Red Army Tank Commander A legend in the Red Army, General Andrei Kravchenko led his tanks in an unprecedented river crossing under freezing conditions in one of the most remarkable baffles on the Eastern Front. Improvisation was the key

On 3 October 1943, the Red Army tank corps commander did not know how his day would end. He received an urgent call to the command post of the Voronezh front. General-Major Andrei Grigor-evich Kravchenko. who had been fighting in Red Army tank forces since the beginning of the war, had come up through the ranks in the typical fashion. Hc joined the Rcd Army in 1Y18, got the right schooling, and served as chief of staff for a motorized division, then a tank division in the Finnish War. Kravchenko commanded a separate tank brigade during the hard, desperate fighting against the German invasion in late 1941. He commanded a brigade of the new T-34 tanks, and like many of these new brigades, his played a decisive role in battles to save Moscow and help stabilize the front against the advancing German forces. Although he earned a reputation as a quiet, almost reserved man, Kravchcnko was recognized early by the Soviet High Command as a fully capable and aggressive operational commandcr.' In those trying early times of 1941, if one could show command ability, one advanced rapidly in position and responsibilities. Kravchenko became arising star. In June 1942, he received command of the I1 Tank Corps, and later, in October, was assigned to command the IV Tank Corps. Assigned to the Southwest Front, his IV Tank Corps played a dramatic part in the fight to save Stalingrad from the encroaching German armies. On 19 November 1942, Kravchenko's tank corps, as part of the 21st Army, began the historic battle that culminated in the encirclement at Stalingrad of the Germans' ill-rated Sixth Army under Colonel-General Friedrich von Paulus. His tank corps slashed through the defenders' line and moved rapidly to exploit success in the rear area. Moving in a southern direction, Kravchenko's tankers sought to link up with the forccs of the Stidinwdd front that were advancing north in an attempt to close the noose around the extended German units. Meeting at 16OU hours on 23 November, only five days after the offensive began, Kravchenko's tank corps met General V.

T. Volskii's IV Mcchanked Corps near the small settlement of Sovietskii, just east of Kalach. With filled glasses of captured chani-pagne, each excited corps commander celebrated and toasted the other's forces and fighting prowess. The swift, decisive action won Kravchenho's tank corps the coveted "Guards" designation. Now, the seasoned and wcll-known commander of the 1V Guards Tank Corps had unexpectedly been summoned to appear before his notoriously stern front commander. Immediately upon arrival at the front headquartcrs, General Kravchenko, a tall, well built, commander with broad shoulders, reported to the front commander, General Nikolai Vatutin. A short, ARMOR - 13 squat man, Vatutin was ano-nonsense, hard-driving lighter; these wcre the traits necessary to obtain and hold a front-level command. Kravchenko had been assigned to Vatutin's front since early 1943, and fought on the southern face of the Kursk salient as the Voronezh front's armored reserve. At Vatutin's sidc sat his earthy, but astute, political oKicer, Nikita Khrushchev, a future premier of the Soviet Union. On this occasion, Gcneral Vatutin had good news to share with Kravchenko. Vatutin, who had an amazing ability to accurately describe the situation and foresee developing events, told Kravchenko how lead elements of the 38th Army fought to the banks of the Dnepr River and crossed north or Kicv. Thcy forced the river with makeshift means. Using rafts from hastily fellcd trees, empty gas cans, and small fishing boats, they snatched a hold on the west bank of the wide river in the area of the small village of Lyutezh. Some 15 kilometers north of the prized city of Kiev, the Red Army now breached a potentially difficult German defensive line. It was not an ideal bridgehead, but nonetheless, it was large enough to move more Soviet infantry and tanks to the west bank. "These units," said Nikila Khrushchev, sobering the momentary euphoria, "are hearing great losses and resisting continuous German counterattacks. It's unlikely that they will be successful in securing the captured bridgehead on the right bank if,they are not supported by our tanks.- "On the way to the Dnepr," continued the front commander, "is a serious obstacle, the Desna River. To build abridge across it to cover our weight requirements would take no less than eight to 10 days. That wait will preclude any timely support to the 38th Army's fonvard units, and it will be a diflicult battle to support the bridgehead across the Dnepr."' Thc Dncpr, the second largest Russian river, had concerned the Soviet tieneral Staff planners since early 1943. Anticipating success in thc Kursk battlc during the summer, the Red Army leadership saw the Dnepr as the retreating Germans' next likely line of defensive positions, and a difficult one to breach. The river was wide, with a west bank 100 feet higher than the east. Dubbcd the "eastcrn rampart," it offered a very dcfcnsible barrier to a continuation of the Red Army's westcrn advancc. Hoping to preempt a strong dcfensive line, advancing Soviet units on the left wing of Vatutin's front raced the Germans to the river early in September. Advanced elements of the 3rd Guards Tank Army approached the Dnepr while German forces were still located on the eastern bank. The Soviets attempted to cross the river south of Kiev in the area of the Great Bukrin, a large bend in the Dnepr. In a poorly coordinated effort, rhc Soviet High Command attempted to assist the Voronezh front with a hastily-planned airborne operation using a full airborne corps. But in dropping paratroopers into the Bukrin bend, everything went wrong. The airborne drop scattered jumpers on both sides of the river, some landing in the river itself. The assault was a complete disaster. The Germans slipped away to the "In his usual quiet, muffled voice, Kravchenko directed his staff to organize an immediate reconnaissance of the Desna. A tank platoon leader was about to earn his extra pay and rations as a "Guards" lieu-west hank and rushed reinforcements tu seal the area. The Voronezh front's first chance to breach the river had failed, but given the 38th Army'small kridgehead, Vatutin's front had another chance to achicve SUCCCSS. Showing his typical relentless style, Vatutin refused to Ict this opportunity slip. German commanders had learned to always count on Vatutin to do the unexpected. Now, he raccd against time. Vatutin would have preferred to use the more powerful 3rd Guards Tank Army, but it was too far south in the Bukrin bend. and was engaged with strong German forces containing its bridgehead. Generat Kravchenko's IV Guards Tank Corps could move faster, and appear unexpectedly in the new bridgehead - if Kravchenko could get his tanks across the Desna. With his knack for inspiring confidence in his subordinates, Vatutin directed Kravchenko, "You must look for a" ossible ford to get over the Desna. l) Receiving his mission with full awareness of his commander's urgency, General Kravchenko immediately left for his tank corps' as- 14 ARMOR - I semhly area, in the woods northwest of Brovary near the Desna River. There, his unit was refitting and reequipping after recent combat, and it still suffered from some major personnel and equipment shortages. O fan authorizcd tank strength of 210, the unit had approximatcly 90 tanks in good repair. Interestingly, some 15 of these tanks were British Lend-Lease Churchills, a heavy, slow tank - diflicult to manage compared to the faster T-34s.!n his usual quiet, muffled voice, Kravchenko directed his staff to organize an immediate reconnaissance of the Desna. A tank platoon leadcr was about to earn his extra pay and rations as a "Guards" lieutenant. He received the task to measure depths and find the most shallow point for a crossing. Tankers from the 20th Guards Tank Brigade, designated for the reconnaissance, searched with local fishermen to find a possible ford. The tankers dived several times in the now-cold October river watcrs to determine the character of the river bottom. They looked for an area with a solid river bed and no large rocks, tree trunks, or other obstacles which might stop their tanks as they drove across the river bottom. It was along, cold, arduous task. At the same time, Kravchenko had his tank brigade commanders begin preparing their tanks for the crossing. He reported his actions to the front commander and received from the front staff the mission to attack in the direction of Lyutezh, to force the Desna and Dnepr rivers, and to render help to the forward units of the 38th Army in widening and securing the Lyutezh bridgehead. The search for a river crossing finally succeeded. The tankers found a potential ford in the vicinity of the village of Letki. There, the Desna was 250 meters wide and two meters deep. But two meters was twice the fording depth of the T-34 tanks. The river bed of packed sandy soil was also a potential problem. After a few tanks crossed, it could quickly become dceper. In addition, the march route to the fording site twisted like a snake through swampy tcrrain. It was not the best of crossing sites, but Kravchenko had to risk it. The tank crews carried out necessary river crossing preparations, displaying great inventiveness. All cracks, openings, hatches, engine louvres, and the turret race were caulked with oakum soaked in grease or tar. Any other potential openings were sealed with tarpaulins, oiled and battened-down. Air could reach the engines through the turret hiItch, hut exhaust fumes had to be fed through exhaust pipes made from tarpaulin sleeves, which carried the gases to the water surface. Tankers of the 22nd Guards Tank Brigade made special protective covers for their main guns, and in a few of the battalions, soldiers crafted air intakes from corrugated hoses. Engineers from the 38th Army assisted the tank corps and prepared the banks for the descending approach into the river. In the swampy areas, sappers layed a corduroy road made from brush wood. General Kravchenko listened attentively to his subordinates' progress reports. Later, he would attribute the success of the operation, in large measure, to hard, continuous work and precise coordinittion and planning by his corps chid of staff, and rigorous execution by the tank corps' engineers. The tanks, personally led by their corps commander. began crossing the river on 4 October, less than 24 hours after recciving thc mission. Across the top of the water, two rows of spar buouys marked the ford. The tanks nioved along this designated path in first gear iit no more than 7-8 miles pcr hour. The drivers drove blindly, carrying out changes in steering directions callcd from their tank commanders, who sat on the turret tops just out of the water. Exiting on the opposite bank, the tanks continued moving towards the Dnepr River. In the middle of the Desna crossing operation, General N. E. Chihisov, commander of the 38th Army, arrived from his headquarters at Letki. While anxious for the tankers' arrival in his bridgehead, he was impressed by everyone's sacrifices. "Andre; Grigorevich, what people your tankers are! For my many years of service," he observed, "I have never seen more courageous soldiers than 1 see at this time. The people are hours in the cold water without getting out. And such a risk the drivers take driving to the opposite bank!"' Tankers had to spend time in the icy cold waters, fastening chains to tanks that bogged down in the river bottom. The sandy soil was begin- I 1 I ARMOR - 15

/Ul i The 5th Guard8 Tank Corps In actlon north of Kiev during Ocr-Nov 1943 I ’..’ \ N O V e WSnuunuu -1 \ \i/ f

ROAD &y ning to give way with the passage of so many tanks. Three such tanks had to be towed to the opposite hank. The engine compartments had lcaked and flooded. In many of the tanks that did make the crossing, the drivers did it blindly, sitting in a foot of frigid water. Nonetheless, hy 0800 hours, 5 October, 71 tanks had crosscd the Desna. Although Soviet sources do not develop the point, the disparity in number of tanks making the crossing and the unit’son-hand strength indicates the Soviets did not drive the Churchill tanks underwater, like the T-34s. Thcy left them behind in the rush for the bridgehead. A pleased General Kravchenko, in a fur waistcoat over his field shirt, stood on the opposite bank with abroad smile. He presented awards for hcroic pcrsonal ethrts in the unique crossing. For the first time, a Red Army armor unit had crossed a river underwater - a first time for any army without specially designed underwater equipment. The Party and the Mothcrland wcre grateful, hut none more than the waiting front commander. After crossing the Desna, the 1V Guards Tank Corps rushed onwards to the Dnepr River. Time was precious. The Germans had long since lcarned to react quickly and strongly to Red Army bridgehcads. No matter how small field the bridgehead, the Soviets would increase it rapidly - a small battalion would grow overnight to a division or more, making it impossible for the Gcrmans to reduce the bridgehead. The Russians, on the other hand, knew that every day, even every hour, increased the Gcr-mans’ potential to cordon off the fragile bridgehead with additional forces, mines, and systematic fires, as they had done at the Bukrin bend. General Kravchenho began to think of the fight ahead. He contacted the commanders of the forward rifle divisions at Lyutezh. Thcy reported that there were currently two German infantry and one tank division in the area. The Germans’ defensive line consisted of three positions, each of which h i d trenches, prepared machine gun and mortar emplacements, and earth and timher obstacles. Forward of their positions were antipersonnel and antitank mines. Crossing such a defense to expand the bridgehead would be no small task for Kravchenko’s corps. But, first, the 1V Tank Corps had to cross the Dnepr. The Dnepr River at this point was 650 to 750 meters wide and hetween 2.5 and 9 meters deep. With the corps’ advance to the river, reconnaissance was again dispatched and, with the help of local inhabitants, found two partially-damaged barges which the Germans had sunk when withdrawing. They raised and repaired these barges. Each barge could carry three tanks across the Dnepr. In addition to the repaired - barges, the corps prepared two tank 76 ARMOR - November-December 7988 1 ferries from pontoon bridging sections. Through the night o l 5-6 October, these improvised methods resulted in approximately ten trips, and by dawn, Kravchenko had 60 of his tanks in the bridgehead. German Field Marshal Erich von Manstein’s Army Group South was an old opponent of Vatutin’s Voronezh front. The Army Group’s Fourth Panzer Army had General Hauffe’s XI1 Corps in the area of the bridgehead. The sector was defended by the Hessian 88th and Brandenburg 208th Infantry Divisions along the stcep river bank. In order to secure the crossing over the Dnepr, Kravchenko ordered preliminary artillery fire on (iermiin observation posts on the opposite bank. He also directed powerful suppressive artillery fires, supported by a large number of the famed Katyusha rocket launchers, to neutralize German machine gunners and artillery positions. The first man to cross was the 20th Guards Tank Brigade commander, Colonel Shutov, a seasoned professional who had served in the Red Army since 1918. Before the war, he had been stationed in the ancient captial of Mother Russia, Kiev, and he knew the city well. His wife and two sons had remained in Kiev since the beginning of the war. He anxiously sought battle for the relief of his family and Kiev. The arrival of Kravchenko’s tank corps was the key to the Red Army defense in the bridgehead. The morale of the forward infantrymen in the rifle corps was bolstered and the reinforced German counterattacks were successfully repelled. Within 24 hours of the IV Guards Tank Corps’ appearance, the bridgehead began to expand. With the addition of the tankers, the depth of the Red Army’s hold across the Dnepr expanded to a width of 8-11) kilometers and a depth of 5-6 kilometers from a previously shrinking area only 2-3 kilometers wide and 1-1. S kilometers deep. Shutov’s tank brigade had figured significantly in the fierce fighting and Kravchenko’s tankers widened and secured the bridgehead. General Hauffe’s soldiers could not drive the Russians back into the river. They fought fiercely to contain the burgeoning bridgehead. Even as the corps’ rear element was waiting to cross the Dnepr, General Kravchcnko received anew order from the tireless and aggressive front commander. The IV Guards Tank Corps was ordered to conduct a deep raid outside the bridgehead. Its oljective was to cut off the highway between Zhitomir and Kiev, in the area of Makarov, and then halt the approach of German reserves from Zhitomir to Kicv. Kravchcnko’s raid to Makarov began as aggressively as the crossing of the Desna toward the Dnepr. The corps tank brigades successfully passed their tanks through the kind of difficult and marshy terrain that normally inhibited the maneuver of armored formations. The tank units ground through the swamp-lined lrpen River to the southwest of the bridgehead and moved as rapidly as possible through a large tract of lorest. After overcoming light resistance from a small group of German infantry, the tank corps, upon reaching good high ground, began to maneuver in the German rear area. With specially attached airborne infantry, which rode on the tanks, Kravchenko’s tankers rapidly advanced toward their assiqed obiectives. As usual, Kravchcnko was well forward in his observation post. He always located himself at the most difficult situation, or most critical spot, sternly gazing on the action. His whole manner projected to his lighting tankers his strong-willed character. For four days, the tank corps fought toward Kiev and the highway to the west that was the Nazi lifeline. Then, just as the tank corps moved out for the raid, the situation in the Lyutezh bridgehead turned worse. The 38th Army was under strong German counterattacks from the areas of Vyshgorod and Pushcha-Voditsa on the southern perimeter. The German command understood the danger of Kravchenko’s tank corps maneuvering against the critical line o l communications in their rear area. Strong forces of infantry and tanks struck from Kiev to the north along the Dnepr River’s west bank, attempting to cut off Kravchcnko’s tank corps and liquidate the menacing bridgehead. It was a desperate effort to stem the Red Army advance and breach of the Germans’ major defensive obstacle, the Dnepr River. Kravchenko was ordered to return his corps to the bridgehead and strike in the direction of the counterattacking Gcrnian forces. This recall troubled Kravchenko. These instructions were in error, he thought. The corps’ attack to Makarov was progressing successfully and bearing results. Believing the attack should continue, he called the front staff to question the order. He hoped to ARMOR - 17

"ln the month's fighting, Kravchenko led his tank corps in crossing the Desna, Dnepr, and - three times - the lrpen rivers, and his unit was the first to pierce to the center of Kiev. Kravchenko 's tireless, aggressive performance earned him his country's highest decoration, the star of the Hero of the Soviet Union." change minds, but Vatutin himself reaflirnied his order to immediately return to the Lyutczh bridgehead. Kravchcnko's tankers were still necessary to hold the Red Army's grab on the west bank. "With an ache in our hearts," wrote Kravchenko after the wiir. "we abandoned our gains, rushed back towards the River Irpen."' None in his command regretted the withdrawal morc than Coloncl Shut ov. With the tank corps' arrival back in the bridgehead, and in coordination with 38th Army rifle units, they repelled all the (ierman counterattacking forces and again expanded the bridgehead. Meanwhile, Vatutin worked to rush other I'orces to fully exploit the Dnepr crossing. German aircraft dropped leaflets throughout the hridgehead area. In an attempt to demoralize the tankers and dash the hopes of the infantrymen, the leaflets read, "(ieneral Kravchenko losl all his 240 tanks and now sits entrapped." Reading one of the lcallcts brought to him. Kravchcnko remarked. "If I had 2 4 ) kinks, I would drive those Fascists all the way to Berlin."' With the arrival of additional forces - the 3rd Guards Tank Army-in the bridgehcad, Vatutin, on 30 Octoher. held a war council with his army and corps commanders. The conference was conducted in the cellar of a bombed-out school house in Novo-Petrot-tsy in the Lyutezh bridgehead, within the range of German artillery. Vatutin clearly and laconically stated the operational plan, and pcrsonally assigned the army, corps, and division missions. Generally, the plan was to capture Kiev from the north and, moving in a southwest direction, destroy elements o f the Fourth Panzer Army and seize important population centers to the west of the Dnepr. "The Supreme Commander (Stalin) has ordcrcd us to launch the offensive on 3 November," he said in conclusion. "The Ukrainian capital is to he liberated not later than 6 November."' Kravchenho stood quietly in the back, against the wall. He made no comments. His tank corps, in coordinated tank and infantry tactics. would fight as a mobile group for the 38th Army. Attacking in the lirst echelon, his corps would again cross the lrpen River. He knew what was expected ol' him and he would get it done. While in the assembly area, 1V G u d s Tank Corps became the target of marauding German Stuka aircraft. Kravchcnko quickly decided deception would be necessary for his unit's third crossing of the Irpen. He had his engineers huild false crossing sites over the river and fabricate mock tanks from plywood in the assembly areas. The dummy tanks drew the German bombing strikes. At 0600, 3 November, the 1st Ukrainian Front (the Voronezh was redesignated on 20 October). began a classic large-scale Red Army artillery preparation along the entire front south of Lyute7h. A powerful strike from a full Artillery Breakthrough Corps at the disposal of the 38th Army initiated the offensive in the direction of the main attack. During the evening of 5 Novem-her, Kravchcnko met with his staI'I' in the outskirts of Kiev. Leaning over a map, Kravchenko indicated the march routes of the tank columns and the coordination requirements of the brigades. He marked on the map the portion of the city they would attack. He ordered the concentration of units and preparations for the advance to the final jumping4 positions. And then Kravchcnko addcd a surprising requirement, "The tanks must drive in the niLg.ht at high speeds with headlights on."9 His staff and commanders exchanged glances in disbelief. Noting the puzzled stares, Kravchenko confirmed his instructions. "Yes. all vehicles - tanks, self-propelled guns, transports - will move at a high speed with headlights on and sirens blaring."'" At 2 0 0 hours, 5 November, General Vatutin gave the order to begin the final assault on Kiev. The tanks' rapid night advance, with headlights on and firing thcir main guns on the move, stunned the German defenders and created confusion and panic. Fearing encirclement, the Germans began to 18 ARMOR - withdraw from the city and, by 0400 hours, 6 November, the German resistance in Kiev ceased, Announcing the capture of the city. Vatutin phoned Stalin, who ordered salutes fired in Moscow and all Russia to celebrate the victory. In the month's lighting, Kravchcnko led his tank corps in crossing the Desna, Dnepr, and - three times - the Irpen rivers, and his unit was the first to pierce to the center of Kiev. Kravchenko's tireless, aggressive performance earned him his country's highest decoration, the star of the Hero of the Soviet Union. He became marked for advancement in command. In January 1944, combining the 1V Guards Tank Corps and V Mechanized Corps. the Red Army created its last tank army during the war, and Kravchenko became its commander. His organization, the new 6th Tank Army, was completrd in time for participation in the Korsun-Shevchenko operation in January-February 1944. With his tank army, Kravchenko now attacked as the mobile group for the 1st Ukrainian Front. slicing through the German forward defense and encircling a salient of some 70,000 Germans. The operation was a catastrophic defeat for the Germans, forcing them to completely abandon the Dnepr River area. In August 1944, Kravchenko led the 6th Tank Army in fighting in the Yassy-Kishnev operation. Executing a brilliant 11-day operation, Kravchenko conducted operations at night, crossed water obstacles, assisted in the destruction of an army group, and placed the German situation on the strategic flank in jeopardy. The army's actions in this operation won it the "Guards" designation. The 6th Guards Tank Army, under Kravchenko's leadership, continued to fight through the Balkans and Carpathian mountains to the end of the war in Europe, in May 1945. After the war in Europe, Krnv-chenko and his tank army wcre transferred to the Far East military theater. In August 1945, his tank army attacked across the Greater Khingan mountains and desert of western Manchuria against the Japanese Kwantung army. In a lightning campaign, forward elements of his tank army ended the Wilr on the shores of the Pacific Ocean. Kravchenko for the second time received his country's ultimate recognition. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, a title earned by only a select few, General Kravchenko became one of the major fighting heroes of the Great Patriotic War. Unfortunately, his accomplishments, like like those of many of the other Red Army tank commanders, have not been spotlighted in the West's poshvar literature, leaving a vague, and often incorrect, notion of the fighting on the Eastern Front. But as Kravchenko stood at the end of along and hard-won triumph against the Germans and Japanese, he understood, and represented fully, the words of a traditional Russian warrior creed, "He who comes to us with a sword shall perish by the sword." Notes Author's interview with Malcolm Mackintosh, British Military Observer to the Red Army, who met and knew Kravchenko 1. 2' A. Kravchenko, "Tankisty forsiruyut reki (Tankers Force the Rivers)," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Military History Journal), No. 9-1963, p. 63. 3' Ibid. Ibid. 4. 5' Anna Stroeva, Komandarm Kravchenko (Army Commander Kravchenho), Polizdat Ukraine, 1984, pp. 63-64. '' Ibid., p. 70. Ibid., p. 70. 7. 8' David Dragunsky, A Soldier's Memoir, 9' Stroeva, p. 68. "'lbid. Progress, Moscow, 1983, p. 11 1. Bibliography Carell, Paul, Scorched Earth, Ballantine, New York, 1966. Dragunsky, David, A Soldier's Memior, Progress, Moscow, 1983. "Gody v brone," Voenizdat, Moscow, 1975. Erickson, John, The Road To Berlin. Westview, Colorado, 1983. Grechko, A. A., "V boyakh za stolitsu Uk-rainy," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. Kravchenko, Andrei, "Tankisty forsiruyut ryeki," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 4 1963. Khrushchev, N. S., Khrushchev Remem- _. bers, Little, Brown, Boston, 1970. Mackintosh, Malcolm, British Military Observer to the Soviet Army who met Kravchenko, interview, 2 October 1986. Stroeva, Anna, Komandarm Kravchenko, Polizdat Ukraine, 1984. 11-1963. Lieutenant Colonel Richard

N. Armstrong was comrnis-sioned from West Virginia University in 1969. He has served in military intelligence in such posts as Department of the Army, 1st Cavalry Division, the USAREUR staff and in the European, Korean, and Vietnamese theaters. He is currently G2, 1 st Cav Div. I ARMOR - 19