sectors are useful in assigning responsibilities for scanning and security, but are insufficient when used as the sole technique to control fires in the defense. See Figure 3. Another terrain-based technique, the Closest TRP method (Figure 4). allows the commander to plan fires or give fire commands based on the TRP closest to the enemy elements he de-Fig. 5. Enemy Formatlon Method sires to engage. In the fire comand to a platoon, he would include the type of enemy to engage, their distance, and cardinal direction from the closest TRP. Disadvantages of this method are there may be no l"sin close proximity in a large EA, and it may be difficult to control the fires of multiple platoons from the same TRP. Thus far, we have discussed t d based fire control techniques. Each _ _ Figure 6. Flre Patterns has the disadvantage of requiring the commander to rely on static terrain to focus and distribute fires while the enemy continues to move. There m several techniques that allow us to distribute and focus fires directly on the enemy as he progresses through the EA. These techniques are enemy-based and use the location of the enemy to mass fires. By using the enemy Target Amy, the commander can control the fires he assigns to each platoon by basing target allocation on a location within the enemy's formation (see Figure 5). Initial platoon targets may be assigned during the OPORD and then varied as the situation changes. The commander should plan for each likely enemy formation, and assign platoons responsibility for w e t s within each of the formations. This method is generally preplanned with a FRAGO to confm the enemy formation as it enters the EA, or as formations change. Fire commands are based on the IPB from the original plan. (e.g. Red, center MRC, tanks, then BMPs). Although this method solves the problem of orienting fires directly on the moving enemy instead of static terrain, it is not without its disadvantages. Once the enemy is taken under effective fire and begins to take losses, orderly formations will break up, and it will become hard to identify the original formation. This technique is useful to initially focus and distribute fires, but I Figure 7. Platoon Quadrants may require another method after the initial engagements. This method may be used to identify priority targets (tanks, C2, etc.) by their position in formations until formations break up. As discussed in the fire control section, C O m Fire Patterns utilize the same basic techniques as pattern f h g for platoons; however, instead of orienting platoons based on friendly locations, it focuses them on the enemy target array. Whether the enemy is in a tight formation or an unrecognizable mob, this technique assigns responsibilities based on the enemy's location from the apparent center of the 40

Planning and Preparation We will design a C O m fire plan using the procedures and techniques for fire control discussed above. For purposes of our example, we will use only primary positions and a primary engagement area. However in normal situations, alternate and supplementary positions and the appropriate EAs would also be considered. The first step in building our fife plan is to conduct the commander's estimate, which will be abbreviated for this example. See Figure 9. We are Team B, a Bradley infantry CO/lrm. Our task within the task force mission is to defend from BP20, to retain the AOA that bypasses the TF main EA, and to deny the enemy use of it. We are a TF supporting effort. Two tank teams defend from BPs to our left rear (southwest) to destroy the MRR in the TF main EA, Swan.

fires should be used to assist the TF main effort by attritting enemy dement. b d o n they reach EA Swan. Analyzing the TF S2 products and conducting a thor-ify many of the details of terrain, particularly enemy avenues of approach. Driving the EA from the enemy side will help determine which AOA he will use and his most likely COA when he enters the EA. As a mult of IPB, we determine: ough ground will CW- *We IC. k i n g an MRR with an objective to our rear (south). His desired route of march is through EA Swan. *The MRR is T72- md BMPl- 4 P W. *One mountad avenue of a p prooch enters our sector (MRR size); two exit (MRB size). *The enemy will travel at 20 kph. *Each MRB will be al approximately 95 percent strength with approximately 9 tanks and 29 BMPs. *He will attack 2 MRBs up, one back. His left MRB (east) will enter our EA in MRB battle, with MRCs in prebattle. MRCs will transition to battle at 1500m. *The MRB in our sector wiil attempt to suppress us with a firing line and allow the trail MRB to attack the flank of the tank team to our southwest. *He will engage at 2500m with tanks. We look at our troops: *Third Platoon has 2 BFVs and 8 dismounts. First Platoon has 4 BFVs and 15 dismounts. Each mech platoon has four Dragon trackers. The tank platoon has 3 tanks. HQ has 1 BFV. *All platoons have a full load of ammunition; ammunition for prostock is available. *Our B N crews a n capable of hitting TOW targets at max range and 25mm at 2500m; the tank platoon can be expected to hit at 2500m. *As many as 14 TOWS can be fired before reloading. *As many as 17 rounds per tank (51) can be fired from the ready rack, then they will have to get rounds from the semi ready rack; *Each BFV has 300 rounds uploaded (dl AP). After 300 rounds BFVs must reload. Time: *We will have 7 minutes to engage enemy as they cross my EA. *Scouts are in position to report the enemy’s formation and direction 15 minutes prior to the enemy reaching our EA. *There will not be time to reload lank ready racks and BFVs between first and second echelon battalions if both are committed into our sector; Considering these factors, we select a COA to defend from the flank of the EA with BFVs on the flanks and tanks in the middle. All dismounted infantry will be assigned to one platoon to defend our right flank. Platoons are assigned the following missions: *The tank platoon (main effort) defends from the center platoon BP to destroy enemy tanks and BMPs within range of the BP. *The northsast BFV platoon defends to retain, in order to Figure YO. Platoon BPs and CO/TM EAs deny access to the flank of our B P. *The aouth-west BFV platoon defends to destroy enemy tank platoons to prevent them from advancing within range of the BP. Once platoon missions are determined, the missions are assigned to platoons. Since Third Platoon has only 2 BFVs, they are assigned the retain mission and all dismounted infantry attached. The other two platoons are assigned the remaining missions. See Figure 10. We assume that our plan will generally work as developed, although we will build 42 flexibility through come of action analysis (wargaming) in the event of a change in the situation. Certainly, we cannot plan for every possible contingency, but we can plan for many of them. By seizing the initiative from the enemy, keeping him under simultaneous h t sand accurate fire, we force him to fight on our terms and limit the number of options open to him. Problems arise when the commander fails to plan for contingencies, because he never wargames the enemy courses of action against his own. This is the best way to get surprised. Before we decide how we will control our fires, we must figure out how we will use our fires. To do this, we must answer the questions from the process discussed earlier: *Our mission is to retain to deny a bypass. *The enemy (1 MRB) will entw our EA from the north in prebattle formation. *His tanks will lead, followed by BMPs. *We will kill him in the EA selected during our ground recon. *We will engage him from high ground on his front left flank. *We plan to destroy memy tanks initially from our m a range, before we are within their range. We want to use TOWS to accomplish this. Once we have destroyed all or most of his tanks, we then plan to concentrate on BMPs, and finally, other vehicles. *Once the enemy tanks are destroyed, or when they are within 2500m, our tanks will engage with main gun, and BFVs will switch to 25mm. With the general fire plan designed, we must utilize the tools and techniques that allow us to control our fires, (distribute, focus and shift our fires): *We will initiate TOW fires with a CO/TM fire command (back up is when two tank platoons cross the max engagement line); tank and 25mm fires will initiate at their max engagement line. *Having considered the way we believe the enemy will attack and our available techniques, we de cide initially to distribute fires based on formations. *When formations are no longer recognizable, we will use CORM pattern firing (because we believe the enemy will stay tight even when attritted). Tanks will take near targets, and BFV platoons far corners. *We will perform final destruction of the enemy by using the closest TRPs. *If anew force (a second enters our EA, we will use formations in the second echelon to Flaure 11. BFV Platoon Engages Enemy Tanks - engage with TOW from one or both BFV platoons, while tanks (and a BFV platoon) complete destruction of the initial elements. *Platoons will keep a constant volume of fire on their target area and cross talk if they can't cover it adequately. The commander will direct platoons to shift as the situation dictates. *The commander will position himself between the third BFV and tank p l a toons to assist the Third Platoon and control the battle. *If the enemy orients and delivers effective fire on our position, we will shift fires of tanks, then Third Platoon to that area. Having completed our estimate, and performed our recon, we have the basis of our fire plan. Our next step is laying out and defining our EA. We will assume that we have begun standard prepantion of our battle position IAW FM 71-1, chapter 4. Laying out the EA is important to the fm plan because it is during this step that the commander determines exactly where he plans to kill the enemy, where he will kill him from, and the control measures he will use to control his fires. For our example, we lay out our EA as in Figure 10. We divide our EA with A1 and A2 as a TOW EA, and B1 and B2 as a 25mm and tank main gun EA. We delineate the areas of the EA and our max engagement lines using TRPs 10-

50. Platoon leaders accompany the commander while he is reconning and building the EA. While in the EA, the commander should issue a detailed WARN0 explaining the enemy situation and his fire plan. He should point out general platoon locations, providing the platoon leader latitude in positioning his vehicles. Completing this step with leaders present allows platoons to begin a parallel planning process, even before the OPORD. They alrertdy know platoon and CO/Trul missions, the enemy situation, and the scheme of maneuver. This should enable them to prepare positions before the OPORD. The OPORD is issued when time permits. When the OPORD is issued, the commander clearly conveys his visualization of the battle, explaining how the enemy will enter the EA, and how he will be engaged from start to fm-ish. Using visual aids like a sand table, or a blow-up diagram, will help platoons clearly understand how to distribute and focus their fires. Platoons position their vehicles in order to maximize their ability to hit continued until the enemy is within artillery range. Execution We receive spot reports from the TF that the enemy is moving, and expected in one hour at EA Swan. We will be within artillery range in thirty minutes. Artillery prep of our positions begins: anon-persistent chemical agent is delivered with the artillery: 256 kits are initiated Fifteen minutes later, scouts report that the enemy is approaching the TF sector, (2 MRBs up, 1 m, MRBs are in column). Spot reports are passed to platoons. Ten minutes later scouts report lead MRBs transitioning to MRB prebattle (MRCs abreast in column). Spot reports are passed to platoons: The commander confirms the IPB from the plan. Second 256 kits read “all clear,” and the TF commander authorizes unmasking procedures. Five minutes later, the COKM observes dust clouds to the north of EA, scouts report MRCs changing to pre-battle. Commander issues initial fire command, “Red, Blue, Black 6; MRB in pre-battle entering EA-A; simultaneous fire-TOW; Red lefr 2 tank platoons. Blue right tank platoon; at my command; standby!” Platoons issue platoon fire commands to focus weapons to individual vehicles. The MRB enters the EA in pre-battle. See Figure

11. When the tank platoons are across the maximum engagement line by 400 meters, the commander issues the command, “Red, Blue Fire!” B M platoons engage with TOW. The team commander attempts to identify and engage the enemy commander’s tank and then assists Third Platoon. Platoons initiate fire: Figure 12. Platoons Engage Using Fire Patterns as Enemy Crosses 120mm/25mm MEL. UE

I I Figure 13. Red‘s Fires Shifted to B1. Figure 14. Tank Platoon Fires Shift to Assist Red. 44 several enemy tanks are destroyed. The MRB continues to move. More enemy tanks are destroyed, and the enemy’s formation begins to lose its identity. The MRB nears EA B1 and B2. The commander issues his next fire command: “Guidons, Black 6; simultaneous fire-sabot, White near-har, Red far-left, Blue far-right; at your command; out!” Platoons know they may issue the command to fire when the enemy target array crosses the maximum engagement line between areas A and B. Platoons issue fire commands and begin engaging as the enemy crosses into area B. See Figure 12. At 2 0 m, the MRB establishes a f n g line with the left MRC, while the right two MRCs turn towards Third Platoon and continue to assault. The commander issues the command, “Guidons, shift fire, Red lefr MRC, Bl; White near-half, right MRCs, B2; Blue far-haK fire!” Platoons engage. See Figure 13. At lOOOm the remnants of the right two MRCs begin to assault. Combined fires of tanks and Third Platoon heavily attrit the assaulting MRCs, now within range of dismounted weapons. All enemy tanks are destroyed. The commander shifts the fires of the tank platoon to assist First Platoon while Third and dismounts destroy remnants of assaulting MRCs, “Guidons, Black 6; shift fire; Blue B2; White, MRC in B1, tanks and right hay; Red, lejt-har; fire.” The combined fm of the C O m destroy most of the remaining elements. See Figure 14. Final destruction is accomplished by using the closest TRP method (see Figure 15). “Red, White, Black 6; White, 3 vehicles lOOOm southwest of TRP 30; Red. 2 vehicles 700m southeast of TRP IO.” After completing the destruction of the MRB, the COD’M requests instructions for the TF commander, and consolidates and reorganizes IAW unit SOP. This concludes the discussion of a defensive fire plan and its execution. In this example, we make several assumptions: The example considers a ”72- and BMPl-equipped MRR. BMPls have a 73-mm gun and AT3 missiles (slow and inaccurate under fire, with a 3000m range) and, therefore, considerably less dangerous than tanks. The T72s in our example were not equipped with reactive armor and, therefore, can be destroyed by TOW. Had we been fighting BMP2s with AT%, they would perhaps have been the most dangerous target at long range: if fighting tanks with reactive armor, the TOWS could not have been used with great reliability, and the plan would have had to support tanks destroying the T72s. Additionally, in this example, we make the assumption that engagement priorities are not an effective method to control fires unless the vehicles can be clearly identified. Beyond 2 0 m, the only reliable way to identify vehicle type is by position in the formation. At 2000m and closer, engagement priorities and target assignment based on vehicle type may be effective, depending on level of crew training and other factors. Each situation is different. This example is used to demonstrate the pro-Notes IDistinguished Crew firing data extrapolated from CAT competition data. Average tank crew firing data is based on a sample of lo00 tank crews firing on ‘IT VIII on Range 117 at Grafenwoehr.

cedure used to develop a defensive fire plan and discuss some of the techniques available to control fires. The authors will take up the development of the ofensive fire plan in the next issue of ARMOR. - Ed. Major Derek Miller is currently a student at CGSC. He graduated from USMA in 1982. He served his first tour in Germany with the 1- 16th Infantry as a rifle piatoon leader, scout platoon leader, and support platoon leader. Following IOAC, he served at Ft. Stewart, Ga., from 1986 to 1991, where he commanded a Bradley Infantry company and an HHC. Following DESERT SH I ELDSTORM, he served for two years as an observerkontroller on the Mechanized Infantry TF Trainer Team at the National Training Center. Captain Richard Averna is currently an observerkontroller on the TF Live Fire Combat Training Team at the National Training Center. He received his commission as an Infantry Officer from the New Mexico Military Institute and a BA from the University of Nebraska. He served in Germany with 4-4lst Infantry (M2), 2d AD (FWD) as a rifle platoon leader and asst. S3. He commanded a Bradley Infantry company in 2-7th Infantry, 24th ID (Mech) during both Operations DESERT SHIELD and

STORM.