Years Aaa; Joachim Peiper and the Deep Attack

Today, the U. S. Army has integrated the concepts of maneuver warfare into its doctrine more than ever before. FM 100-5 (1986) is a recognition of the operational level of war, the requirement of mission-type orders, initiative at the lower levels, and the concept of striking at an enemy’s weaknesses. But, the doctrine’s emphasis on the concept of hitting deep into an enemy’s flank and rear is perhaps one of its more intriguing aspects. To hit deep into the rear of static or dynamic enemy forces is certainly not anew consideration for comhat on a European battlefield. As recently as WWII, there were many occasions when mechanized and armored forces made deep penetrations into opposing formations in order to reach an ob.jective or to stop an attack. This is especially true with regard to German forces which counterattacked against advancing Allied armies on both the Eastern and Western fronts. Many German officers achieved prominence for their skill and success in conducting such deep attacks. One officer of special note was Oberst (Colonel) Joachim Peiper, commander of the 1st SS Panzer Regiment of the 1st SS Panzer Division. This article is a brief examination of Colonel Peiper’s use of the deep attack during the German Ardennes offensive of 1944, known as the Battle of the Bulge. Its purpose is to provide some insight into the military tactics and decision-making of this commander during this operation. Hopefully, it will also provide a few ideas on some of the many considerations commanders should make when conducting a deep attack on an offensively postured enemy. It will also demonstrate how many of today’s generally accepted concepts on the use of mechanized and armored forces in the deep attack served as keys to the deep attacks of the past. Although well educated and fluent in English, Peiper was a tough, arrogant, and hard-core Nazi officer. He was famous for his ruthlessness and for his success in performing notable feats of daring in Russia. Typical of his exploits was his rescue of the German 302nd Infantry Division in 1943. The 302nd was withdrawing under pressure from an area near the western banks of the Donets River, and was burdened with more than a thousand wounded. The 1st SS Panzer Division was tasked to come to its aid at a time when the 1st SS was itself under severe assault on the Donets. Obedient to his orders, Sepp Dietrich, the commander of the 1st SSI withdrew a patzcr prertadier - mechanized - battalion, which Peiper commanded, and sent it in. Peiper’s unit crossed the Donets, smashed through the advancing Russian Army, repelled the Russians’ furious counterattacks, and pushed on until it had located the 302nd. The battalion formed a protective ring around it and held off Russian assaults until all of the division’s remaining elements got safely across the frozen river. However, at the point of crossing, the river ice was too thin to bear the weight of Peiper’s halftracks. He swung the battalion around and drove it through the rear of the Russian forces until he reached abridge near German forces, which was capable of bearing the vehicles. With a record of such operations, it is understandable that the German High Command, while develop- 26 ARMOR - ing its plan for a major offensive in the West during the winter of 1944, selected Peiper for the assignment of commanding the lead elements of the principal drive. The offensive was essentially an all-out effort by Germany to stave off defeat. Roughly, the plan was to push through the weakly defended Ardennes Forest, which lies within the borders of Belgium and Luxemburg, drive on to the Meuse River, and seize Antwerp, a Channel port in Belgium. The capture of Antwerp would have given the Germans an outlet to the sea. The German High Command depended on two key elements for its attack. First, it depended on fog and weather to ground Allied air power. Second, it depended on complete surprise. Because surprise was a key element for success, many details of the attack were kept secret even from its participants until days before its start. It was under this cloud of secrecy that the Ardennes operation began for Peiper. Brought to the West two days beforehand, Peiper received orders on December 14 to drive the 1st SS Panzer Regiment rapidly through the northern region of the Ardennes and reach the Meuse River, to ignore his flanks, and to capture as many U. S. fuel dumps as possible. Briefings and maps included most of the tactical necessities, such as accurate information on the U. S. situation and the composition of U. S. forces. From his maps, Peiper recognized that environmental factors would be of great importance to his attack. The roads assigned to his unit and remaining elements of the 1st SS Panzer Division, which were required to follow him, were generally bad. Their negotiability by tracked vehicles would be difficult. In Peiper's opinion, the roads were best suited for bicycles. Yet, despite these misgivings, he recognized that the route provided many bridges that would aid the speed of the advance. To fulfill his mission, Peiper first turned to task organization. He wanted to fight an integrated com-ARMOR - November-December 7989 27 bmed arms battle, and sought a precise mix of forces. Armored and mechanized capabilities had to be used to their maximum advantage, and the strength of each had to be considered in terms of how it could enhance and overcome the weaknesses of the other. The forces available for Peiper’s attack included one battalion of Mark IV and Mark V medium Panther tanks, one battalion of Tiger I1 heavy tanks, and one battalion of paltier grenadiers. After considering factors such as mission, enemy, tcrrain, and troops and time available. Pciper organized his unit into a kariipfpippe - combat team. In order to give Peiper’s advance additional support, the German High Command reinforced his unit with one regiment of paratroopers from the 3rd Fallschirmjager Division. However, cooperation between the two units was brief. Only a reinforced company of the paratroopers remained with Peiper’s column after the morning of December 17, which was its first day of attack. The column would be 25 kilometers long. Most combat elements had to be in the front of the column because it was impossible for the vehicles in the rear to overtake those in the front due to the bad roads. Peiper decided that a few halftracks would proceed ahead as fast as possible until they met resistance. The medium tanks would be among the forward elements. The heavy tanks would be kept in the rear until the unit reached the Meuse River. Then they would proceed at medium speed. Since contact with U. S. forces was possible at any point during the advance, Peiper made all forward combat elements, except for the lead halftracks, capable of quickly deploying for attack. He created an assault formation from these forces. The formation featured two Panther tanks as point, followed next by troops in halftracks, and then by a mixture of Panther and Mark IV tanks. Any decision to make a hasty attack after contact with U. S. forces would be a critical decision because all movement would be halted. In deciding Peiper would have to give consideration to force ratios, U. S. force dispositions, and possible U. S. force intentions. To expedite this decision-making process, Peiper issued orders against firing into small the roads leading to Honsfeld full of U. S. vehicles traveling from the front, Peiper’s tanks and halftracks simply fell into the column and entered the town with them. Although they were initially oblivious to the Germans’ presence, the U. S. troops soon discovered the situation and retreated in disarray, leaving a large amount of equipment. Despite this early success, Peiper’s situation quickly deteriorated. His column’s flanks were wide open, and its vehicles were nearly out of Troops from Kampfgruppe Peiper consolidate at a Honsfeld barnyard after following an American column into the town. The equipment in the background was abandoned by U. S. troops in their withdrawal. groups of U. S. forces in close proximity to his column when they did not oppose its advance. In the first hours of December 17, Peiper’s force drove rapidly toward its objective. His plans for traveling, movement to contact, and the hasty attack lead to initial success. Ordered to go 50 kilometers, Peiper raced almost 30 before the end of the day. U. S. forces were completely surprised by the breakthrough. At the town of Honsfeld, for example, Peiper managed to capture a large c moup of troops still asleep. With fuel. Neither he nor his men had slept or eaten since arriving in the West five days before, and their fatigue was obvious. The entire situation was made worse because Peiper, in his rush to advance, had taken many short cuts through woods and secondary roads. Followup elements were bogged down on these roads due to mud and other terrain conditions. Thus, as a result, supplies and reinforcements could not quickly reach the forward combat elements. Radio difficulties further hampered Peiper; he could not communicate with all elements of his column and 28 ARMOR - the remainder of the 1st SS Panzer Division. Peiper’s radio problems were seemingly out of his control. But his decision to move the column through short cuts was clearly his error. That maneuver degraded the combat capability of his force despite any advantages gained in speed and time. At the town of Stavelot, where Peiper’s unit conducted a hasty attack, the effects of his error were most apparent. Stavelot controlled an important pany of panzer grenadiers from his forward forces to take the stone bridge at the town’s entrance. The company was repulsed and forced to withdraw to safe positions. Apparently surprised by the strength and determination of the force, Peiper ordered howitzers and mortars to hit suspected U. S. positions. In addition, he sent a tank company out to find another way into the town. Neither maneuver gained any advantage. Instead of succumbing to the Germans’ artil- 4 This Tiger I1 threw a track and was abandoned on December 19 on the outskirts of the village of La Gleize. Here, Peiper’s battle group was nearing the limit of its penetration into the Bulge. road and bridge intersection on Peiper’s line of advance. The road to Stavelot curved around a gigantic rock and funneled into a single bridge over the Ambleve River. The U. S. force which held the Belgian town was composed of one armored infantry battalion, a platoon of tank destroyers, a battalion of combat engineers, and odd units, such as a few antiaircraft artillery batteries. When Peiper made his initial a p proach on Stavelot in the late afternoon of December 17, he immediately assessed that it would be difficult to enter the town with his tanks. Peiper quickly ordered a com-lery barrage, the U. S. forces launched a counterattack, consisting of one platoon of infantry, against Peiper’s column, which he managed to repulse. The tank company found that the only alternate way into the town was impassable with tanks. Peiper commited another company of pattier grenadiers to the attack, but it was also beaten back. It was at this point that Peiper realized that the troops in his forward force were in no condition to conduct a successful assault, so he decided to delay the attack for a few hours in order to wait for the more rested troops of his follow-on force and additional supplies. At dawn on December 18, Peiper, who was now reinforced, once more committed a company of partier grenadiers against Stavelot. But in conjunction with the infantry attack, he positioned two Panther tanks 200 meters from the edge of the town and instructed them to charge toward the town’s entrance at maximum speed. The tanks drove rapidly around the curve at Stavelot’s entrance, firing their guns. The first tank was hit, and it burned, but it had so much momentum that it penetrated some antitank obstacles at the curve and damaged two U. S. tanks positioned there. The second tank used that opportunity to drive through and seize the bridge. Peiper quickly followed up with other vehicles. In the town, a fierce battle developed, which lasted two hours and caused heavy losses on both sides. By the end of the morning, the U. S. forces had withdrawn. Given the responsibility of serving as the armored spearhead of the German offensive, Peiper’s unit was required to perform as a combination reconnaissance and assault force. But it appears that in attempting to drive full steam toward his objective, Peiper felt the need to concentrate more on the reconnaissance role. This seemingly caused him to seek short cuts, which separated his forward elements from his follow-up and support elements. Doing so was a tactical error. The problem was less apparent when the unit encountered light resistance at points such as Honsfeld. The forward elements were adequate to make successful hasty attacks and proceed. However, the problem was more apparent where resistance was relatively heavy, such as Stavelot. Penetra-ARMOR - November-December 7989 29 tion there was difficult initially because Peiper could rely only on his fatigued forward force, and he used it in piecemeal attacks - a punier grenadier company here, a tank company there. Yet, although these maneuvers were significant to Peiper’s advance, they had very little impact on the entire offensive. Immediately after the engagement at Stavelot, Peiper pushed his forward forces onward through the town and toward the main objective. However, by that time, the U. S. theater commanders had recognized that Peiper’s force was key to the German offensive. After reconnaissance flights located him from the air, his force became the target of two U. S. divisions, their troops angered more than ever because they heard that Peiper’s troops had murdered unarmed U. S. prisoners-of-war and Belgian civilians. U. S. forces took Stavelot shortly after Peiper abandoned it. As a result, his force was cut off from all German forces in the rear. With insufficient supplies, especially fuel, the weary column could not continue to fight for long. Peiper, unable to reach his objective, halted at the town of La Gleize in Belgium, and began to engage U. S. forces, which had managed to encircle his unit. After suffering from ground attacks and tactical air strikes from December 18 until December 23, Peiper was forced to order his men to abandon their fuelless vehicles and to retreat on foot to Germany. After the war, when Peiper was asked whether he would have executed any measures differently if he had to launch the offensive again, he provided some informative comments. With regard to his own regiment, he claimed that he would have instituted a speedier system of supply. He stated that when combat teams attacked, tanks would attack at the same time as infantry. He recognized that unsupported infantry attacks wasted too much time. Further, Peiper stated that the infantry would ride on tanks. Combat teams would be completely self-sufficient, and bridging units would be assigned to each armored point. Peiper took a well-organized approach to planning the execution of his mission, despite the fact that he did not have much time to do so. After receiving his orders, he managed to analyze the maps and information on roads, the disposition of U. S. forces, and the composition of his own unit. He was able to establish - in his mind - a basic framework of action which resembled mission, enemy, terrain, and time. With that framework, he decided on the organization of his force. Peiper’s choice was the karnpfgnlppe, and he designed it to provide both reconnaissance and assault capabilities. The careful preparation demonstrated Peiper’s expertise. However, he failed to properly execute his plan. Concerned with speed and time, he compromised his unit’s cohesion and hampered its combat capability. The fact that Peiper’s mission, as well as the entire German offensive, ended in failure, should not detract from the tactical lessons that are provided from his experience. As illustrated here, even the most capable and experienced commander can make seemingly unimportant maneuvers which will hinder the conduct of his mission. Certainly, the history of one commander’s deep attack cannot build or reduce confidence in those commanders who will have the responsibility of leading deep attacks in the future. However, history may help remind those commanders of the great complexities that the deep attack entails. Mark Edmond Clark received a B. A. in political science and an M. A. in U. S. history from Columbia University. Additionally, he received a J. D. with a concentration in international law from Georgetown University. He has worked for law firms in Washington D. C. and was an associate in the Office of General Counsel of Mobil Oil Corp. Now, wholly dedicated to the study of military affairs, he has completed a book on U. S. military posture for the 1990s and beyond, and is currently preparing an article on Army modernization during General Maxwell Taylor’s tenure as Chief of Staff. He plans to attend Princeton University in 1990 and earn his Ph. D. in political science. 30 ARMOR - November-December 7989