Fighting Under Desert Conditions

by Lieutenant Colonel David Eshel, IDF Retired "The desert is the tactician's paradise, but the quartermaster's nightmare..."

Afrika Korps. WWll The Israeli Army is probably the only Western-oriented military force that has pained wide ex-The Desert Environment The plains of the desert, in some places broad, and in other areas narrow strips between mountainous areas, can offer good mobility to a tracked, armored force. But desert terrain can vary: what appears to be a rnckv hard siirface mav he under- - -. -. -. - - - - - - -.-. -. J --........... -. - -..,.. -. - I -.. - - -...- perience in desert fighting since laid with soft, sandy soil. Flat areas tial. What may appear I World War 11. The harsh desert en-surfacc in an aerial phot vironment has forced many adapta-hide escarpments and E tions on both men and machines. airfields, but will not support heavy wadis that will hinder For these reasons, our experiences tracked or wheeled vehicle traffic especially at night. 0 may be dry lakes or salt marshes that may be suitable for camps or --., hP;ninrpri. Inrl fn t L lLn-,.cP #ha., Lnpq+h +L c,.rmm+..., A ctaynmcn,...: "1UJ W b "1 1111b-1bi)l UL." " U L U C, I" 11.b Allied forces deployed in Saudi Arabia. W b b U U J b L l l b J a n b W b L " b l I b ( I L L 1 L L I b hard crust. Carefully scout the terrain before moving vehicles across it. In Saudi Arabia, movemcnt' is generally good lor tracked vehicles, but there are few paved roads, making logistical vehiclc traffic difficult, especially in open areas where there is no protection from air attack. Carefill recnnnainsance is essen-to be a flat ograph may iteep-walled movement, nly careful abl urlllJ Ill JLbl buJbuplc, oblique-angle aerial photographs will reveal the shadows of these land features. Q 24 ARMOR - November-December 7990

In many locations, traffic is limited to narrow defiles. These can present excellent ambush sites for antitank commando teams inserted by helicopter. In other areas, what appears to be a flat surface may be strewn with boulders that can throw the tracks of tanks and AFVs at critical moments. Tracked vehicles d 1 _: - - - L I The Israelis "human-engineered" their Merkava tank for desert fighting. may have insufficient ground clearance to pass through boulder-strewn areas, further impeding mobility. Heat is the most critical threat to desert operations, as so many recent newscasts have reminded us. But with that heat can come suffocating humidity that is very difficult for Westerners to tolerate unless they are acclimatized. This condition can stretch a soldier's tolerance to the very limit. Tanks and armored vehicles act as heat sinks: conditions inside can rapidly become intolerable, and even the ex-teriors of the vehicles can burn soldiers and cause spontancous combustion of flammable materials. Crews trained in European climates will take time to adapt to these conditions, probably suffering substantial loss of effectiveness until they get used to the environment. Both British and German troops experienced this effect in World War I1 during fighting in the Western Desert of North Africa; the climatic conditions in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries will be even more severe. Soviet vs. Western Armor The Israeli Army has operated both Soviet and Western tanks in desert combat. Our experience indicated that the Soviet vehicles are poorly designed from a human engineering standpoint, especially for operations in very hot environments. Israeli crews in T-55s and T- 62s employed in the Sinai experienced severe heat stress and near suffocation because of cramped interiors and poor interior ventilation. These tanks had already been modified considerably by Israeli ordnance experts, but they could do little to improve the weaknesses of the basic designs. During fighting in both the Golan and the Sinai, Soviet crewman abandoned their tanks. Arabs were acclimatized to the desert, but when cap-turcd, some were close to exhaustion after only a very short time in action. Captured tank and BMP crews had to be dragged from their deathtraps nearly unconscious after suffering heatstroke. The combination of heat, lack of ventilation, and exposure to toxic fumes from main gun breeches can be more deadly than enemy action. Western tanks are somewhat better in terms of ventilation, and the layouts of the fighting compartments are more spacious, although much space is dcvoted to high tech equipment. The Israelis designed the Merkava in light of their experience in desert fighting. It is probably the best tank for fighting in hot climates. The fighting compartment is spacious and well ventilated, there is direct access from the driver's station to the lighting compartment, and there is a door at the rear for easy exit in an emergency. Air conditioning and easy access to cooled water reservoirs helps endurance: Merkava crews suffered much lcss heat stress than Israeli crews mounted in other tanks, even during thc most extremc weather conditions. Many Western armies have experimented with cooled tank crew overalls that draw off body heat and permit the crewman to wear chemical protection suits for long periods without compromising efficiency. The suits also prevent dehydration in extreme weather conditions, Collectivc NBC protection systems, like the systems in the MlAl tanks, offer another solution to the heat stress problem, allowing crews in contaminated areas to fight buttoned-up without protective equipment. While this type of protection can make life much easier for tank crews fighting under a sustained chemical threat, the systems also have disadvantages, mainly that the tank must be completely buttoned up for the system to be effective. This reduces visibility. Anyone who has commanded a tank in action knows that this reduces quick reaction to target acquisition, and increases danger from helicopter attack. The agc-old disputc ovcr whether it is bcttcr to tight with closcd or open hatches will probably never bc resolved. Armchair experts will always advise commanders to close the hatches for protection, but the experienced commander will still opt for open hatches, using his binoculars for all-around observa-ARMOR - November-December 7990 25 tion, rather than depend upon optical equipment, no matter how sophisticated. Many a tank crew has survived by detecting its opponent and bringing its main armament to bear quickly, in spite of the danger from shrapncl and airburst artillery, which rcmain the most serious danger to tank commanders fighting from opcn hatches. Open hatches, of course, do not solve thc problem of operating under the threat of chemical attack. The choice has to be made by individual commanders as to which method to use whcn facing a particular threat. In our opinion, given the acute discomfort of wearing existing chemical protection suits, the choicc is a difficult one, to say the least. But opcrating in desert climatcs for long durations, dressed in personal NBC gear in buttoned-up tanks, will tax the endurance of even the best trained crews very quickly, considerably reducing their combat efficiency. The best solution would be the use of collective NBC protection as last resort only, when traveling over rear areas endangered by chemical attack, but using personal protective gear in combat areas, with open hatches, especially for the tank commander. Given early warning of a chemical attack, a tank commander can use his mobility to avoid danger areas. Crews could operate without protective masks until warned of impending attack. Cooled crew coveralls could significantly extend the endurance of these crews, keeping body temperature at normal levels over long periods. Chemical attacks in a desert environment tend to dissipate quickly and tend to be confined to limited areas, so it would be best for crews in these conditions to keep on the move, exiting the danger zone as quickly as possible. One must remember that, while the danger of chemical attack is acute, the effectiveness - due to the Iraqis’ limited rcsources - should limit the danger zonc considerably, making rapid mobility the best defense. Not only humans are affected by the humid heat of the dcsert. Hardware, especially more sensitive equipment, is prone to frequent malfunction, affected by heat, humidity. and espccially dust. We are not talking about ordinary city dust, but hard, abrasive grains of sand of widespread particle size. Some of thc grains arc largc enough to causc abrasive damage; the finest dust dcmands meticulous filtration. In worst cases, the fine dust carries sodium chloride or mineral salts that can attack precision equipment. The problem becomes more serious during movement - tanks and other AFVs raise clouds of fine dust. Dispersing the vehicles will help somewhat, but spreading out too much can be dangerous, too, if vehicles lose visual contact over vast areas. Thcn unit navigation becomes a problem. Some solutions are to use antenna flags or pennants to make individual vehicles more visible in daylight, and colored marker lights to maintain visual contact in darkness. In many cases, the only part of a vehicle that is still visible during a dusty desert road march is the antenna, and it should be used accordingly for idcntification. Gunnery in Desert Warfare Tank gunnery poses acute problems under extreme heat conditions. Solar radiation can substantially influence firing accuracy because gun barrels tend to distort. Firing tests indicate maximum distortion at lo00 and 1600 hours, whcn thcre is the greatest disparity bctwecn the temperatures along the top and bottom of the gun tube. At midclay, the reflective heat off the rlcscrt tcnds to equalize the heat striking the top of the barrel. Thcrnial shrouds over the barrel will limit this problem, although it remains to be proved if the shrouds developed for European climates will be adequate in a desert environment. Suffice to say that solar radiation will adverselv affect first-round hit probability. Errors in precision tank gunnery have been known to exceed 7 mils, which would result in amiss cven though all parameters would be correct in the fire-control system. Another desert gunnery problem is caused by the shimmering heat waves that disrupt sighting beyond loo0 meters. The effect becomes even more intense when looking through sensitive optical equipment that magnifies the rippling heat waves and can completely blot out target sensing. Radios Heat causes great strain on radios and other electronic equipment, which can be extremely prone to malfunction in the desert. Dust and high humidity affects internal components, creating problems that are difficult to isolate and repair. Often, 26 ARMOR - November-December 7990

The desert can be either friend or foe for the warrior. In most cases, especially during early morning or before dusk, visibility is almost limitless over the desert flats. Cover is rare, and every hill, however low, becomes a vital objective for. maneuvering forces. it is better to exchange modules rather than track down faults, but this creates the added logistical burden of keeping line echelon units stocked with replacement modules. High temperatures inside tanks and AFVs also affect reliability, although air conditioning will reduce this hazard. More at risk are radios mounted in open vehicles where they are exposed to heat and corrosion. Protective covers are essential to keep the equipment working reliably. Radio communication itself can become erratic during some periods of the day. Dry air and frequent dust storms create static electricity that can disrupt communications completely or greatly reduce the range of FM radio networks. At night, especially after midnight, AM communications can fade severely, also picking up interference from long-range radio stations and jani-ming short-range communications. Desert veterans have been in situations where musical broadcasts completely dominate the band, blocking out any military messages. Dust, Grit, and Reliability Desert operating conditions severely affect tank running gear. Hard grit enters sensitive moving parts, which can virtually explode as they overheat. Dust storms can quickly overwhelm air filtering systems, turning them into a gelatinous mess. Tank crews must monitor operating temperatures to be surc that when overheating begins, filters can be quickly changed. Care must also be taken with optical equipment. Careful maintenance, to avoid scratching sensitivc optics, is critical. Dirty optics or scratched optics can mean the difference between a target hit and amiss, literally a matter of life and death. Conclusion This is advice gained from experience of desert fighting. The desert can be either friend or foe for the warrior. In most cases, especially during early morning or before dusk, visibility is almost limitless over the desert flats. Cover is rare, and every hill, however low, becomes a vital objective for maneuvering forces. Although modern tank gunnery techniques enable quick target acquisition and reaction to gain first-round kills, identification of targets remains a problem even with the best equipment. At desert distances, it is difficult to recognize friend from foe, even if the enemy is using different equipment. Tanks in hulldown, or cspccially turret-down, positions are extremely hard targets to detect and identify. To survive in the open desert, devoid of cover, one must keep moving. Remaining static for long can mean a quick death from an enemy tank or tank-killing ATGM crew hiding in a holc. This is why most experienced commanders prcfer to fight their tanks from open hatches, using binoculars to detect movement. Often, there is only a split second available to react. Moreover, the open hatch admits air that is both reassuring and helpful in keeping a crew operating at full efficiency. In addition, every third or fourth TC has to control several tanks as wcll, so observation is essential to keep his unit intact, something that is very hard to do using optics alone. As Western forces struggle to adapt to the severe heat of the Arabian Pcninsula, they might take comfort in thc words of a famous Israeli tank veteran, who said, "Let's face it. Most of the time, you are so scared that you don't even have time to think of the heat." One of the most decorated soldiers in the Israeli Army, Avigdor Kalahani should know. Lieutenant Colonel David Eshel, IDF, Retired, is senior defense advisor to Eshel Dramit Ltd. publications. He is a graduate of the French Armor School at Saumur and a former lecturer at the IDF Command and Staff College. He served many years as a career officer with the Israeli Defense Forces with which he saw much combat duty including action with signal and tanks units. He recently published a book, Chariots of the Desert, a combat history of the Israeli Armored Corps. ARMOR - November-December 7990 27