Employing a Brigade Scout Platoon

Employing a Brigade Scout Platoon by Major Kent D. Thomas "Time spent in recce is never wasted." British Aniiy Adage Just as reconnaissance was key for leaders in the past, it is critical for leaders today. The commander who loses the recon-counterrecon battle begins the fight at a disadvantage. To see the battlefield is critical to the fight. Commanders at various levels view the battlefield differently. Army and corps commanders use overhead platforms, airborne platforms, cavalry regiments, special forces, and long range surveillance units (LRSU).

Division commanders have divisional cavalry squadrons, OH-BDs, and LRSU. Battalion commanders have scouts, and company commanders have observation posts. The brigade commander, however, has no clearly identified asset to see the battlefield. He can glean second-hand information through battalion scouts or division assets, but that information is often skewed by the needs of the commander who owns the asset, may not be timely, and may not address the brigade commander's needs. One solution to the problem is the brigade scout platoon. Mounted in highly mobile vehicles capable of rapid movement across a brigade front, such an organization offers great promise to fill the brigade commander's void in recon-counterrecon capabilities. First Brigade, 3d Armored Division had the opportunity to test the brigade scout platoon concept during exercise

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SHIELD (REFORGER 90). The division provided an existing scout platoon of one officer and 18 soldiers from 4th Battalion, 8th Cavalry, outfitted with six HMMWVs in place of their TO&E M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicles. Two of the HMMWVs had dual-net secure capability, while the other four had Before the exercise, the platoon was told to prepare to conduct a series of critical tasks taken from its MTP. Tasks were divided into those key to the exercise, possible during the exercise, and unlikely during the exercise, to allow the platoon's leadership the opportunity to prioritize training. A scrub of missions immediately before

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resulted in a final critical task and single-net secure radios. mission list (see table 1). Brigade Scout Platoon Critical Tasks

(ARTEP 17-57-1 0-MTP)

0 Passage of Lines -Perform a passage of lines (17-3-1014) -Assist a passage of lines (17-3-1015) 0 Perform a Route Reconnaissance (17-3-1017) .Conduct a Screen (17-3-1023) 0 Perform an Area Reconnaissance (17-3-1019) 0 Execute Actions on Contact (17-3-1021) (In order to disengage and continue reconnaissance and surveillance operations) Missions 0 Maintain contact with the forward covering force. Coordinate and assist passage of lines. Provide link between the forward covering force and the brigade, allowing more decisive and flexible employment of maneuver battalions. 0 Maintain contact and conduct screen between battalions attacking on separate axes. 0 Provide route and zone reconnaissance before and during brigade movement and attack. 0 Provide flank screen during brigade movement to contact. 0 Cover avenues of approach into the brigade area, both in the defense and on the offense. Responsible for coverage of specific NAls critical to the brigade scheme of maneuver. 0 Reinforce a battalion reconnaissance and surveillance effort. Table 1 ARMOR - November-December 7990 45

Actual missions the platoon conducted during

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SHIELD included: .Maintenance of contact with the forward covering force, while reporting progress by phase line, and coordinating forward movement of the brigade under radio listening silence. 0 Maintenance of contact between battalions attacking on separate axes, while also screening key named areas of interest (NAI) for possible enemy activity. 0 Screens to both the front and flank of the moving brigade. 0 Reinforcement of battalions to supplement screens over extended distances, to thicken an economy of force sector,. and to replace scout elements lost in combat. Security for the command groupbrigade tactical command post when light infantry threat warranted (never more than two vehicles required). 0 Route reconnaissance, bridge classification, obstacle identification, and route clearing. The platoon was also instrumental in keeping MSRs open at night when enemy forces sought to disrupt resupply. The scout platoon was effective in all missions and was a major factor in the brigade’s agility and ability to synchronize and focus combat power in a timely manner. Before the battle, the platoon identified the location of key leadership within the brigade and served as a courier/messenger element to ensure rapid dissemination of information and orders, as well as to provide subordinate commanders a timely method of relaying information to the brigade while radio listening silence was in effect. Early in the fight, the platoon maintained contact between the brigade and elements of the forward covering force. Not only did thc platoon rclay important information from thc covering force to the brigadc, but it also trackcd forward movement and positioning of subordinate elements, allowing the brigade to maintain radio listening silence without sacrificing command and control. During forward and rearward passage of lines by the brigade, the platoon manned passage points. As a separate force available to coordinate this critical task, the platoon freed battalions from the requirement to look two ways at once, and allowed the battalion commander and his staff to focus on the battle. Battalions were thus able to transition more rapidly into the fight as they moved forward, and later continue the light as long as possible before quickly withdrawing through passage points coordinated and manned by the scout platoon and brigade headquarters. As an economy of force element during the attack, the scout platoon effectively monitored a critical NAI, while screening between battalions attacking on separate axes. Had the platoon not been available, combat power would have been diverted Tor this task. Later in the fight. the platoon used its superior mobility to screen a battalion-sized frontage, allowing the brigade to mass additional combat power for the penctration of the enemy defense. The brigade’s ability to add an additional battalion to the fight made the difference between success and failure. The scout platoon’s mobility and effcc-tiveness made that addition possible. In the defense, the platoon was in position to observe critical NAI/TAIs, again allowing greater combat power to be massed for the fight. In the counterattack, the scout platoon first served as an advance screen, then as a deep reconnaissance force. Its SUCCCSS in finding seams in the enemy defense allowed rapid penetration by the maneuver battalions. Operating deep in the enemy rear, the platoon identified enemy positions. This allowed the brigade to bring indirect fires, air, and attack helicopters to bear in support of the scheme of maneuver. The platoon’s identification of obstacles and engagement areas further allowed the brigade to influence the enemy rather than to be influenced by it. The platoon proved to be very versatile. At one point in the offensive phase, it conducted an area reconnaissance based on reports of light infantry forces and performed security for the command group and brigade TAC, also in response to the light infantry threat. Its ability to perform multiple missions simultaneously increased its value to the command. As configured for CENTURION SHIELD, the platoon had some noticeable shortcomings. It could not subdivide itself into enough sell-supporting sections to covcr assigned tasks. It was not armcd adequately to disengage from tanks or enemy attack hclicopters, and did not have sufficient secure communications capability to operate in more than two sections. Finally, it lacked adequate mounted and dismounted day-night vision capability. Based on the 1st Brigade’s experience, the desired organization 46 ARMOR - November-December 7990

Forcing the scouts to concentrate on finding rather than fighting the enemy worked well. Aware of their vulnerability, scouts were careful to remain well camouflaged. and equipment for a brigade scout platoon would include: 0Ten HMMWVs, one officer, 29 soldiers. With the multiplicity of missions the platoon does well, more vehicles are required than were available on

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SHIELD. Each vehicle needs a minimum of three personnel to sustain 24- hour-a-day operations. Secure and long-range communications capability. Ideally, each vehicle would have two secure nets. It was not uncommon to send two vehicles on a mission that needed a two-net capability during CENTURION SHIELD, yet only two of the platoon's HMMWVs had that capability. In light of the importance of normally assigned missions, a two-net capability and long-range antennas are highly desirable. 0 Armament consisting of personal weapons Cor each soldier (at least one M-203 per vehicle) and a vehicular weapon system capable of providing the crew the capability to disengage quickly. The Mark 19 40- mm grenade launcher appears appropriate. Coupled with one or two AT-4 systems per vehicle, the platoon would have the capability to defeat an enemy force when confronted, yet retain the capability to disengage when outgunned. The lack of an armor-defeating primary weapon system would encourage the platoon to avoid contact when at all possible, thus preventing decisive engagement. High power, day-night vision devices; something capable of giving the platoon a distinct advantage in reconnaissance. 0 For dismounted operations, the platoon needs night vision goggles and disrnountcd, secure radios. 0 Internal indirect lire support capability. On

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SHIELD, lire support for the platoon was provided through the brigade command net with the brigade FSCOORD responding to calls for fire. While acceptable, the addition of a platoon forward observer with digital message device (DMD) would increase the responsiveness of needed fires. 0Air defense is also a recognized need. Addition of a Stinger section would add too much mass to the unit. It may well be better to cross-train one or two scout crews in the use of the weapon, allowing the platoon to disengage quickly and avoid decisive engagement. 0Although not tested on CENTURION SHIELD, motorcycles as an additional platoon asset seem to make sense intuitively, if the HMMWVcancarryone. The change from

CFV

to HMMWV should not, however, be delayed by motorcycle testing. The HMMWV proved far more versatile than the CFV, and its lack of armor kept the scouts from engaging in direct lire engagements with enemy forces. Forcing the scouts to concentrate on finding rather than fighting the enemy worked well. Aware of their vulnerability, scouts were careful to remain well camouflaged. As a result, they were discovered less often, and were killed less frequently, than CFV-mounted scouts. The HMMWV's incrcased survivability was achieved through mobility rather than protective armor. Addition of the armament ARMOR - November-December 7990 listed above would make up for the loss of the TOW and 25-mm gun. The brigade scout platoon proved itself an invaluable asset during CENTURION SHIELD. It provided the brigade commander the ability to focus on the bigger fight or the next fight. In mobile armored warfare, many tasks have to bc accomplished simultaneously. The brigade scouts allow the brigade commander and staff to focus on those tasks without disrupting the battalion light and batt aion I' commander's focus. Under radio listening silence, the platoon tics the command and control structure together, allowing rapid dissemination of information. During passage of lines, it provides a single coordinating entity for the brigade, while allowing battalions to focus on the light. In thc defense and offense, it can trigger brigade targets, assist in the movement of the brigade as a whole, or supplement key task forces without weakening others. Because it is mobile, a HMMWV platoon can often accomplish several of these missions concurrently. It is an idea whose time has comc. Major Kent Thomas is the XO, 2d Battalion, 32d Armor, Kirchgoens, Germany. He is a 1974 graduate of Georgetown University and holds an M.S. degree from Purdue University and an M.M.A.S. degree from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. His armor assignments have been with the 9th Infantry Division and the 3d Armored Division. During REFORGER '90, he was the S3 of the 1st Brigade, 3d Armored Division. 47