Cavalry Missions and Structure

Cavalry Missions and Structure by Colonel (P) Jarrett J. Robertson Introduction For three key reasons, interest in reconnaissance, security, and economy of force operations has heightened in recent years. AirLand Battle doctrine places a primacy on a commander's ability to see the battlefield. It also stresses a nonlinear battlefield, requiring a commander to mass his combat power at the decisive point. Obviously, a commander cannot mass a reserve at the decisive point without owning a unit capable of an economy of force role. Finally, even if doctrine did not require these capabilities, recent practical experience at the National Training Center (NTC) has stressed their need. At the NTC, commanders have become painfully aware of the consequences of failure to see the battlefield. For all of these reasons, a commander should have organizations to fulfill these requirements. Accordingly, this article will assume a requirement for reconnaissance, security, and economy of force missions, and will discuss how we can design these forces to accomplish such missions. These thoughts are not resource-constrained. Structural trade-offs are not identified. The thoughts are not the results of any strict, clinical testing. Instead, they are the result of 24 years of observation and reflection regarding the cavalry force and, in particular, more than two years of experience at the NTC, where units continue to grapple with the OPFOR under realistic, challenging conditions. Historical Background Cavalry contributions in North Africa and Europe in WWII were well understood in the late '40s and early '50s. General (Ret.) James H. Polk and several others sat down after the war and were instrumental in designing the type of cavalry organization they felt necessary to be successful on the battlefield of the future. Having fought WWII with inadequate structure and organization, and having had to deal with constant attachments and detachments, they were convinced that cavalry needed to be a self-contained organization, a combined arms team of scouts, tanks, infantry, artillery, and air defenders. The organization also needed sufficient organic logistical support to allow it to operate independently. These principles and requirements led to the cavalry structure that emerged in the '50s and '60s for both the cavalry regiment and, the divisional cavalry squadron. The cavalry platoon in both divisional and regimental cavalry in the mid '60s was a typical result of this work. It consisted of a scout squad, tank section, infantry squad, and a 4.2-in. mortar crew - a self-contained combined arms team. The only significant change to the post-WWIl organization was the addition of an air cavalry troop to complement the three ground cavalry troops in the divisional cavalry organization. Another noteworthy aspect of the divisional cavalry organization was its robust organic CSS structure, which gave it the capability to sustain itself independently for some period of time. It was not a bad organization, and it gave the division commander great flexibility. The next chapter in the evolution (or disintegration) of cavalry occurred in the late '60s and '70s. The U.S. Army became fvtated with a need for firepower. The NATO dilemma of dealing with a large Warsaw Pact armor threat led the U.S. to start tinkering with the two border regiments in West Germany. We made the scouts into tank killers and eliminated the infantry. This carried over into the divisional cavalry as well. This era was followed by the leader-to-led issue and the Army of Excellence of the late '70s, in which we again tinkered with cavalry as trade-offs for other initiatives. In the process, we ruined the divisional cavalry squadron completely and damn near ruined the cavalry regiment. With the establishment of the NTC, we have come full circle and are now rediscover-ing the need for a cavalry structure very similar to the post-WWII organization. The

NTC

lessons learned clearly point to the need for reconnaissance, security, and economy of force missions to deal with the OPFOR. The NTC experience has also shown glaring deficiencies in our current force structure, particularly in the cavalry or reconnaissance organizations from battalion through division level. With only one rotation of I 30 ARMOR - November-December 7988 I

BATTALION

SCOUT

PLATOON

0 . .

PLT LEADER L

>MAN CREW

YMMWV

H M W s - 5-MAN CREWS I I_

H31 - %MAN CREWS

PLTJ

SGT

e

TOTAL:

5 H M W s 4 M35 1 M2

54 PERSONNEL

INFANTRY SQUAD

M2 BRADLEY

10 MEN

Fig. 1 regmental cavalry completed at the NTC, it's too early to draw definitive conclusions regarding ACR structure, but the need for some modification is apparent. We will focus here on the need for an adequate cavalry organization for the maneuver heavy battalion, brigade, and the heavy division. Only passing comment will be made concerning regimental cavalry issues. Structural Recommendations The types of organizations detailed here are those I feel are required for reconnaissance, security, and economy of force missions from battalion through corps. Once again, I emphasize that these are personal opinions and are unjustified by empirical data. Battalion Scout Platoon (Figure 1) At the NTC, we've clearly seen the need for scouts at the battalion task force level. The structure of the platoon is not far off. It should be capable of reconnaissance and security missions (less guard, which brigade or division cavalry organizations should handle). The platoon should be capable of screening for the battalion and reconnoitering the kind of units the battalion would normally attack. I would add four vehicles to the platoon for a total of ten. One would transport an infantry squad for dismounted reconnaissance/security. The othcr vehicles would form two scout squads of four crews each. One 'Mt the NTC, we've clearly seen the need for scouts at the battalion task force level. The structure of the platoon is not far off...." squad would consist of M3 Bradleys. The other squad could he light, perhaps mounted in HMMWVs, €or more close-in reconnaissance. Given people, equipment, and training, this organization should be able to do the job. Brigade Cavalry Troop (Figure 2) Obviously, our divisional brigades are especially bankrupt of any recon or security capability. A brigade commander must rely on either subordinate battalion scout platoons or divisional assets for help. Neither solution works. The NTC proves this with every rotation. In contrast, the 194th and 197th brigades have organic cavalry troops, consisting of scouts, tanks, and mortars. While these two brigades have only been allowed to bring their cavalry troops on recent rotations, the demonstrated potential influence in reconnaissance. security, and economy of force operations has been significant. The separate brigade commander has a great asset. Its use need not be confined to reconnaissance and security operations. In fact, given the organization of the troop, the separate brigade also has an economy of force asset, which enables the brigade commander to ARMOR - November-December 1988 31

"One solution is to give every divisional brigade commander his own cavalry troop .... The troop would have three line platoons and a headquarters platoon with a fair amount for CSS and communications capability for extended operations. '' shape a battlefield to his best advantage.

DIVISIONAL

BRIGADE

CAVALRY

TROOP

12 MlAls 14 M3s 3 M2s

APPROX 150

PERSONNEL

0 . . 0 . . 0 . . @ 0 . Therefore, one solution is to give every divisional brigade commander his own cavalry troop. The platoon organization reverts to the early H- -Series TOSrE, and integrates scouts and tanks within a platoon. The extended operations. The infantry have line squads are added for dismounted and a headquarters reconnaissance and security mis-platoon with a fair amount for CSS and communications capability for sions. 4 SCTM3s 4 MlAls

1 M2 INF SQUAD

3 4.2-In MORTARS

DIVISIONAL

APPROX 850

PERSONNEL

SQUADRON

APPROX 200

12 OH-58DS

14 M3s 7

AH-IS

PERSONNEL

3 M2s 10 UH-60s 12 MlAls

AERO RIFLE PLT

3 4.2-in

APPROX 130

APPROX 150 PERS.

PERSONNEL

NOTES:

0 SUFFICIENT COMMO FOR EXTENDED DISTANCES

0 SUFFICIENT ORGANIC CSS FOR INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS

0 ROBUST AIR CAVALRY FOR SUSTAINED/EXTENDED OPERATIONS

0 CAN RECON, PROVIDE SECURITY, FIGHT TO FULFILL MISSIONS

Divisional Cavalry Squadron (Figure 3) The current organization does not appear to be what a division requires for a cavalry force. Its design appears out of balance and it cannot fullill necessary missions. With two ground troops of scouts and two rather small air cav troops. the squadron is a hybrid organiiation that really doesn't fit any normal scenarios for employment. Due to structural limitations, the squadron is only capable of performing reconnaissance missions either on the ground or in the air on limited ayes and with little staying power. An inherent requirement of cavalry is the capability to fight. if necessary, to complete the reconnaissance mission. As an example, a cavalry unit should be able to probe the enemy's position and eliminate enemy recon and security forces. Our current divisional cavalry squadron really can't do that. On the other hand, its other mission of security can only be partially met. The squadron can screiri for the division, both offensively and defensively, but it cannot guard anything. It cannot function as 32 ARMOR - November-December 7988 an advance guard, nor can the squadron guard a division flank. Finally, the squadron cannot provide the division commander a realistic economy of force capability. Therefore, the division cannot use the squadron to occupy a sector or a battle position in order to free maneuver battalions for other missions. The book says that if a unit requires such a capability, the division can beef up the squadron with maneuver companies. This solution will not work. We learned that during WWII. That’s why we organized the type of cavalry units that we had in the ’50s and ‘60s. The ability to blend scouts and tanks into an effective fighting force is a major training challenge. The other problem that we have created centers around the aviation assets for the squadron. Because of these assets, most divisions put the squadron under the aviation brigade. While this helps aviation training and maintenance, it hinders the ground troops’ training and maintenance requirements. As a solution, I see no better answer than to return to the H- series TO&E. The three ground troops would be the mirror image of the brigade’s cavalry troop discussed earlier. The air cavalry troop would be more robust than the current version, to allow for sustained air operations. This squadron is capable of all types of reconnaissance and can fight to fulfill its mission. It is also capable of providing security for the division, to include guard. Lastly, the squadron can provide an excellent economy of force capability to the division commander, freeing his heavier maneuver battalions for other missions. It should also have the communications capability and training to work under either divisional or brigade control. Cavalry Regiment Overall, the armored cavalry regiment is a sound organization. The evolution of the support squadron, air cavalry squadron, and the addition of certain separate companies make the regiment a fairly well balanced combined arms team. However, we require some additions and changes to complete a very capable, lethal, and well-rounded organization. Here’s what we should change: Engineers: One engineer company is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of a cavalry regiment. Two more independent engineer companies are needed. They should be integrated at the squadron level by giving each line squadron a separate engineer company. We don’t need the engineer battalion headquarters. It is just overhead. Artillery Batteries: We should convert each squadron howitzer battery to the 3-by-8 configuration. It is a proven advantage which cavalry, by virtue of its extended operational frontage, cannot be without.

ADA

Battery: Addition of an ADA battery to the regiment is currently scheduled for the 1990s. It is a critical necessity now. We should expedite its integration into the force structure. Cavalry Troop Structure: We should design the regimental cavalry troop in the same manner as the brigade and divisional cavalry troops, intregrating scouts and tanks at the platoon level, along with an infantry squad. The third mortar should be returned to the cavalry troop mortar section to increase organic firepower and flexibility. It is important that the divisional and regimental troops be similar. I ARMOR - November-December 1988 Squadron Tank Company: The 14 tanks in this company provide insufficient sustainable combat power for regimental squadron operations. Each tank platoon should be a five-tank platoon with the traditional two tanks in the headquarters platoon. Conclusion This represents a highly personal view regarding cavalry structure. Two points are worth emphasizing, First, more than one gencral officer has expressed the view that he would willingly surrender one or more maneuver battalions to gain a reconnaissance and economy of force capability at the brigade and divisional levels. Second, the next war will feature acute requirements for the capabilities which cavalry should be structured to provide. The U.S. Army must abandon narrow arguments concerning branch proponency and space trade-offs to address legitimate war-fighting requirements. While we may argue over types of equipment required, or whether the old TO&Es are better, the overriding issue remains. We need to rethink the missions and structure requirements of our cavalry organizations as we continue the evolution to AirLand Battle doctrine. Let the debate begin. Colonel Jarrett J. Robertson, a brigadier general-designate is the 3d

ACR

commander. He was commissioned in Armor at Southwest Missouri State University in 1963. Recently, he has served as deputy commander for Training and Commander Operations Group at the NTC. 33