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ARMOR · November-December 1992

The Counterreconnaissance Battle: Managing the Monster

Captain Kenneth L. Deal Jr
pp. 12–21Features1992

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The rising sun is a welcome sight to the scout platoon leader. He fought along, hard battle during the night, and three of his vehicles were destroyed. He can account for only three BRDMs destroyed, and he heard BMPs penetrate his screen but has no idea where they are now. The battalion commander gave him two tank platoons, each from a different company. He has not had contact with one of them all night and suspects they did not link up, as ordered. Enemy electronic warfare was effective, and made it impossible to use the radio ef/ectively. Of the other platoon, two of the four tanks went maintenance down, and he has no idea when they will be recovered, and the remaining two working tanks went back to the parent unit hours before daybreak to prepare defensive positions. Even if he knew where the enemy was, he couldn’t fight them now. Of his three destroyed vehicles, five scouts died of wounds because the closest company medics were 10 kilometers away and couldn’t find the scout locations on time. To top it off, the battalion commander wants to see him to learn why the fight was such a failure. I f he could only get a few hours sleep maybe, he could start to prepare for the next battle; not a chance, the battalion defensive order is to be issued mid-morning, and the scout platoon leader is expected to be there.

Unfortunately, this picture is all too frequent. A scout platoon leader eager to be successful is unable to, because he is given neither the assets nor the structure to accomplish the mission. It is ironic that what may be the most important task in the battalion defense is given the least attention. And it raises more questions about who should be responsible for the coun-terreconnaismce fight, or more accurately, the “security zone” battle. Given that the counterreconmiss-ance battle is the responsibility of the defending task force, one of the most successful techniques is for the TF commander to allocate a company-size element to fight the battle. The question then becomes, how does the company commander array his limited forces to ensure success throughout his sector? What should he know? What should he look for? What is considered successful for such 8 mission? And how does he organize for the fight?

The battalion commander should assign the counterreconnaissance battle, or the battalion “security zone,” to his most competent commander or his most effective company. If at all possible, it should be a habitual assignment so the unit has time to train (as a result of the unit METL). because the nature of this security mission requires a well trained unit with platoons and crews that can operate with little or no guidance. The battalion commander must give the security zone commander very specific guidance, which at a minimum must give the commander’s intent for that specific mission, what the battalion commander wants accomplished, and where he wants it done. The security ARMOR - zone commander must determine how. Once the assignment is given. the company commander is fully responsible for everything that happens in the sector. This may include any passage lanes or any forward obstacles. To ensure unity of effort, the company commander must control all assets in the security zone, including the scouts, mortars, and any MI assets forward. The S2 is always a critical part of the information cycle and will give the countemconnaissance commander PIRs. He will continue to monitor the company net to better template enemy forces and follow the recon battle. In the same vein, the counterrecon commander should supply the task force with IRs (information requirements) that can help win his fight. The S2 should no have operational control of any forward elements in the main battle area. When the commander conducts his leader’s recon, he must do a complete intelligence prepamtion of the battlefield, paying special attention to key terrain, avenues of approach (mounted and dismounted), engagement areas, and withdrawal routes. Much of this will come from the battalion S2. but he needs to look at the terrain and assess what will be critical for him, especially since the battle is usually fought at night or under limited visibility. If at all possible, the leader’s recon should be done with the battalion commander, the S2. the FSO, the security zone commander and the scout platoon leader. This will begin the synchronization process and the battalion commander will know exactly what to expect from his company forward. Additionally, the S2 can then brief the counterrecon plan as part of the R and S plan in the battalion operations order, and the subordinate commanders in the defense can prepare and adjust their own patrol plans accordingly. This will accomplish several things: decrease the risk of fratricide, alleviate the possibility of inaccurate spot reports, provide se-Organization of the Counterreconnaissance Force m 101 I I Figure 1 curity in depth, and facilitate reinforcing or reconstituting the security zone. The task force TOC must be an integral part of the fight, and the staff must understand that while the team is forward in the security zone, the countemon battle is the main effort. Of all the doctrinal defense techniques, the defense in sector will best accommodate the countemonnaissance force. It not only allows the most flexibility, but it is the most effective defense when fighting over a wide area, with multiple avenues of approach.

The counterrecon force should consist of a company team with the commander being the security zone commander.

Counterreconnaissance should be the primary focus of the company. Since night is most critical in security operations, leaders should minimize daytime distractors to the counterreconnaissance team. Detailed defensive prepamtion and lengthy task force-level rehearsals will draw away combat power. Distractors place additional strain on the team command structure, and can eventually lead to degraded command and control in the security zone. If the task force knows this, and makes allowances for the unique counterreconnaissance kam, many of the synchronization issues can be solved in an informal manner. Having the staff come forward to the security zone is an option. Additionally, the team commander must have a thorough understanding of the MBA, since the team will join the main defense once the security fight is won. Under most circumstances, the counterrecon force should be a company team, complete with its organic sup port to be located forward of the main battle area (see Figure 1). The battalion should consider allocating additional assets to assist in the mission. Once the mission is assigned, the commander will assume responsibility for all support to the forward elements, regardless of their parent unit. Only in this manner will the task force achieve depth throughout the security zone. Additionally, this will reduce the amount of W i c forward. Also, it will enable the commander to keep tight control of all activities in his sector. This becomes critical once the direct fm fight is joined and ARMOR - November-December 7992 Expected Direction of Enemy Attack The Companymeam Counterreconnaissance Force ---7 ------4 / / / </ 51: TANKS

\w/’ Secondary Engagement Area t=l A SCOUT SECT OPS

Primary Engagement Area enemy recon elements can take advantage of the potential confusion during limited visibility. Scouts are a pivotal element in this defense, acting as early warning and tracking the enemy forces throughout the zone. It is critical that the scouts do not fight, for once they join the direct fue fight, they lose their value as a surveillance element. There will be plenty of killing systems available for enemy destruction. The scouts must be myed in depth, and should not be considered static observation posts. With his section, the senior scout can conduct roving patrols in the sector, (mounted and dismounted) not only to aid security, but also to ensure that enemy recon does not have the advantage of going to ground and selecting the time and method it will move. The scouts need to be able to follow the enemy forces until they are destroyed. Obviously, this is a high risk mission, and the risk of fratricide is uncomfortably high; however, the security zone cannot afford to let elements slip by or just assume that the battle handover is completed. In the morning, the security zone commander must be able to account for all enemy vehicles by counting their burning hulks (proper identification of vehicle type will indicate what recon element has been engaged). If the scouts are positioned correctly, there should be no friendly ARMOR - movement. If the scouts are required to move, routes will be fully briefed and understood, with well rehearsed recognition signals to avoid fratricide. In the case of the security zone, the benefit of a roving patrol far outweighs the danger of fratricide. The tank platoons are the killers. The platoon should organize into killer sections so they can spread throughout the sector and provide coverage on all avenues. To ease the difficulty in battle handover, the killer sections can habitually align with the same scout. Plan for the tanks to tight all night. They have the greatest armor protection, and will be the most flexible during limited visibility. The Bradley platoon should be in reserve all night and plan to engage the single recon vehicles that slip through the tank platoon sectors. The four Bradleys will be augmented with the HQ section, creating a powerful reserve. Keeping the mech platoon at REDCON 3 (ready to move within 30 min.), while maintaining only 25 percent security, will provide the counterrecon force with a well rested force to assume the screen, if needed, and to provide countersurveillance patrols at first light. At the same time, the tank platoons will "go to ground" and rest until night, thus allowing the team to conduct continuous operations without degrading the effectiveness of the counterrecon force over long periods. The S4 should anticipate problems and emplace the assets to correct them. All maintenance-down vehicles must be recovered from the security zone and fixed as far forward as possible. Supplying the team with an additional M88 in addition to maintenance personnel, will augment the normal section and assist the team. Another consideration might be to attach additional ambulances to the company and perhaps to locate the forward aid station closer to the FLOT than normal. In the defense, the team will use more ammo than fuel, but will still only consume a fraction of each vehicle basic load; however, the S4 should consider keeping a FAQ (fuel, ammo, quick) uploaded and available to the team first sergeant. The FAQ must have, at a minimum, one fueler and two HEMlTs ammo in the team. Since the security zone is the task force main effort, it must also receive priority for support in all aspects with the exception of engineer effort.

Engineer support is always a welcome asset, but the commander must be fully prepared to fight without the aid of obstacles or prepared positions. If FASCAM is available to the task force, it can easily be integrated into the security zone.

The security zone commander must be given priority of fires throughout the security zone battle. The company FIST plays an important part in the defensive prep, ensuring all targets are observed 'and registered during daylight hours, and illumination targets should cover all possible avenues of approach. Fires should be planned all the way through the sector and the FSO should be prepared to fue them, based on the events on the battlefield. Give special consideration to no-fire areas (NFA) to support the scout positions, to include random "safe areas" that the roving patrols can go to for safety.

The mortar platoon will be fully integrated into the force and under the control of the company commander. The battalion FSO should allocate a specific number of rounds that will be used in the counterrecon fight so the commander can keep track of exactly how much he has fued and how much he has left, without wonying about his own internal fire support being taken away. Additionally, the TM XO can pre-stock ammo to continue the fight.

The counterrecon fight is often the most important phase of the defense, since the defeat of enemy recon elements may well determine the out-loaded with resupply of ea i h type of ARMOR - come of the battle. If the task force treats the counterrecon fight as the initial main effort, and devotes a well trained, technically competent, and disciplined team to the battle, then the task force chance for success increases dramatically.

As the sun blinks over the horizon the company commander calls in his situation report to the task force TOC. It was along night but he knows he won the battle. Of the ten destroyed vehicles, only one was his, and the crew was evacuated quickly and will survive. The scout platoon leader has organized a patrol to identih) the remains of the enemy vehicles, and the infantry platoon that was not committed during the night will begin to patrol the high ground to look for enemy observation posts. The first sergeant is bringing up the LOGPAC for the company team, as well as the scouts and mortars. The executive officer has returned from a route recon, back to the unit's subsequent positions, and will brief the platoon leaders and crews while the commander, FSO, scout and mortar platoon leaders attend battalion operations order at 0730 hours. It will be a very good day.

Captain Kenneth L. Deal Jr. was commissioned as a Distinguished Military Graduate of the University of Idaho. He is a graduate of AOBC, JOMC, SPLC, and AOAC. He served as a tank platoon leader with 2-72 Armor, Camp Casey, Korea, and as a tank platoon leader and the scout platoon leader for 1-63 Armor, as well as the assistant S3 for the 177th Armored Brigade at Fort Irwin, Calif. Upon completion of the Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course, he will be assigned to 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment.

End of indexed article

Citation

Captain Kenneth L. Deal Jr.. “The Counterreconnalssance Battle: Managing tho Monrter.” ARMOR, November-December 1992, pp. 12-21.

Captain Kenneth L. Deal Jr. “The Counterreconnaissance Battle: Managing the Monster.” ARMOR, November-December 1992, pp. 12-21.

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