On the Track of the CAT

On June 191h, 1987, 1st platoon, Delta Company, 4th Battalion, 8th Cavalry (formerly 3-33 Armor, "The Pickles"), did what no other U. S. Army unit has been able to do in 24 years of international tank gunnery competition: we won the Canadian Army Trophy (CAT)! Out of a possible 21,800 points, 1st platoon posted a final score of 20,490, which was 800 points higher than its closest competitors, 2nd platoon, 4th Company, 124th Panzcr Battalion (19,6%) points). The winning platoon's battle run was the last of the five-day competition, making this first-time U. S. victory as dramatic as a World Series Game Seven grand slam homerun with two outs in the bottom of the ninth inning. The achievement capped months of intense training by Delta Company and verified a superb training program. Every two years, the CAT tank gunnery competition brings together 10 teams, consisting of 24 platoons, from NATO's Central Army Group (CENTAG) and Northern Army Group (NORTHAG). Nations represented at this year's CAT were Canada, Belgium, Great Britain, the Netherlands, West Germany (3 teams), and the United States (3 teams). In recent years, the official top prize has been awarded to the army group with the highest total points at the end of the competition; however every team hopes that one of its platoons will have the highest battle run score of the competition. That platoon and its team, battalion, division, corps, army - and the tank it used - become the real winners of CAT. Unfortunately, the past failures of the United States to win CAT have had the effect of transforming the competition into a test. This is not a phenomenon peculiar to the United States. The showing of the Royal Hussars at this year's competition was the subject of a front page story in London's Siatda?, Telegraph, June 21, 1987, titled "NATO Allies Outgun Britain's New Battle Tanks". Critics have used the results of past CATS to slam the way the Army trains, the quality of its all-volunteer force, and its procurement policies. 'r The Canadian Army Trophy, a silver Cen-These criticisms are as baseless as those who time in 24 years. turion tank, won by a U. S. unit for the first would claim that our use of the Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer (UCOFT) and Simulation Network (SIMNET) proves that simulators can be used to further reduce yearly training ammunition allocations. Our victory does not prove that the M1 is a better tank than the Leopard 11, nor that US. volunteers are superior to West German conscripts. Our victory did prove that, given a capable piece of equipment and a solid training program, U. S. soldiers, not "gladiator troops" (a label pinned on us by a member of one of the other competing teams) are among the firnest tankers in the world. The most often cited reason why U. S. teams had been unsuccessful in their attempts to win CAT was that Army personnel policies made it impossible to bring together the necessary number of troops with CAT ex-pcrience. Many experts were convinced that stabilized crews were the answer lo German dominance at past competitions. The 1987 CAT Committee of Control requirement, for each sponsor (in our case, V Corps) to train two companies prior to an April 1 blind-draw selection, made the pool of experienced CAT tankers even smaller. The other company was made up of members of 3d Battalion, 8th Cavalry. (There is no doubt in our minds that they would have enjoyed the same success we did, had they been chosen to represent 3AD and V Corps.) Veterans of CAT scoffed at a 3rd Armored Division team that said it was going to win without a single ARMOR - November-December 7987 17

"Cat Fever" Above, 1/D/4-8 Cav begins its winning battle run at bound 1, range 301, at Grafenwoehr. At left, 1LT Pierre E. Massar, platoon leader of 1st Platoon, returns to Gelnhausen for the victory celebration followina this year's "World Series of Tank Gunnery." At left, the members of 1st Platoon, D Co., 4-8 Cav, stand at ease at Gelnhausen upon return from the CAT competition. The platoon was the first U. S. unit to win the competition in 24 years, and did it with the pressure on. The final battle run decided the competition between 10 teams from six NATO nations. 18 ARMOR - tank commander, gunner, loader, or driver that had ever competed in CAT. The team that we fielded was not a group of super tankers; rather, it was representative of today’s armor force. The company was made up of the most qualified volunteers that one battalion had lo offer. Even so, given the talent that was available, it was clearly representative of the battalion as a whole. Training is the key to winning CAT; however, logistics is a most significant element of any training plan. In today’s Army we tend to view training and logistics as two separate activities, primarily because of our desire to assign functional areas of responsibility. While this distinction makes it easier for the commander and his executive officer to write OER support forms, it also tends to cause leaders to view training and logistics as related, but not dependent on each other. Our experience during CAT vindidated a strong belief we took into CAT logistics and training are mutually supportive. Many pay lip servicc to that simple statement; our challenge was to implement a system that would make it a reality in our CAT company. To win we knew that we would have to train and maintain significantly better than U. S. units had done in previous CATS. It is noteworthy that we broke with the Army of Excellence MTOStE when we moved support personnel from HHC to the CAT company. We viewed that restructuring as a critical stcp in building a CAT team rather than a gunnery company. Our team, not any one platoon or 16 tankers, won CAT. The team concept ensured that training and logistics were not viewed as separate entities. The M1 system exacerbates the need to treat training and logistics as a team. High-tech and relatively new systems like the MI tend to blur the distinction between maintenance problems, systems problems, and training problems. The following situation illustrates this lack of distinction: You have a maintenance problem when a shortline round is due to a laser that is overheated or improperly installed. You have a systems problcm when a crew shoots shortline because the number five circuit card comes loose in the computer-electronics unit (which happened frequently). You have a training problem when a shortline is caused by improper lasing techniques. In all these examples, the result is a shortline, and leaders know that shortlines must be eliminated to win CAT. If the leader does not understand the intricacies of the MI, and the bond between logistician and trainer is not strong, the trainer blames maintenance, and logisticians blame training. (We had very few maintenance problems; the M1 had some systems problems.) At a minimum, valuable preparation time is either lost or wasted before the real cause is determined. In worst-case situations, the real cause is not identified, and the problem persists. We were successful because we were able to determine the cause quickly and apply the needed remedy. A strong team gave us that abi My. If the MI is one of the finest tanks in NATO, and the quality of U. S. soldiers was as good as those in our allies’ armies, then the key to winning CAT for the first time had to be training. Our analysis of past U. S. efforts to win CAT indicated that the lack of a stable, coherent, and a well-thought-out training plan had hindered units. A careful reading of their after-action reports indicated that they had concentrated almost exclusively on major densities and seemed to view the time they were not on the range as disfunc-tional, maybe even wasted. CAT teams are allocated so much range time during their preparation phase that there seemed to be a tendcncy to view time at home station as but a respite between densities. Our training strategy did not revolve around any single training event or device. Instead, we designed a total program that stressed innovative training at home station as well as making maximum use of scarce range time and main gun ammunition. The keystones of that training strategy were: 0 We constructed a Tank Crew Proficiency Course (TCPC) at a local training area that was a 1/4- scale duplicate of the competition range. Platoons maneuvered their own tanks, equipped with the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES), along the scaled-down course roads and engaged remote-controlled targets outfitted with the Target Interface Device System (TIDS). MlLES and TIDS created target effect (the target fell when hit) and we were able to score CAT battle runs. All the tasks, conditions, and standards of CAT training were integrated into this course. It was so realistic that crews were able to practice target acquisition and range memorization. 0 Not all of our training was this glamorous. We stressed platoon basics by spending countless hours in the classroom gathered around a terrain board. We developed range ARMOR - November-December 7987 79

- attack procedures, drilled C", and reviewed lessons learned during CAT training at Grafenwwhr and Baumholder. Normal division densities at Grafenwoehr and Baumholder were used for CAT training. Before we fired a single main gun round, we ensured that the target scenarios and the range configuration duplicated what we knew about CAT battle runs. We developed an accurate scoring method that provided detailed firing data which we used to attack known weaknesses. 0 Mr. Doug Watters, AMCCOM, developed anew procedure for zeroing the M1. Watters used a grid target panel, in conjunction with a correction matrix, to produce a zero that allowed us to consistently put rounds through an 8-inch bullseye at 2,000 meters. We feel strong about replacing calibration with zeroing. Whatever extra rounds are used to zero will be saved with more first-round hits during the subsequent training tables. 0 During two of our densities at Grafenwoehr, we invited teams From both NORTHAG and CENTAG to attended a pre-competition training camp. The so-called "Kitty CAT training camps were the brainstorm of our Commanding Gcneral, MG Thomas Griffin. As a licutenant, he had competed in a contest similar to CAT and remembered the pressure of international competition. The CG wanted everything possible done to duplicate the pressurized atmosphere which, if not handled properly, can humble the best trained platoon. He insisted that our soldiers would have a better chance of winning CAT if the first time they saw a-German cross painted on the side of a Leo I1 was not at the actual competition. MG Griffii was right. We feared no one. 0 As part of our program to ensure that our soldiers could handle the stress of the actual competition, we asked the United States Military Academy for the services of Dr. Dennis Forbes, a member of the faculty. Dr. Forbes was no stranger to CAT. He had been part of the 3AD team in IY8 I. Dr. Forbes came to Grafenwoehr in the third week of May and remained with the team through the last run of the competition. His method of controlling stress was accepted by the troops and paid immediate dividends. Dr. Forbes gave us a team of competitors rather than participants. Everything we did for many months preceding was directed towards winning. Critics of the competition have argued the the CAT mission is detrimental to a unit because it focuses all its assets and training to the attainment of a single goal for up to a year. Many would carry the argument even further and add that CAT gunnery training does not support the Army's gunnery program, e.g., the competition does not require crew commands, night firing, or degraded gunnery. Our experience is that these critics are wrong. CAT training supports the mission of a forward-deployed armor battalion in Central Europe. Delta Company deployed to Hohenfels one month after CAT for participation in the battalion's task force ARTEP. The company had no field time between CAT and Hohen-Eels to brush up on rusty field skills and conduct the tactical training that had been ignored for up to ten months. Even though the battalion's - other companies had conducted ARTEP training, Delta Company's across-the-board performance at Hohenfels was superior to every other company in the battalion. It is noteworthy that the battalion as a whole had an excellent ARTEP, with some observers rating it as one of the top two performances in the division. The key to understanding Delta Company's performance is clear when we look at the process rather than the prodiict of CAT training. The product of our CAT training program was the first victory for a U. S. Army platoon in the history of the competition. Team-building and development of the company chain of command were the critical elements of the process that allowed us to successfully implement our training plan. The individual skills that were honed during CAT went far beyond those required for gunnery. They were the kind of skills that support the accomplishment of any mission and make a good unit a great combat team. It may seem trite to point out that CAT training must stress quality and not quantity; however, it's true. A successful day on the range is not a function of how many battle runs are made, or even the platoon's performance. A good day on a CAT range is when the trainers know what targets they missed and why they misscd. A great day on a CAT range is when the crews have full confidence in their equipment and the scoring system and believe they missed those targets. Whcn both of these things occur, platoons (helped by trainers) can go through the process of determining whether misses were due to individual or platoon weaknesses. They identify problems, and trainers must design 20 ARMOR -