Reconnaissance in Force: To Seize Advantage From the Enemy

"Wiat enables... tire good general to strike arid coriqiier...k fore-kiiowledge... Roiue hiiii (the eiieiiiv) arid leani the priiiciyle of his activip or iiiactiri@. F o e Itiiii to reveal hint-sei$ so as to firid out Iris n.iliierable spots... He wiio caii iiiodifi his tactics k relation to his p p i i i i t arid there-bv siicceed in winriiiig, iiiav be called a heavert-boni captain."

Since the dawn of warfare. forewarning about enemy location, disposition, and intent has been indispensible to those commanders who best understood how to exploit it. But information regarding the enemy does not grow on trees, free for the picking; most often, such information must be forced from that enemy like a bone from a hungry dog. Nevertheless, the information needed to defeat an enemy most often comes from the enemy himself, and one must be prepared to go out and take it. British General J. F. C. Fuller, the man who gave us the principles of war we apply to our planning today, corroborates the need to fight for information: nioiigii, gerieral!y speaking, tlic air reconriaissaiice will discover the areas in nhicli the eiieiiiv is weak or in f o e, the selectioii of the iiiore likelv poiiits of assaiilt is decided oii bJ1 figlitiiig... Slioiild the initial blow fail 011 accoiirtt of iuiepectedlv strong resistaiice. the point of iiripact is at oiicc siifted. Geiieral!v speaking, this shoiild be iiririecessaq for if recoiiriaissaiice has been tlioroiigli tlic coiiceritration of force brought to bear bv the attacker will rtear!val-wa?abe vast!\* superior to the resistance the defeiidcr caii offer...' Units can go out and take information from a hostile force by executing a reconnaissance in force (RIF). This effort centers around forcing an enemy, through armed attack, to reveal hidden strengths and/or weaknesses that the friendly force can exploit. Quite often, this type of information can only be had by literally attacking to see what happens and then adjusting accordingly. The reconnaissance in force is especially relevant when we know that the enemy is defending at a definite location, but we do not know his strength and, above all, we do not know his intention: is the enemy opposition just a rear guard action or screen calculated to gain time, or is this a main body prepared to halt our advance at all costs? If it is a delaying force, then we must attack quickly to break through that force and deny the enemy his desired time. If it is a series of strong points defended by a determined main body, then we must decide either to make a deliberate attack or to bypass, depending on the overall mission. Time generally increases the defender's advantages and decreases the advantages of the attacker. That is why it is imperative that attacks begin as soon as possible, and that the attacker determines the type of opposition that the enemy intends to offer. In this regard, aviation and electronic surveillance devices may pinpoint and clarify the extent of defenses, but they certainly will not reveal the enemy commander's intentions, nor many of his limitations. The same often applies to small unit reconnaissance patrols, which are commonly limited to locating the forward line of defense and locating select equipment or groups of personnel; rarely can they gauge the strength of a position, or the enemy's determination to hold it. One can draw such information ARMOR - 43

A RIF is condiicted similar to a inoventent to contact... - FM 7 1 - 9 An M48 of the 1 lth Armored Cavalry Regiment leads a reconnaissance in force near Ben Cat during the Vietnam conflict. from a competent enemy by a largescale action, such as a RIF. Current U. S. Army doctrine recognizes the utility of RIFs: While most attacks seek the oiitrigltt defeat of the opposing force...art attack mn?, be laiiriclied simp& to force the eneritv to disclose Iris streitgtli, dispositions, or iitteiitioiis. Siiclt a recon-riaissarice in force may develop into a major attack if tlte initial probe discloses an etploitable weakrtess in the citemy's dejkitses. - FM lWj3 How does current doctrine dictate conduct of RIFs? FC 71-100 tells us: The division n i p iise several task forces iirider a brigade siritiiltaiieoiis- 111, or task forces stagered in time artd at widelv separated points. Siich action keeps the erieriiy off balance, discloses his dispositions over abroad area, arid ntei develop tlic location and plartried iise of his mer-ves. I f the reconnoitering force makes a patetration, it disnipts artd destrom all possible eiteiiiv rear irtstallatioiis arid prepares to render all possible assistance to any ciploitirig force. Miilti-ple recortrtaissartces irt force are favored by operations 011 a wide front, friend!\, siiperiorihi in aniior and niohiliy, arid art imqmieiiced erterity or an erieiiiy who Itas weak coritrol arid coriiiiiiiriicatiorts. Planning slioiild iitcliide arraiigeiiteiits for withdrawal or ctwication of the force. 4 Other U. S. Army doctrinal manuals expand our view on RIF planning and execution: Wltatervr size the force, tlie operation is piaimed arid aeciited like arty other attack cvcept that less will be ktowrt of the eiteiity.. A temirt objective wlticlt, if tltreaterted or occiipied, will caiise the ertaiiv to react is most ofleii iised. If the eneiiiv sihiatiort along a front is to be developed, the force coridiicting tlte reconitasisartcc advances along its front eritployiitg strong agyessive probes to detenitiite the sihiatiori at critical points... If engaged iipori coriipletiort of the recoiiitaissaitce, tlte force r i r q, reiitaiii in contact with the erteiity or it ma?, witlidraw. I f tlie recortriais-same is to be followed by jiirtlier attack, other iiiiits pass tltroiigli or around the recoririoitering force in the attack, or the reconrtoiteriiig force niay corttiriiie the attack. - FC 71-35 How should a unit be configured to execute a RIF? D. H. Mahan, a famous Civil War-era West Point instructor, gives us the following description of what tacticians thought essential during his time: Recorrnaissartces, made in tlie iieigliborliood of art eiientv, require to be done irrider tlie protection of a proper detacltnicrit; tlie strength arid coriipositioii of wliich will depend 011 tlie object to be attained... Wieit art eiteiiy's position is to be reconnoitered, with a view to force hint to show his Iiartd, bv cawing hirii to call out all his troops, tlicn a large detacltritertt of all aims, adequate to the task of pressing the a t a i i v vigoroiislv, arid also of withdrawing with safe? wliert pressed in hint, mist be tltrowri f o r a r d. Civil War era requirements for units have certainly not changed in modern times. FC 71- 100 states: nte recoitrtoiteriiig force mist be of a size arid conipositioit to caiise the erientv to react strorigI?) arid defirtitelv to the attack, this disclosirig Itis locations, dispositions, streitgtli, plaiiried fires, arid plarirted iise of resenvs. llie size of tlte force depelids 011 tlie mission arid the sihiatiort. nie.divisiort coritritartder i i t q iise a battalion task force or lie may iise the biilk of the division, retaining siifti-cient resenw to exploit eitentv weaknesses. Tanks arid attack lielicopters provide the riiicleiis for these forces.' Are cavalry organizations suitable for RIFs? FM 17-95 Cavalry Upera-tiorts recognizes the RTF as a corps regimental cavalry mission. We can 44 ARMOR - November-December 7989 expect such a mission of our regimental cavalry because, except for the notable absence of infantry, the regimental cavalry is a relatively large and self-contained combined arms force. However, if the objective is in close terrain and/or the enemy has strong antitank capability, a primarily mounted force, such as the cavalry, could prove inadequate, even suicidal. A corps commander would have to heavily supplement the cavalry with infantry or elect to use a more appropriate unit, such as a mechanized or light infantry brigade. What about divisional cavalry? Current doctrine (FM 17-95) does not give divisional cavalry squadrons missions involving sustained offensive combat. Presumably, this limitation is due to the divisional cavalry'slack of its most potent ground offensive weapons - tanks. Therefore, battalion task forces execute divisional RIFs. Perhaps this is not such a bad idea. Given that there is only one cavalry unit in the division, arguably, the division commander would not wish to risk - at least routinely - the rapid attrition of his single, highly-trained reconnaissance unit on what is essentially a high-risk offensive combat mission when he has the choice of some ten battalion task forces that are tailor-made to execute such actions. What is key to the success of a RIF? Napoleon once said that in war, there is but one favorable moment; the great art is to seize it? This is especially true with a RIF. Commanders need to clearly understand that they must posture their main body for immediate exploitation of exposed soft spots, or the whole effort may he wasted. Also, "On the fast-paced AirLand battlefield, information will have to be gained quickly from an enemy who is likely forewarned of your approach through a host of modern detection devices. Fighting for information will probably be the norm rather than the exception." commanders must take care that their RIF does not reveal their own intentions, and that the operation does not lead to a sudden general engagement for which the friendly force may be unprepared. In the face of modern electronic scnsors, the use of stealth to gain information is rapidly losing realism. On the fast-paced AirLand battlefield. information will have to be gained quicklv from an enemy who is likely forewarned of your approach throueh a host of modern detection devices. Fighting for information will probably be the norm rather than the exception. Today's commanders should see this reality and train and equip today for the desperate reconnaissance battles that will undoubtedly face us tomorrow. Routine planning and execution of RIFs is one way to train for such an eventuality. Notes 'Sun Tzu, The Art of War, circa 500 B. C., as edited by Brig. Gen. T. R. Phillips and reproduced in The Roots of Strateav. (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books. 1985), p. 36. 2Maj. Gen. J. F. C. Fuller, "Armor and Counterarmor," lnfantrv Journal, March-May, 1944, reprinted in Historical Readings, Armor Officer Advanced Course, Command and Staff Department, US Army Armor School, Ft. Knox, Ky., May 1979, p. 126. 3FM 100-5, poerations, Washington, D. C.: U. S. Army, 1986, p. 95. 4FC 71-100, Armored @ Mechanized Division @ Briaade Operations, Ft. Leavenworth: US. Army, 1984, pp. 8-28. Mechanized lnfantw Briaade, Washington, D. C.: US. Army, 1985, pp. 3- 49. 6FM 71-2J. The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force. Washington, D. C.: US. Army, 1984, pp. 3- 72. 7Mahan, D. H., Out-Post, (New York: John Mley. 56 Walker Street, 1861), p. 112. 5FC 71-3, The Armored 'FC 71-100, pp. 8-27, 8-28. 'Napoleon Bonaparte, Militaw Maxims, as edited by Brig. Gen. T. R. Phillips and reproduced in the book Roats of m, (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1985), p. 436. Captain Andrew F. DeMario was commissioned in Infantry from OCS after serving as an enlisted combat engineer and armor crewman. He branch-transferred to Armor in 1984. A graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic Course, Airborne School, and the Armor Officer Advanced Course, he has served as a platoon leader in both infantry and armor units, as XO of an infantry company, as assistant S3 of an armor battalion, and a force modem-ization officer with HQ, 3d ID. He is currently the S3 of 4-13 Armor ARMOR - 45