The Cadre Armor Division Concept

Introduction The direct result of AirLand Battle Doctrine at the tactical, operational, and strategic level of conventional warfare has been a shift in emphasis along the continuum of war from general war to regional conflict. The effective and efficient execution of this doctrine by the United States Army has to be considered one of the key reasons for the major political and m i l h y changes taking place in Central and Eastern Europe. At the strategic level, this doctrine has been the prime reason for the implementation of a deployment/utilization strategy that has caused potential enemies to reevaluate their strategic military options. Operationally, both friend and possible foe have deemed this strategy a viable option to ensure our capability to secure national survival and vital interests. However, it is at the tactical level that both have been most effective. Not only potential enemies, but our soldiers realize that a plan is in place to win armed conflict, based.on the AirLand Battle tenets of initiative, deep battle, synchronization, and adaptability. Moreover, in combination with an operational level deployment/utilization strategy of forward deployed, contingency, and reinforcing forces, the doctrine can be executed successfully. Additionally, the effects of technological advances in the 1970s and '80s regarding weapon effectiveness, mobility, and communications have been phenomenal. An additional benefit of this advancement has been the development of a now well established training system, under TRADOC, that produces soldiers much more qualified, in less time. These measures have greatly shortened the time required to respond to conventional conflict. Additionally, the Soviets' massive withdrawal from Warsaw Pact countries has increased the amount of time to more than one year to respond to large-scale general Based on these realizations, plus fiscal constraints, it is the appropriate time to consider shifting part of our combat power from the Active Component (AC) to the Reserve Component (RC) - United States Army Reserve (USAR), in the form of cadre-level combat divisions. A number of units are in place to accomplish this transition. Currently, there are 12 training divisions and two training brigades within the USAR RC structure. All of these units are Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) organizations. (However, they have a command and control structure from company/troop through battal-iodsquadron to division, organized along the lines of Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) combat units.) Of these 12, three divisions and one brigade are armor training organizations with the mission of Armor Center displacement, at Fort b o x, Ky. - 100th Division (Training), Louisville, Ky.; formation of additional armor training centers at Fort Hood, Texas - 84th Division (Training), Milwaukee, Wis. - 5th Cavalry Brigade (Training), Omaha, Neb.; and at Fort Bliss, Texas - 85th Division (Training), Chicago, Ill. Due to the geographic proximity of the 100th Division to the Armor Center, combat support, and combat service support USAR-type unit support capabilities within that proximity, and empirical manning, training, readiness data, the first USAR divisional unit to be redesignated as a cadre division War. should be the 100th Division (Training). In addition, for the past four years, the 100th has enhanced its already outstanding performance by conducting field training exercises to Army Training and Evaluation Program - Mission Training Plan (ARTEP-MTP) 71-2 tasks and standards, to the extent conditions would allow. This additional training has further enhanced the abilities of drill sergeants to train Initial Entry Training (IET) soldiers. It has also become a base of institutional knowledge that will allow the division to grow and mature into a combat cadre divisional unit. Concept Historically, before World War I, Army combat divisions were maintained at a cadre level, to be augmented by state National Guard militias at times of national emergency. After World War I, based on the organization of Army divisions by General Pershing during World War I, a number of active divisions were maintained at combat-ready levels in both personnel and equipment. During an expansion of the Army, core elements from these combat-ready divisions would form the base of new divisions in time of national crisis. This was the method employed in 1942 and 1943 to meet the requirements of combat divisions for World War II. After World War 11, the Army employed a combination of methods to both minimize total Army force manpower requirements and provide training for E T soldiers. Here are three historic examples of this method:. The 3d Armored Division was deactivated late in 1945 and reactivated as the 3d Armored Division Replace-ARMOR - November-December 7997 41 ment Training Center, Fort Knox, Ky. As reconstituted, the 3d maintained its combat division TO&E with subordinate commands at various levels of both personnel and equipment fill. Additionally, other elements remained at “cadre” officer and noncommissioned officer personnel levels and became the base for training more than 25 percent of all enlisted men joining the Army. In addition to the 14-week IET cycle, the division conducted six additional training missions: reenlisted refresher training: 16-week band training; leader course training (officer candidate preparatory/acting noncommissioned officer); specialist schools (mess stewards, cooks, clerks, and mechanics); “methods of instruction” cadre school; and reserve officer/enlisted training methods update courses. Upon completion of training, soldiers were reassigned to all branches of the Army. In 1955, the 3d Armored Division Replacement Center was reorganized into a tactical armored division, and in 1956 deployed to the Federal Republic of Germany as a TO&E combat armored division. *The 2d Armored Division, which was the division that the 3d replaced in Germany, was redesignated as the 2d Armored Training Division, Fort Hood, Texas in 1958. While it maintained its armored division TO&E, the division was manned at a cadre level throughout. IET soldiers were attached to the assigned cadre-level units in order to complete both Basic Combat Training (BCT) and Advanced Individual Training (AIT) in the combat branches of Armor, Artillery, and Infantry. As with the 3d AD, after completion of BCT and AIT, attached personnel went to units throughout the Army. In 1962, after training more than 89,000 soldiers, the 2d Armored Training Division was redesignated aline armored division with a combination of soldiers who had just completed training and those assigned from appropriate branch-specific schools. *In mid-1946, after serving with distinction in World War 11, the 100th Infantry Division was deactivated. Late in 1946, it was reactivated as the 100th Airborne Division, U. S. Army Reserve (USAR). In 1952, it was again redesignated as the 100th Infantry Division. In 1955, the 100th was redesignated, this time as a replacement division for the Replacement Training Center, Fort Knox, Ky. It was during this period that the 3d Armored Division was itself being reorganized from the Replacement Training Center, Fort Knox, to aline combat armored division. In fact, the 100th Division’s mission was to assist the Replacement Training Center during the transition of the 3d Armored Division and the planned use of 2d Armored Division as an AC training division in 1958. In 1959, the division was redesignated as a “training” division. During the Berlin Crisis, the 100th Division (Training) was recalled to active duty and trained more than 32,000 soldiem in BCT and AIT skills at Fort Chaffee, Ark. Late in 1962, the division returned to reserve status. Reorganization of the division into a three-line-brigade organization took place in 1973; this provided a command and control structure along ROAD guidelines, facilitating the ability of the division to function as either a TDA or TO&E organization. The mission of the 10th Division expanded from strictly BCT and AIT to One Station Unit Training (OSUT) - Armor/Armored Cwalry in 1977. This historical data, plus Department of the Army, “Army Ground Forces” studies 11 and 12, and the evolution of the Army of Excellence - Tables of Organization and Equipment (AOE-TO&E) will serve as the basis for this concept. Assumptions made in order to develop this concept further are: *Cadre divisions will be combat ready within one year of mobilization. *Both AC and RC units will be located at Fort Knox, Ky., or geographically supportable from a division headquarters located in Louisville, KY. *Major subordinate commands of the cadre division will be located as close as possible to the cadre division headquarters. Figure 1 shows the basic organizational structure of the cadre division. It is a ten-maneuver-battalion, series 87004L200 AOE-TO&E. While a “pure” cadre organization is possible, as shown in the TO&E, both its effectiveness as a Reserve Component major command and post-mobilization utilization would be extremely limited. Therefore, to bridge the gap between RC-National Guard combat division reinforcing forces, the training base requirements of RC-USAR training divisions and the formation of completely new combat divisions, I propose a modified “cadre” division (see Figure 2). Conceptually, it is augmented with a fifth brigade consisting of four armor battalions and two armored cavalry squadrons organized under current TDA authorization. This fifth brigade, with an appropriate command and control slice from the division headquarters, is designed either to displace the 1st Armored Training Brigade, or augment United States Army Armor Training Center upon mobilization. Both these missions are currently compatible with missions assigned to the 2d Brigade, 100th Division (Training) and the division headquarters. In fact, the 2d Brigade, 100th Division (Training) has conducted Mobilization Armor Training Center training missions. This OSUT mission consisted of training IET soldiers, based on a 12-hour day, 6day week Mobilization Program of Instruction. 42 ARMOR - November-December 7997

Armor Division L-Series TO&E Cadre Armor Division Study Ar Div I I I I l h Mech Inf Bde Div Arty Div Avn We Ar Bde ADA Bn D CEWl Bn CM Co FA 0n Sig Bn Mech Bn Mech Inf Bn Ar Bn Aslt Co MSE (en) Mech Inf Bn Atk Bn Fwd Spt Bn (155 SP) 3x8 Figure 1 ADA Bn D Armor Division L-Series TO&E Cadre Armor Division Study Ar Div Q I I I I I Div HQs Ar Bde MedlhfBde

- ArBn Mech Inf Bn - - HHC - ArBn MSE (Bn) Fwd Spt Bn Mech Inf Sig Bn Mech Bn Ar Bn Atk Bn FA Bn (155 sp) 3x8 Mech Inf 4 T U Figure 2 ARMOR - 43

Armor Division L-Series TO&E Cadre Armor Division Study I I MedlhfBde I

Ar Bn Aslt Co MSE (Bn) Ar Bn Mech Inf Mech Inf SLl Figure 3?he division consists of one armor-heavy brigade (1st Brigade), one balanced brigade (2d Brigade), and another armor-heavy brigade (3d Brigade). The 1st Brigade could consist of three Army National Guard battalions maintained at an Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) at or near combat readiness. In fact, it would be the division combat ready brigade with appropriate CS and CSS units also manned and equipped at that level (see Figure 3). The 2d Brigade would consist of USAR units at personnel and equipment levels prescribed by their applicable L-series cadre level organization. The 3d Brigade could consist of an AC brigade headquarters (194th SAB, Ft. Knox, Ky.), an AC armor battalion (1-10 Cav, Ft. Knox, Ky.), and a National Guard armor battalion, again, at or near ALO 1, plus a USAR mechanized battalion at cadre level. With exceptions noted above, all other CS and CSS units would be organized per their applicable L-series AOE-TO&E and maintained at cadre level ALOs. Personnel reorganized in existing TO&E units would require formal Area of ConcentrationFIOS education. AC unit personnel who are part of the division would provide a good additional source of soldiers for the RC if they change their status. A maximum of one grade above TO&E authorization would be permitted for NCOs in 11- and 19-series MOS duty positions. Active Guard and Reserve, and civilian personnel positions would be cross-leveled and consolidated wherever possible. Key personnel strength comparisons. A complete cadre RC armor division represents a 45 percent officer, a 77 percent enlisted, or a 74 percent are: total personnel reduction compared to an ALO 1 AC organization. (Figure 4.). A complete cadre RC armor division with an armor training center TDA brigade represents a 41 percent officer, 76 percent enlisted, or 71 percent total personnel reduction compared to an ALO 1 AC organization. (Figure 5.). A cadre RC armor division with an armor training center brigade and its fmt brigade, as a division combat ready brigade with appropriate CS and CSS units (all ALO 1) represent a 34 percent officer, 59 percent enlisted, or a 57 percent total personnel reduction compared to an ALO 1 AC organization. (Figure 6.) Training plans of units already conducting L-series TO&E and armor training center training will not be affected. Focus of training will be on those units requiring reorganization 44 ARMOR - Novernber-December 1991 (both existing TO&E and TDA units, Le., cadre-level maneuver battalions). Training will be conducted in three phases:. First (1-3 years): Emphasis will be on in-house basic TO&E maneuver unit organization and tactical operations. Training will be conducted, as much as possible, with readiness groups and mobile training teams and maneuver training commands for command post exercises (CPXFirst Battle: Battalion-Corps-type training.. Second (4-6 years): Small unit (platoon or company/troop) tactical training conducted during both Inactive Duty Training and Annual Training. All training will be executed to applicable dards, and conditions. Additionally, as skills increase, gunnery - both live fire! and Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer (UCOFI‘) - will be integrated into training plans.. Third (7-9 years): CPX and tactical training at the battalion/squadron and brigade level, plus tank gunnery, to be conducted during Annual Training. Inactive Duty Training focus will be on simulation exercises, i.e., FB:BC and Simulation Network (SIIvINET). At this phase, the units may conduct their Annual Training at one of the national train-ARTEP/MTP tasks, stan-Cadre Armor Division Major Subordinate Cmd Roll-Up

Div HQ 1st Ar Bde 2d Mech B&i 3d Mech Bde

4th DA Bde Spt Cmd

239 41 3,025 140 6 1,595 190 8 2,619 150 6 2,111 212 12 2,581 153 258 1,558 159 76 2,611 T - 0 - 3.305 237 1.741 139 2,817 187 2,267 147 2,805 209 1,969 153 2.846 159 -

!! W E 41 2,793 6 1.528 8 2,454 6 1,968 12 2,471 254 1,399 73 2.198 ALO-Cedre I - O w o E I

3,071 140 22 572 734 1,673 82 6 404 492 2,649 97 8 482 587 2,121 72 6 356 434 2,692 95 9 690 794 1,806 95 80 428 603 2,430 142 50 696 888

Total 1,243 407 16,100 17.750 1,231 400 14,811 16,442 723 181 3,628 4,532 Figure 4 Cadre Armor Division WlATC TDA Brigade Total - Unit ALO-Cedre TbA-ATC - O W O E I

- O W E I - o m 1 I - - Cadre Armor Div 723 181 3,628 4,532 - -

- 723 181 3,628 4,532 100th ATC - 66 3 486 555 66 3 486 555 (5th Total 789 184 4,114 5,087 Figure 5 Cadre Armor Division WlATC TDA Brigade & Division Combat Ready Brigade Total - Unit ALO-CadrdTDA ATC -

- - O W E I - O W E I - O w o E I

- 789 184 4,114 5,087 w/ATC Div Cbt Ready Me* 1 ea FA Bn - -

- 33 0 539 572 33 0 539 572 1 ea FSB - -

3 3 307 313 3 3 307 313 - -

4 1 256 261 4 1 256 261 1 ea EN Plt -.

1 1 182 184 1 1 182 184 1 ea ADA Co 1 ea MP Co - -

1 0 39 40 1 0 39 40 Total 889 195 6,628 7,712 1stAr Bde - -

- 58 6 1,191 1,255 58 6 1,191 1,255 ‘Differential sum, 1.0. cadre versus ALO 1 for each dement. Figure 6 ARMOR - November-December 7997 45

100th Div MTC I I I I - Figure 7 ing centers Fort h i n, Fort Chaffee, or even Hohenfels) or as part of a REFORGER-like operation. In all of the phases of training, both sustainment of basic soldier individual skills and inwinter-phase refresher training will be conducted. This will be done to ensure the maximization of knowledge and operational utilization of both the soldiers and the division. Post-mobilization training for armor training center units will not change. However, they will develop a contingency plan in case they are needed to round out existing divisional battalions or squadrons or assume the 1st Brigade mission if it is used independently. Remaining division training will be based on personnel and equipment fill schedules rather than training time required and deployment date. A unique training asset available to the 100th Division (Training) is the 100th Division Maneuver Training Command (100th Div. MTC). This Second Army asset, currently colocated with the lOOth Division (Training) headquarters and OPCON to it for personnel, financial, and limited logistical support, consists of 19 teams in all three Army disciplines, CBT, CS, and CSS. Figure 7 shows the organizational composition of the 100th Div. MTC. This organization, for the past 16 years, has conducted the planning, development, execution, and evaluation of all types of training exercises up to brigade level for military organizations within both the Second and Fourth U. S. Army areas. Therefore, I further propose that, while the overall mission of the 100th Div. MTC not be changed, its focus through emphasis from FORSCOM and TRADOC be placed on the 100th while it develops as a combat division. As assisted by Readiness Group Knox, the MTC will develop exercises emphasizing technical, tactical, and leadership skills required to successfully execute combat missions, if not exclusively, primarily for the 100th Division. Logistical support for this organization will be guided by the following principles:. Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment, i.e., CTA 50-901, is already issued or on hand in all uni 46. Installation property, again, is on hand but may require redistribution. installations will be consolidated based on final TO&E unit utilization or location.. Existing Mobilization and Training Equipment Sites use will be maximized for the storage and training availability of major end items.. Existing tactical equipment will be cross-leveled, and equipment will be requisitioned based on the difference between on-hand status and authorized level per that unit's ALO. Equipment to round out the cadre division after mobilization will come from the following sources:. F'repositioned Organization Materiel Configured in Unit Sets (POM-

(PURE).

. New manufacture.. Theater of Warmmtions Divi-. Combination of all of the above. sion Sets. The cost of implementing this concept, based on Headquarters, DA, Manpower and Force hogram Analysis Division, Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate data is approximately nine to 24 percent of the total cost for an AC heavy division. (See Figure 8.) The cost of a "pure" RC cadre heavy division is the least expensive: however, as stated earlier, its effectiveness is also minimal. It would take it the longest to become combat ready and would not have the capability to displace or augment trainers in the training base. An RC heavy division would be the most expensive and would still not be the best prepared to go to war, nor possess the capability to support the training base. The use of an RC cadre w/AK is approximately $2.5 million more expensive than the RC cadre, but it can support the training base. However, it still cannot meet combat readiness criteria on, 1 -

AC Heavy Division Versus RC Cadre Heavy (Armor) Division Annual Costs' (in millions) RC, Cadre RC, RC, Cadre W/ATC Bds - AC - RC e WlATC Bds & Div Cbt Bd Personnel AC 435.1 1 RC2 134.9 38.38 38.38 38.38 civilians3 5.25 5.25 5.25 ATC Bde4 3.05 3.05 Div Cbt Bde5 14.44

108.79 - 15.23 - 5.07 - 5.07 - 25. S6 Total 543.90 150.13 48.70 51.75 86.47 Notes: Jul90. 'Data from Cadre Division Concept Study (Draft), Department of the Amy, DAW-SSW. dated 15 21ncludes TPU, AGR. and AC personnel. 31ncludes GS and FTS avilians. Number required was based on 1 O w 1 Division (Tng) manpower level (73) plus 72 since data is currently unavailable for other concept units. Calculation is as follows: 73+72x35K divided by 1 k5.25. 4Based on current 100th Div (Tng) 2d Bde TDA aumOrlzation. Calculation is as follows: 555x5.5K divided by 1 M-3.05. 5Additional 2.625 personnel required for 1st Cadre Bde t r make it ALO 1. Calwlatlon Is as fdlom: 2,625x5. M divided by 1 bL14.44. 'Calculation based on 25% cadre fill (personnel and equipment), Le. 5.07 dlviied by 25-20.28+5.07 (cadre)-25.35. Figure 8 cadre with division combat ready and ATC brigade, is approximately $38 million more expensive than the RC cadre division, but $70 million less than the RC heavy division. These differentials are significant and justify the expense for a unit that would be capable to meet both its pre- and post-mobilization armor training center trainer mission, plus provide an additional online combat unit source. Conclusion AirLand Battle Future Doctrine, current utilization/deployment strategy, plus the evolution of anew world order dictate the reevaluation of tactical, operational, and strategic employment of United States Armed Forces. The rapid technological growth and the effectiveness of weapons systems and training methodology for soldiers, coupled with fiscal constraints, makes realigning costly combat-heavy forces inevitable. This realignment could take place and minimize the overall loss of combat effectiveness by placing specific heavy combat divisions at a cadre level of organization in the United States Army Reserve. By using selected USAR training divisions as "core" elements, the training base would not be adversely affected. In fact, they would continue to contribute to the training base because their mission would now be both the training of initial enhy trainees and combat preparedness. An additional benefit of this concept is that it will provide a connection between the use of National Guard reinforcing combat forces and the next level of current mobilization, which is creating completely new combat divisions. Moreover, this method will provide away to bring force levels down without compromising the combat power of existing AC divisions. Regardless of mission, either forward de-ARMOR - ployed or contingency, no AC Army division would be organized either in personnel or equipment at less than fully combat ready - there will be no skeleton combat AC divisions. In fact, even the "cadre" divisions, as this concept shows, could be organized either pure or with elements having a varying degree of combat readiness. The degree to which this would be done would obviously be dependent on both threat analysis and other constraints, like personnel, equipment, or fiscal. The risks involved in this concept are not minimal. However, if reaction lead times are accurate, and cadre divisions can become combat-ready within those lead times, this concept should be considered seriously as an acceptable risk. Colonel Joseph C. Kopacz was commissioned from Armor Officer Candidate School, and has attended Armor Officer Advanced School and CGSC. He attended John Carroll University and holds a B. S. degree in marketing from the University of Louisville. He sewed as a platoon leader and SUPBO with 2-68 Armor, 8th ID (Mech); Asst G3, 100th Div (Tng); S2/3, 100th Div Support Bn: Armor/Cavalry team leader, 100th Div Maneuver Training Command: squadron commander, 1 - 397th, 3d Bde, 100th Div (Tng); and as chief, Plans, Operations, Training, RM, and MOB Division, 100th Div Manuever Command. As a civilian, he is a marketing man-agemenvfinancial planner. 47